Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NAVYA-NYĀYA THEORY OF VERBAL COGNITION

Critical Study of Gadādhara's Vyutpattivada

(With Introduction, English Translation & Explanatory Notes



V. P. Bhatta

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Vol-II

NAVYA-NYĀYA THEORY OF VERBAL COGNITION

Critical Study of Gadādhara's Vyutpattivāda

R
181.43
BHA-N
V. II

EASTERN BOOK LINKERS
EBL

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

120162

Navya-nyāya Theory of verbal Cognition, the Vyutpattivāda; is the single most important treatise of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭāchārya on Śabda, in general and on sentence meaning in particular. It is exclusively devoted to the establishment of Gadādhara's original views on how verbal cognition or sentence-meaning is produced from sentence. While the Śaktivāda deals with the theories of individual word-meanings and the role of expressive power in the understanding of word-meanings, the Vyutpattivāda deals with the sentence-meaning and the role of *samsargamaryādā* in understanding sentence-meaning. Thus, when studied with the Śaktivāda, it gives a comprehensive account of the Navya-nyāya theory of word and sentence-meaning.

The present edition of the Vyutpattivāda, which is being published in two volumes, contains an introduction, original Sanskrit text, and English translation along with exhaustive explanatory notes. As Gadādhara has used sophisticated Navya-nyāya style in the composition of the Vyutpattivāda, Dr. Bhatta's introduction and explanatory notes will prove to be of immense value to the students and the scholars of Indian Philosophy and linguistics in the understanding of the Vyutpattivāda.

ISBN : Vol.I : 81-86339-99-9

Vol.II : 81-7854-000-2

Set : 81-7854-001-0

Price : 3000.00 (2 Vols. Set)

20162

Returned on

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

R
181.43
BHA-N.2

पुस्तकालय

गुरुकुल कांगड़ी विश्वविद्यालय, हरिद्वार

वर्ग संख्या........ आगत संख्या 120162

पुस्तक-विवरण की तिथि नीचे अंकित है । इस तिथि सहित ३०वें दिन तक यह पुस्तक पुस्तकालय में वापिस आ जानी चाहिए अन्यथा ५० पैसे प्रति दिन के हिसाब से विलम्ब दण्ड लगेगा ।

Stock Verification 2024

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NAVYA-NYĀYA THEORY OF VERBAL COGNITION

CRITICAL STUDY OF GADĀDHARA'S VYUTPATTIVĀDA

(With Introduction, Sanskrit text, English Translation and Explanatory Notes)

120162

Vol II

पुस्तकालय
गुरुकुल कांगड़ी विश्वविद्यालय
R181.43, BHA-N.2
120162

V. P. Bhatta

Eastern Book Linkers

DELHI : : (INDIA)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Published by :
Eastern Book Linkers
5825, New Chandrawal, Jawahar Nagar,
DELHI-7 Phone : 3970287
E-mail : easternbook@mantraonline.com

Edition : 2001

© Author

R
181.43
B11A-N.2

Price : 3000.00 (2 Vols. Set)

ISBN : Vol.I : 81-86339-99-9
Vol.II : 81-7854-000-2
Set : 81-7854-001-0

Laser type setting:
Creative Graphics
A-40/6, Gali No. 2,
Brahmpuri, Delhi-110053
Phone : 2195643

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

PREFACE

It is a great pleasure and privilege to present the second and the final volume of Navya Nyāya Theory of Verbal cognition for the scholars and students of Indian Philosophy and linguistics. While the first volume covered the translations and explanations of the Vyutpattivāda till the end of the first part of the second *kāraka,* the second volume covers the translations and explanations of entire remaining portions of the text.

The Vyutpattivāda constitutes one of the most significant contributions of Gadādhara to the field of Indian semantics. While Gadādhara has covered epistemology and logic through his commentaries on the Tattvacintāmani such as the Tattvacintāmaṇi Vyākhyā, and the Dīdhiti prakāśa, he has covered philosophy of language, i.e. semantics by composing independent works such as the Śaktivāda and the Vyutapattivāda.

Importance of the study of the Vyutapattivāda cannot be stressed too adequately from the view point of Indian philosophy and linguistics. While Gadādhara has explained the Navya Nyāya theory of word and meaning in the Śaktivada, he has elaborated on the theory of sentence -meaning or verbal cognition (śābdabodha), which is the understanding of Syntactico-semantic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

relations between word-meanings, in his Vyutpattivāda. Gadādhara analyses systematically the meanings of various parts of speech and their semantic relations with each other to obtain the total sentence meaning or verbal congnition.[1] For instance, he analyses the meanings of various *kāraka*-and non-*kāraka* cases, the meanings of verbal roots and conjugational endings, and the meanings of the primary and secondary derivative affixes, and then explains the various syntactico semantic relations *(samsarga)* between various parts of speech. While the cognition of various word-meanings (parts of speech) through power of relations *(śakti)*. is verbal cognition in unity *(sākhaṇḍa śābdabodha)*, the cognition of syntactico-semantic relations between various parts of speech through the power of semantic relations or relational seam is verbal cognition in unity (*akhaṇḍa śābda bodha)*. Gadāhara has adopted the most scientific approach to the analysis of sentence-meaning in the Vyutapttivāda. He has taken into account various grammatical rules of Pāṇini assigning *kāraka* case affixes, conjugational affixes, and primary and secondary derivative affixes before finalizing the various parts of speech constituting the sentence meaning. Also he has expressed the view points of modern grammarians and the ritualists before establishing the Navya-nyāya theory of sentence-meaning. Thus, the work is an encyclopedia of Indian semantics.

The methodology adopted in the second volume is the same as the one adopted in the first volume. The volume II begins with an introduction discussing relevant topics such as the objecthood, the instrumentality, the indirect objecthood etc. that introduce Gadādhara's theories along with the theories of the grammarians and the ritualists wherever necessary. The translations, which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

are based on Sudarśanāchārya's edition of the Vyutpattivāda, Bombay, 1923, are arranged in numbered paragraphs and are supported by explanations. While the explanations are based, to a great extent, on the Ādarśa commentary of Sudarśanāchārya, attempt has been made to look into other commentaries such as the Gūdhārthatattvāloka and the Prakāśa wherever found necessary.

I have received many valuable suggestions and corrections from my colleagues at Sanskrit Dictionary, Deccan College, Pune, and I am extremely grateful to all of them. Also my wife Sarveshwari and son Giridhar have always encouraged me and helped me by reading the parts of Proof and I would like to express my sincere gratitude towards them.

V.P. Bhatta
Deccan
College,
Pune

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CONTENTS

Preface iii-v

Chapter I

Meaning of the accusative in desiderative 1-10

Chapter II

Denominative usages 11-20

Chapter III

Types of objects (karmavibhāgaḥ) 21-32

Chapter IV

Upapada and Karmaprava-canĪya accusatives 33-44

Chapter V

Analysis of the agency (kartṛtva) 45-55

Chapter VI

Analysis of instrumentality (karaṇatvavicāraḥ) 56-65

Chapter VII

Meaning of saha in instrumental usages. 66-77

Chapter VIII

Theory of indirect objecthood (sampradānatva) 78-88

Chapter IX

Use of namas in dative constructions 89-101

Chapter X

Analysis of Ablation (apādānatva) 102-112

Chapter XI

Meaning of ablative in 'vyāghrād bibheti' 113-117

Chapter XII

Meaning of ablative in 'kūpād andham vārayati' 118-123

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Chapter XIII

Analysis of Śeṣa 124-132

Chapter XIV

Analysis of Nirdhāraṇa in Genitive and Locative Constructions 133-142

Chapter XV

Meaning of the locative and analysis of locushood 143-155

द्वितीयाकारकद्वितीयखण्डः

अनुमित्याद्यर्थकधातुस्थलीयद्वितीयार्थः 156-256

Chapter II

English Translation with explanations 257-461
The analysis of Accusative-meaning

Chapter III

The Instrumentlal-meaning 462-590

Chapter IV

The Analysis of dative meaning 591-678

Chapter V

Analysis of Ablative Meaning 679-742

Chapter VI

Analysis of Genitive meaning 743-769

Chapter VII

Analysis of Locative Meaning 770-791

Chapter VIII

Analysis of the Vocative Meaning 792-795

Chapter IX

Analysis of the Meaning of strīpratyayas 796-803

Chapter X

Analysis of meanings of Secondary Affixes 804-830

Glossarial Index 831-847

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INTRODUCTION

TO

SECOND VOLUME

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER I

MEANING OF THE ACCUSATIVE IN DESIDERATIVE

Introduction

Sanskrit, perhaps, is the only language which has a large number of finite non-periphrastic desideratives (*sannantats*). For instance consider 'He wishes or desires to do' (cikīrṣati) and 'He wishes or desire to eat' (*bubhukṣate*). These desideratives are found to be used with the accusatives such as cooking (*pākam)* in 'He desires to do cooking', (*pākam cikīrsati)* and 'rice' (*odanam)* in 'He desires to eat rice' (*odanam bubhukṣate*). etc. When the desideratives are used, the agent (speaker) generally wishes to accomplish an object; and therefore, wishes to complish the actions as well. Consider for instance *'pākam cikīrṣati'* and *'odanam bubhukṣate'* once again. Here the person wishes to accomplish the cooking and wishes to cat the rice; and therefore, wishes to accomplish the action of doing and the action of eating respectively. Recognising this fact, Pāṇini has assigned the desiderative affix (*san*) optionally in the sense of the wishing (desiring) after a simple root expressing the (accomplishment of the) action, i.e. the object wished for, and having the same agent as the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

wisher there of (P.iii. 1.7). Thus the desiderative *cikīrsati* in *'Pākam cikīrṣati'* can denote the desire to accomplish the action of doing which has the same agent as that of the desire and functions as the object of desire.

A point to be noted here is that Sanskrit allows desiderative constructions such as *'cikīrṣati'* only optionally; and hence periphrastic phrases such as '*kartum icchati'* can be freely used to expresses the same sense of desire as the finite desiderative form. '*cikīrṣati*' in '*pākam cikīrṣati*' etc.

Also it should be noted that Sanskrit restricts the desiderative affixes to the roots which are intended to express the objects of accomplishment; for instance the decideratve affix (*san*) is used after '*gam*' in '*gantum icchati*'*jigamiṣati'* as the root '*gam*' intended to express only the action of going, the object of accomplishment; whereas the same desiderative (*san*) is not used after '*gam*' in '*gamanena icchati grāmam'* as the root '*gam*' is not intended there to express the object of accomplishment. Cit is intended to express the instrument of accomplishing the village).

By far the single most important criterion for the desiderative usage is that the subject (agent) of the verb 'to wish' should also be the subject (agent) of the verb denoting the action, i.e. the object of accomplishment (*samānakartṛka*). For instance, consider '*odanam bubhukṣate*'. Here the subject of the verb 'to wish' is also the subject of the verb 'to eat' expressing the action of eating (the rice), the object of accomplishment. Thus, the desideratives '*bubhukṣate*' etc. are not found in 'Yajnadatta wishes that Devadatta should eat' (*devadattasya bhoianam icchati yajñadttaḥ*) where the subject of the verb 'to wish' is different from the subject

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the verb 'to eat'. Also while the desideratives are found to be mostly used in the sense of desire or wish (*icchāyām*), the same desideratives are not found used in any other sense such as knowing; thus. '*kartum jānāti*' is not '*cikīrṣati*'. However, they are found to be used, as an exception, in the sense of doubt or fear of an imminent danger (*śankāyām*) Thus when one doubts or fears that the bank is in an imminent danger of breaching down, the desiderative usage '*śaṅke patiṣyati kūlam = kūlam pipatiṣati*' is found. Lastly but not leastly, desideratives are stems or bases from which primary and secondary derivatives can be formed; and thus '*nidhidhyāsitavyaḥ*' is explained.

Problem

However, epistemologists differed as to whether the accusative-meanings (such as the cooking and the rice) function as the objects of the root-meanings or that of the desire; and alto whether the root-meanings such as the action of doing etc. function as the objects of desire or not. Consequently, different epistemologists have analysed the meanings of the accusative and that of roots differently. Also they have analysed the relationships between the accusative-objects and the root-meanings and also the relationships between the root-meanings and the desire differently.

Grammarians theory

Influenced by Pāṇini (p. iii. i.7), Kātyāyana (Vār, 10, on p. iii.1.7) analyses the desideratives such as 'He desires the doing' (cikīrṣati) with an infinitive as 'He desires to do' (*kartum icchati*); and holds that the root-meaning such as the action of doing functions as the object of the desire. Also he opines that the desiderative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such as '*devadattaḥ bubhukṣate*' is to be understood as 'Devadatta desires to eat rice by himself (*devadattaḥ svataḥ boktum icchati*); and therefore, the root-meaning such as the eating has the same agent as that of the desire (the desiderative is not used when Yajñadatta desires that Devadatta should eat (*devadattasya bhojanam icchati*.) Thus Vārtikakāra proposes a direct relationship between the root-meaning such as the action, and the desire.

Now the grammarians such as Nāgeśa (Laghumañjuṣā, p. 1075) perceive that when the root-meaning such as the doing is the object (*karman*) of desire and has the same agent as that of the desire (*samānakartṛka*), the same becomes the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) with respect to the desire, the chief qualificand (*pradhāna*); and therefore, the same root-meaning, i.e. the action can be related to the desire through the relations of both the objecthood (*karmatva*) and the state of having the same agents (*samāna kartṛkatva*). Further, they perceive that when the root-meaning, i.e. the action qualifies the desire, the latter (desire) becomes the qualification of the former (action), and the relations will be both the community of locus (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) and the state of having the reference to the objectness described by the objectness of the root-meaning (*viṣayatānirūpita viṣayitva*). For instance, consider the usage 'He desires to make the pot' (*ghaṭam cikīrṣati*). Here the desiderative expresses the desire which is qualified by the root-meaning, i.e. the action of doing (making), through the community of locus and the state of having a reference to the objectness described by the objectness of the doing itself. Now in such cases, the accusative expresses the objecthood to be related to the root-meaning, i.e. the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

action, directly through describing and to the desire indirectly through the action; and also in such cases the *ākhyāta* expresses the substr-atumness; therefore the cognition produced is that one has the desire qualified by the root-meaning, i.e. the action of doing describing the objecthood resident in the pot.

Accusative-meaning too is the object of desire.

It should be observed here that while the root-meanings such as the action of doing are the objects of desire (*icchākarman*), the accusative-meanings such as the cooking too can function as the objects of desire indirectly through the actions, as they are the objects that one ultimately wishes for. Consider, for instance, *pākam cikīraṣati'* and *'grāman jigamiṣati'*. Here the cooking and the village, the accusative-meanings, which are the objects of doing and going respectively, function as the objects of desire indirectly through the actions of doing and going, as they are the objects that the agents wish for. Thus, recognizing this crucial linguistic factor, Patañjali (Mahābhāṣya on P. vii. 1.7) has suggested that while the root-meaning such as the going has one object, namely the village, the desire has two objects, namely the village and the action of going (*gamer grāmaḥ karma iṣes tūbhe karmāṇi*)

Logicans' Theory

Logicians, especially Gaṅgeśa (Tattva cintāmmaṇi, IV) etc. were greatly influenced by Patañjali's statement that accusative-meanings too can function as the objects of desire and so desire has two objects (*iṣes tūbhe karmāṇi)*; and also they were greatly influenced by the semantic fact that in producing the effects such as the cooking, the root-meanings such as the doing function as the means of accomplishment while being

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

accomplished in by themselves. Thus, they analysed the accusative desiderative usages such as 'He desires to do cooking' (*pākam* cikīrṣati) as 'He desires to accomplish the cooking by means of the doing' *(pākam kṛtyā sādhayati)*; and have held that the desideratives express the desire that has the root-meaning, i.e. the action, as the qualifier and the accusative-meaning, i.e. the cooking, as the qualificand (object). Also thus they have held that while the accusetives after '*pāka*' etc. express the objocthood of the form of qualificandness (*viśeṣyatārūpakarmatva*) relating to the desire through the describing, the instrumental expresses the instrumentality of the form of the qualifierness of the action that can be related to the desire through the relation of describing the accomplishedness of oneself (*svasādhyatvaprakāritā*). Thus one cognizes that one has the desire that has the action as the qualifier and the cooking as the qualificand from '*pākam cikīrṣati*' etc.

Saundaḍas' Theory

However, the problem with such a theory of Gaṅgeśa is that it directly contradicts the grammatical convention that the desiderative suffix is applied after the root expressing the (accomplishment of the) object wished for; and hence the root-meaning, i.e. the action functions as the object of desire. Further, it contradicts the grammatical convention that the *kāraka* - case-meanings are to be related to the root-meanings such an the actions and therefore, the objecthood expressed by the accusative '*pākam*' etc. needs to be related to the root-meaning such as the action of doing in '*pākam cikīrṣati*' etc. Also, suppose such a grammatical convention is not adhered to, then the problem would be that the incorrect accusative usages such as 'He desires to stay the home'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(gṛham tiṣṭhāsati) instead of the correct locative usage 'He desires to stay at home' (*gṛhe tiṣṭhāsati*) could be contingent. This becomes necessary on the ground that the desire to stay (as opposed to the staying) can have the home as its object; and hence the objecthood of the home expressed by the accusative (*gṛham*) can be related to the desire through describing.

Thus Saundaḍa (*Nyāyakośa*) proposes that the accusative in'*pākam cikīrṣati*' etc. must be admitted to express the objecthood of the form of the objectness of cooking (*viṣayatva*) and the same can be related to the root-meanings such as the action of doing; and thus the convention that *kāraka*-case-meanings are to be related to the root-meanings such as the action, gets adhered to. Also, he proposes that the root-meaning such as the action of doing can be held to function as the object of the form of being the object of desire and the same can be related to the desire through the objecthood and the state of having the same agent as that of the desire. Thus one cognizes in such cases that one has the desire that describes the objecthood of the action which in turn describes the objecthood of the cooking.

Now the advantage of this proposal is that the incorrect accusative '*gṛham tiṣṭhāsati*' can be avoided. Since the staying cannot be said to describe the objecthood of the home (it can only describe the locushood of the home), the same objecthood cannot be related to the staying and thus the accusative usage expressing the objecthood of the home becomes avoided.

Gadādhara's theory

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, 11 (ii. 17) was also convinced of the fact that the desiderative cannot express

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the desire having the root-meaning (such as the action) as the qualifier and the accusative-meaning as the qualificand; and therefore, the accusative-meaning such as the qualificandness of the cooking cannot be related to the desire through describing. Thus, he proposes that the desiderative must be admitted to express the desire having the root-meaning (the action) as the qualificand (*kṛtiviśeṣyakecchā*) such as 'Let there be the action accomplishing the cooking' (*pākakṛtir bhavatu*). Now since in such a theory the accusative is admitted to express only the objecthood of the cooking relating to the action (*kṛtikarmatva*) and not the objecthood of the cooking relating to the desire (*icchākarmatvam*), the incorrect accusative usage such as '*gṛham tiṣṭhāsati*', wherein the home can appear as the object of desire, is avoided.

A point to be noted here is that in the case of desideratives, the affix must be admitted to be expressing the desire as having the root-meaning as the qualificand (*dhātvarthaviśeṣyaka*), (it cannot be admitted to be expressing the desire having the root-meaning as the qualifier *dhātvartha prakāraka,*) to facilitate the usage '*odanam bubhkṣate*' wherein the eating of the rice is the qualificand. Also, it cannot be argued that in such a case as '*odanam bubhukṣate*', only a desire wherein the eating is the qualifier and the rice is the qualificand through the objectness, is understood; for, the same usage '*odanam bubhukṣate*' is made even in the case of the desire such as '*odnabhojanam bhavatu*', wherein the eating of the rice is cognised to be the qualificand. Further it should be noted that while the cognitions produced in the active usages such as '*pākam cikirṣati*, and '*odanam bubhukṣate*' etc. are that one has the desire

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

referring to the action of doing having the cooking as the object, (*pākādikarmakakṛtyādi viṣayakecchāśrayaḥ*) and that one has the desire referring to the eating having the rice as the object '(*odanakarmakabhojana viṣayake-cchaśtrayaḥ*), the cognitions produced in the passive usages such as '*pākaḥ cikirṣyate*' and '*odanam bubukṣ yate*' are that the cooking is the object of the action of doing, the object of desire" (*icchāviṣayībhūta kṛtiviṣayaḥ pākaḥ*) and that the rice is the object of eating, the object of desire' (*iccāviṣayībhūta bhakṣaṇaviṣayaḥ odanaḥ*).

Conclusion :

While desideratives are common features of all languages for expressing speaker's desire, non-periphrasitic finite desideratives are the peculiarities of only Sanskrit. Now since the primary condition for the desiderative usage is that the speaker must necessarily wish for the accomplishment of an object, the accusatives express the objects wished for in the desiderative usages as in '*pākaın cikīrṣati*' *etc.* excepting that nominative expresses recipient of disadvantage (when the *san* is used in the sense of fear) as in '*śvā mumūrṣati*' etc.

Also since the speaker wishes to accomplish an object by accomplishing an action first, the desiderative roots express the actions functioning as the objects of desire. Also since the speaker wishes to accomplish the object by accomplishing the action by himself, the action and the desire have the same person (speaker) as the agent (*samānakartṛka*).

Grammarians especially Nāgeśa etc. perceived that when the root-meaning such as the action is the object of desire and has the same agent as that of the desire, the same becomes a qualifier qualifying the desire, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

qualificand, through the objecthood (*karmatva*) and the state of having the same agent (*samānakartṛkatva*).

However, the real point of difference among the epistemologists is regarding the function and the relation of the accusative-meanings. Following the Mahābhāṣya statement and general linguistic theory, Gaṅgeśa has proposed that the accusative-meanings such as the cooking are the objects and hence the qualificands of desire; whereas the root-meanings such as the action of doing are the means and hence the qualifiers of the desire. However, since such a theory contradicts the general grammatical convention that *kāraka*-meanings are related to the actions and also since such a theory cannot avoid the incorrect accusative usages such an '*gṛham tiṣṭhāsati*', Saundaḍa and Gadādhara have proposed the theory that the accusatives must be admitted to be expressive of the objecthood relating to the root-meanings (actions) and the same root-meanings are the objects and hence the qualificands of desire. Now as regards the Mahābhāṣya statement. Patanjali does not deny that accusative - meanings are the objects of the root-meanings; rather he merely states that when the root-meanings are the objects of desire, even the accusative-meanings which are the objects of root-meanings become the objects of desire indirectly. And this view is supported by the linguistic fact that the accusatives associated with the roots such as 'jñā' and 'iṣ' referring to some objects as in *ghaṭaṃ jānāti* and '*sukham icchati*' etc., refer to the objectness (*viṣayatva*) or the chief-qualificandness (*mukhyaviśeṣyatva*); and hence the accusatives, associated with the desidaratives referring to some objects, too can refer to the objecthood, described by the root-meanings (actions), which can be considered as the chief-qualificandness described by the desire.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER II

DENOMINATIVE USAGES

Introduction

In modern languages denominatives (nouns used as verbs) are a rarity and used selectively for expressing certain actions for which no regular verbs exist. For instance consider 'John mans railway gate outside the city'. Here 'man' is a denominative (noun used as verb) for expressing the action of furnishing with man for servicing of railway gate. However, in Sanskrit denominatives (*kyajantas or kāmyajantas*) are common expressions and used quite frequently. For instance, consider '(Caitra) desires the son for oneself' '(*caitraḥ*) *putrīyati-putrakāmyati vā*)' and 'The teacher treats the boy as his son' (*māṇavakam putrīyati*). Also, these denominatives are found to be used with both the nominatives and the accusatives as they are both intransitive and transitive.

In denominative usages the speaker generally wishes to accomplish an object as connected with himself or wishes to treat the object of comparison (*upameya*) as the standard of comparison (*upamāna*). Consider for instance '*caitraḥ putrīyati* or *putrakāmyati* and *māṇavakam putrīyati*' once again. Here while the speaker such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as Caitra, in the first instances, wishes to accomplish the object, the son, the speaker such as the teacher, in the second, wishes to treat the boy, the object of comparison, as the son, the standard of comparison. Recognizing this linguistic fact, Pāṇini has assigned denominative affixes such as *kyac* and *kāmyac* in the sense of wishing after nouns ending in case affixes and expressing the objects wished for as connected with oneself (*supa kāmayaccātmanaḥ kyac*, p. iii. i. 89) and also in the sense of treatment after nouns expressing the standard of comparison (*upamānādācāre,* p.iii.1.10). It should be noted here that Sanskrit restricts the denominative affixes to only the words ending in affixes, i.e. nouns such as *'putra'* in *'putrīyati'* etc; and therefore, the same are avoided after the sentences such as '*mahāntam putram icchaṭi*'.Thus only '*mahāntam putrīyati*' and not '*mahānta-putrīyati*'.

Also It should be noted that the necessary condition for the denominative usage is that the speaker must wish to accomplish the object as connected with himself and not for some one else. Thus, when the speaker wishes that the king should have a son for himself (there is no wishing for the son for oneself), the denominative usage '*rājñaḥ putrīyati*' is avoided and only a non-periphrastic usage '*rājñaḥ putram icchati*' is allowed.

Problem

However, the basic difference between the desidaratives and the denominatives is that while the former are mostly transitive (*sakarmaka*), the latter are both intransitive and transitive; and thus, they have been classified as both intransitive and transitive. The basis for such a difference and the classification as such is that while some denominatives such as '(*caitraḥ*) *'putrīyati*' and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'*hamsati*' etc. are to be admitted as not having syntactic expectancy for any object, other denominatives such as '*māṇavakam putrīyati*' are to be admitted as having syntactic expectancy for some object. Following is a critical study of the intransitivity and the transitivity of denominatives.

Nature of denominatives : Intransitive usages

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, II (i) 30) holds as follows: That the denominatives (*nāmadhātus*) formed from the nominal and other derivative bases expressing the objects and the standard of behaviour with denominative affixes '*kyac*' and ' *kāmyac*' assigned in the sense of desire and the behaviour, are, unlike the desidaratives (*sannantas*), intransitive (*akramaka);* Whereas the same formed with '*kyac*' and '*kvip*' affixes assigned in the sense of the behaviour and the treatment can be both intransitive and transitive. That is to say that while intransitive denominatives are used in the sense of desire and the behaviour, the transitive denominatives can be used only in the sense of treatment. Thus '*citraḥ putrīyati/putrakāmyati*' and '*hamsati/hammāyate kākaḥ*' and also '*bhṛtyam putrīyatt*'. Since the denominative bases such as '*putra*' and '*hamsa*' in *putrīyati* (or *putrakāmyati)* and '*hamsati*' (or *hamsāyāte)* denote the object of desire and the standard of behaviour, there is no separate syntactic expectancy for an object. Whereas since the denominative bases such as '*putra*' in *bhṛtyam putrīyati'* denote only the standard of comparison, i.e. the standard of treatment, these can have syntactic expectancy for a separate object.

It should be noted that the denominative usages such as 'He wishes to cook' (*pākīyati*), which are formed with the denominative affixes after *kṛdanta* (action) nouns such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as '*pāka*', too must be admitted to be intransitive as they too are devoid of any syntactic expectancy for the accusative object word. Thus, the incorrect accusative usages such as '*taṇḍulam pākīyati*' are avoided despite the fact that the speaker may wish that the cooking of the rice should be accomplished for oneself; and the correct denominative usages such as 'He desires the cooking of the rice' (*taṇḍulasya pākīyati)* can be allowed: Here the accusative is contradicted by the rule '*karmaṇoḥ kṛti'* (P. ii. 3.65) which assigns only the genitive case for the object of the *kṛdanta*-base. As a matter of fact, even when the rice etc. are intended to be merely the relations (and not the objects) of the action of cooking, the genitive can be justified in the non *kāraka*-relationship.

Thus the single most important condition for the denominative usages is that the denominative bases should not have syntactic expectancy for any object and should not take any accusative object. Therefore the accusative usages such as 'He desires the Pandit as the son' (*paṇḍitam putrīyati*) and 'He desires the hero as the son' (*pravīram putrakāmyati*), wherein the Pandit and the hero are related to the object of desire, i.e. the son, are avoided.

Also the second condition for the denominative usages is that the speaker must wish the object as connected with himself (*ātmanaḥ*) and hence the usages '*putrīyati*' and '*putra kāmyati*' are not tenable when the speaker wishes that some one else (king) should have a son. Thus to avoid such usages. in the case where the speaker wishes that someone else should have a son, Gadādhara proposes that the base - meanings such as the son should be related to the denominative affix-meanings

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such as the desire, through both the object referringness-(*viṣayitva*) and the occurrence in the same agent (speaker) as the adjunct of desire (*pratiyogitayā yo viṣayaḥ tādṛśapuruṣa vṛttitva*). Since, in the case of the wishing that someone else should have a son, the base-meaning such as the son is not wished as connected with the speaker himself, the same cannot be related to the desire through the said two relations; and hence the usages '*putrīyati*' and '*putrakāmyati*' are avoided.

Intransitive usages with ācārārthaka affixes.

Now as regards the intransitive denominative usages with the affixes in the sense of behaviour (*ācārārthaka*): Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, II (ii) 37) holds that the denominatives such as 'The goose behaves like a swan' (*haṁsa ivācarai = haṁsāyate or haṁsati*), which are formed with the '*kyac*' or '*kvip*' affixes after the agent-words expressing the standard of comparison (*upamāna*), too are intransitive. Though the behaviour of the goose which is similar to the behaviour of the swan, a particular type of gait, is the meaning of the *kyac* affix, the same, only as unlimited by (i.e. devoid of) any effect, would be admitted to be the meaning of the denominative. Also though sometimes the behaviour (of the crow etc.) having the form of the operation referring to some kind of objects such as the knowledge of sounds, can be the meaning of the denominative, only the same, as delimited by the grammatical object such as the object, would be admitted as the meaning of denominative. And thus the denominatives do not have expectancy for any objects, as the operations do not produce any affect and also as they are not delimited by any object.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Also the denominatives such as 'He behaves in the hut like in the palace' (*kuṭyām prāsādayati),* which are formed with the *kyac* affixes after the words expressing the standard of comparison such as the locus (*upamāna*), are intransitive. In much cases, the denominatives express the behaviour of the poor similar to the behaviour of the rich in the palace; and since such a behaviour is only of the form of staying, the same can only be intransitive. Now since the hut is only the locus of such a behaviour, i.e. staying, only a locative is possible after the word *'kuṭī'*. The similarity between the staying in the hut and that in the palace is by producing the happiness of the same class.

Transitive usages

The denominatives formed with the '*kyac*' and other affixes after the words of standards of comparison (*upamāna*) in the sense of the treatment of the object of comparison as the standard of comparison (*ācāra*) are transitive. Gadādhara (Vyutpativāda, ii. (i) .35) holds that the *kyac* affix assigned (after the standard of comparison) in the sense of the treatment (*ācāra*) of the object of comparison as the standard of comparision (*upamāna*), may be viewed as assigned in the sense of considering the object of comparison as the standard of comparison (*tulyatayā jñāna*); and therefore the denominative accusative statement such as 'The master treats, i.e. considers the servant as his son' *(bhṛtyam putrīyati*) is justified. In such cases, the base-meanings such as the son, can be held to be relating to the similarity (of treatment); or as an alternative the base itself can be held to be referring to the one similar to the object of treatment through the relation of referring to the identity of oneself *(abhedāvagāhitva)*.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It should be noted that according to Gadādhara, the denominative base such as '*putra*' in '*bhṛtyaṃ putrīyati*' etc. cannot be admitted to denote the object of comparison (*upameya*); rather, it should be admitted to be denoting the standard of comparison (*upamātna*), as the base is held to be denoting the one similar to the standard of comparison (*putrāditulya*), The base, however, by being intended to refer to the adjunct of comparison (*tulyatvapratiyogi*), can be held to be referring to the object of comparison (*ācārakarman*), as the one similar to the son (*purtādi tulya*) is the object of treatment.

Gadādhara's own theory

According to Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, II (ii) 36), the phrase '*putramiva ācarati*' means the master treats, i.e. considers the servant as his own son (*putraṃ yathā vyavaharati tathā vyavaharati*) and the treatment (consideration) is either the knowledge that the object of treatment needs to be protected as the son (*pratipālyatvādinā jñānam*) or the activity leading to the protection (*pratipālana vyāpāra). Thus 'putrīyati*' means the master is the agent of the treatment similar to the treatment given to the son (*putrakarmaka vyavahāra tulyavyavahārakartā)*.

Just as the moon and the face have the state of being the standard of comarison and that of the object of comparison (*upamānopameyabhāva*) by having similarity in delightfulness, just so the son and the servant have the state of being the standard of comparison and that of the object of comparison by having the similarity in the treatment received. Thus the denominative base such as '*putra'* in '*putrīyati*' has both the state of expressing the standard of comparison

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(treatment) (*upāmānavācitā*) and the state of expressing the object of comparison (treatment) (*ācārakarmavācitā*), the adjunct of comparison resident in the treatment (*ācāra niṣṭhasādṛśyapratiyogi*).

Cognitions in Intransitive and Transitive usagess

Jagadīśa (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, verse 107) too holds that denominattves, formed with '*kyac*', '*kamyac*' and other affixes, can be both intransitive and transitive; and while intransitives are nominative constructions such as '*caitraḥ putrīyati*' or '*śyenāyate kākaḥ*', the transitives are accusative constructions such an '*māṇavakam putrīyati*'.

According to him, in the intransitive denominative usages such as '*caitraḥ putrīyati*', where the denominative affix (*kyac*) is used in the sense of desire, the denominative bass-meaning such as the son is related to the desire (denominative affix-meaning), as the referent or as the content (*viṣayatayā*) (here the desire is regarding the son). And the desire is related to the substratumness, the *ākhyāta*-meaning (through describing), which in turn is related to the nominative-meaning such as Caitra. And thus the cognition produced is that Caitra has the substratumness described by the desire regarding the son. Also in the intransitive denominative usages such as '*kākaḥ śyenāyate*', where the denominative affix '*kyac*' is used in the sense of behaviour similar to the behaviour of the standard of comparison, the denominative base-meaning such as the Śyena-bird is related to such a behaviour, the affix meaning, as being the agent; and the same is related to the substratumness. Thus the cognition produced is that the crow has the substratumness described by the behaviour similar to the behaviour of the Śyena-bird.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, in the transitive usages such '*māṇavakam putrīyati'*, where the '*kyac'* affix is used in the sense off the treatment similar to the treatment of the standard of comparison (*ācārasadṛśācāra*), the denominative base-meaning such as the son is related to the second treatment functioning as the qualifier through the objecthood; whereas the accusative-meaning such as the boy is related to the first treatment functioning as the qualifier through the objecthood. Thus the cognition produced is that the teacher has the effort conducive to the treatment describing the objecthood of the boy which is similar to the treatment describing the objecthood of the son.

Resume:

Denominatives (*nāmadhātus*), which are the peculiarities of Sanskrit, are used when the speaker wishes to accomplish an object as connected with himself and also wishes to treat the object of comparison as the standard of comparison or the abject of comparison is meant to behave as the standard of comparison. Thus '*caitraḥ putrīyati'* and '*māṇavakam putrīyati'* or '*kakaḥ haṃsati'*. And Pāṇini recognizing this fact has ruled *supaḥ-ātmanaḥ kyac*, *kāmyacca'*. p. iii. i. 8-9) and '*upamānād ācāre,'* (p. iii. 1. 10).

However the denominatives, unlike the desideratives (*sannantas*), can be both intransitive and transitive. Since the denominative bases in '*caitraḥ putrīyati*' and '*kākaḥ haṃsati'* etc. denote the object of desire and the standard of comparison (behaviour), there is no syntactic expectancy for any other object; and thus the accusative usages such as '*caitraḥ paṇḍitam putrīyati'* and '*kakāḥ svam haṃsati'* are avoided. Also Gadādhara has pointed

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

out that denominatives with *kṛdanta*-bases such as '*pākīyati*' too are intransitive as they lack of any objects; and thus accusative usages are avoided. Also even when the rice etc. are expected to be the objects, only genitive usages such as '*taṇḍulasya pākīyati*' are possible as the rule *kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti* (P. ii. 3.65) assigns the genitive for the objects. Further, Gadādhara has stated that when the speaker wishes that some one else should have a son, the denominative *putrīyati* is not made (rather only '*rājñaḥ putraṃ icchati*' is made); and therefore, 'the object as connected with oneself' is a condition for the denominative usages.

Whereas the denominatives, formed from the words expressing the standard of comparison ending with '*kyac*' affixes in the sense of the treatment, are transitive; and since the treatment, i.e. consideration, requires an object to be treated, the accusative statements such as '*bhṛtyam* or *māṇavakam putrīyati*', wherein the objects are specified in the accusetives, are possible.

Finally as regards the cognitions produced from the intransitive and transitive usages: While the cognition produced from the intransitive is that Caitra has the substratumness described by the desire regarding the son, the cognition produced from the transitive usage is that the teacher has the effort conducive to the treatment describing the objecthood of the boy which is similar to the treatment describing the objecthood of the son. These cognitions confirm to the intransitivity and the transitivity of the denominative usages; and thus justify the classification of the denominative usages as intransitive and transitive by the Indian epistemologists.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

R
181.43
BHA-N.2
120162
गुरुकुल कांगड़ी विश्वविद्यालय
पुस्तकालय

CHAPTER III

TYPES OF OBJECTS (KARMAVIBHĀGAḤ)

Introduction

Sanskrit being a natural language has a large number of transitive constructions. While all the objects involved in the transitive constructions have some common features such as the accusative endings, and effects, they vary in their real nature of being primarily desired. For instance, consider the village in 'He goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*), the grass in 'He touches the grass while going to the village' (*grāmam gacchan stṛṇam spṛśati*), the cow in 'He milks the cow for the milk' (*gām dogdhi payaḥ*), and the cruel in 'He is angry at the cruel' (*krūram abhikrudhyati*). Here, the village is the sought most, the grass is the not sought most, the cow is not covered, and the cruel is special one. Thus, Pāṇini has composed four different rules dividing the objects. The rules are: i) Those that are positively desired to be obtained by the agent are objects' (*karturīpsitatamam karma*, p. i. 4.49), ii) 'Those that are likewise connected but not positively desired are objects' (*tathāyuktam cānīpasitam*, p. i. 4. 50), iii) 'Those that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

are not intended to be covered by any other designations are objects' (*akathitam ca*, P. i. 4.51) and iv) 'Those that got the designation of object under special circumstances are objects' (*krudhadruhor upasṛṣṭayoḥ karma*, p. i. iv. 38).

Problem

However, Patañjali and following him, Bhartṛhari devide the objects mainly into two types: Those that are sought most and hence primary and those that are not sought most and hence secondary, Also, epistemologists have differed as to what constitute the primary and secondary objects and also as to what are the essential characteristics of primary and secondary objects. The present article is an attempt to illustrate the types of primary and secondary objects and also their characteristics.

Classification of primary objects

Patañjali and Kaiyaṭa, while commenting upon the superlative affix '*tamap*' in the rule (p. i.4.49), have provided the basic classification of the primary objects (*mukhyakarman*) as i) 'Those that are reached' (*prāpya*), ii) 'Those that are manifested or brought about' (*nirvartya*) and as iii) 'Those that are transformed or produced' (*vikārya*).

Discription of Prāpyakarman

Now the village (*grāma*) in '*grāmam gacchati*' is the reached (*prāpya*) type of primary object, because the same is what is sought most to be reached by the agent through his action. However, Kaiyaṭa points out that the village can be the object to be reached even if the same is not sought most but is merely sought (*īpsita*).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Bhratṛhari (*Vākyapadīya,* vii. 179) states that the object to be reached (*prāpyakarman*) is that wherein no tangible distinction, i.e. effect, is produced from the action undertaken. For instance, the sun and the city in 'He sees the sun' (*ādityam paśyati*) and 'He reaches the city' (*nagaram upasarpati*) are the objects to be reached as no tangible effect is produced in them due to the undertaking of the action of seeing and reaching. However, it should be noted that this view of Bhartṛhari regarding the objects to be reached is a very significant one as it distingusishes the same from the remaining primary objects and thus conforms to the modern linguistic theories that actions such as seeing and reaching (i.e. going) are not really transitive as such. Thus its contradiction to the established semantic theory of the Navyas does not amount to dilution of the *prāpyakarman*.

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, 11 (i).317) too accepts object to be reached (*prāpyakarman*) as a separate category of primary object. However, according to him, it is the abode of the effect produced from the action (*kriyājanya phalāśraya*) or the content of the action such as knowing *(kriyāviṣaya)*. For instance, the village in '*grāmam-gacchati'* is the *prāpyakarman* since it is the abode of tile contact (effect) produced from going, and the pot in '*ghaṭam jānāti*' is the *prāpyakarman* since it is the content of knowing. Thus, dispite admitting *prāpyakarman* as a distinct category, the logicians maintain that the same has the essential characteristic of the primary object, i.e. the possession of the effect. Some Navya grammarians (*Darpaṇa*, p. 372 on 24) too were influenced by the logicians and have maintained that *prāpyakarman* is the abode of the effect. However,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

they have qualified the same as not being the abode of the unique property of being the content of the knowledge. (*pratīti viṣayānāśraya*) to avoid the designation of *prāpyakarman* for the object to be manifested (*nirvartyakarman*). Now since the rice and the mat in '*odanam pacati*' and '*kaṭam karoti*' are the abode of the unique property of being the content of the knowledge of being manifested, the same need not become *prāpyakarmanṣ* dispite possessing the effects such as becoming soft and being made (i.e. origination).

Descripticin of nirvartyakarman

There is a great controversy as to what exactly is the object to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartya karman*) and whether it is identical with the object to be produced or transformed (*vikāryakarman*). Patañjali, while justifying the twofold usage such as '*taṇḍulam pacati*' and '*taṇḍulān odanam pacati*'. has stated that while the first usage is made to convey the idea that one brings about the rice through the cooking (*taṇḍulam pacan odanam nirvartayati*), the second usage is made to convey the idea that one produces the rice which is a product of rice grains (*taṇḍulavikāram odanam nirvartayati*). From this it becomes clear that according to Patañjali, both object to be manifested (brought out) and object to be produced are one and the same, but get the different names on the basis of their status as being manifested or produced. Bhartṛhari (*Vākyapadīya*, vii. 149) states that object to be manifested or brought about is either what is manifested or brought about either from what is existing before or not existing before. Thus, according to him, the pot and the ashes in '*ghaṭam karoti*' and '*bhasma karoti*' are the objects to be manifested or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

brought about as the same are brought about from what are existing before and not existing before (in the first instance the pot is brought about from the mud that is existing before, whereas in the second instance the ash is brought about from the one not existing before, such as wood).

It should be noted here that the object to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartyakarman*) is held to be manifested or brought about from the existing primary matter (*prakṛti*) in view of the Sāṅkhya theory of *satkāryavāda*; whereas the same is held to be manifested or brought about from the matter not existing before in view of the Vaiśeṣika theory of *asatkāryavāda*. *Thus*, according to Bhartṛhari, one and the same object can be regarded as either *nirvartyakarman* or *vikāryakarman* depending upon whether the primary matter (*prakṛti*) is intended to be the cause from which the object is to be manifested without destruction, or weather the object is to be newly produced from the destruction of the primary matter.

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, II (ii) 39-41). too admits the object to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartyakarman*) as a separate category of primary object. However, according to him, the *nirvartyakarman* is strictly a conventional designation applied to the object to be transformed or produced (*vikāryakarman*) such as the rice or garland in '(*taṇḍulān*) *odanam pacati*' and '(*kusumāni*) *srajam karoti*' where the words expressing the primary material causes are not used. In this theory, Gadādhara is greatly influenced by Patañjali who holds that both the object to be manifested and the object to be produced are one and the same and the different names are due to their status of being

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

manifested or being produced. Some modern grammarians (Darpaṇa, P. 372) too admit that the object to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartyakarman*) is a conventional name applied to the object to be transformed or produced (*vikāryakarman*). However, unlike Gadādhara, they hold that the object to be manifested or bought about (*nirvartyakarman*) is a conventional name applied to the object to be transformed or produced (*vikāryakarman*) when the material cause is not considered to be transforming into the object to be produced (*prakṛtiḥ pariṇāminī yasya nāśrīyate tannirvartyam, Vākyapadīya, vii, 145*).

Description of vikāryakarman

Object to be transformed or produced (*vikāryakarman*) is same as the object to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartyakarman*). However, when the material cause is intended to be transformed into the object to be produced, the same is known as the object to be transformed or produced. For instance, consider '*taṇḍulān odanam pacati*' and '*kāśān kaṭam karoti*'. Here the rice and the mat are the objects to be transformed, because the material causes, namely the rice grains and the Kāśa grasses, are intended to be transformed into the rice and the mat. Thus, Bhartṛhari (*Vākyapadīya,* vii. i. 150) states that when the material cause is intended to be transforming into the object to be produced, the same is considered to be the object to be transformed or produced (*prakṛtestu vivakṣāyām vikāryam kaiścid anyathā*).

However, Bhartṛhari divides the *vikāryakarman* further into two types as: i) those that are produced from the destruction of their material causes such as the ashes in '*kāṣṭham bhasma karoti*' and ii) those that are

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

produced without the destruction of their material causes but originating a peculiar quality such as the *kuṇḍala* in *'suvarṇam kuṇḍalam karoti'*

Gadāḍhara (Vyutpattivāda, II (ii) 39) holds that both material cause (*prakṛti*) such as the woods and the gold and also the object to be produced (*vikṛti*) such as the ash and the kuṇḍala must be covered by the term *vikāryakarman*. According to him, even the words expressing the material cause such as '*kāṣṭha*' and '*suvarṇa*' have the accusative cases; and therefore they must be considered as the objects along with their products; however, since there is no third category of objects that can be said to include these objects, the same *vikāryakarman* must be held to cover them as well.

It should be noted that Gadādhara does not differ essentially from Bhartṛhari in his analysis of *vikāryakarman;* however, he saw the necessity of including *prakṛti* under *vikāryakarman* as it cannot be included anywhere except under the category of *vikāryakarman*. Thus for Gadādhara, both *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* are the *vikāryakarmans*.

Later grammarians (Darpaṇa P. 372) too, like Gadādhara, hold that the *vikāryakarman* includes both the *prakṛti* and the *vikṛti*. However, they define the *vikāryakarman* as that which has either the effect qualified by non existence (*viśiṣṭāsattva*) or the effect qualified by the origination (*utpatti*). Now while the gold etc. are the objects to be produced by having the qualified non-existence, the Kuṇḍala etc. are the objects to be produced by having the origination. Thus both *prakṛti* and the *vikṛti* are the *vikāryakarmans*.

Classifiication of Secondary objects

While those that are positively desired (*īpsita*) are

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the primary objects (*mukhyakarman*), those that are not positively desired (*anīpsita*) are the secondary objects (*amukhya* or *gauṇakarman*). Pāṇini has enumerated the secondary objects as: (i) those that are not mentioned or not covered by other *kāraka*-designations (*akathitam ca*, P. i. 4. 51); and (ii) those that have had other designations before (*krudhadruhor upasṛṣṭayoḥ* P. i.4. 38).

Division of Anīpsita

Patañjatli, while commenting on p. 1.4. 50, states that the term 'not desired' (*anīpsita*) covers both indifferent object (*udāsīna*) and disliked object (*dveṣya*) by exclusion (*paryudāsa*). According to him, the roots of the tree (*vṛkṣamūla*) and the poison (*viṣa*) are the stock examples of indifferent and disliked or hated objects, as the same are obtained indifferently and with hatred in '*grā-mam gacchan vṛbkṣamūlany upasarpati*' and '*viṣam bhakṣayati*'.

Description of udāsīnakarman

Bhartṛthari (Vākyapadīya. vii. 146.) too states that *anipsita* covers both that which is reached indifferently (*audāsīnyena yat prāptam*) and that which is disliked or hated to be obtained (*karturanīpsitam*). According to him, the grass is what is reached indifferently in '*grāmam gacchan stṛṇam spṛsati*' as it is reached by chance indifferently while going to the village.

It should be noted here that though Bhartṛhari etc. cover both that which is to be reached indifferently and that which is disliked by interpreting the term '*anīpsita*' as an exclusion (*paryudāsa*), the indifferently reached (*udāsīna*) is a type of *anīpsita*-object wherein the agent is not at all interested in reaching it but by chance

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

reaches it and hence differs from the disliked object. Prabhā (commentary on Bhūṣaṇa) gives probably the most accurate definition of the *udāsīnakarman*. According to it, *udāsīnakarman* is what is the abode of the effect by chance but not intended to be the abode of the effect produced from the action. For instance, the roots of a tree in '*vṛkṣamūlāny upasarpati*' is the *udāsīnakar-man*, because it is the abode of the contact but is not intended to be the abode of the contact produced from going. Thus while Bhartṛhari simply outlined the general characteristics of the *udāsīnakarman* by stating that *udāsīna* is what is reached indifferently, Prābhā specifies the specific characteristics of the *udāsīnakarman*.

Description of dveṣyakarman

Disliked or hated object (*dveṣyakarman*) is the second type of *anīpsita karman*. According to Bhartṛhari (*Vākyapadīya* vii. 1. 151) *dveṣyakarman* is that which is not sought or liked tobe obtained by the agent through his action (*yacca karturanīpsitam*). For instance, poison in '*viṣaṃ bhakṣayati*' is the disliked or hated object as it is not sought or liked to be obtained by the agent through the action of eating although it is in reality obtained. Thus it must be bserved now that both *udāsīnakarman* and *dveṣyakarman*, by being *anīpsitakarmans*, are indeed the abode of the effects. However, while the former is the abode of the effect by chance but not intended to be the abode of the effect produced from the action, the latter is the abode of the effect produced from the action deliberately undertaken by the agent although disliked. Thus *anīpsitakarman* assumes the *udāsīna* or *dveṣya* objecthood due to the difference in the intentions of the agent.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Description of akathita or anākhyāta karman

Following the rule of Pāṇini that those that are not covered by other *kāraka*-designations are also objects (*akathitam ca*. 1.4.51), *Bhartṛthari* (Vākyapadīya, vii. 14.6.) states that not covered *anākhyāta* is the second type of secondary object. According to him, the *kārakas* that are not intended to be other *kārakas* and hence not covered by other designations are *anākhyāta*--objects. For instance, the cow in '*gām dogdhi payaḥ*', which is not intended to be any other *kāraka* such as the *apādāna* etc., and hence is not covered by any other-designation, is the *anākhyāta* object.

It should be noted that the not covered object (*anākhyāta*) is the objects which is always not intended to be covered by the speaker by any other designation. For instance, the cow in '*gām dogdhi payaḥ'* becomes the *anākhyāta*-object only when not intended to be covered by the designation of ablation (it can be covered by the designation of ablation, as it is the fixed point from which the milk flows).

Gadādhara (*Vyutpattivāda* II (ii) 39) holds, however, that *akathita* or *anākhyāta* object is a secondary object, since the same is the abode of a secondary indirect effect. For instance, the cow is the secondary object because it is the abode of the indirect secondary effect such as the separation of the milk produced from the operation conducive to the flowing (*kṣ araṇānukūlavyāpāra*). However later grammarians (Śabdaratna, p. 845) oppose this interpretation of Gadādhara on the ground that the same is against the grammatical convention and cannot cover the cow when the root 'milk' (*duh)* is intended to convey the primary sense of milking. According to them, the cow needs to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be covered by the designation of *akathita*-object even when the root 'milk' *(duh)* is intended to convey the primary sense of milking; and since the cow cannot be covered by the designation of *akathitakarman*, the interpretation of Gadādhara is untenable.

Description of anyapūrvaka karman

The last category of secondary object is the object with the other designations before or *anyapūrvaka*. Following the rule of Pāṇini that the person against whom the feelings of anger etc. are directed is called object in connection with verbal base '*krudh*' and '*druḥ*' preceded by the propositions (*krudhadruhor upasṛṣṭayoḥ karma*, P.i. u 38), and also that the *kāraka* which functions as the most efficient means with respect to the root '*dīv*' is also the object (*divaḥ karma ca,* P. i. 4.43), Bhartṛhari states that the *anyapūrvaka* is a kind of secondary object which gets the name object by overruling the other designations such as 'indirect object' (*sampradāna*) and *'instrument' (karaṇa)* under special circumstances. For instance, the cruel and the dice in '*krūram abhikrudhyati*' and '*akṣān dīvyati*' are the *anyapūrvaka* objects by overruling the designations of indirect object and the instrument under the special circumstances that the roots '*krudh*' and '*druh*' are preceded by '*abhi*' and the root '*div*' is intended to denote the action of being angry and playing the dice for the sake of playing the dice.

It should be noted here that the *anyapūrvaka* object is a large category of secondary objects which covers not only the indirect object and the instrument but also the locus etc. when the original *kāraka* status is either already expressed by other grammatical elements or is not intended to be expressed.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Resume

Pāṇini recognized the difference between the various types of objects and hence composed four sets of rules to cover different objects. However, Patañjali and following him Bhartṛhari classified objects into the categories of primary (*mukkya*) and secondary (*gauṇa*) objects on the basis of the presence of desire and lack of desire of the agent which play crucial role in obtaining them.

Now the primary objects, which are further divided into reached (*prāpya*), manifested (*nirvartya*) and produced (*vikārya*), are real objects and hence are affected by the action undertaken. While the *prāpyakarmans* such as the village etc. in '*grāmam gacchati*' etc. possess the effects of actions, the objects such as the pots etc. in '*ghaṭam jānāti*' etc. become the contents of actions. The *nirvartyakarman*, despite the great disagreement among the epistemologists, is, as Gadādhara testifies, a conventional designation that applies to both manifested and produced objects under different circumstance; whereas the *vikāryakarman* covers, besides the object to be produced, even the material causes such as *kāśa*-grass in '*kāśān kaṭam karoti*' etc.

Now as regards the secondary objects which are further devided into i) *udāsīna,* ii) *dveṣya*, iii) *akathita* and iv) *anyapūrvaka*. While the *udāsīna* and *dveṣya* are *anīpsita* objects by having the effects by chance and deliberately, the *akathita* or *anākhyāta* is a secondary object because the same covers the unintended objects and *anyapūrvaka* is a large category of secondary objects which covers all the objects which get their names by overruling the other designations.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER IV

UPAPADA AND KARMAPRAVA-CANĪYA ACCUSATIVES

Introduction:

Sanskrit has two types of accusative constructions: i) One wherein a *kāraka* item or relation is perceived to be qualifying the action concerned and ii) two wherein (no *kāraka* item or relation but) a non-*kāraka* item or a noun is perceived to be qualifying another noun. Consider for instance 'Caitra cooks rice grain(s)' (*caitraḥ taṇḍulam pacati*) and 'Gopas are on both sides of kṛṣṇa (*ubhayataḥ kṛṣṇam gopāḥ*). Here in the first instance, the relation of the rice grain(s), the object - *kāraka* expressed by the accusative, is perceived to be qualifying the action of cooking; whereas in the second instance (Kṛṣṇa is not an object-*kāraka* and therefore), the relation of non-*kāraka,* Kṛṣṇa expressed by the accusative, is perceived to be qualifying both side, another noun. Thus, the accusative cases can be classified as the *kāraka*-accusatives that express the relations of *kārakas* - with the actions and the non-*kāraka*-accusatives that express the non-*kāraka* relations of nouns with other nouns.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian grammarians further, recognized the difference that non-*kāraka*-accusatives can be either caused by certain nouns or by certain indecinables expressing actions. Thus, they have further classified non-*kāraka*-accusatives as *upapada*-accusatives or as those that are caused or added on account of other nouns and *karmapravacanīya* - accusatives or those that are affected by certain indeclinables expressing actions. Consider for instance 'Hari is above and above the world' (*uparyupari lokam hariḥ*) and 'It rained following the recitation of the Samhitās of Śākalya' *(śākalyasya samhitām anu prāvarṣat)*. While in the first case, the accusative afterloka is an *upapada*-accusative as it is caused or added on account of the noun '*uparyupari*', in the second 'instance, the accusative after '*samhitā*' is a *karmapravacanīya*-accusative as it is effected due to the indeclinable '*anu*' expressing the action of reciting causing the objecthood of the Samhitā.

Problem

However, while Patañjali enumerates a list of *upapadas,* Gadādhara adds some more *upapadas* to the list. Also. scholars differ as what the *upapada* accusatives express. While Nāgeśa and Gadādhara etc. hold that *upapada*-accusatives express the non-*kā*raka relations of space etc., Khaṇḍadeva etc. hold that *upapada*-accusatives too refer to some peculiar *kāraka*-relationships. Also scholars differ as to what the term *karma pravacanīya* means and what the *karmapravacanīya* - accusatives express. Thus, the present article is an attempt to illustrate all those points first and then to arrive at a possible conclusion later.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Meanings of *upapada*-accusatives in '*ubhayatas* kṛṣṇam gopāḥ' etc.

Grammarians do not define the term '*upapada*' as such. However, etymologically the term *upapada* means a word or a noun nearby and thus signifies the nouns which cause the accusative case endings expressing non-*kāraka*-relations. Patañjali under the rule P.ii 3.2 quotes Ślokavārtika which lists the *upapadas* as '*ubhayatas*', '*sarvatas*, '*dhik*' and '*uparyupari*.' Thus the accusatives in 'The Gopas are on both sides or on all sides of Kṛṣ ṇa'(*ubhayataḥ/sarvataḥ kṛṣṇam gopāḥ*), 'Fie upon the nondevotee of Kṛṣṇa' (*dhik kṛṣṇābhaktam*), and 'Hari is far too above the world' (*uparyupari lokam hariḥ*) are *upapada* accusatives. Nāgeśa (*Laghumañjūṣā* p. 466) holds that the *upapada*-accusative in '*ubhayatas*/sarvatas *kṛṣṇam*' refers to the spatial relations, and thus one cognizes that Gopas are present on both sides or on all sides. However, Khaṇḍadeva (Bhāṭṭarahasya, p. i,67) holds that the accusatives in such cases refer to the *kāraka*-relations or relational adjunctness (*pratiyogitva*) relating to the activity; and therefore, one congizes that the activity leading to the staying of the Gopas conditions the adjunctness of Kṛṣṇa. The grammarians (*Laghumañjūṣ ā*, p. 1232) hold further that the *upapada*-accusatives found in '*dhik kṛṣṇābhaktam*' refer to the non *kāraka*-relation of ownership. Thus one cognizes in such cases that the censure is regarding the non-devotee of Kṛṣṇa. However, Jagadīśa (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, p. 357) holds that the accusative in such cases refers to the objectness (*viṣayatva*); and therefore one cognizes that the censure has non-devotee of Kṛṣṇa as its object. Whereas the ritualist, Khaṇḍadeva opines that the accusative in such cases refers to the *kāraka*-relation of locushood. Thus one

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cognizes that the activity leading to the censure occurs in the (locus of the) non-devotee of Kṛṣṇa.

Now as regards *āmreḍitas. The grammarians* such as Nāgeśa (Laghumañūṣā p.1232) hold that the *āmreditas* such as *uparyupari* refer to the occurrence not far above or upperside; and the accusative associated with such *āmreḍitas* refers to the non-*kāraka*-relation of nearness (*sāmīpya)*. Thus, one cognizes in '*uparyupari lokam hariḥ'* that 'Hari is the agent of occurrence in the region not far above the world'

Whereas Giridhara (Vibhaktyartha nirṇaya, p. 176) holds that the *āmreḍitas* such as *uparyupari* refer to the region which is the locus of the nearness conditioned by the farness (of heaven etc.); and the accusative refers to the inherence relating to the farness (of heaven). Thus one cognizes in such cases that 'Hari is situated in the region, the locus of the nearness conditioned by the farness inherent in the world.'

However, the ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva propose quite a distinct theory that accusative in such cases too refer to the *kāraka*-relation of locushood (of the world) which is related to the activity. Thus one cognizes in such cases that 'Hari has the activity leading to the presence in the world quite far away.'

Meanings of *upapada*-accusatives in 'abhitah grāmam' etc.

Since the *upapada*-accusatives are found even in connection with certain other-*upapadas* such as '*abhitaḥ*', '*paritaḥ*', etc., Patañjali (on p. ii. 3.2) quotes another Vārtika which assigns the accusative in connection with the *upapadas such as 'abhitaḥ*', '*paritaḥ*'. '*samayā'*, '*nikaṣā*', '*hā*' and '*prati*'. Thus, the accusatives in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'abhitaḥ/paritaḥ grāmam', 'samayā' 'nikaṣā vā grāmam,' 'hā kṛṣṇābhakatam', 'bubhukṣsitam na prati bhāti kiñcit' are the *upapada* -accusatives.

'Abhitaḥ' and *'paritaḥ'* denote the sense of the spatial relation and *'hā'* refers to the censure; and therefore, the accusatives in connection with such *upapadas* are to be explained as in the case of *'ubhayataḥ'*, *'sarvataḥ'* and *'dhik'* respectively.

'Samayā' and *'nikaṣā'* denote the nearness and the accusative in association with them refers to the spatial limits. Thus one cognizes in *'samayā nikaṣā vā grāmam'* that the nearness is conditioned by the spatial limits of the village. However, the ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva propose the distinct theory that the accusative in connection with *'samayā'* and *'nikaṣā'* refers to the *kāraka* -relation of conditioning relating to the activity. Thus one cognizes in such cases that the activity conducive to the staying is conditioned by the nearness of the village.

Now as regards the *upapada* - accusatives with *'prati.'* Giridhara holds that since *'prati'* refers to the inherence, the same along with *'bhāti'* refers to the contentness of inherence. Thus one cognizes in 'Nothing appears to the hungry' (*bubhukṣitam na pratibhāti kiñcit*) that nothing is the content of the knowledge inherent in the hungry:

However, the ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva analyse *'bubhukṣitam na prati bhāti kiñcit'* either as *'yat kiñcit pratibhāti tanna bubhukṣitam'* (whatever appears is not what is desired to be eaten) (which is a *prasajyapratiṣedha* connecting the negative with the activity) or as *'yat bubhukṣitam pratibhāti tanna kiñcit'* (what appears to the hungry is nothing) (which is a *paryudāsa* connecting the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

negative with the noun). However, since in both cases, the accusative is held to be denoting the *kāraka*-relation of superstratumness, the same is a *kāraka* case for the ritualists.

Meaning of upapada-accusatives in 'nadīm yāvat..'

Logicians such as Jagadīśa (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 3. 58) have recognized the fact that the *upapada*-accusatives are found with certain other words as '*yāvat*', '*ṛte*' etc. as well; and thus have taken '*tato*' *nyatrāpi dṛśyate'*, (*Vār* on p. ii. 3.8) as assigning the accusatives in connection with '*yāvat'* etc. According to Jagadīśa, '*yāvat*' refers to the boundary (pervasion) and the accusative refers to the conditioning. Thus, one cognizes in 'My city is upto the river' (*nadīm yāvatmama puram*) that 'My city has the boundary conditioned by, i.e. extending upto the river'.

Gadādhara (Vyutapattivāda, II (ii). 73) too recognizes the fact that the accusative are used with '*yāvat'* etc. and the *upapada* in connection with them refers to the limit- (pervasion). However, according to him, the limit can be either spatial *(deśika)* or temporal *(kālika)* and therefore, '*yāvat*' refers to the spatial limit in '*kāśītaḥ kauśikīm yāvat yāti*' and the accusative refers to the counterpositiveness. Thus one cognizes in such cases that one has the act of going which pervades the antecedent absence conditioning the counterpositiveness of *Kauśikī*, and that one has the act of worshipping which pervades the antecedent absence conditioning the counterpositiveness of the tenth day.

The karmapravacanīya-accusatives

Now as regards the *karmapravacanīya* accusatives. Pāṇini has recognized that Sanskrit has the accusative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

usages such as 'It rained following the recitation of Samhitās by Śākalya' (*śākalyasya smhitām anu prāvarṣat*), where the indeclinable '*anu*' facilitates the cognition of the action of recitation of Samhitās for which there is no word in the sentence and thereby facilitates the accusative case and the grammatical objecthood for the Samhitā. Thus, he has ruled (p.i., 4.83) that '*anu*' etc. are *karmapravacanīyas* that express the action for which there is no word in the sentence and hence facilitates the objecthood for Samhitā etc. Patañjali too has recognized this fact; and therefore, holds that *karmapravacanīya* does not mean 'that which expresses the object' but rather means that which expresses the action of the sentence.

The *karmapravacanīyas* are eleven in number and '*anu*', '*upa*', '*apa*', '*pari*', '*āṅ*', *prati*, '*abhi*', '*adhi*', '*su*', '*ati*' and '*api*', are listed under *karmapravacanīyas*. Pāṇini under the governing section *karmapravacanīyas* (p.4. 84), rules '*anu*' in the sense of sign (p. 1.4.84); '*apa*' and '*pari*' in the sense of exclusion (p. i.4. 88); '*āṅ*' in the sense of limit (p. i.4.89); '*prati*', '*pari*' and '*anu*' in the sense of sign, statement of circumstance, share and pervasion (p . i.4. 90); '*abhi*' in the sense of sign etc. excepting share (p. i. 4.91); '*prati*' in the sense of representation and exchange (p. i. 4.92); '*adhi*' and '*pari*' as meaningless (p. i. 93); '*su*' in the sense of respect (p. i.4.94); '*ati*' in the sense of super abundance (p.i. 4.95); and '*api*' in the sense of word understood (p. i.4.96).

There is a great controversy regarding the meaningfulness of the *karmapravacanīyas* and that of the accusatives associated with them. Nāgeśa (Śekhara, p.470) holds that since the *karmapravacanīyas* are expressive of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

actions, the particular *karmapravacanīyas* such as '*anu*' etc., which are assigned in the sense of sign and the signed etc., are merely suggestive of the *kāraka*relations; and the accusatives actually express them. Thus, according to him, in '*śākalyasya samhitām anu prāvarṣat*', the *karmapravacanīya*, '*anu*', which is expressive of the action of reciting, merely suggests the *kāraka*-relation of sign and signed (or cause and effect,); whereas the accusative after *samhitā*' actually expresses such a relation. Thus, the cognition produced in such a case is that the raining is the object of the knowledge caused by the recitation of the Samhitās, the cause.

Further, Nāgeśa holds that *karmapravacanīyas* such as '*prati*', '*pari*' and '*anu*', which are assigned in the sense of pervasion etc., too are only suggestive of the *kāraka*-relationships, and the accusatives associated with them actually express the *kāraka*-relationships. Thus, in 'vṛkṣam *prati pari aṅu vā vidyotate vidyut'*, the *karmapravacanīyas* such as '*anu*' etc. merely suggest the relation of pervasion etc., and the accusatives after '*vṛkṣ am*' etc. actually express the same relations. Thus the cognition in such a case is that the shining of the lightening pervades upto the tree.

However, the logicians such as Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, II (ii) 75) disagree with Nāgeśa. They hold that since *karmapravacanīyas* such as '*anu*' etc. are assigned in the sense of the sign and the signed (*lakṣaṇa*) etc., and the same are nothing but the *kāraka*-relationships of the cause and the caused, the *karmapravacanīyas* themselves express the *kāraka*-relationships; and the accusatives express the semantic relationships such as the superstratumness. Thus, the cognition in '*yajñam anu prāvarṣat*' (It rained following the sacrifice) is that the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

raining, the effect, conditions the causality occurring in the sacrifice.

Further Gadādhara insists that *karmapravacanīyas* such as '*prati*' etc. too express the *kāraka*-relation of the indicator and the indicated (*lakṣaṇa*); and the accusatives expresses the semantic relations such as the superstrativeness. For instance in *'sādhur devadatto mātaram prati'* (Devadatta is nice to his mother), Devadatta is nice to his mother means he acts in such a way as it pleases his mother; and the *karmapravacanīya* '*prati*' expresses the *kāraka*-relation of pleasing and pleased; whereas the accusative after the '*mātṛ*' expresses the relational adjunctness or conditioning. Thus, the cognition produced is that Devadatta has the act of pleasing conditioning the pleasing nature of the mother.

Ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva (Bhāṭṭa rahasyas, p. 68) too agree with the logicians and hold that the *karmapravacanīyas* express the *kāraka*-relationships such as the cause and the effect relationship and the accusative express the semantic relations such as the superstratumness. However, they differ from the logicians in their theory and hold that the relationships are indirectly related to the activity (as opposed to the action). Thus, the cognition produced in '*yajñam anu prāvarṣat*' is that the activity is conducive to the raining which conditions the cause and the effect relationship occurring in the Saṃhitā.

However, it must be noted here that the *karmapravacanīyas*, which are actually expressive of the actions for which there are no words in the sentence, need not be admitted to be expressive of the *kāraka*-relations. As the term *karmapravacanīya* itself suggests, they are the words which indicate or condition the objecthood for certain

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

items such as the Samhitās etc. by expressing the actions, and so need not be expressive of the *kāraka*-relationships. Thus recognizing this fact, both the logicians such as Gadādhara and the ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva have held that certain specific *karmapravacanīyas* such as '*prati*', though are, assigned in the sense of pervasion *(vīpsā)* etc. need not be actually expressive of the pervasion and hence the *kāraka* - relations. According to them, the *karmapravacanīyas* in such cases are merely suggestive of the pervasion; and hence the *kāraka*-relationships are actually expressed by the repetition (*dvir-ukti*) itself. Therefore, despite admitting (*karmapravacan-īya*accusatives as *kāraka* - accusatives (*kāraka*-accusatives are stronger than *upapada* - accusatives and hence take precedence over the *upapada*-accusatives), the logicians and the ritualists seem to be appreciating and somewhat recognizing the fact that all the *karmapravacanīyas* need not be expressive of the *kāraka*-relationships as such.

Resume

Pāṇini has recognized two types of accusative usages: i) a *kāraka* - accusative usage wherein a *kāraka* item expressed by the accusative is related to the action and ii) a non-*kāraka*-accusative usage wherein non-*kāraka* item expressed by the accusative is related to a nonverbal (nominal) item. Thus '*caitraḥ taṇḍulam pacati*' and '*ubhayataḥ kṛṣṇam gopāḥ*'. Here while the first is a *kāraka*-accusative usage (rice is related to the action of cooking), the second is a non-*kāraka*-accusative usage *(Kṛṣṇa* is related to non verbal (nominal) item of both sides).

The non-*kāraka*-accusatives are either *upapada*-accusatives, i.e. cases added on account of the presence

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of another noun, or *karmapravacanīya*-accusatives, i.e. cases governed by certain action-expressing indeclinable words.

The *upapadas* such as '*ubhayatas*' represent a peculiar linguistic phenomenon in Sanskrit. They affect the words such as '*kṛṣṇa*' (in *ubhayataḥ kṛṣṇam gopāḥ* etc.) though the words to which they are added do not represent the objects. That is to say that the *upapada*-accusatives express certain non-*kāraka* relationships (or the functions) of nouns that are other than the objects. Thus, Nāgeśa and Gadādhara have stated that the *upapada* - accusatives such as '*ubhayataḥ kṛṣṇam*' express the non-*kāraka*-relationships of space etc. relating to other noun-meanings.

It should be observed here that the ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva etc. too have recognized this fact, viz. *upapada*-accusatives refer to the non-*kāraka*-relationships; however, owning to the peculiarity of their theory that all the syntactico-semantic relationships must be related to only the activity, they have proposed the theory that *upapada*-accusatives express the *kātaka* or syntactico semantic relationships such as the relational adjunctness that can be related to the activity.

Now as regards the listing of *upapadas*. There has been a great confusion regarding the number of *upapadas*. First Patañjali (under p. ii.3.2) cites a Śloka Vārtika listing '*ubhayataḥ*', '*sarvataḥ*', '*dhik*', and the trid of '*upari*' etc. as *upapadas*. However, recognising that the list is incomplete he cites another Vārtika that lists '*abhitaḥ*', '*paritaḥ*', '*samayā*', '*nikaṣā*', '*hā*' and '*prati*' as *upapadas*. However, even these two lists do not exhaust all the *upapadas* in Sanskrit. Thus, taking recourse to the Vārtika statement that *upapada* -

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

accusatives are found elsewhere as wall (*tato'nyatrāpi*), Gadādhara adds '*yāvat*' etc. to the list of *upapadas*. This only shows that Sanskrit as a spoken language developed and added more and more *upapadas* to its vocabulary.

Now as regards the *karmapravacanīya-* accusatives. Pāṇini has recognized that Sanskrit has certain indeclinable words such as '*anu*' etc. which express the actions for which there are no words in the sentence and condition the objecthood facilitating the accusative cases. Thus, he has used the term *karmapravacanīya* to denote such indeclinables.

Later grammarians such as Kaiyaṭa etc. too recognized this fact that *karmapravacanīyas* are expressive of actions; and therefore held that the *karmapravacanīyas*-suggest the *kāraka*-relationships which are actually expressed by the accusatives. Bhartṛhari differed from the grammarians and proposed that the *karmaprava-canīyas* need not express or indicate the actions, but can merely suggest the relations conditioned by the actions. However, the difficulty in such a theory is that when no action is expressed by any word, both the objecthood for the Samhitā etc. and the *kāraka*-relationship for the syntactico-semantic relations become untenable.

Gadādhara and Khaṇḍadeva go to the other extreme. They suggest that the *karmapravacanīyas* express both the actions and the *kāraka*-relationships. However, such a theory renders the accusatives meaningless. Thus, although the term *karmapravacanīya* is confusing, it can be held that *karmapravacanīyas* express the actions (and thereby facilitate the objecthood for the Samhitās etc.); whereas the accusatives express *kāraka-* relationships as usages demand.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF THE AGENCY (KARTṚTVA)

Introduction

In Sanskrit (the word expressing) the subject which is technically named the agent (*kartṛ*) assumes the nominative (*prathamā*) case or the instrumental (*tṛtīyā*) case depending on weather or not the agency of the agent is already expressed by other grammatical elements or not *'anabhinite'* (p.II. 3. 1.). For instance, consider the sentence ' Devadatta cooks rice grains' (*devadattaḥ taṇḍulam pacati*) and II) 'The rice grains are cooked by Devadatta' (*devadattena pacyate taṇḍulaḥ*). In the first instance, the word *'devadattaḥ'* expressing the agent has assumed the nominative case as the agency of Devadatta is already expressed by the conjugational ending, whereas in the second instance, the word' *devadattena'* has assumed the instrumental case as the agency of the same is not expressed by any grammatical element already. Thus, Pāṇini has assigned the nominative (p.II. 3.1) and the instrumental cases in the sense of the agency *'kartṛ-karaṇayos tṛtīyā'* (p.II 3. 18).

Etymologically speaking (Nyāyakośa), the term

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'*kartṛ*' signifies the abode of the effort (*kṛtyāśraya)*, and hence the agent can be considered to be the possessor of the effort conducive to the action (*kriyānukūlakṛtimān)*. Consider for instance, 'Caitra cooks rice grains' (*caitraḥ taṇḍulaṁ pacati)*; here Caitra is the agent by being the abode of the effort conducive to the action of cooking (*pākānūk-ūlakṛti)*.

Problem

Pāṇini's rule (p.i.4.54) and the subsequent analysis of the agent has established the agent as the independent one, who is the possessor of the action or the effort. However, there are different types of agents (primitive and causative and also primary and secondary) whose functions vary. Thus, while some epistemologists (*Prācyas)* have defined the agency (*kartṛtva)* from the view point of the independence (*svātantrya),* others (Navyas etc.) have defined the agency from the view point of the possession of the action (*kriyā)* or the activity/effort (*bhāvanā*/*kṛti*) expressed by the roots and the endings respectively. In the following pages, we shall examine all these issues to arrive at a conclusion.

Pāṇini's rule and analysis

While all the *kārakas* contribute to the accomplishment of the action in one way or the other, the agent (*kartṛkāraka)* contributes directly to the accomplishment of the action, and hence constitutes the most important of the *kārakas*. Thus Pāṇini has ruled that the independent one in his actions is the agent (*'svatantraḥ kartā'* p.i.4.5). What Pāṇini means (Kāśikā on p. i.4. 54) by the rule is that one who is the chief one and the one the speaker intends to present as the independent in his

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

actions and also whose contribution to the accomplishment of the action is second to none is the agent. Thus, Devadaṭta and the vessel are the agents in *'devadattaḥ pacatị'* and *'sthālī pacati'* as the same are intended to be independents in their actions and their contribution to the accomplishment of the action of cooking are second to none.

Meaning of the term '*svatantra*'

Patañjali (on p. I. 4.54) examines the meaning of the term *'svatantra' or independent'*. He, however, rejects the analysis that the term *'svatantra'* means' who has his own loom' or weaver (*yasya svam tantram*) and establishes that it means being oneself as the chief one (*ātmapradhāna*). Also he holds that the same term should be admitted to cover even the prompted agent (*hetumat*) as the instrumental case after '*devadatta*' in ' He makes Devadatta cook the rice' (*pācayaty odanam devadattena*) would become difficult to explain otherwise.

Division of agents

It should be noted that while the first person (me) is the agent in the primitive usage such as 'Hari is served by me' (*haris sevyate mayā*) by being the abode of action of serving, Hari and Kṛṣṇa are the agents in the causative and the other usages such as 'Battle is caused to be effected by Hari' (*hariṇā yauddhaḥ kāryate*) and 'Hari makes Kṛsna go' (*gamayati kṛṣṇam hariḥ*) etc. by being the abode of the causative operation (effort) etc. Thus, the Indian epistemologists (*Nyāyakośa*) divide the agent as the pure agent (*śuddha*), the causative agent (*prayojakakartṛ*) and the quasi passive agent (*karmakartṛ*). The pure agent is the one who is the abode of the opera-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tion (action) expressed by the root (*dhātūpātta-vyāpārāśrayatvam)*; thus the first person is the pure agent in '*mayā haris sevyate*'. The causative agent is the one who is the abode of the causative operation (*ṇijarathapreraṇāśrayatvam)*: thus Hari is the causative agent in '*kāryate hariṇā*'. The quasi passive agent is the one who is the abode of the action expressed by the root as well as the one intended to be obtained by the causative operation (*vyāpārāśrayatve sati ṇijarathavyāpāreṇa āpyamānatvena vivikṣitatvam)*. Thus Kṛṣṇa is the quasi passive agent in '*gamayati kṛṣṇam hairḥ*'.

Also it should be noted here that in statements such as '*ghaṭo bhavati*' and '*paṭo naśyati*' *etc.*, the pot and the clothing etc. are only the secondary agents (*gauṇa-kartṛ*) as the same are not the employers (prompters) of the other *kārakas* but are simply the abode of the becoming and the counter-positive of the destruction. Also, it should be noted (cf. Kaiyaṭa on P.i.4.55) that though all the *kārakas* are instruments and take part actively in the production of the action, they can be independent as far as their won contributions are concerned; and therefore, when the speaker intends to emphasize the role of the particular *kāraka,* he can present the same as the agent. Consider for instance the statements '*devadataḥ pacati*', '*kāṣṭhāni pacanti*' *and* '*sthālī pacati*'.' While in the first instance, the actual agent Devadatta is presented as the agent, in the second and the third instances, the means and the locus, the woods and the vessel, are presented as the agents. Thus, according to the grammatical convention, the *kāraka* whose function is emphasized by the speaker and whose action is expressed by the verbal root is the agent with respect to the same action; and thus when the function

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the agent is emphasized it becomes the primary agent, and when the function of the non-agent is emphasized it becomes the secondary agent.

The grammarians' theory

The Prācya grammarians (as reported in Bhāṭṭatantrahasya p. 106), however, define the agency (*kartṛtva)* as the state of employing (prompting) the other *kārakas* while not being oneself employed (promted) by the other *kārakas* (*itarakārakāprayojyatve sati kārakāntara-prayoktṛtvam)*. Since the weaver (*kuvinda)* in *'kuvindam paṭam karoti'* employs (prompts) the other *kārakas* such as the looms, while not being employed (prompted) by the other *kārakas,* the same is the agent.

However, the Navya grammarians (Laghumañjūṣā, Subartha, p. 1348) refute such a definition of the agency on the ground that then the individual soul (*jīva)* as prompted by the supreme soul (*īśvara)*, cannot be covered by the agency. Thus, they hold that the agency must be defined as only the state of possessing the operation (action) expressed by the verbal root (*dhātvarthavyāpārāśrayatvam)*. Since in '*caitraḥ pacati taṇḍulam'*, Caitra is the abode of the operation of cooking expressed by the root, the same is the agent. Also since in '*caitro maitreṇānnam pācayati,* Caitra and Maitra have the operation of making one cook, and the operation of cooking expressed by the causative and the primitive roots, respectively, the same are the agents. In the quasi passive statement '*caitro maitram gamayati'*, Maitra can be explained as the quasi passive agent as the same is the abode of the operation of going although the instrumental is obstructed after the primitive agent due to the designation of 'object'.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Refutation of Navyas' definition

However, the ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva (Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya, p. 106) refute the Navyas' definition. According to them, in such a difinition, Caitra etc. in 'Caitra does not cook the rice grains' (*caitro na pacati taṇḍulam)* etc., cannot be explained to be the agents as the operation of cooking expressed by the root '*pac*' cannot be established in Caitra etc. Thus, they hold that the agency must be defined as only the state of being the abode of the productive activity expressed by the conjugational ending not related to the gender and delimited by the action, the root-meaning (*dhātvarthāvacchinnaliṅgānanvayipadopasthāpyārthāśrayatvam)*. In the active and the passive statements such as *'caitraḥ pacati taṇḍulam'* and *'caitreṇa pacyate taṇḍulaḥ'*, Caitra can be explained to be the agent since the same is the abode of the productive activity expressed by the conjugational endings (*'ti'* and *'te'*) and delimited by the action of cooking (Here the effects such as the becoming soft are to be obtained only as the relations; and hence the rice, the abode of such effect, need not be agent).

According to them, the causatives such as *'pācayati'* are to be analysed as *'pākam kārayati'* and hence Maitra and Caitra, the primitive and the causative agents in *'caitro maitreṇānnam pācayati'*, can be explained to be the agents due to their being the abode of the effort conducive to the cooking *(pākānukūlakṛti)* and the activity conducive to the effort *(kṛtyanukūlābhāvanā)* respectively expressed by the conjugational ending. Also, in the secondary usages such as *'viklidyante taṇḍulāḥ'* the conjugational ending must be admitted to have an indication in the sense of the abode of the cooking; and hence the rice grains, the abode of cooking, can be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

explained as the agent. Also, in the negative usages such as '*caitro na pacati*'. the cognition produced is that the action conducive to the cooking in Caitra is the counter-positive of the absence, and hence Caitra even while not being the abode of the activity can be explained as the agent.

However, finally, the ritualists (Bhāṭṭarahasya, p. 109) propose that the primary agency (*mukhyakartṛtva)* must be held to be only the state of being the abode of the effort (*kṛtyāśrayatva)* conducive to the action of cooking etc. or the imposed property (*akhaṇḍopādhi)* co-extensive to such a state. They propose such a theory on the ground that the very term *'kartṛ'* (agent) is derived from the root '*kṛ*' (to exert) expressing the effort; and hence agency cannot be any thing but the state of being the abode of the effort, and the usage of the term '*kartṛ* (agent) in the non-abodes of the efforts is only secondary.

The logicians' theory

The Prācya logicians such as Gaṅgeśa (Tattvacintāmaṇi, 1.4) have held that the primary agency (*mukhyakartṛtva)* is the state of being one in whom either the action or the effort inhers (*kriyāyā kṛter vā samavāyitva)*. They have held so on the ground that the primitive and the causative agents such as Maitra and Caitra in '*caitro maitreṇānnam pācayati'* etc. need to be covered by the definition of the agency; and the same is possible only when both the *kārakas* inhering either the action or the effort are held to be the agents (here Maitra is the agent by inhering the primitive action of cooking, whereas Caitra is the agent by inheriting the effort conducive to the action of cooking). Thus, the Prācya logicians can be held to have proposed a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

generalized theory of the agency which does not discriminate between the possession of either the action or the effort and recognizes both the action and the effort as the characteristics of the agents.

However, the Navya logicians such as Jagadīśa (Śabdaśakti Prakāśikā, p. 103) were greatly influenced by both the grammarians and the ritualists. Thus they have held that the agency described by the particular root-meaning is the meaning expressed by the particular conjugational ending which can have the relation with the particular derivative root-meaning (*yaddhātūpasthāpyārthaḥ yādṛśatiṅā svopasthāpyāthenānubhāvayitum śakyaḥ taddhātūpasthāpyasyatadevakaṛtṛtvaṁ).* In '*odanaṁ pacati caitraḥ' etc.*, Caitra etc. are the agents because the same have the agency such as the effort expressed by the particular root '*pac'*

It should be noted here that the agency must be distinguished as the meaning expressed by the conjugational ending that is related to the action expressed by the particular root but not associated with *yak*, so that the objecthood of the rice in '*taṇḍulaḥ pakṣyate'* where in the root is associated with *yak* need not be covered.

Also such an agency is the state of possessing the knowledge in '*caitro jānāti' etc.* and the state of being the counterpositive in '*ghaṭo naśyati'* etc. Thus, while the Prācyas did not discriminate between the possession of the action or that of the effort and recognized both the action and the effort as the characteristics of the agent, the Navyas, being influenced by the grammarians and the ritualists, recognized only the possession of the effort as the agency though they were forced to modify their theory and to admit the possession of the action as the agency in accordance with '*caitro jānāti'* etc.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, Annambhaṭṭa (Tarkasaṁgraha Dīpikā, P. 1. 17) holds that the agency is the state of possessing the effort, the will to act and the direct knowledge regarding the material cause (*upādānagocara-aparokṣ ajñānacikīrṣākṛitimattvam)*. For instance, the lord is the agent of creating *dvyaṇukas* and the potmaker is the agent of making the pot due to possessing such an effort etc.

However, this is only a modification of the theory of the Navyas that the agency is the possession of the effort. Since the effort, the will and the knowledge are conducive to each other and have a cause and effect relationship, Annambhaṭṭa has considered all the three as the characteristics of the agency.

Secondary use of the term 'agent'

According to the logicians, only those *kārakas* that possess the conscious effort are the primary agents and hence the *kārakas* that do not possess such an effort are non-agents, Thus, the use of the word 'agent' (*kartṛ)* in the inanimates such as the wood (*kāṣṭha)* in '*kāṣṭham pacati'* is only secondary. However, it should be noted that this view is contradictory to the view expressed by the grammarians that the *kāraka* whose operation (action) is expressed by the verbal root, is the agent of the same operation (action); and hence need to be understood only in emphasizing the secondary nature of the inanimates and not in total denial of the agency for the inanimates.

Resume

Grammarians and other Indian epistemologists have recognized the linguistic fact that the word expressing the subject or the agent (*kartṛ)* assumes the nominative or the instrumental case ending in Sanskrit; and thus Pānini

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

has assigned the nominative or the instrumental case ending for the same. Also, Pāṇini has defined the agent (*kartṛ) as* independent in his actions (*svatantraḥ kartā)* stressing the independence and the chiefness of the agent who is second to none in the accomplishment of the action concerned.

However, since Sanskrit has primitive and causative usages such as '*devadattaḥ pacati*' and '*caitro maitreṇānnam pācayati'*, Indian epistemologists have distinguished the agent as primitive, causative and quasi-passive agents. Further, since even the inanimates such as wood (*kāṣṭham)* or vessel (*sthālī)* are used as the agents, they have distinguished the agent as primary (animate) and secondary (inanimate) agents.

The Prācya grammarians were greatly influenced by Pāṇini's rule, and the fact that the agent is independent in his action; and hence defined the same agent as the principle or chief of the other *kārakas* not being prompted by the other *kārakas* in turn; and thus laid the emphasis on the independence of the *kāraka* in their definition of the agency.

However, the Navya grammarians were influenced by the fact that agent invariably possesses an action or operation (*kriyā)* in effecting a fruit; and hence have defined the agency as the state of being the abode of the action or operation expressed by the verbal root. However, it should be noted that such a definition can cover only the primitive agents who possess the action but not the causative agents, who or which possess only the causative operation or effort.

On the other hand, the ritualists have distinguished between the action or the operation (*kriyā)* expressed by the verbal root and the productive activity (*bhāvanā*)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

expressed by the verbal ending; and also they have held the former to be produced while the latter tobe the producer; and thus they have defined the agency as the state of being the abode of the productive activity expressed by the verbal ending delimited by the root-meaning (action or operation). However, the ritualists, especially Khaṇḍadeva etc. were governed by the fact that the term '*kartṛ*' used for the agent signifies the abode of the effort; and hence the agency must be defined as the state of being the abode of the effort or the imposed property coextensive with such a state.

Thus, the grammarians and the ritualists can be said to have proposed two distinct theories that the agent is the abode of the action (operation) or that he is the abode of the productive activity or the effort; which cover primitive and the causative agents respectively. The Prācya logicians have recognized this fact; and hence have stated that the agency is the state of being one in whom either the action or the effort inhers. It should be noted here that the Prācyas' theory is probably the most significant as it covers not only the regular primitive agent such as Devadatta in '*devattaḥ pacati*', who is the possessor of the action of cooking, but also the causative agent such as Caitra in '*caitro maitreṇānnam pācayati*' who is only the possessor of the effort/productive activity. Also, the Navyas' theory that the agency is the meaning (conscious effort) expressed by the particular conjugational ending particularizes the agency but does not introduce any new aspect or present a new analysis as such. Thus, the most important purpose of the analysis of the agency, that it should cover all sorts of agents, is achieved only by the definition of the agency proposed by the Prācya logicians.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF INSTRUMENTALITY (KARAṆATVAVICĀRAḤ)

Introduction

Sanskrit uses the instrumental case for expressing both the grammatical agent or subject *(kartṛ)* and the instrument *(karaṇa)*. Consider, for instance 'Rāma kills Vālin through his arrow' (*rāmeṇa bāṇena hato vālī)*. Here, the words expressing Rāma, the agent, and the arrow, the instrument, are found in the instrumental cases. Recognizing this linguistic fact, Pāṇini has ruled that the instrumental case is to be used for expressing both the agent and the instrument (*kartṛkaraṇayoḥ stṛtīyā,* p. II. 3. 18).

The Classical Sanskrit grammarians adopted the most scientific semantic methodology in analysing the instrumentality; and thus Pāṇini has defined the instrument as the most efficient means in bringing about the action (*sādhakatamam karaṇam,* p.I.4.42). The Kāśikā explains the meaning of the rule as that the most effective *kāraka* item which is the most helpful (*prakṛṣ ṭtopakāraka)* in accomplishing an action (*kriyā-siddhi),* receives the designation of *karaṇa.* And the examples

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

given are : 'He mows with the sickle (*dāreṇa lunāti)* and 'He cuts with the axe' (*paraśunā chinatti)*. Here the sickle and the axe are the instruments, as they are the most efficient means in bringing about the actions of moving and the cutting respectively.

Also, it should be noted here that the Kāśikā analysis of the term 'most efficient item' (*sādhakataman)* in the rule as 'the most helpful in accomplishing the action' (*prakṛṣṭopakāraka)* has lead later grammarians such as Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (Laghumañjūṣā, p.) to explain the instrument as the most efficient in producing the effect of the action immediately upon the operation occurring in oneself (*svaniṣṭhavyāpārāvyavadhānena phalanispādakam)*; and thus the arrow etc. in '*rāmeṇa bāṇena hato vālī* etc. are explained to be the instruments with respect to the loss of life due to their efficiency in producing the loss of life immediately upon the shooting operation of the arrow. etc.

Problem

However, while the Prāchya and the Navya-grammarians have perceived that the instrument accomplishes its action through its own or others operation and hence is the cause (means) which produces the action through its own operation, or that it is the *kāraka* immediately upon the operation of which (*kāraka)* the action is effected, the Prāchya and the Navya-logicians have perceived that the instrument is an extraordinary cause and hence is an extraordinary cause possessing the operation. (*vyāpāravadasādhāraṇam kāraṇam karaṇam)*. Also, the ritualists and Jagadīśa had a different outlok and considered the instrumentality as an indivisible property (*akhaṇḍopādhi)* and the state of being the meaning of the instrumental (*tṛtīyarthatva)* respectively.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In this paper we shall analyse the nature of the instrumentality as propounded by the logicians and the ritualicians vis-a-vis the nature of the same as propounded by the grammarians for the complete understanding of the instrumentality.

Prāchya-grammarians' analysis.

The Prācya-grammarians (Bhāṭṭa-tantrarahasya, p. 110) do not define the instrumentality as such. However, they hold that the term 'most efficient' (*sādhakatama)* is intended to exclude the non-instrumental *kārakas* such as the agent (*kartṛ)* etc. from the instrument *karaṇa* : and hence explain that the rule means that the instrument is the cause (means) of the action directly through its own operation, while not being the cause (means) of the action indirectly through the operation of other *kārakas* such a the agent etc. *(kārakāntaraniṣṭha vyāpāradvārakriyāhetvabhāve sati kriyāhetutvam)*. Since the agent and the object etc. are the causes (means) of the action only through the operation of the instrument such as the arrow, they need not be the instruments in 'Rāma kills Vāli through the arrow' (*rāmeṇa bāṇena hato vāli)*.

It should be noted here that according to the Prācya-grammarians, the absence of the operation (*vyāpāra)* in other causes (*hetvantara)* determines the efficient cause as the instrument; and therefore, the instrumentality (*karaṇatva)* of the efficient cause is the state of causing the action without requiring the help of the operation of some other *kāraka (kārakāntaravyāpārm vinā kriyāhetutvam)*.

Navya-grammarians' theory

However, the Navya-grammarians (Laghumañjuṣā, p. 32) oppose the Prācya-grammarians' analysis on the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ground that the usages such as 'Caitra cuts with the axe' (*'caitras kuṭhāreṇa chinatti*) cannot be considered to be secondary usages; and therefore, the non-coverage of the axe etc. cannot be termed to be desired. In such usages; the axe is the cause of cutting only through the operation of the agent such as lifting up etc.; and hence does not cause the cutting through merely its operations. Thus, they analyse the instrumentality as the state of being the particular *kāraka* immediately after the operation of which (*kāraka)* the action of the particular *kāraka* is effected (*svaniṣṭha vyāpārāvyavadhāna phalaniṣpādaka-tvam)*. Since the action of cutting of the axe is effected-immeately after the moving operation of the axe, the same axe can be explained to be the instrument.

It should be noted that the difference between the analyses of the Prācya-grammarians and the Navya-grammarians is that while the Prācya rammarians view a negative aspect, namely the absence of the operation in some other cause (*hetvantarāvṛttitva),* as the determining factor of the instrumentality, the Navya-grammarians view the positive aspect, namely the presence of the operation in the *kāraka* (*svaniṣṭ havyāpāra)*, as the determining factor of the instrum-entality. The advantage of such a Navya-analysis is that even a locus (*adhikaraṇa)* such as vessel (*sthālin)* in '*sthālyā odanam pacati* can be explained to be the instrument when the action of cooking of rice is intended to be effected immediately after the operation of the vessel; and thus facilitates the convention that the *kārakahoods are determined by the speaker's intention.*

The Prācya logicians' analysis

However, the Prācya-logicians (Nyāyamañjari, p. 1.2) oppose the grammarians analysis on the ground that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the consuming of medicine (*auṣadhabhojana)* in 'Obtain the nourishment slowly by consuming medicine' (*auṣ adhabhojanena karanṇena puṣṭim saṃpādaya)* cannot be explained to be the instrument as the obtainment of nourishment is not effected immediately after the operation of the consuming of medicine. Thus, according to them, the instrumentality should be analysed as the state of being the instrument (means) that functions as the extraordinary cause possessing the operation (*vyāpāra-vadasādhāraṇam kāraṇam karaṇam)*. And since the consuming of medicine in *'auṣadhasevanena puṣṭim saṃpādaya'* functions as the extraordinary cause in bringing about the nourishment, the same can be explained to be the instrument. It should be noted that since the instrument is qualified by the possession of the operation (*vyāpāravattva*), the non-instruments such as the contact with the pot-halves (*kapāladvayasaṃyoga)* etc. need not became the instruments with respect to the effects such as the pot etc. in *ghaṭaṃ karoti* etc. (the contact with the pot-halves does not have the operation producing the pot.). Also, since the instrument is qualified to be the extraordinary cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa),* the knowledge of the god (*īśvarajñāna*) need not become the instrument with respect to the creation of the universe *(jagatsṛṣṭi)* as the same is no way extraordinary. Thus though-rejecting the grammarians' analysis as untenable, the Prācya logicians conform to the central linguistic idea that the instrument is the cause possessing an operation (*vyāpāravat, kāraṇam)*. However, by introducing the qualification of extraordinary cause (*asādhāraṇa)* in the instrument, the logicians help in distinguishing the instrument from the ordinary causes.

Also it should be noted here that while the cause (*hetu)* produces its effect with or without its operation,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the instrument produces its effect only with its operation; and thus, the cause is the producer of the effect with or without the operation, whereas the instrument is the producer of the effect only with its operation.

Gadādhara's analysis

Gadādhara, the celebrated author of Vyutpattivāda, (III,32), too follows the Prācya-methodology in analysing the instrumentality. According to him,the instrumentality is to be analysed as the state of being the cause possessing the operation (*vyāpāravatkaraṇatvam)*; and since the fire wood is the cause possessing the operation of burning, the same is the instrument with respect to the cooking in *kāṣṭhena pacati*. However,he believes that even the agent has the potential ability to become the cause (instrument) with respect to the action of cooking through his operation as he too accomplishes the action of cooking through his operation; and hence to avoid the undesired contingency of the instrumentality for the agent, and to avoid the usage *caitraḥ caireṇa pacati,* he states that the operation of the instrument must be qualified as being dependent on the operation of the agent different from itself (*svabhinnakartṛvyāpārādhīnatva*). And since the operation of the agent such as the movement (*ceṣṭā*) is not dependent on the operation of the agent different from oneself (it is dependent only on his own effort), the contingency is avoided.

Navya-logicians analysis

The Navya-logicians (Nyāyakośa) agree with the Prācya-logicians that the instrument is the extraordinary cause (*asādhāraṇa)* and not as that which possesses the operation (*vyāpāravat)*. They hold so because the state of being the extraordinary cause (*asādhāraṇatva)* is the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

state of being that (cause) in the absence of which (cause) the effect is not generated (*yadvilambāt kāryānutpādaḥ tādṛśakāraṇatvam)*; and thus implies the state of possessing the operation automatically. That is to say that the idea of being possessed of the operation (*vyāpāravat)* can be obtained in the instrument by perceiving the extraordinary cause as being excluded from the non-association with the effect (*phalāyoga vyavacchina),* as only the cause possessing the operation can be conducive to the effect (Saptapadarthī, p.).

Also since such a state of being the extraordinary cause is present only in the arrow etc., but not in the time etc., the arrow etc. can become the instrument, whereas the time etc. need not become the instruments with respect to the effect such as the loss of life etc. in *rāmeṇa bāṇena hato vāli'.*

Ritualists analysis

Since the ritualists (Bhāṭṭatantra-rahasya, p. 111) have always adopted an economical approach to the analyses of the *kārakas*, they have adopted the same to the analysis of instrumentality as well. Thus, they have stated that the instrumentality (*karaṇatva)* is of the form of an economic imposed property (*akhaṇḍopādhirūpa)* established by the common knowledge that such and such a *kāraka* is the instrument of such and such an effect. *(anugata pratīti)*. Now since the arrow (*bāṇa)* in *rāmeṇa bāṇena hataḥ* has the indivisible property (instrumentality) established by common knowledge, the same is an instrument in *rāmeṇa bāṇena hataḥ.*

A point to be noted here is that the ritualists are opposed to the Navya-grammarians' analysis of the instrumentality on the ground that the usages such as 'He makes the pot through the movement of the potter's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

wheel' *(bhramyā ghaṭam karoti)* and 'He enjoys the heaven through his merit' *(puṇyena svargam bhuṅkte)* are primary *(mukhya)* and not secondary *(bhākta)*; and hence the movement *(bhramī)* and the merit *(puṇya)* cannot be explained to be the instruments as they are not the causes *(means)* possessing the operations. Nevertheless' it must be observed here that the ritualists analysis of the instrumentality is not an analysis in the strict sense of the term as it does not analyse the instrumentality as such; rather refers to the same as an unanalysable indivisible property established by the common knowledge of the instrumentality.

A syntactic analysis

A linguistic fact to be observed in this regard is that the instrument is the meaning of the instrumental case in all of the instrumental usages; and hence the same can be analysed on the linguistic (syntactic) criterion. Thus in consideration of such a linguistic (syntactic) fact, Jagadīśa (Śabdaśakti Prakāśikā, p. 88) holds that whatever meaning is conveyed by the instrumental case with respect to whatever action expressed by whatever verb, the same is the instrument with respect to the same action expressed by the same verb. Since in 'He mows with the sickle' *(dātreṇa chinatti)*, the sickle *(dātra)* is the meaning expressed by the instrumental case *dātreṇa,* the same is the instrument with respect to the action of mowing expressed by the verb *'chinatti'*.

Although this analysis seems like stating the obvious that the instrument is the meaning of the instrumental case, the same analysis gains significance in view of the fact that while all the other analyses of classical Indian

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

epistemologists are based on the semantic criterion, this alone is based on the syntactic criterion, and thus makes use of the syntactic function of the instrument.

Resume

The instrument *(karaṇa)* is a *kāraka* and hence like all other *kārakas* is the means in bringing about the action concerned. However, Indian epistemologists recognized the semantic fact that unlike all the other *kārakas*, the instrument alone is a special means and plays a very crucial role in bringing about the action. Thus, Pāṇini has ruled (I.4.42) that the *kāraka*, which is the most efficient in accomplishing the action *(prakṛṣṭopakāraka)*, becomes the instrument; and the same has given a clear direction to the Indian analysis of instrumentality and made many an Indian epistemologist to analyse the same on the basis of the ability of the most efficient *kāraka* to produce the action through its operation.

The Prācya-grammarians perceived that only the non-instrumental *kārakas* such as the agent etc. accomplish the action through the operations of the others, whereas the instrumental *kāraka* accomplishes the same through its own operation; and thus have held that the instrument is the cause (means) which produces the action through its own operation and not through that of others. The Navya-grammarians do not fundamentally disagree with the Prācyas; however, they have perceived that the axe *(kuṭhāra)*, etc. in *kuṭhāreṇa chinatti* accomplish the action of cutting etc. with the help of the operation of the agent such as the lifting up and down etc.; and hence held that the instrument is the *kāraka* immediately after the operation of which *(kāraka)*, the action is effected.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

On the other hand, the Prācya-logicians visualized that the instrument is not an ordinary cause but is an extraordinary means as it has the ability to accomplish the action through the operation; and hence introduced the new aspect that the instrument is the extraordinary cause (means) possessing the operation (*vyāpāravad asādhāraṇam kāraṇam*). Gadādhara and the other Navya-logicians do not introduce any new aspect in the analysis of the instrumentality as such, but technically modify the analysis to avoid the agent etc. from becoming the instrument by stating that the operation of the instrument must be dependent on the operation of the agent different from itself *(svabhinnakartṛvyāpārādhīna)*.

As regards the ritualists analysis, it must be stated that mere holding of the instrumentality as an indivisible property *(akhaṇḍopādhi)* does not help in understanding it, but the same is an exercise to aconomise the concept. However, Jagadīśa's analysis of the instrumentality based on the syntactic function that instrument is the meaning of the instrumental case relating to the action expressed by the verb justly highlights the syntactic function of the instrument; and hence is a welcome contribution to the Indian analyses.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER VII

MEANING OF SAHA IN INSTRUMENTAL USAGES.

Introduction

In any natural language, words such as with, along with and together with etc. are used to signify association which can be either occurrence together of two things in a particular time (i.e. simultaneity) or that of two things in a particular place. For instance, consider

(i) John comes with or along with marry,

(ii) Martin stays with his father in his native vil lage.

Here in the first instance, the word with or along with conveys the occurrence together of actions, i.e. simultaneity of the action of coming of John and that of marry; whereas in the second instance, the word with conveys the occurrence together of Martin and his father in one place

Sanskrit too, like any other natural language, makes use of indeclinable words such as with or along with (*saha*) to convey association of things (*sāhitya)*, in instrumental constructions Consider for instance, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

following instrumental constructions : i) 'The father came along with his son (*putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā*), ii) 'He has eaten rice along with soup' (*sūpena sārdham bhuktaḥ odanaḥ);* and iii) 'Pot is produced by the stick along with the wheel' (*cakreṇa sārdham daṇḍena janitah)*. Here in these instances, the indeclinable with (or along with) conveys the association of things (actions) (*sāhitya*) which can be described as the state of being the action occurring at the same time as that of the action of the non-prominent (*samabhivyāhṛta kriyāsamānakālīnakriyātvam)*. And the instrumentals such as *putreṇa, sūpena or cakreṇa* convey the senses such as the agency, the objecthood or the instrumentality which are related to the actions such as the coming, the eating or the producing expressed as parts of the meanings by the word association (*saha*). The meaning of association (*saha*) is further related to the respective actions expressed by the respective predicates such as *āgataḥ, bhuktaḥ* or *janitaḥ* which in turn are related to the subjects such as the father, the soup or the pot through the agency, the objecthood or the instrumentality respectively. Thus, one congizes in such cases that 'The father has the agency described by the coming occurring at the same time as that of the coming of the son,' 'The rice has the objecthood described by eating occurring at the same time as that of the eating of soup', or 'The pot has the origination describing the instrumentality of the stick occurring at the same time as that of the wheel' respectively.

Indian linguists such as Pāṇini too have recognized the linguistic fact that the indeclinable words such as with or along with (*saha)* etc. govern the instrumental case endings after the secondary, i.e, non-primary or non

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

prominent *kārakas* such as the agent etc. when the association of the same *kārakas* is to be conveyed in bringing about the actions such as coming etc. Thus, Pāṇini has ruled that the instrumental is to be used after non-prominent *kāraka* which is the relational adjunct of association (*sahayukte apradhāne,* p. ii. 3.19).

Although Indian epistemologists without any exception have followed Pāṇini in using the instrumental after the non-prominent *kāraka (apradhāna)*, doubt can arise as to what is non-prominent *kāraka; one* which is secondary in bringing about action or one which is secondary in his association with the action. Thus, ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva (*Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya, p.* 113) clarify that the *kāraka* which is cognised to be related to the action by words (*śabdataḥ)* is prominent and the *kāraka* which is cognized to be related to the action by implication (*arthataḥ*) is non-prominent. Consider for instance, *putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā* once again. Here the father is prominent (*pradhāna)* because he is congnized to be related to the action of coming by words such as *āgataḥ;* whereas the son is non-prominent (*apradhāna)* because he is cognized to be related to the action of coming by limplication (the verb-predicate *āgataḥ* is not construed with *putreṇa)*. However, it should be noted here that just as the indeclinables such as '*saha*' etc., when expressed, govern the instrumentals after the words expressing the non-prominent, in the same way the same, even when not expressed, govern the instrumentals at times. Thus Sanskrit has the usages such as 'The elderly one goes (along with) the young one (*vṛddho yūnā gacchati)*.

Problem

However, different epistemologists have expressed

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

different views regarding the exact nature of association (*sāhitya*); and hence defined it variously. Also they have differed as to whether the association is to be related to the action expressed by the predicate or to the *kārakas* such as the agent expressed by the nominative. Further, there are various uses of the word '*saha*' in various senses. Thus, this article is an attempt to illustrate all these issues.

Ritualists theory

The ritualists (Bhāṭṭatantra rahasya, p. 113) admit that association (*sāhitya*) is the meaning of '*saha*'; however, they follow the convention that all the syntactico-semantic and other relations are conveyed by the case endings in Sanskrit; and hence hold that even the 'association' is actually expressed by the instrumentals in '*putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā*' etc; whereas the indeclinable '*saha*' is merely suggestive of the idea of association. Further, they hold that the association, being a *kāraka* case-meaning, is related to the action such as coming through the indirect relation of the state of having the father as the substratum of the action describing itself (association) (*svanirūpaka pitrāśrayakatava*). Thus, the cognition produced in such cases is that the father is the substratum of the action of coming which describes the association of the son in coming

Ritualists recognize the linguistic fact that the indeclinable '*saha*' expressing the association (*sāhitya*) can be used basically to express either occurrence togher at the same time or simulaneity of actions (*saha vidyamānatva*) or the state of relating to the same action (*ekakriyānvayitva*). Consider for instance the expressions 'The female ass carries weight with ten young ones'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*sahaiva daśabhis putraiḥ bhāram vahati gardabhī)* and 'The father has come along with the son (*putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā)*. Here While in the first instance, the indeclinable *saha* expresses the simultaneity of two actions of carryings, the same, in the second instance, expresses the state of relating to the same action of coming (of the father and the son). Thus, the ritualists conclude that the association (*sāhitya*) is both '*saha vidyamānatva*' and '*ekakriyānvayitva*'.

Jagadīśa's theory

Jagadīśa (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 14 p. 120) has presented the most significant analysis of the association (*sāhitya)* in India. He has visualized that the indeclinable '*saha*' is to be used when the following three conditions are met : i) Simulataneity of (the taking place of) two actions (*samānakālīnatva)*; ii) the two actions taking place are directly or indirectly related to one and the same *kāraka* such as the agent etc. (*samāna kartṛkatva*); and iii) the action is to be related to the *kāraka* such as the agent etc. which in turn is related to the association itself (*svānvitakārakāvacchinna*). Thus he holds that the association (*sāhitya)* means the sumultaneity of the action which is related to the same *kāraka* (agent) to which another action is related, and which is delimited by the agency of the *kāraka* such as the father related in turn to the association (with the son) itself (*svānvayi tatkartṛtvādi kārakāvacchinnayoḥ samānakartṛkayoḥ kriyayoḥ samānakālinatvam)*. Consider for instance the *sāhitya* in *putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā* once again. Here the actin of coming of the father takes place at the same time as the taking place of the another action of coming of the son; the two actions of comings are directly or indirectly related to the father who is related to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

association as the agent etc. Thus, the association here is the simultaneity of the action of coming which is related to the agent *kāraka* (father) to which another action of son's coming is related and which action is delimited by he agency of the *kāraka* (father) which in turn is related to the association itself. Now since the instrumental conveys the superstratumness, Jagadīśa holds that the cognition produced is that the father has the agency described by the coming occurring at the same time as that of the coming describing the agency of the son.

Probably the single most important contribution of Indian analysis is the description of the state of being the two actions related to one and the same *kāraka* such as the agent *(samānakartṛkatva)* as the state of being the two *kārakas* related to a single action (*ekakriyānvayitvam)*. It has recognized so because in the cases such as '*ptreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā'*, the two actions, namely tje action of coming of the father expressed by the predicate *āgataḥ,* and the action of coming of the son implied by the same predicate are directly and indirectly related to the agent (father) (the nominative meaning); and also because both the *kārakas,* i.e. the agent such as the father and the instrumental meaning such as the son are actually related to the same action of coming which is expressed in the case of the father and implied in the case of the son by the predicate *āgataḥ*.

Gadādhara's theory

Gadāhara (*Vyutpattivāda, III. 49)* closely follows Jagadīśa in his analysis of association (*sāhitya);* and agrees with the fact that the simultaneity of two actions (*kriyādvayasamānakālīnatva)* is understood by the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

indeclinable word '*saha*'. However, he holds that the same simultaneity of actions need not be the expressed meaning conveyed by the indiclinable '*saha*'. According to him, the simultaneity of actions can be implied when the indiclinable such as '*saha*' refers to the time (of the action expressed by the predicate word such a *āgataḥ*) as relating to the nominative- meaning in turn relating to the action of coming of the instrumental-meaning. Consider for instance *putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā* once again. Here the indiclinable word *saha* refers to the time of the action of coming expressed by the predicate *āgataḥ*, and the same is related to the nominative meaning such as the father who is in turn related to the action of coming of the son, the instrumental meaning. Now since the action of coming occurring in the son is further cognized as relating to the father, the simultaneity of the two actions can be obtained by implications.

A point to be noted here is that the relation of the predicate with the subject (agent) as delimited by the delimiting property of the subjectness automatically obtains the relation between the predicate and the delimiting property of the subjectness; and therefore, the relation of the action of coming of the son with the father delimited by the action of coming obtains the relation of simultaneity between the action of coming of the son and the action of coming of the father automatically.

Gadādhara's explanation of negative instances

When in the positive statement *putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā,* the association of the form of the time of the action expressed by the predicate (*sambhivyāhṛtakriyākāla)* is related to the subject (agent) such as the father

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(expressed by the nominative) relating in turn to the action of the son, the absence of the same association needs to be related to the subject (agent) such as the father in the corresponding negative statement such as 'Father does not come along with his son' (*putreṇa saha nāgataḥ pitā)*. However, such a relation is untenable because the absence of such an association, i.e. the absence of such a time, expressed by the negative is only the delimitor of the subjectness of the subject (agent) such as the father upon whom the substratumness of action expressed by the *ākhyāta (āgataḥ)* is predicated Thus the semantic convention that the negation appears as only the primary item (qualificand) in the case of *prasajyapratiṣedha* (this sentence is a *prasajya pratiṣedha* because the negative is compounded with the verb and not with noun) would become contradicted.

Now faced with such a difficulty, Gadādhara proposes that the time of the action of coming (occurring in the son), the meaning of *saha,* is to be related to the father, the meaning of nominative, relating in turn to the action of coming in the positive statement; whereas the absence of the same time of the action of coming (occurring in the son) is to be related to the predicative action of coming (expressed by *saha)* relating to the father, the nominative meaning, in the corresponding negative statement.

Thus while the congnition produced in the positive statement is that the father, delimited by the action of coming occurring in the son, is the agent of coming, the cognition produced in the corresponding negative statement is that the father has the absence of the agency described by the action of coming occurring at the same time as coming occurring in the son.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, Gadādhara proposes an alternative theory. According to this theory, the indiclinable *saha* itself can refer to the action of coming occurring at the same time as the action of coming (of the son) (*āgamana kālīnāgamanādikam)*. And the agency described by the action of coming etc. expressed by the predicate *āgatah'* etc. can be related to the father, the nominative meaning, who is qualified by such an action expressed by the indeclinable, through the relation of agency. For, the predicate not being identical with the delimiting property of the subjectness of the subject, no contradiction to any semantic convention can be cited.

Other uses of *saha*

In addition to the association (*sāhitya)*, the indeclinable *saha* is found to have been used in number of othere senses as well. Consider for instance 'The clothing appears as delimited by the clothingness', (*paṭaḥ paṭ atvena saha bhāsate)* and 'One falls from the eating with the fallen one' (*patitena saha bhojanāt patati)*. Here, while *saha* in the first instance refers to the relational adjuctness of the potness, the same in the second instance refers to the sameness of row. Thus, Jagadīśa holds that the indeclinable *saha* expresses the state of having the same relational adjunctness (*samānapratiyogikatva)* as well. According to him, in the case of *paṭaḥ paṭatvena saha bhāsate,* the state of having the same relational adjunctness is cognised in the objectness of the clothingness because such a usage is never made at the time of the cognition of the objectness of the clothingness described by the knowledge at some other time.

The most important sense of the indeclinable *saha* which is next only to the simultaneity of actions

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(samānakālikatva). is the occurrence together in the same place *(sāmānādhikaraṇya)*, Consider for instance 'One should keep the fire with the wife.'' *(patnyā sahāgnim ādadīta)*. Here since the simultaneity of actions of keeping fire is impossible, only the association of the form of occurrence in the same place *(sāmānādhikaraṇya)* is the meaning of *saha*.

Now such an occurrence together in the same place *(sāmānādhikaraṇya)* can be further divided into two types : i) occurrence together in the same row *(ekapañkti)* or ii) occurrence together in the same dish *(ekapātra)*. Consider for instance 'One falls from eating together with the fallen one' *(patitena saha bojanāt patati)*, and 'One falls from sharing (having) food with the fallen one' *(patitena saha bhojanam kurvāṇaḥ patati)*. Here in the first instance, the meaning referred to is the eating together in the same row *(sahapaṅkti)*, as the eating together in the same row with the fallen one is the cause of ones own falling; and in the second instance, the meaning referred to is the eating together in the same dish *(ekapātra)*, as the eating together in the same dish with the fallen one is also the cause of one's own falling. Thus, *saha* is admitted to refer to the occurence of an action together with another action in the same place as its meaning.

Conclusions

Sanskrit like any other natural language uses the indeclinables such as with or along with *(saha)* in the instrumental constructions to convey the association of the action of the prominent *(pradhāna)* with the non-prominent *(apradhāna)*. Thus *putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā etc.* are found. Pāṇini too has recognized this linguistic fact;

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and hence has ruled that the instrumental case is used after the word expressing the non-prominent when the words *saha* etc. are used.

Here, as the ritualists point out, the *kāraka* such as the father who is cognized to have the relation with the action such as coming expressed by the verb is the prominent (*pradhāna*) and the *kāraka* such as the son who is cognized to have the relation with the action such as coming understood by implication is non-prominent (*apradhāna*).

Now, while the word *saha* is used basically to denote *sahavidyamānatva* and *ekakriyānvayitva,* the association (*sāhitya),* as Jagadīśa points out, can be held to mean the simultaneity of two (implied and expressed) actions which are related to the *kāraka* relating in turn to the part of the association itself.

However, Gadādhara differs from such a view. According to him, when the time of the action expressed by the verbs (*samabhivyāhṛta kriyākāla*) is held to be the meaning of the indeclinable *saha* and the same is related to the nominative meaning such as the father in turn relating to the action occurring in the son, the simultaneity of actions becomes understood by implication; and therefore, the same need not be the expressed meaning of *saha*. Further, he holds that the meaning of the indeclinable needs to be related to the predicative action such as coming relating to the father, the nominative-meaning, in the negative statements so that the same can be explained. However, the alternative theory that the indeclinable refers to the action of coming (of the father) occurring at the same time as the coming (of the son) is a radical departure from the traditional theories ; and thus marks only the final conclusive

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meaning understood from the predicate and the instrumental in the instrumental statements.

Finally as regards the other uses of *saha*. Indian epistemologists such as Jagadīśa etc. recognised the other uses of *saha;* and therefore, held that *saha* refers to the state of having the same relational adjunctness *(samāna pratiyogikatva)* as well. Further, they recognized that *saha* can refer to the occurrence in the same locus (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) which is divided into *ekapaṅkti* and *ekapātra*.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER VIII

THEORY OF INDIRECT OBJECTHOOD (SAMPRADĀNATVA)

Introduction :

Sanskrit, like all other classical languages, has distinguished direct and indirect objects. While the direct object (*karman*) usually assumes the accusative ending, the indirect object (*sampradāna*) usually assumes the dative ending. For instance consider the statment '*He gives a cow to the Brahmin*' (*brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti*). Here while the direct object, the cow (*gām*), has assumed the accusative ending (*am*), the indirect object, the Brahmin (*brāhmaṇāya*), has assumed the dative ending (*aya*). Thus, while Pāṇini has assigned the accusative ending for the direct object (*karman*) (*karmaṇi dvitīyā*, p. ii. 3. 2), he has assigned the dative for the indirect object (*sampradāna*) (*caturthī sampradāne*, p. ii 3.13).

Etymologically speaking (Nyāyakośa), the term *sampradāna* is significant and signifies (expresses) the recipient who is the relational adjunct of the ownership produced from the renouncing of ones right, occurring in the abode of giving (*svāśrayagocaratyāgajanya-svatvapratiyogi*). In '*brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti*', the dative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

signifies (expresses) the relational adjunctness or describerness of the Brahmin (the recipient) relating to the ownership; and thus, one cognizes that the person has the agency of giving producing the ownership of the cow having the Brahmin as the adjunct (i.e described by the Brahmin) from such a usage.

Problem

However, Pāṇini's rule (P. i. 4. 32) and the making of the significant designation of 'recipient' (*sampradāna)* for the indirect object has prompted Indian epistemologists to define the indirect objecthood variously on both syntactic and semantic grounds besides making them analyse the nature and the types of indirect objects. Following is a study of the nature and the definition of the indirect objecthood.

Pānini's rule

Pāṇini rules that the indirect object, i.e the recipient, is what one has in view through the direct object when it becomes instrumental in bringing about an action (*karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam,* p. i. 4.32.). It should be noted (*Kāśikā,* on p i. 4 32) that since the term *sampradāna* is etymologically significant, it is to be understood in connection with only the roots such as to give; and therefore only the recipient such as the teacher would become the *sampradāna* in *'upādhyāyāya gām dadāti'* etc.

Further it should be noted that since the designation of *sampradāna is* significant, it prevents the designation for the village (*grāma)* in *'ajām grāmam nayati'* etc as the use of the designation becomes restricted to only the *kārakas* which are the recipients of the object of givinig, and the village is not the recipient of any object of giving.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, Sanskrit has dative usages both in connection with transitive and intransitive verbs; and thus 'He gives a cow to the Brahmin' (*viprāya gām dadāti)* and 'She lies down for the husband'. (*patye śete*).

Now in the natural interpretation of the rule, the designation of indirect object (*sampradāna)* cannot be explained for the husband as the same is not the *kāraka* one has in view through the object. Thus, Kātyāyana and following him Patañjali (on P. i. 4.32) suggest that the word *kriyayā* should be added to the rule. In that case the rule would mean that what one has in view through the object or through the action is called *sampradāna;* and since the husband in '*patye śete*' is the one the wife has in view through the action of lying down, the same can be explained the designation of indirect object. However it should be noted here that according to Bhartṛhari (Vākyapadīya, III. 7. 129) and Kaiyaṭa (on p i 4. 32), the addition of the word action (*kriyayā)* is not necessary in the rule. They hold so because all the actions such as cooking etc. are the objects of the implied actions such as doing or knowing; and since the action of lying down can be the object of implied knowing, the husband can be explained as the one (indirect object) the wife has in view through the object (lying down) of knowing. Nevertheless, the ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva etc. (Bhāṭṭarahasya, p. 119) refute the explanation on the ground that the cognition of knowing or doing having the cooking etc. as the objects is not necessarily produced from the verbal roots such as '*pac*' etc.; and therefore, there is no possibility that the lying down etc.; in '*patye śete*' etc. can be cognized always as the objects of knowing etc. without adding the word '*kriyayā*' to the rule.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Definitions of the Indirect objecthood : Navya-grammarians' theory

Pāṇini's rule that the indirect object is what one has in view through the direct object has prompted Indian epistemologoists to define the indirect objecthood *(sampradānatva)* variously on both syntactic and semantic grounds : The Navya grammarians such as Nāgeśa (Laghumañjūṣā, p. 1261) hold that the indirect objecthood *(sampradānatva)* is the state of being the *kāraka* intended to be the possessor of the effect produced from the relation of the direct object of any action *(kriyākarm-asambandhajanya phalabhagitvena uddeśyatvam)*. For instance, in *'viprāya gām dadāti'*, and *'patye śete'* etc., the Brahmin and the husband are the indirect objects as they are intended to be the possessors of the effects such as the happiness produced from the relations of the ownership of the cow, and the lying down of the wife, the objects of giving and knowing. Thus, one cognizes in such cases that Caitra has the action of giving that produces the happiness in the Brahmin and also that the wife has the action of knowing that produces the lying down that in turn produces the happiness in the husband. However, it should be noted that such a definition of the indirect objecthood cannot be derived etymologically from the word *'sampradāna';* also it should be noted that in *'caitraḥ grāmam gacchati'.*, Caitra, as he is the possessor of the effect such as the happiness produced from the relation of contact with the village, the object of going, could be imposed the indirect objecthood; and therefore, the definition is overpervasive *(ativyāpaka)*.

The ritualists' definition

Somadeva, the author of Nyāyasudhā (Bhāṭṭarahasya, p. 115), presents a definition of the indirect objecthood

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*sampradānatva)* based on semantical criterion. However, he holds that it is the state of accepting the gift while being intended to be the recipient of the gift being made (*tyajyamānadravyoddeśyatve sati svīkāravatvam*). According to him, the acceptance is the receiving conducive to the possibility of using the objects according to ones own wish; and since the Brahmin is the one accepting the cow and also since he is intended to be the recipient of the gift of the cow being made, the same is the indirect object of giving. However, it should be noted that this definition is intended to cover only the indirect objects of giving etc. and hence fails to cover the indirect objects in intransitive usages such as '*patye śete*' etc.

Also, according to Khaṇḍadeva (Bhāṭṭarahasya, p. 118), even when the said *saṁpradānatva* (as explained by Somadeva) is not understantood by the hearer, the verbal cognition that the act of giving describes both the objecthood of the cow and the indirect objecthood of the Brahmin is produced from '*viprāya gām dadāti*'; and therefore, the indirect objecthood must be held to be merely the state of describing the ownership resident in the object to be given (*deyadravyaniṣṭhatvanirūpakatva)* or the imposed property coextensive with such a state (*tatsamaniyatākhaṇḍopādhi);* and the dative would be expressing only such an indirect objecthood.

Logicians' theory

However, Jagadīśa (Śabdaśakti prakāśaikā, 70) has defined the indirect objecthood (*sampradānatva)* adopting a syntactico-semantical criterion. According to him, the indirect objecthood is the meaning expressed by the dative case that is related to the action of giving. Thus

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

he states that the indirect objecthood is the meaning expressed by the dative occurring in the syntactic analysis as related to the meaning expressed by the verbal roots other than that of going etc. (*gatyādibhinne yaddhātūpasthāpya yādṛśarthe vigrahasthacaturthyā yaḥ svārtho bodhyate*). For instance, in *brāhmaṇāya dhanam dadāti'*, the Brahmin is the indirect object since he is the meaning expressed by the dative occurring in the syntactic analysis and relating to the giving, the meaning expressed by the root other than of going. Also since in *'grāmāya gataḥ'*, the village is not the meaning expressed by the dative relating to the meaning expressed by the root other than that of going, the same need not be the indirect object. Further since in *'vṛkṣasya secakaḥ* ', the tree is not the meaning expressed by the dative occurring in the analysis such as '*saṁvardhayitum*', the same need not be the indirect object.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that this definition of the indirect objecthood covers only the primary indirect objects such as the Brahmin in '*brāhmaṇāya...*' and not the secondary conventional indirect objects such as the husband in '*patye śete*' etc.

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, IV. 1.) was deeply influnced by Pāṇini (p i 4.32); and holds that the indirect objecthood can be defined as the state of being the object of the desire of the agent as being the beneficiary by being the abode of the effect produced by the action (*kriyājanya phalabhāgitayā karturicchāviṣ ayatvam*). In *'brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti'*, the Brahmins is the indirect object since the same is the object of the desire of Caitra as being the beneficiary by being the abode of the ownership produced by giving.

However, Gadādhara's real contribution to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

analysis of the indirect objecthood is his recognition of the fact that the indirect object must be distinguished from the direct object; and while the direct is the abode of the regular effect produced by the action functioning as the delimiting property of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the root, the indirect object is what is intended to be the relatum of the effect other than the regular effect. Thus he holds (Vyutpattivāda, IV. I.) that the indirect objecthood is the state of being what is intended to be the qualificand of the relation of the effect which (state) is different from the state of being the abode of the regular effect functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning expressed by the root (*dhātvarthatāvacchedakaphalāśrayatvabhinnaphalasambandhitayā iṣṭatvam)*. For instance, in '*brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti'*, the Brahmin is the indirect object since he has the state of being what is intended to be the qualificand of the relation of the effect such as the happiness which (state) is different from the state of being the abode of the ownership resident in the cow, the delimitor of the expressedness of giving. According to Gadādhara, the dative in such cases expresses the state of being the object of the desire of the agent as being described by the recipicnt (*nirūpitatvena kartur icchāviṣ ayatvam);* and therefore one cognizes from '*brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti caitraḥ*' that Caitra is the agent of giving the cow which produces the ownership of the cow intended by the agent to be described by the Brahmin.

It should be noted here that only Gadādhara's definitions cover both primary indirect object such as the Brahmin in *'brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti'* and the secondary indirect object such as the husband in '*patye śete*' etc.; and hence is a flawless one.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Threefold nature of indirect object

The indirect object can be admitted as threefold : i) impeller (*preraka*), ii) consentient (*anumantṛ)* and iii) non-refuser (*anirākartṛ)*. Thus, Bhartṛhari (Vākyapadīya, iii. 7.129) states that the *kārakas* become the indirect objects by impelling (*preraṇā),* consenting (*anumati)* and non-refusal (*anirākaraṇa)*. The Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāradarpaṇa (112) states that the impellership (*prerakatva)* is the state of being the possessor of the operation conducive to the cognition of the state of being the means to the desired end such as the giving etc. by the agent while being the object of desire as being the possessor of the effect (ownership) produced by the root-meaning. Thus, the Brahmin is the impeller in *'viprāya gām dadāti':* Whereas the consentientship (*anumantṛtva)* is the state of possessing the operation conducive to merely admitting or allowing of the effect such as the ownership resident in the direct object such as the cow. Thus, the teacher is the consentient in *'upādhyāyāya gām dadāti'*. Also, the non-refusership (*anirākartṛtva)* is the state of not possessing the operation conducive to either preventing or assisting of the activity of the agent while being the object of the desire as being the possessor of the effect produced by the action, the root-meaning. Thus, the deity of sun is the non-refuser in '*sūryāa arghyam dadāti*'.

Also, it should be noted that the indirect objecthood (*sampradānatva),* which is admitted to be the meaning of the dative, must be understood variously under various circumstances. While the indirect objecthood in the primary dative usages such as '*brāhamaṇāya gām dadāti'*, is the state of being the object of desire of the agent as being described (*nirūpitatvena karturicchāviṣ*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ayatva), the same in the secondary dative usages such as '*caitrāya krudhyati, kupyati vā*' etc. is the object-referringness (*viṣayitva)*. Also in the secondary dative usages such as '*pātāya yatate*', the dative expresses the indirect objecthood of the form of being the motive (purpose) (*uddeśyatva)* to be related to the effect such as falling, the root-meaning. However, since the accusative usages such as '*caitram krudhyati*, *druhyati vā*' *etc.* are made using the roots '*krudh*' and '*druh*' etc., the indirect objecthood for the direct object of '*krudh*' and '*druh*' etc. is optional. Also, when the roots such as '*krudh*' and '*druh*' etc. are preceded by the affixes such as '*abhi'*, the direct objects have only the direct objecthood. Thus, the accusative usages *śiṣyam abhikrudhyati, abhidruhati'* etc. are facilitated.

Resume

Pāṇini has recognized the basic linguistic fact that indirect object takes dative case; and accordingly he has assigned the dative for indirect object. However, by making an etymologically significant designation of 'receipient' *(sampradāna)* for the indireet objeet, he has facilitated the indirect objecthood for the Brahmin etc., only in connection with the roots such as ' to give' *(dā)* etc., and thus prevented the same for the village etc. in connection with the roots such as 'to lead' *(nī)* etc.

The linguistic fact that Sanskrit has dative usages in connection with both transitive and intransitive roots must be recognized; and therefore, the same usages must be facilitated by explaining the indirect objecthood not only for the Brahmin etc. but also for the husband etc. by adding '*kriyayā*' in the rule.

Indian epistemologists have presented various

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

definitions of the indirect objecthood (*sampradāṇatva)* on syntactic and semantic grounds. Nāgeśa has presènted the definition of the indirect objecthood based on the semantical ground, and hence held that the indirect objecthood is the state of being the possessor of the effect produced from the relation of the direct object of any action, giving or otherwise. It tries to cover the indirect objects in connection with both transitive and intransitive usages; however the same being over pervasive suffers from the flaw of covering not only the husband in '*patye śete*' but also Caitra in '*caitro grāmam gacchati*'. Also Somadeva's definition that the indirect objecthood is the state of excepting the gift while being intended to be the recipient of the gift too is based on semantical criterion; however, the same suffers from the defect of not covering the indirect objects in intransitive usages; also the proposal of the ritualists that the indirect objecthood is an imposed property co-extensive in its occurrence with the state of describing the ownership resident in the gift to be given, though economical, suffers from the same defect of not covering the indirect objects in intransitive usages.

Thus only Jagadīśa and Gadādhara among all the epistemologists have presented the definition of the indirect objecthood that cover the indirect objects in both transitive and intransitive usages while being non-over pervasive Also, while Jagadīśa's contribution is that he has defined the indirect objecthood using both syntactic and semantic criteria that the indirect objecthood is the meaning expressed by the dative occurring in the analysis related to the meaning of the roots other than that of 'to go' (it incorporates the syntactic oriterion of the objecthood being the meaning of the dative and the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

semantic criterion of being related to the action), Gadādhara's contribution is that he has distinguished the indirect object from the direct object and thus has stated that the indirect objecthood is the state of being what is intended to be the qualificand of the relation of the effect which is different from the state of being the abode of the regular effect, i.e. the direct objecthood.

Also the primary indirect object must be distinguished as threefold, : viz. 1) the impeller (*preraka),* ii) the consentient (*anumantr*) and iii) the non-refuser (*anirākartṛ*) to account for the *kārakas* that assume the indirect objecthood on account of impelling, consenting and not refusing. Further, the indirect objecthood expressed by the dative must of admitted to be varying under different circumstances as different *kārakas* such as the direct objects assume the indirect objecthood in different usages. Thus, it can be concluded that meaning of the dative as distinguished from the direct objecthood is fully explained by the Indian epistemologists.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER IX

USE OF NAMAS IN DATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

Introduction

In English and other modern languages, the dative case marks typically the indirect object of some propositions. Consider for instance:

i) Dived gives a fruit to John and

ii) He pays his homage to the god. While in the first instance, the dative marks the indirect object such as John of the verb 'give', in the second instance, the dative marks the object such as 'god' of the preposition 'to'.

In Sanskrit too, dative can be said to mark the indirect object (or recipient) of a verb such as give (*sampradāna*) and the indirect object or beneficiary of certain indeclinable (*upapada*) nouns. Consider for instance : 'He gives a cow to the Brahmin' (*vīrāya gām dadāti*) and 'This sipping water is for Śiva' (eṣo' rghyaḥ śivāya namaḥ). While in the first instance, the dative marks the Brahmin, the indirect object or recipient of the verb 'give' (and thus corresponds to the dative case

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

marking of the indirect object in English), in the second instance, the dative makes 'Śiva' the indirect object or beneficiary *(uddeśya)* of the noun '*namaḥ*' (and thus corresponds to the dative marking of the indirect object or the proposition 'to' in English).

Though in both cases, the giving or offering of certain articles (things) is made, the basic difference between the recipient of gift (*sampradāna)* and the beneficiary of offering *(tyāgoddeśya)* is that while the former *(sampradāna)* is the one connected with the object of giving expressed by a verb (p.i. iv. 32), the latter (*tyāgoddeśya*) is the one connected with the object of offering expressed by a noun. In other words, while *sampradāna* is a *kāraka* as he is connected with the action expressed by the verb, *tyāgoddeśya* is a non-*kāraka* as he is connected with the offering expressed by the noun.

Recognizing this crucial linguistic fact, Pāṇini has ruled that the dative is used after the beneficiary of offering in association with certain indeclinable such as '*namas*', '*svasti*', '*svāhā*', '*svadhā*' , '*alm*' and '*vaṣat*' (p. ii. 3.16).

Problem

However, epistemologists differed in the analysis of the meaning of the indeclinable such as '*namas*' and the meaning of the dative in such dative constructions as '*eṣorghyaḥ śivāya namaḥ.*' Also there are other uses of the indeclinables such as '*haraye namaḥ*'. And the scholars have differed in the analysis of the meaning of the indeclinables and that of the dative in the other cases. In the following pages, we shall record the various views of Indian epistemologists.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Grammarians' theory

It should be noted here that although linguistically speaking, '*namas*' etc. are indeclinable nouns and govern the non-*kāraka-* dative cases in *'eṣorghyaḥ śivāya namaḥ'* etc., semantically speaking they are equal to the verbs (or predicates) and express certain actions or operations of offering etc. that are similar to the actions of giving etc. expressed by the verbs such as 'give' (*dā*) in *sampradana* usages such as *'gām- viprāya dadāti'.*

Thus the grammarians such as Nāgeśa (Laghumañjūṣā, verse 4, p. 105) have held that the indeclinable words such as *'namas'* etc. express the operations such as offering conducive to the destruction of one's (speaker's) ownership (*svasvatvanivṛttyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ);* and that the dative expresses the state of being the beneficiary to whom an offering is made (*tyāgoddeśyatva).*

For instance consider the *upapada*-usage *'eṣo' rghyaḥ śivāya namaḥ'* once again. Here the indeclinable '*namaḥ'* expresses the operation of offering conducive to the destruction of Caitra's (speaker's) ownership; whereas the dative after *'śiva'* expresses the state of being the beneficiary to whom the offering of sipping water is made. Thus, one cognizes, according to the grammarians, that the sipping water is the object of offering describing the state of being the beneficiary of Śiva.

Logicians' theory

Logicians such as Jagadīśa (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, verse, 92, p. 126) too have generally agreed with grammarians in that the indiclinables such as *'namas'* express the operations such as offering; however, they have qualified the operation as describing the instrumentality of the hymns (*mantrakaraṇakatyāga*) and held that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the dative in such cases expresses the state of being the beneficiary of love *(pitṛyuddeśyakatva)* of the form of being dependent on the desire *(tadicchādhīnatvam)*. According to him, the dative base-meaning such as Viṣṇu is related to such a dative meaning (i.e. love or desire) which in turn is related to the operation of offering.

Now consider for instance the statement 'The flowers are the offerings to Viṣṇu' (*puṣpāṇi viṣṇave namaḥ*). Here the indiclinable word '*namas*' expresses the operation of offering describing the instrumentality of the hymn, whereas the dative expresses the state of being the beneficiary of love. (i.e. Vishnu). Also, the dative base-meaning (Viṣṇu) is related to the love which is in turn related to such an offering. Thus, the flowers are the objects of offering describing the instrumentality of hymn and having Viṣṇu as the beneficiary.

Gadādhara's theory

However, Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, i. 22) simplifies Jagadīśa's theory and holds that the indiclinables such as '*namas*' express merely the operation of offering (*tyāga*). According to him, the indcalinable such as '*namas*' need not express the state of describing the instrumentality of the Vedic hyms (*mantrakaraṇakatva)* as the ame can be understood by implication.

Also according to him, the dative refers to the state of being the beneficiary of offering (*tyāgoddeśyatva);* and supposing the offering is the desire for destruction of ones ownership (*svasvatvābhāvecchā)* such as *śivasyāyam bhavatu,'* then the state of being the beneficiary of offering (*tyāgoddeśyatva*) means the state of being the object of desire as being the possessor of ownership. However suppose the offering is the desire for the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

production of being the beneficiary's owner-ship as well as the destruction of speakers ownership, then the state of being the beneficiary of offering means the state of being the object of offering by way of being the possessor of ownership (*svatvabhagitayā tyāgaviṣayatvam).*

In the first alternative, the desire (*icchā*), that oneself (beneficiary) should have the ownership, is the meaning of the dative case; and the dative base-meaning such as Śiva is related to the offering through the prod-ucedness (*janyatā).* In the second alternative, only the peculiar objectness (*viṣayatāviśeṣa)* is the meaning of the dative case; and the dative base-meaning such as Śiva is related to such an objectness through the descri-bedness; whereas the offering-expressed by '*namas*' is related to the article offered (sipping-water) through the peculiar objectness. Thus the congnition produced is that the offering which has the sipping water as the peculiar object describes the peculiar objectness, i.e. the beneficiaryness of Śiva.

It should be noted here that the indeclinables such as '*namas*' express the offering (*tyāga)* only as describing the agency of the speaker (*svaprayoktṛ puruṣ akartṛkatvoprāgeṇa)*; and therefore the offering made by someone other than the speaker is never cognised from the use of the words '*namas*' etc. in '*śivāya namaḥ*'etc. Also since the doubt as to whether the article offerered belongs to some one other than the speaker or to oneself never arises, there is no need to use '*aham*' in the usages such as '*śivāya namaḥ*' to express the offering of an article as belonging to oneself (speaker). Also, when the priest uses the indeclinable words such as '*namaḥ*' '*svāhā*' etc. in '*śivāya namaḥ*' '*agnaye svāhā*' etc. for expressing the offering of certain articles to Śiva, Agni etc. on behalf of the yajamāna, he does so only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

upon imposing the ownership of the article offered upon himself; and thus the agency of the speaker (priest) described by the action of offering can be conveyed in such cases without any difficulty.

Further, it should be noted that the offering of the article other thatn the one prescribed by the Vedas, when it is different from the worshipping, is never expressed by the indeclenables such as '*namas*' etc. in '*śivāya namaḥ*' etc.; and therefore, the utterance of the indeclinables such as '*namaḥ*' must be grasped as only Vedic. Thus the incorrect usage such as '*annam brāhmaṇāya namaḥ*' cannot be imposed with the intention of conveying the offering of the ordinary food to the Brahmin.

Another interesting point that Gadādhara makes is that the indeclinables such as '*namas*' never express the offering having person lower than oneself (speaker) as the beneficiary (*nīcoddeśyaka tyāga);* and therefore, the utterance of the indeclinables such as '*namas*' must also be qualified as 'having respected person as the beneficiary' (*gauravitoddeśyaka*). And thus the incorrect usage such as '*annam namaḥ śūdrāya*' etc. cannot be imposed with the intention of conveying the offering of the food to the Śūdra that has other than the respected person as the beneficiary.

Gadādharya states further that indeclinables such as '*svāhā*' and '*svadhā*' in '*agnaye svāhā*' and '*pitre svadhā*', which produce the cognition of the offering to the god as adventitiously qualified by the throwing into the fire (*agniprakṣepopahita devoddeśyakatyāga)* and that of the offering to the Pitṛs (*pitruddeśyaka tyāga)* respectively, must be admitted to have the expressive powers in the offerings made by the speaker (*puruṣīyatyāga)*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as adventitiously qualified by 'what is prescribed by the Veda' and 'what is describing the agency of the speaker' (*deśanādesitoccāraṇakartṛtvopalakṣita)*. Thus the incorrect usages such as '*śūdrāya annam svāhā/svadhā vā'* need not be imposed intending to produce the cognition of offering to the Śūdra, a non-Vedic deity, as there is no Vedic prescription for such an offering; also thus the incorrect usages such as '*aham svāhā svadhā vā'* need not be imposed intending to produce the cognition of offering to the gods describing the speaker's own agency, as the agency of the speaker is already understood. Lastly the use of the indeclinable words such as '*svāhā'* and '*svadhā'* in the Tantric worships needs to be explained as tenable by admitting that same is prescribed by the Vedas, as otherwise the same would become untenable due to the absence of the expressive power of such words in the state of being what is offered to the Pitṛs etc.

Other uses of '*namas*'

In English dative is used, besides to mark the indirect object, to denote the beneficiary of (paying of) ones regards. Consider for instance 'I pay my regards to my parents', Here the dative 'to' is used before 'parents' to denote the beneficiary of (paying of) regards.

Sanskrit too uses the dative cases along with the indeclinables '*namas'* etc. to denote the beneficiary of paying of ones regards. Consider for instance, 'Śalutations to Viṣṇu' (*viṣṇave namaḥ)*. Here the dative is used along with '*namaḥ'* to denote the beneficiary of paying of ones regards to Viṣṇu (*namaskāra)*.

However, significantly, the indiclinables such as '*namas' etc*. are used in dative constructions in Sanskrit to denote the paying of ones regards to the superior

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

individual (*namaskāra*) only. Consider for instance, 'Salutations to Hari' (*haraye namaḥ*) and 'Regards to the pitṛs' (*pitṛbhyaḥ svadhā)*. Here the words '*namas*'and '*svadhā*' denote the ideas of paying ones regards to the superior individuals such as Hari and Pitṛs. Since here too the superior individuals are recipient or beneficiary of regards, they receive the dative case in association with '*namas*' etc. by the rule (P. i. 4. 32).

Gaṅgeśa's theory

Interestingly, Indian epistemologists analyse the paying of ones regards to the superior (*namaskāra)* as the revealing of ones own lower rank compared to the higher rank of the beneficiary. Thus the *namaskāra* is the revealing of one's (speaker's) lower rank to the beneficiary (*svāpakarṣabodhaka vyāpāra*). Consider for instance, Śalutations to Śiva' (*haraye namaḥ)*' Here the speaker (Caitra) pays his regards to Śiva means, the speaker (Caitra) reveals his own lower rank to the beneficiary, i.e. to the superior Śiva.

Thus Gaṅgeśa (Tattvacintāmaṇi, ch. 1) holds that the indeclinable such as '*namas*' denotes the operation of oneself (speaker) (*svīyavyāpāra)* conducive to the congnition of ones (speaker's) lower rank compared to that of the beneficiary (*svāpakarṣabodhānukūla*). Thus, in 'Śalutations to Siva' (*haraye namaḥ),* one cognizes that the speaker, desiring the auspiciousness, has the peculiar operation conducive to the cognition of ones (speakers) own lower rank compared to the higher rank of Śiva, the beneficiary.

The paying of ones regards (*namaskāra)*, analysed as the operation of oneself conducive to the cognition of ones lower rank, can vary as the physical operation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*kāyika*) such as bowing, the verbal operation (*vācika*) such as mutterring of words, and the mental operation (*mānasika*) such as concentration vary. Thus, holding that such operations need to be generalized, Gaṅgeśa (Tattva cintāmaṇi, ch. 1., p. 103) states that the state of being such an operation is a particular generic property (*jātiviśeṣa*), common to any one of the three operations. Therefore the usages such as '*haraye namaḥ*' can be made at the time of either of the three operations of the speaker.

Gadādhra's theory

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, IV. 20) closely follows Gaṅgeśa in his analysis of the meaning of the indeclinable '*namas*'in '*haraye namaḥ*' etc., He holds that the paying of ones regards (*namaskāra*) is a peculiar operation of oneself (speaker) conductive to the cognition of one's (speaker's) own lower rank (*svāpakarṣ abodhānukūlaḥ*). And the dative in such cases denotes the limit (*avadhi*) or the state of possessing the limit (*avadhi mattva*) relating to the lower rank of the speaker (*svāpakarṣa*). Thus one cognises in '*haraye namaḥ*' that the speaker has the peculiar operation conducive to the cognition of one's own lower rank that has Hari as the limit or boundary.

However, it should be noted here that both dative and accusative statements are prevalent in Sanskrit in association with (the use of) the indeclinables such as '*namas*'. For instance, consider 'Salutations to Svayambhu' (svayambhuve namaḥ) and 'Having saluted Nārāyaṇa' (*narāyanam namaskṛtya*). Here, while in the first case, dative case is used in association with '*namas*', in the second case, only an accusative is used is association with '*namas*'. The reason for this distinction is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that while in the first case, the word '*namas*' is an *upapada*-word expressing the operation of the speaker conducive to the cognition of ones own lower rank, in the second case, '*namaṣkṛtya*' is a verb expressing the operation of the speaker conducive to the congnition of the objecthood described by the congnition of the state being the limit of ones own lower rank. Thus, the rule is that the dative is used in the case where the indeclinable word '*namas*' is an *upapada* and hence has the relation with the dative case-meaning (i.e. the state of possessing the limit); whereas the accusative is used in the case where '*namaskṛtya*' is a verb; and hence has the relation with the accusative case-meaning (i.e. the substratumness of the objecthood). Thus, the cognition produced from the accusative usage '*nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya.*' is that one (speaker) has the operation conducive to the cognition of the objecthood of Narāyaṇa described by the cognition of the state of being the limit of ones (speaker's) own lower rank. A point to be noted here is that in '*haraye namaḥ*', '*prajābhyaḥ svasti*', '*agnaye svahā*', '*pitṛbhyaḥ svadhā*', '*daityebhyo hariḥ alam*' etc. the indeclinables such as '*namas*' *etc.* are *upapadas;* and since *upapadas* are only suggestive of speaker's intention to grasp certain meanings (*tātparya grāhaka)* and not directly expressive (*vācaka*) of any meanings, the dative in association with such words are only *upapada*-vibhaktis. And the purpose of admitting the dative in such cases as the *upapada*-dative is that the same avoids both the *śeṣa* -genitive in association with '*namas*' etc. and the dative in association with words other than '*namas*' etc. denoting the same sense.

Grammarians' theory

Most of the modern epistemologists have closely

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

followed Gaṅgeśa's analysis in their theory of the paying of ones regards, the meaning of '*namas*' etc. However, there is some controversy regarding the meaning of the dative and its relation to the operation.

According to the grammarians (Laghumañjūṣā, 4 p. 109), paying of ones regards is the operation of the speaker such as the bowing or muttering of words conducive to the cognition of one's lower rank, which (operation) has the beneficiary of regards as the boundary or limit of lower rank (found in the speaker). Therefore, the dative occurring after the beneficiary of regards denotes the state of being the beneficiary as the boundary or limit (*uddeśyāvadhitva*). Thus the cognition procuced in '*haraye namaḥ*' is that the speaker has the operation such as bowing conducive to the cognition of one's (speaker's) lower rank having the beneficiary (Hari) as the boundary or limit.

Ritualists' theory

Ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva (Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya, p. 125) disagree with the grammarians in that the dative express's the state of being the beneficiary as the boundary or limit. According to them, the dative needs to express merely the state of being the beneficiary of regards (*uddeśyatva)*. And the same is related to the activity expressed by the *ākhyāta* through the relation of possessing the operation of bowing describing itself (*svanirūpaka namanāstitvavaiśiṣṭya)*. Thus one cognizes from '*haraye namaḥ*' that the speaker has the activity possessing the operation of bowing describing the state of being the beneficiary of regards to Hari.

Jagadīśa's theory

Jagadīśa (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, verse 92, p. 126)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

follows ritualists. Although he does admit that *uddeśyatva* can be the meaning of the dative, his statement that the objectness *(viṣayatva)* is the meaning of the dative amply clarifies his position that the state of being the beneficiary or the indirect objecthood is what is understood by the dative. Thus, the cognition produced in the cases like 'Salutation to the Brahmins' (*brāhmaṇebhyo namaḥ)* is that the speaker has the operation of bowing that describes the state of being the beneficiary or the indirect objecthood of the Brahmins.

Resume

Like in English, in Sanskrit too dative marks the indirect object of giving and indirect object of offering. Thus, *'viprāya gām dadāti'* and *'eṣo' rghyaḥ śivāya-namaḥ'*. However, while the first is a *kāraka-* case, by being connected with the action of a verb, the second is a non-*kāraka*-case by being connected with the noun-meaning.

Since *the upapadas* such as *namas* are used in lieu of verbs, the grammarians have held that the same express the operation of offering conducive to the destruction of ones own ownership and the dative refers to the beneficiary of offering. However, while the logicians such as Jagadīśa have proposed that '*namas*' etc. convey the offering describing the instrumentality of hymns and the dative conveys the state of being the beneficiary of love, Gadādhara etc. disagreed with such a view and held that the '*namas*' etc. convey merely the offering, as the instrumentality of hymn is implied. Further they have held that '*namas*' etc. convey the offering as describing the agency of the speaker and as having the respectful person as the beneficiary. Thus the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

incorrect usages such as '*śūdrāya annam svāhā*' and '*aham svāhā svadhā vā*' etc. need not be imposed. Now as regards the other uses of the indiclinables such as '*namas*' etc. Since the paying of one's regards (*namaskāra*) is analysed as the revealing of ones own lower rank while confirming the higher rank of the beneficiary of regard's, logicians such as Gaṅgeśa have held that '*namas*' etc. refer to the speaker's operation conducive to the cognition of the lower rank of oneself.

Though later epistemologists have followed Gaṅgeśa in their analysis of the paying of one's regards, they have differed from him in their analysis of the meaning of the dative occurring of the indirect object: while the later logicians such as Gadādhara have held that the dative expresses the time limit, the grammarians proposed that it expresses the state of being the beneficiary as the limit or rank; also the ritualists and Jagadīśa have proposed that the dative expresses the state of being the beneficiary and the indirect objecthood. And this difference in the analysis of dative meaning is due to the difference in their perceptions regarding the status and the function of the indirect object of paying regards to.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER X

ANALYSIS OF ABLATION (APĀDĀNATVA)

In Sanakrit different *kāraka*-relationships are expressed by different cases endings. While the subject the object, and the indirect object are expressed by the instrumental, the accusative and the dative case endings, the ablation (*apādāna*) is expressed by the ablative or the fifth case ending. Thus Pāṇini assigns ablative in the sense of ablation (*apādāne pañcamī,* p. ii. 3.28). Also while the *kāraka* who is independent is the agent (*svatantraḥ-kārtā*), and the item sought most is the object (*īpsitatamam karma*), the boundary or the limit from which one moves away (*avadhi*) is the ablation. Thus Pāṇini defines the ablation as the fixed point in relation to the moving away or that from which something recedes away (*dhruvam apāye apādānam,* p. i. 4. 24.).

Problem

However, different Indian episitemologists belonging to different systems of Indian philosophy and grammar have analysed ablation (*apādāna*) variously on semantic, syntactic and other grounds.

Also, different epistemologists have presented dif-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ferent theories of ablative-meaning by highlighting semantic, syntactic and other aspects of ablation. Following is a study of the nature of ablation and the meaning of ablative case.

Analysis of ablation: grammarians position

Bhartṛhari (*Vākyapadīya*, iii. (7). 136) has analysed the ablation (*apādāna*) mainly as the boundary or limit of the action (*kriyāvadhi*); and hence has stated that the indifferent item, i.e. the item not affected by the action of moving away (*udāssīna*), becomes the ablation when functioning as the boundary or limit of the action. Also, according to him, such an indifferent item needs to function further as the fixed point (*dhruva*) for becoming the ablation. Thus for instance, the horse becomes the ablation by functioning as the fixed point in relation to the falling of the person from the moving horse (*cala*) in '*aśvāt puruṣaḥ* patati', whereas the wall becomes the ablation by functioning naturally as the fixed point in relation to the falling of the horse from the non-moving wall (*acala*) in '*kuḍyāt aśvaḥ patati*'.

Thus whatever *kāraka* acquires the nature of being a boundary or limit (*avadhibhāva*) by assuming the unreal nature of fixed point (*atadāveśa*) is the ablation. And this position of Bhartṛhari is in conformity with the etymological analysis of the term *apādāna* that an item which serves as boundary in relation to moving away (*apagamya ādīyate avadhitvena* iti *apādānam*).

Here the ablation according to Bhartṛhari (Vākyapadīya, iii (7) 137), can be divided into three types: as i) of the expressed action (*inirditṣaviṣaya*) such as the falling in 'The person falls from the horse' (*aśvāt patati*) (here the action of falling that produces the separation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is expressed); (ii) of the understood or indicated action (*upāttaviṣaya*) such as the coming out in 'The lightening shines (as coming out) from the cloud' (*balāhakāt* (*nissṛtya*) *vidyotate vidyut*) (here the root *vidyotate* indicates the shining of the lightening as coming out or separating from the cloud); and iii) of the required (implied) action (*apekṣitakriya*) such as the coming in 'Where are you coming from, Pāṭatalīputra' (*kuto bhavān, pāṭalīputrāt*) (here this action of coming from Pāṭ alīputra is implied).

Analysis of ablation based on semantic consideration

A number of Indian epistemologists however, have analysed the ablation by taking into account the semantic aspect (function) of the ablation. The ablation is, semantically speaking, the fixed point in relation to moving, i.e. one which is the abode of the effect such as the separation while not being the abode of the action. Thus, Gadādhara (*Avacchedakatānirukti* ...) has stated that the ablation is the abode of the separation produced from the action while not being the abode of the action (*kriyānāśrayatve sati kriyājanyavibhāgāśrayatvam*). In 'The leaf falls from the tree' (vṛkṣāt *parṇam patati*), the tree is the ablation with respect to the falling by not being the abode of the action of falling (moving away); whereas the leaf need not be the ablation because, despite being the abode of the separation, the same is not the non-abode of the action of falling.

It should be noted here that the ablation is the abode of the effect of separation while not being the abode of the action of falling etc. means that the same ablation can have the mutual absence such as 'It is not the abode of the action' (*kriyāvānna*). Thus Gadādhara

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(Vytpattivāda, V. 1) presents yet another definition of the ablation based on semantic consideration (function) that ablation is the abode of the separation produced from the actions, the delimitor of the counter positiveness described by the mutual absence resident in oneself (*svaniṣṭhabhedapratiyogitāvacchedakībhūta kriyājanyavibhāgāśrayatvam*). Since the tree, in '*vrkṣāt parṇam patati*', is the abode of the separation produced from the action, the delimitor of the counter posttiveness described by the mutual absence such as '*kriyāvānna*' occurring in oneself, the same is the ablation. And since the action is qualified to be the delimitor of the counter-positiveriess...', the leaf can be avoided from becoming the ablation as the same does not have the separation produced from the action, that is the delimitor of the counter-positiveness (the mutual absence *'kriyāvānna'* is contradictory in the leaf).

However, the point to be noted here is that since the ablation is not the abode of the action concerned, the same would have the mutual absence such as '*kriyāvānna*;' and hence the action can be viewed as the delimitor of the counterpositiveness. Thus the present analysis views the action as the delimitor of the counter positivesness and the ablation as the item effected from such an action.

Jagadīśa's analysis of ablation

Jagadīśa also follows the same semantic consideration that the ablation is the abode of the effect such as separation, while not being the abode of the action. However, he analyses the ablation (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 6) as the one being the abode of the effect such as separation produced from the action inherent in something

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

different from the ablation itself (*parasamaveta kriyājayanyavibhāgāśrayatvam*). And the tree in '*vṛkṣāt parṇam patati*' can be the ablation as it is the abode of the separation produced from falling inherent in something different from oneself, i.e. the leaf. Also since the action is qualified as inherent in some thing different from oneself, the leaf need not become the ablation by being the abode of the separation produced by the falling as the action in not inherent in something different from oneself, the leaf.

However, the difference between Gadādhara's and Jagadīśās analyses is that while the former has considered the ablation to be merely the non-abode of the action, the latter has considered the same as the non-abode of the action inherent in something different from oneself.

Analysis based on syntactic consideration

However, the real contribution of Jagdīśa to the analysis is his effort to analyse the ablation as a syntactic entity. Thus he states that the meaning of he ablative case, which can be cognized (from the analysis of compound) to be relating to the action expressed by the root, is the ablation with respect to the action expressed by the root. In '*vṛkṣāt parṇam patati*', the tree is the ablation with respect to the action of falling expressed by '*patati*', as the same is the meaning of the ablative cognized to be relating to the action of falling. The most significant aspect of this analysis is that it takes into consideration the fact that the ablative case is used in the sense of the ablation; and hence the same is the meaning expressed by the ablative case.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Ritualists' analysis

Ritualists (Nyākośa), on the other hand, hold that the being the ablation must be analysed to be an indivisible property (*akhaṇḍopādhi),* coextensive with being the said ablation as evidenced by the common usages such as 'This is an abliation' and 'This is another ablation (*anugatavyāpārasākṣika*). According to them, such an assumption is justified on the ground that ablation as an *akhaṇḍopādhi* is economical, whereas the ablation as being the abode of the separation produced from the action while not being the abode of the action (*kriyānāśrayatve sati kriyājanyavibhāgāśrayatvam)* is heavy.

It must be observed here that the ritualists analysis of the ablation as an indivisible property (*akhaṇḍopādhi)* is prompted merely by the consideration of so-called economy in assumption that ablation as an indivisible property is economical. However, since the analysis of the same as *kriyānāśrayatve sati kriyājanya-vibhāgāśrayatvam* needs to be taken into account as the factor conducive to the identification of the indivisible property, the intended economy remains much doubtful in reality.

Avoidance of ativyāpti

It may be objected now that the tree needs to be the ablation in 'Bird leaves the tree' (*vṛkṣam tyajati)* as the same is the abode of the separation while not being the abode of the action of leaving. However, it should be noted that since the designation of object is stronger than that of ablation, the same takes precedence over the designation of ablation; and hence the contingency of the designation of ablation for the trce gets avoided.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Also the contingency can be overcome by qualifying the effect, the separation, as described by the ablation *(yannirūpita)* instead of as resident in the ablation *(yanniṣṭha)*. And since the separation in '*vṛkṣam tyajati*' is intended to be resident in the tree and not described by the tree, the tree need not become the ablation by being the abode of separation produced by the leaving.

The ablative-meaning: Basice Theory

The ablative case is ruled in the sense of the ablation (P. ii. 3. 28); and hence has expressive power in the sense of ablation. However, since the ablation is analysed as being the abode of the separation produced from the action inherent in something different from the ablation itself, the ablative must be admitted to have expressive power in the separation and the inherence in something different from the ablation itself; and the ablative base-meaning such as the tree must be admitted to be related to the separation through the inherence and to the mutual absence (part of the other ablative meaning) through the relation of describing of the counter-positiveness of the entity, the abode of the separation from the abode of the delimitor of the expressedness of the base-meaning. Whereas the same ablative case meanings, the separation and the inherence in something other than the ablation must be admitted to be related to the action of falling etc. through the relation of the producing and the self linkirig relations respectively. Thus one cognizes in '*vṛkṣāt parṇaṃ patati*' that the leaf is the abode of the action of falling inherent in the item, i.e. the abode of the mutual absence of the tree, through such a relation of describing of the counter-posi-tiveness of the entity, i.e. the abode of the separation from the tree, which in turn is the abode of the delimitor

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the expressedness of the expressed ablative-meaning such as the treeness, whereas the tree is the abode of the separation produced from the action of falling.

Navyas' theory:

According to the Navyas (Bhāṭṭantra rahasya, p. 126), merely the state of describing the counter-positiveness of some entity, the abode of the dolimitor of the expressedness of the expressed ablative-meaning, cannot be the relation of the ablative base-meaning with the difference (mutual absence). For, in that case when the leaf falls from the tree, the incorrect usage 'The leaf falls from the leaf' (*parṇāt parṇam patati*) would become necessary as the falling can occur even in the falling leaf that has the difference (-mutual absence) describing the counterpositinieness of some indifferent leaf, the abode of the delimitor of iṭhe expressadness of the expressed ablative-meaning (leaf). Thus, they propose that the entity constituting the relation of the ablative base-meaning with the difference (mutual absence) must be qualified as the abode of the separation produced from falling. Now since the indifferent leaf is not the abode of the separation produced from the falling, the incorrect usage can be avoided.

Navya Naiyāyikaikadeśin's theory

According to some section of Navyas (Bāṭṭ-atantrarahasya, p. 128), the state of not being the abode of the action (*kriyānāśrayatvam*) in the definition of ablation is only the possession of the difference (mutual absence) that has the possessor of the action as its counterpositive (*kriyāvatprattiyogika bhedāśrayatvam*), and not the being the counterpositive of the difference (mutual absence) occurring in the possessor of the action

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*kriyāvanniṣṭha bhedapratiyogitvam*), as it would involve a heavy relationship. Now since the action is the delimitor of the counter positiveness described by the mutual absence and the mutual absence is resident in the ablation, as well as in the indifferent leaf, the qualifying phrase 'the state of being the abode of the separation produced from action' (*kriyājanya-vibhāgāśrayatvam*) needs to be included in the definition of the ablation to avoid the indifferent leaf from becoming the ablation. Thus in this theory the separation and the mutual absence are the two separate meanings of the ablative. And the ablative base-meaning (tree) is related to them (i.e. to the separation and to the mutual absence) through the superstratumness; whereas the same two are related to the action of falling through the producing and the being the delimitor of the counterpositiveness respectively. Thus the congnition produced from 'vṛkṣāt *parṇam patati'* is that the leaf has the falling which is the delimitor of the counterpositiveness described by the mutual absence occurring in the tree and which is the producer of the separation occurring in the tree.

Ritualists' theory

As a matter of fact, when the ablative case is held to express the separation and the inherence in some thing different from itself (ablation), the ablative needs to be assumed to have two separate expressive powers in those two meanings. And also when the ablative base-meaning such as the tree is held to be related to both of them, two separate conventions need to be assumed. And compared to such assumptions, it would be economical to assume that the ablative has single expressive power in the sense of the ablationness (*apādānatvam*). Thus the ritualists hold that the ablationness is of the form of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

indivisible property (*akhaṇḍopādhirūpam*) coextensive in its existence with the state of being the abode of the separation produced from the falling and inherent in something different from itself. According to them, the cognition produced in '*vṛkṣāt parṇam patati*', is that the activity is conducive to the action of falling describing the ablationness of the form of the indivisible property occurrent in the tree.

It should be noted however, that in the cases such as '*vṛkṣāt vibhajate*', the said form of ablation is impossible to cognize due to the absence of the state of being the abode of the separation produced from the splitting or separating; and therefore only the boundary of the form of the self-linking relation must be held to be the meaning of the ablative.

Resume

Pāṇini has recognized the linguistic fact that ablative (*pañcamī*) is used in the sense of the ablation (*apādāna*) and hence ruled the ablative in the sense of ablation (P. ii 3.28); and also stated that the ablation is the fixed point in relation to moving away (P. i. 4.24). However, different epistemologists differed in their analyses of the ablation and the ablative-meanings.

Bhartṛhari has conceived the ablation mainly as the unaffected indifferent boundary or limit (*avadhi*) functioning as the fixed point in relation to the action such as falling; and thus elaborated upon Pāṇini's analysis. However, both Gadādhara and Jagadīśa analysed the ablation mainly on the semantic function and held that the ablation is the fixed point means it is the abode of the effect such as the separation while not being the abode of the action such as falling. However, while

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Gadādhara understood -the same as being the abode of the separation produced from the action, the delimitor of the counter-positiveness, Jagadīśa understood the same as being the abode of the separation produced from the action inherent in something different from itself. Also the ritualists analysed the ablation to be an indivisible property without really attempting to analyse the nature of ablation as such.

Now as regards the meaning of the ablatives. Since the ablative is ruled in the sense of ablation and the ablation is the being the, abode of the separation produced from the action inherent in some thing different from itself, the ablative is held to have expressive powers in the separation and such an inherence .. by the logicians. Whereas some Navya-logicians have admitted that the ablative has the expressive powers in the separation and the mutual absence on the ground that the mutual absence too constitutes the nature of ablation. However, both these theories as well as the theory that the ablative expresses the separation and the producing (Vyutpatti vāda, v.3.) are based on the convention that the ablative expresses the constituents of ablation. And also the theory that the ablative expresses the indivisible property of the form of the ablationness too is based on the same convention that the ablative expresses the ablation. Thus all the theories confirm to the general convention that the ablative refers to the general form of the ablation or its constituents.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER XI

MEANING OF ABLATIVE IN 'VYĀGHRĀD BIBHETI'

Introduction

In Latin ablative case, which is equal to 'from or 'by' in English, expresses source, cause, agent and instrument. Consider for instance 'He fears death from foe' and 'He shoots him by arrow'. Here foe and arrow are the source and instrument of fear respectively and hence take ablative cases.

In Sanskrit to, ablative case (*apādāna*) is used to express cause or source of fear (*bhayahetu*). For instance, consider 'He fears (his life) from the tiger' (vy*āghrād bibheti*'). Here the tiger is the source or cause of ones fear for life and hence the ablative case is used after 'vy*āghra*' indicating the tiger, the source of fear. Pāṇini too recognized this linguistic fact and hence assigned the ablative after the cause of fear in association with the roots expressing the fear and the protection from fear (*bhītrārthānām bhayahetuḥ* p. i. 4.25). Thus, 'He fears from the tiger' (*vyāghrād bibheti*) and 'He protects the rich from the thief' (*caurād dhanikam trāyati*) can be explained to be ablative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

statements with ablative cases after *'vyāghra'* and *'caura'*, the sources of ear.

Problem

However, various epistemologists have explained the ablative-meaning i.e. ablation in such cases variously. Thus, we shall discuss the important. explanations to understand the exact nature of ablation in the ablative statements.

Grmmarians' theory

Modern grammrians (Laghumañjūṣā, 5, p. 109), explain the ablative statements such as '*vyāghrād bibheti*' by holding that 'source or cause of fear' (*bhayahetu*) in the rule means 'the cause of undesired end' (*aniṣta hetu*) forming a part of 'fear' (*bhaya*); and hence ablation is the cause of undesired end such as death. Also they hold that the ablative case expresses the producedness relating to the root-meaning. Thus,, according to them, the cognition produced in such a case is that the knowledge of fear of undesired end (death) is caused or produced from the tiger.

It should be noted here that when the knowledge of fear as produced from certain source of fear such as tiger is not established, the ablative statement such as '*vyāghrād bibheti*' is not made. Thus the knowledge of fear is admitted as the meaning of the roots such as 'fear' (*bibheti*) etc. Also it should be pointed out that if such a statement under such a circumstance is made then the same must be explained by imposing the causality of source of fear on the tiger.

Jaqadīśa's theory

It should be noted that the fear (*bhaya*) is generally defined as the knowledge of impossibility of avoiding the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

undesired end at the time of its cause (*aniṣṭahetūpanipāte tatparityāgānarhatājñānam*, Gautama sūtra vṛtti, iv. .3). For instance, the knowledge of impossibility of avoiding the death at the attack of tiger is the fear. Almost in the same vein, it can be stated that lack of ability to overcome the danger at the time of the cause of danger (*aniṣṭaviṣayasādhanopanipāte tajjihāsānarhatā*) is also the fear. Thus the lack of ability to overcome death at the time of the attack of tiger is also fear.

Thus, Jagadīśa (Śabdaśakti prakāśika, 68, p. 80) holds that fear (*bhaya*) is the thought of one's undesired end as inevitable (*bhāvitvena svāniṣṭacintanam*). According to him, such a fear is the meaning of '*bibheti*' and either the being the cause (*janakatva*) or the being, the effect (*janyatva*) is the meaning of the ablative occurring after the cause of fear such as '*vyāghra*'. Thus, the cognition produced from '*vyāghrād bibheti*' is that one has the thought of inevitable undesired and (death) having the tiger as its cause. Now this theory is not radically different from that of grammarians excepting that it clarifies the concept of fear further.

Gadādhāra's theory

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, v. 9) probably proposes the most significant theory of ablative-meaning in '*vyāghrād bibheti*', '*dasyubhyo rakṣati*'. etc. According to him, fear (*bhaya*) is the assumption of undesired end (danger) from the enemy (*parato' niṣṭa sambhāvanā*) in '*vyāghrād bibheti*'; and protection (*trāṇa*) is the operation conducive to the avoidance of undesired end (*aniṣṭ anivṛttyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ*) in '*dasyubhyo rakṣati*'. And the ablative expresses the causedness or the produceedness (*prayojyatva*) which is related to the undesired end (danger). Thus one cognises in such cases that one has

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the assumption of undesired end caused from the tiger and that one has the operation conducive to the avoidance of the undesired end caused from the thief.

Further, Gadādhara suggests an alternative theory of the abaltive-meaning to facilitate the ablative state for the tiger in '*vyāghrād bibhoti*' when the fear of death is not established for the person; but nevertheless the person assumes the death from the tiger. According to him, though in such a case, the state of being caused or produced (*prayojyatva*) from the tiger (the abaltive-meaning) is contradictory to the undesired end (death) (i.e. to the root-meaning), the ablative can be held alternatively to express the state of having the producedness as the qualifier (*prayojyatā prakārakatva*) which can be related to the assumption of the undesired end (death) (the state of having the producedness as the qualifier is not contradictory in the assumption of the death as the same assumption can be produced from the tiger). Thus the statement '*vyāghrād bibheti*' becomes facilitated. Further the advantage in such a theory is that '*bibheti devadattāt*' etc. can be facilitated even at the assumption of harm from the friend Devadatta due to the illusion of his enemy-status. Thus, while the ablation (*apādāna*) in the case of '*vyāghrād bibheti*' can be summed up to be the one who is assumed to be the cause of fear (*bhayahetutvena sambhāvita*); the same in '*dasyubhyo rakṣati*' can be summed upto be the one who is actually the cause of fear (*aniṣṭ aprayojaka*).

Ritualists' theory

Ritualists (Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya, p. 131) generally follow the grammarians and logicians in explaining the ablationness for the tiger and the thief in '*vyāghrād*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

bibheti' and '*caurād dhanikam rakṣati*' etc. However, they propose that the root '*rakṣati*' expresses the operation conducive to the absence of fear (*bhayābhāvānukūlavyāpāra*) and also that the ablative expresses the possession of cause. They propose so to explain the rich etc. as the objects due to the possession of the effects such as the absence of fear and to explain the thief etc. as the ablations due to being the cause of fear. Thus according to them, what one cognises from '*caurād dhanikam rakṣ ati*' is that the operation is conducive to the absence of fear resident in the rich and caused by the thief.

It should be noted here that in 'Of which god who is angry are people afraid in the battle' (*kasya bibhyati devasya jātaroṣasya samyuge*), the meaning of '*kasya*' is directly related to the battle (*samyuge*) and is related only indirectly to the operation conducive to the fear, the root-meaning; and therefore only a *śeṣa*-genitive (instead of the *kāraka*-ablative) is used.

Conclusion: While the grammarians have maintained that 'fear' (*bhaya*) is the undesired end (*aniṣta*) and the production is the meaning of the ablative. Jagadīśa has held that 'fear' is the thinking of one's inevitable undesired end and either the being the cause or being the effect is the meaning of the ablative; thus he has implied that the ablation is being the cause of undesired end. However, Gadādhara has suggested significantly a distinct theory that 'fear' is the assumption of undesired end, and the causedness or the producedness is the meaning of the abaltive; thus he has implied that the ablation is the being the cause of the undesired end which may be either real or assumed erroneously.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER XII

MEANING OF ABLATIVE IN 'KŪPĀD ANDHAM VĀRAYATI'

Introduction

Now as regards the meaning of ablative in 'He prevents the blind from falling into the ditch' (*kūpād andham vārayati*). While generally the item, which is desired by the agent to be the substratum of the effect of actions, is the grammatical object (*kartur īpsitatamam karma* p. i. 4.4.), the item, which is desired by the agent to be the substratum of the effect of certain other actions, is the ablation (*apādāna*). Consider for instance:

i) 'He goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*)

ii) 'He prevents the blind from falling into the ditch' (*kūpād audham vārayati*). Here while in the first case, the village, which is desired by the agent to be the substratum of the contact, the effect produced by the action of going, is the grammatical object, in the second case, the blind man, who is desired by the agent to be the agent of the separation, the effect produced by the action of preventing from falling into the ditch, is the ablation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Recognizing this linguistic fact, Pāṇini has ruled that the item desired by the agent in association with the roots expressing the sense of prevention is the ablation (*vāraṇārthānām īpsitah,* p. i. 4. 27). And the rule means that the particular item, which is desired by the agent to be the substratum of the effect such as the separation in association with the roots expressing the prohibition of action, is the ablation. Thus the ditch in '*kūpād andham vārayati*' is the ablation, as it is the one which is desired by the agent (Caitra) to be the substratum of the separation in association with the root '*vārayati*' expressing the prohibition of the action of falling.

Problem

However, various epistemologists such as logicians and grammarians presented various analyses of the 'prevention' (*vāraṇa*) and also differed in their analyses of the ablation. We shall make a brief study of all these issues.

Gadādhara's explanation

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, v.10) explains that the 'prevention' (*vāraṇa*) in the rule means the prohibition from undertaking any action (*kriyāpratiṣedha*). Thus, while in 'He prevents the cow from the wheat' (*yavebhyo gām vārayati*), the prohibition has the form of being an operation conducive to the absence of the agency of cow (*kartṛtvābhāvānukūlavyāpāra*), the action has the form of (being) eating (wheat) etc. Also while the cow is the object of preventing by having the effect such as the absence of the agency, the delimitor of the expressedness of the root-meaning (*dhātvarthatāvacchedaka phalaśāli*), the wheat is the ablation of preventing by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

being desired by the agent to be the substratum of the effect such as the separation produced from the particular action such as preventing (*tattat kriyājanya phalabhāgitayā karturabhīpsita*).

Also Gadādhara suggests that the ablative after '*yavā*' expresses the state of producing the effect (such as the contact down below the throat), the object of desire of the cow as occurring in the wheat (*yavādigatatvena icchāviṣayaphalakatva*). Thus, according to him, the cognition produced from '*yavebhyo gām vārayati*' is that one has the effort conducive to the operation in turn, conducive to the absence of the agency of the eating (*vyāpāra viśeṣakartṛtvābhāvānukūla vyāpārānukūla kṛtimān*) which is conducive to the effect such as the contact, the object of desire of the cow as occurring in the wheat.

It should be noted that according to Gadādhara, the desire as occurring in the agent of the operation such as eating needs to be included in the meaning of the ablative case; for, otherwise the ablative statement such as 'He prevents Caitra from the poison' (*caitram viṣād vārayati*) instead of the statement 'He prevents Caitra from poisonous food' (*saviṣānnād vārayati*) would become necessary even when the eating of poison is not intended directly as such, but only eating of the poison as connected with the rice is intended, i.e. occurs by chance. Thus only to indicate such an inclusion of the desire in the ablative-meaning, Paṇini has used the term '*īpsitaḥ*' in the rule.

Jayarāma's explanation

Jayarāma (Kāraka vyākhyāna, p. 10). closely follows (Gadādhara in his explanation of the ablative statement such as '*kūpād andham vārayati*'. According to him, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'prevention' (*vāraṇa*) is the operation conducive to the absence of the action of falling etc. (*abhāvānukūlavyāpāra*), and the ablative after '*kūpa*' expresses the occurrence (*vṛttitva*) relating to the blind etc.; whereas the accusative after '*andha*' expresses the counter positiveness described by the absence of falling, the delimitor of the expressedness of the root-meaning; and the absence is related to the operation through the relation of contact down below produced from falling. Thus the cognition produced from the sentence is that one has the operation conducive to the absence of falling resident in the ditch that has the blind as the counter-positive (*kūpavṛttyandhapratiyogikābhāvānukūlavyāpāravān*)

Jagadīśa's explanation

Jagadīśa (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 68 p. 83) explains that 'prevention' (*vāraṇa*) in '*kūpād andham vārayati*' is the operation conducive to the stopping which has the action such as falling as the qualificand (*kriyādharmika nivṛttyanukūlavyāpāra*). According to him, the ablative after '*kūpa*' expresses the qualifireness of the ditch *(kūpa prakārakatva)* and the accusative after '*andha*' expresses the residence in the blind (*andhavṛttitva*). Thus the cognition produced from the sentence is that one has the operation conducive to the stopping of the action of falling into the ditch resident in the blind which has the action of falling as the qualificand and the ditch as the qualifier. (Here the operation conducive to the stopping is the verbal utterance such as 'please don't fall into the ditch').

Grammarians' theory

Grammarians (Laghumañjūṣā, p. 109), however, technically differ from the rest of the epistemologists in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

their analysis of the ablation in the ablative statement '*kūpād andham vārayati*'. According to them, prevention (*vāraṇa*) is the obstruction of ones inclination for undertaking any action (*pravṛttivighāta*) of the form of the operation conducive to the absence of the action of falling producing the contact (*saṁyogānukūlavyāpārābh-āvānukūla vyāpāra*). Also according to them, the being what is desired by the agent (*īspitatamatva*), which is nothing but being the ablation, is the being the substr-atum of the effect, viz. part of the meaning of the root 'prevent' (*vāraṇadhātvartha plalāśrayatva*); and the same ablation is to be analysed further as being the substratum of the effect to be produced from the operation of falling, i.e. the counterpositive of the absence of falling (*abhāva-pratiyogi vyāpārajanyaphalāśrayatva*). And since the ditch is potentially the substratum of the effect such as the contact to be produced from the operation of falling, i.e. the counterpositive of the absence of falling (into the ditch), the same is the ablation.

It should be noted here that since the grammarians view the ablation as the substratum of the positive effect such as the contact, instead of viewing the same as the substratum of the negative effect such as separation, their analysis apparently contradicts the established view that the ablation in '*kūpād andham vārayati*' is the substratum of the effect such as the separation produced from the operation (action) such as preventing. However, the contradiction needs to be avoided on the ground that the item such as the ditch becomes the ablation only upon the prevention of the blind from falling into it. and hence could very well be the substratum of the positive effect such as the contact in the event of not preventing the blind from falling into it.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Conclusions

Now it can be concluded as follows. That while Pāṇini recognized the linguistic fact that the item which is desired by the agent in association with the roots expressing the sense of prevention is the ablation, Gadādhara and his followers elaborated the same fact as that the item (such as wheat) which is desired by the agent to be the substratum of the effect such as the separation produced from the action of preventing is the ablations : Also Jagadīśa specified that the action such as falling is the qualificand and the ablation such as the ditch is the qualifier in the analysis of the prevention (*vāraṇa*). Thus only the modern grammarians have technically differed from others by stating that the ablation is the potential substratum of the positive effect such as the contact produced from the operation of falling.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER XIII

ANALYSIS OF ŚEṢA

Introduction

Case endings express both *kāraka* - and non-*kāraka*-relationships. Consider for instance, 'He makes a pot', (*ghaṭam karoti*) and 'This money belongs to Caitra' (*caitrasyedam*). Here while the accusative (*am*) after '*ghaṭa*' in the first instance expresses the *kāraka*-relation of object, the genitive (*sya*) after '*caitra*' in the second expresses the non*kāraka*-relation of ownership. Now while the ablative etc. express only the *kāraka*-relations such as ablation, the genitive (*ṣaṣṭhī*) expresses both *kāraka* and non-*kāraka*-relationships. For instance, consider 'He kills the thief' (*caurasya hinasti*) and 'He is the king's relation' (*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*). Here while the genitive after '*caura*' expresses the *kāraka*-relation of the objecthood, the genitive after '*rājan*' expresses the non-*kāraka*-master-servant relation. Recognizing this fact, Pāṇini assigns the genitive case in the sense of remaining *kāraka*- or non-*kāraka*-relations that are other than the already stated *kāraka*-relations such as the ablation (*ṣaṣ ṭhī śeṣe* p. ii. 3.50)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Problem

Pāṇini, by using the term 'in the sense of the remaining relationships' (*śeṣe*), made it clear that the genitives can be used in both the *kāraka*-and the non-*kāraka*-relationships; however, the epistemologists have differed regarding the division of the genitives into *kāraka* - and non-*kāraka*-genitives and also regarding the expression of the *kāraka*-and non-*kāraka*-relationships. Following is a study of the various positions of different epistemologists regarding the genitive and the *kāraka* and the non-*kāraka*-relationships.

Grammarians Position

According to the grammarians, the genitive *(ṣaṣṭhī)* is the nominal (*sup*) ending which expresses both *kāraka*- and the non-*kāraka*-relationships. For instance, while the genitive expresses the *kāraka*-relation of the objecthood (*karmatva*) in 'He remembers his mother' (*mātus smarati*) (*adhīgartha*, p. ii, 3.52), the same expresses the non-*kāraka* ownership (*svatva*) in 'This money belongs to Caitra' (*caitrasyedam*) and the master servant relation (*svāmitva*) in 'He is a king's relation' (*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*) etc.

However Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya, (p. 44) notes that while the genitive expresses the *kāraka*-relationships such as the objecthood in '*mātus smarati*' etc. in general (*sambandhatvena*), the same expresses the non-*kāraka*-relationships such as the ownership in '*caitrasyedam*' in particular. Thus, despite the possibility of the accusative when the objecthood is intended (p. i. 4.49), the genitive usage '*mātus smarati*' becomes necessary when the *kāraka*-relation of the objecthood in general is intended. Also despite the possibility of the positive relationship of the contact with Caitra, the negative genitive statement

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'*caitrasya nedam vāsaḥ*' becomes necessary when the absence of the particular non-*kāraka* relationship of the ownership of clothing is intended. Thus the Mahābhāṣya statement that 'Hundreds are the meanings of genitive' (*śatam ṣaṣthyarthaḥ*, on P. i. 1. 49) too becomes facilitated. However, the Prācya grammarians (Laghu-mañjuṣā,vi; p. 113) hold that only the *śeṣa*-relation such as the objecthood or the instrumentality based on the action and *kāraka*-relaṭionship (*kriyākārakabhāva*), is intended to be expressed by the genitive in the śeṣa-genitive usages. (i.e. the śeṣa-relationship, such as the objecthood or the instrumentality is the effect, while the action and *kāraka* relationship is the cause). Thus, in '*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*,' while the *śeṣa*-relationship of master-servant relation (based on such an action - and *kāraka*-relationship) of king with the person is understood, the agency of the king is not intended to be understood.

Thus the grammarians can be held to have proposed the position, that genitive expresses both *kāraka* and the non-*kāraka*-relations; and while the former are expressed in general as relationships, the later are expressed as individual relationships as such.

Logicians' position

Jagadīśa (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, p. 78) holds that the genitive is two types : *kāraka*-genitive and non-*kāraka* *śeṣa*—genitive. According to him, the sense, which is related to the action as a qualifier (*kriyāprakārībhūta*), is a *kāraka*, and hence the genitive which is intended to express such a *kāraka*-sense (as a qualifier) is the *kāraka*-genitive; whereas the sense, which is related to something other than the action (i.e. nominal sense), is a non-*kāraka;* and hence the genitive which is intended

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to express such a non-*kāraka*-sense is non-*kāraka-(śeṣa)*-genitive. For instance, the genitive in '*mātus smarati*' is a *kāraka*-genitive, as the same genitive is intended to express the sense of the objecthood relating to the action of remembering as a qualifier; whereas the genitive in '*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*' is the non-*kāraka (śeṣa)*-genitive, as it is intended to express the sense of ownership relating to the person, who is other than the action.

However, it must be noted here that the logicians hold that *śeṣa*-genitives in the statements 'The face of the maiden imitates the lotus' (*padmasya anukurotyeṣa kumārīmukhamaṇḍalaḥ*) and 'The doctor should treat with his own medicine the Gurus, the Brāhmins, the ascetic and the destitute' (*guruvipratapasvidurgatānām pratikurvīta bhiṣak svabheṣajaiḥ*) are *kāraka*-genitives by expressing the objecthoods of the face and the Guru etc. as relating to the actions such as imitating and medically treating; whereas the grammarians hold (*kāraka vyākhyā-nam*) that the *śeṣa*-genitives in such cases are non-*kāraka*-genitives due to the relation of the objecthoods of the face and Gurus etc. with the implied nominal items, i.e. the similarity and the sickness (*vipatti*) etc. Also, it should be noted that the logicians hold that in '*taṇḍulasya pācakaḥ*' etc., the genitive is a *kāraka*-genitive as it expresses the objecthood (*kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti*, p. ii. 3.65) to be related to the action of cooking. Thus, the logicians can be held to have devided genitives into *kāraka* and non-*kāraka*-genitives on the basis of their ability to express *kāraka* and non-*kāraka* relations; and consequently, have distinguished the genitive from the view point of *kāraka*-case-endings.

Gadādhara's position

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, VI.) too holds that the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

genitive is twofold as *kāraka*-genitive and non-*kāraka* (*śeṣa*)-genitive. However, according to him, the genitive, which is intended to express its meaning such as the agency or the objecthood etc. relating to the root-meaning (action) as only being a relation in general (*sambandhatvena*), is the *kāraka*-genitive; whereas the genitive, which is intended to express its meaning such as the ownership etc. relating to something other than the root-meaning (noun) as the particular relation, is the non-*kāraka-(śeṣa)*-genitive. For instance, the genitive in '*nāgnis stṛpyati kāṣṭhānām na pumsām vāmalocanā*' is the *kāraka*-genitive as the same is intended to express the instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) relating to the action such as becoming satisfied only as a relation in general; whereas the genitive in '*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*' is the non-*kāraka-*(*śeṣa*)-genitive, as the same is intended to express the ownership relating to the person (who is other than the action) as a relation in particular, Also that is why the position of the Navīnasmārtas that the genitive after '*śūdra*' in '*āmam śūdrasya pakvānnam pakvam ucchiṣṭam ucyate*' is the *kāraka*-genitive becomes justified, as it is only intended to express the agency of the Śūdra to be related to the action of cooking as a relation in general and hot intended to express the non-*kāraka*-ownership (*svatva*) of Śūdra in particular.

It must be noted here that Gadādhara does not fundamentally differ from Jagadīśa in his position and admits the division of genitive into *kāraka* and non-*kāraka*-genitives. However he recognizes the technical difference that the *kāraka* and non-*kāraka* relations are relating to action and non-action nominal items respectively. Also it must be noted that the convention that the meanings expressed by the *kāraka* and the non-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

kāraka-(śeṣa)-genitives are related to the actions and the non-actions respectively can be maintained in all the cases. The difficulty that the meaning expressed by the non-*kāraka*-ganitive cannot be held to be related to the action of medically treating in '*guruvipratapasvi durgatānām pratikurvīta bhiṣak svabheṣajaiḥ*' can be overcome by following the grammarians' position (*Kārakavyākhyāna*) that in such cases the genitive meaning is to be related to the nominal item of disease by implying the word '*roge*' or '*vipattau*'.

Ritualists' Position

The ritualists do not directly state that the genitive is twofold as *kāraka*-ganitive and non-*kāraka* (*śeṣa*) genitive. However, they can be taken to agree with the twofold division of genitive as *kāraka* and non-*kāraka* genitives. However, the basic difference between the logicians and the ritualists is that while the former admit that the genitive expresses the *kāraka*-relationships in general and the non-*kāraka* relationships in particular, the latter hold that the genitive expresses both the *kāraka* and the non-*kāraka*-relationships only in general. Their position can be summarized as follows: That (Tantrarahasya, p. 141) the word *'śeṣa'* means any or all the remaining relationships that are other than already assigned or mentioned (relationships) such as the objecthood etc. And since such relationships are to be admitted as the expressed meanings of the genitive, they need to be admitted only as the meanings expressed in general and not as the individual relationships in particular (otherwise endless expressive powers need to be assumed in them); and thus the being the relationships in general becomes the delimitor of the expressedness of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the expressed meanings. Now by admitting the expressive power of genitive in both the relationships, both the *kāraka* - relationship such as the objecthood in '*mātus smarati*' and the non-*kāraka*-relationship such as the ownership in '*caitrasyedam*' (or the master-servant-relationship in '*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*) become the meanings of genitive.

Also it should be noted here that usually the non *kāraka*-relationships such as the master-servant-relationship etc. expressed by the *śeṣa*-genitives (and described by the king etc.) in '*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*' etc. are held (by the epistemologists) to be related to the nominal meanings such as the person etc. through the superstr-atumness. However, the ritualists suggest that even such non-*kāraka*-relationships should be admitted to be relating to the action or activity (*bhāvanā*) indirectly; and the same relationships could be facilitated by admitting the convention that the reference to the activity by the verbs not relating to the *liṅga* through the relation of the qualificandness (of the activity) is the cause of the cognition of the word-meanings wherein the meanings of '*sup*' (genitive and other cases) are the qualifiers. This is necessitated, according to them, by the fact that otherwise two separate conventions, one for the non-genitive case-meanings and the other for the genitive-base-meanings need to be assumed. Thus, in the case of '*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*' the genitive-base-meaning such as the king is related to the master- servant-relationship through the describing and the same resident in the person is related to the activity of 'being' indirectly.

However, it must be observed here that this position of the ritualists is diametrically opposite to the general epistemological convention that the *kāraka* and the non-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

kāraka-relations are related to the actions and non-actions respectively, as it violates the basic assumption that *kārakas* are those that are related to the actions and the non-*kārakas* are those that are related to the nominal items.

Conclusions

The śeṣa-genitive (*śeṣa* ṣaṣṭhī) is the genitive used in the sense of the remaining *kāraka*-relations such as the objecthood (*karmatva*) and the non-*kāraka*-relations such as the master servant-relation (*svatva*). Thus the genitive in 'He remembers his mother' (*mātus smarati*) is the *śeṣa*-genitive as it is used in the sense of the remaining *kāraka*-relationships such as the objecthood, and the genitive in 'He is a king's person' *(rājñaḥ puruṣ aḥ)* is the *śeṣa*-genitive as it is used in the sense of the non-*kāraka*-relation such as the master-servant-relation (*svasvāmibhāva*). However, epistemologists have differed regarding the expression of the *kāraka* and the non-*kāraka*-relationships and also regarding the division of the *śeṣa*-genitives into *kāraka*-and non-*kāraka*-genitives. While the grammarians have held that the *śeṣa*-genitives express the *kāraka*-and the non-*kāraka*-relationships as general and particular relationships and thus have implied that the genitives are also two types as *kāraka*-and non-*kāraka*-genitives, the, logicians especially Jagadīśa and others have explicitly stated that the genitives can be divided into twofold as *kāraka*-and non-*kāraka*-genitives on the basis of their ability to express the *kāraka*-and the non-*kāraka*-relationships and thereby have maintained that the genitives express both the *kāraka*-and the non-*kāraka*-relationships. Also Gadādhara, while agreeing with Jagadīśa, maintains that the genitives are to be divided into *kāraka*- and non-*kāraka*-genitives on the basis of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

their. ability to express the *kāraka*-and non-*kāraka*-relations relating to the actions and to the non-actions respectively.

However, the ritualists, despite agreeing with the theory that the genitives are twofold as *kāraka*-and non-*kāraka*-genitives, differ from the rest and hold that both *kāraka*-and non-*kāraka*-relationships are the genitive-meanings as relations in general and the same are related to the activity and thus pave. the way for the uniform convention of case-meanings. Thus, it can be stated in fine that Indian epistemologists have considered the genitives to be two fold and competent in expressing both *kāraka*-and non-*kāraka*-relationships, and have held *śeṣ a*-genitive to be a device in Sanskrit used for covering all the syntactico-semantic relationships.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER XIV

ANALYSIS OF NIRDHĀRAṆA IN GENITIVE AND LOCATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

Introduction

While in English and other languages the idea of comparative or relative degree can be conveyed by ablative, the idea of superlative or highest degree is conveyed by genitive or locative case. Consider for instance 'Johnson is superior to or better than Nixon' and 'Pātton is the best of or among soldiers'. Here while the comparative degree of Johnson is conveyed by the ablative to, or 'than', the superlative degree of Patton is conveyed by the genitive 'of' or locative 'among'.

Sanskrit too uses mostly the ablative case to express the comparative degree, and the genitive or locative case to express the superlative or highest degree. Consider for instante: ''Demons are more brave or heroic than men' (*narebhyo rākṣasāḥ śūratarāḥ*). and 'Kṣatriyas are the most brave or heroic of or among men'(*narāṇām nareṣ u vā kṣatriyāḥ śūratamāḥ)*. Here while in the first case the ablative is used after the word '*nara*' to express the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

higher (relative) degree of brevity of the demons compared to men, in the second case the genitive or locative case is used after the word '*nara*' *to* express the superlative or highest degree of brevity of the Kṣatriyas among the men. Closely connected with the superlative degree is the *nirdhāraṇa*-genitive and locative; and recognizing this liguistic fact, Pāṇini has ruled that the sixth (genitive) or the seventh (locative) cases are used after those words expressing the whole class from which speification or distinction is made of an individual class (*yatraśca nirdhāraṇe,* p. ii. 41). Here the specific-ation is made by distingushing the individual class from the whole class by means of its genus, quality or action (P. ii. 2. 10).

problem

An important point that should be borne in mind before undertaking the analysis of the specification or destinction (*nirdhāraṇa) i.e.* superlative degree, is that same is cognized only when a person or a thing belonging to an individual class excells from the rest of the persons or things belonging to the same whole class in generic property, quality or action. That is to say that the specification or distinction is cognized of a person or a thing delimited by an individual class-property, from the person or thing delimited by the whole class-property,; whereas the comparative or relative degree can be conized even between the two different property-delimiteds, i.e. persons or things belonging to two different whole classes. Consider for instance 'narāṇam kṣatriyaḥ śūratamaḥ naraeṣu' vā' and 'harebhyo rākṣasāḥ śūratarāḥ'. Here in the first case, the superlative or highest degree, i.e. specification, is cognized of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Kṣatriya, delimited by the individual property of the Kṣ atriyaness, from men delimited by the whole class property of humanity; whereas in the second case, the comparative degree is cognized between the demons and the men, the two different whole class property delimiteds.

Grammarians' analysis

Grammarians (*Laghuśabdendu-śekhara*, p. 520) explain the rule that the genitive and the locative cases are used after the gerieic terms expressing the general group of people or things consisting of the individuals (*svaghaṭita-samudāya*) from which the individual group of people or things qualified by the property, quality or action (*jātiguṇa kriyādiviśiṣṭa*) is specified or distinguished due to the (possession of) specific property excluded from the rest of the people or things constituting the general group (*svetarasamudāyaghaṭaka vyāvṛttadharmakaraṇaka*). That is to say that the genitive and the locative cases used after the generic terms expressing the generic property-delimiteds from which the individual property-delimited is distinguished through exclusive property, quality and action etc. Consider for instance the usage 'The Brahmin is the highest of or among the men' (*narāṇām brāhmaṇaḥ śreṣṭhaḥ nareṣu vā*). Here the genitive and the locative cases are used after the word '*nara*' expressing the men delimited by the generic property of humanity, from whom the Brahmin, delimited by the individual property of Brahminness, is distinguished due to the exclusive quality of highest rank.

Grammarians propose that the *nirdhāraṇa* cases such as the genitive and the locative express the state of being the object of specification or distinction through the property excluded from the rest of persons or things

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

constituting the general group (*svetarasamudāyaghaṭaka vyāvṛttapṛthakkaraṇa*). Thus according to them, the cognition produced in '*narāṇām brāhmaṇaḥ śreṣṭhaḥ nareṣu vā*' is that 'The Brahmin who is the object of specification or distinction (from the men) through the property (being the highest in rank), excluded from the rest of the people constituting the general group, and who has the general group of men as the bounday, is the highest.

Jagadīśa's analysis

Jagdīśa (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 93, p. 128) closely follows grammarians in his analysis. However, it is noteworthy that according to him, specification or distinction (*nirdhāraṇa)* means the individual entity (*viśeṣ asya)* possessing the unique property excluded from the general group of people or things consisting of other than oneself (*svetarasāmānyavyāvṛtta dharmavattvam);* and therefore the *nirdhāraṇa*-genitive or the locative expresses such a specification or distinction. Thus, the cognition produced in '*narāṇam brāhmaṇaḥ śreṣṭhaḥ nareṣu vā*' is that 'The Brahmin, who is possessing the unique property of the highest rank excluded from the general group of men consisting of oneself is the highest of all men.'

Gadādhara's analysis

Gadādhara (Vyutapattivāda, vi. 4) has given the most significant explanation of the rule and the analysis of specification or distinction (*nirdhāraṇa*). He has recognized the linguistic fact that in *nirdhāraṇa* -cases, only the individual property-delimiteds such as the Kṣatriya, who belongs to the general class of people or things such as men, is distinguished from the general property-delimitates due to his possession of the exclusive

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

property etc. such as the bravity etc. Thus, according to him, the rule (P. ii. 3.41) means that the genitive and the loctive cases are used after the words expressing the generic property-delimiteds from which the entity delimited by the general property and qualified by the particular property such as the Kṣatriyaness (*jātyādiviśeṣ aṇaviśiṣṭa yaddharmāvacchinna*) is distinguised to be possessing the predicate (bravity etc.) excluded from such a general property-delimiteds devoid of the particular property (tādṛśaviseṣaṇaśūnya). In '*narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūratamaḥ nareṣu vā'*, the genitive and the locative cases are used after the word '*nara*' expressing '*man*' delimited by the generic property of humanity, from whom the Kṣatriya, delimited by the generic property of humanity, and qualified by the particular property such as the Kṣatriyaness, is distinguished to be possessing the predicate such as the bravity, exclued from the men devoid of the particular property such as the Kṣatriyaness.

It should be noted that in the case of *nirdhāraṇa* such as '*narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūratamaḥ'*, the predicate such as the bravity, resident in the particular property-qualified such as Kṣatriya, cannot be explained to be excluded from the entire general class of humans; and therefore, specification or distinction of the Kṣatriyas etc. from the general class of humans becomes impossible when intended to include even the Kṣatriyas in that class. Thus, Gadādhara has qualified the limit or boundary of specification (*nirdhāraṇāvadhi*) such as the general class of human beings as devoid of the particular property such as the Kṣatriyaness. Since the bravity, resident in the Kṣatriya, can be excluded from the general class of humans such as he Brahmins devoid of the particular property such as the Kṣatriyaness, the specification of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the Kṣatriya from the rest of the human can be said to mean that the genitive etc. are used after the generic terms expressing the general class of beings when the particular class of beings belonging to the same class of beings are intended to be distinguished from the general class of beings through the specific qualities such as the bravity etc.

Gadādhara has recognized the linguistic fact that the genitive etc. are used after the generic terms only in the case of specification (*nirdhāraṇa*) of the particular class of beings belonging to the same general class from the the general class by means of the property, quality, and action etc., but not in the case of the specification of one general class of beings from another general class of beings. Thus he has stated that the genitive and the locative case are used after the generic terms when the general class-property-delimited, qualified by the the particular class-property. is to be specified or distinguished from the same general class-property-delimited, Therefore while the genitive and the locative are found used in the case of '*narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūratamaḥ nareṣu vā'*, wherein the Kṣatriya, delimited by the general class of humanity, and having the qualification of kṣatriyaness, is to be distinguished from the general human class-delimited; the same genitive and the locative are not found used in the case of '*narebhyo rākṣasḥ śūraḥ'*, wherein the rākṣasa, delimited by the general class of rāksasaness, is to be distinguished from the humans, delimited by another general class of humanity. This is so because the rākṣasa, delimited by he rākṣasaness, is not delimited by any particular class of property, and hence cannot be claimed to be an individual belonging to the particular or sub-class of the main general class of human beings from which he is to be distinguished.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A technical difficulty that Gadādhara faces however, is that he cannot accommodate the specification or distinction (*nirdhāraṇa)* of the particular class-property-delimited from the general class-property-delimited in the genitive and locative statements. Thus Gadādhara suggests that the exclusion (*vyāvṛttatva*) is the meaning of the *nirdhāranṇa*-cases (genitive or locative) found after the generic terms expressing the general class-property-delimiteds such as '*nara*'. Now it may be objected that when the exclusion is admitted to be the denoted meaning of *nirdhāraṇa-* cases occurring after the generic terms, only the exclusion of the particular class-property-delimited from the general class property-delimited, and not the exclusion of the same from the general class-property-delimited, who is devoid of the particular class-property, can be cognized to be relating to the delimitor of the predicate such as the bravity.

However, Gadādhara refuteṣ the objection on the ground that the *nirdhāraṇa*-cases express the exclusion (*vyāvartanā),* which is of the form of being counter-positive of the mutual absence (*anyonyābhāvapratiyogitva)* in the case of the *samānādhikraṇa* statments such as '*narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ sūratamaḥ nareṣu vā'*, wherein the predicate such as the most brave is related to the subject such as the Kṣatriya through identity; whereas the same cases express the exclusion, which is of the form of being the counterpositive of the constant absence (*atyantābhāvapratiyogitva)* in the case of *vyadhikaraṇa* statements such as *'narāṇām kṣatriye śauryam nareṣu vā'* wherein the predicate such as bravity is related to the subject such as the *Kṣatriya* through non-identity. According to him, such an exclusion is related to the predicate such as the bravity as delimited by the delimiting property of the predicateness (*vidheyatāvac-chedakāvacchedena*); whereas the base-meaning, i.e. the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

limit or boundary of exclusion such as the men is related to the exclusion (of the form of absence) through the superstatumness described by the substratumness pervading the humanity, the delimitor of the expressedness of the base-meaning, qualified by the mutual absence of the subject (kṣatriyaness-delimited); and therefore the idea of the specification, i.e the exclusion of the particular class property-delimited from the general class property-delimited, devoid of the particular class property (such as the Kṣatriyaness), can be congnized in the predicate in such *nirdhāraṇa* cases.

Ritualists' analysis

Ritualists (Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya, p. 169) follow the general pattern in the explanation of the rule, and hold that *nirdhāraṇa* cases such as the genitive and locative are used after the generic words expressing the general whole class of items from which the individual class of items are to be distiguished through property etc., According to them, in locative statements such as 'The black ones of or among cows are most plentiful in milk' (*gavām goṣu vā sampannakṣīrāḥ kṛṣṇāḥ),* the base-meanings such as the cow are related to the specification expressed by the *nirdhāraṇa*-cases through the describing, whereas the same specification is related to the activity through the relation of occurrence in the object of specification such as the cow.

However, the real contribution of ritualists to the analysis is their distintion of the ablative statement from the genitive/locative statements. According to them, the genitive and the locative cases are used after the adjunct of specification (*nirdhāraṇa pratiyogi*),viz, the whole class such as the cow when the delimiting property of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

adjunctness of the adjunct of specification such as the cowness is present in the object of specification (*nirdhāraṇa viṣaya)* such as the black cow (i.e. when the object of specification belongs to the same general whole class as the adjunct of specification); whereas only and ablative case is used after the adjunct of specification, viz the whole class such as the man when the delimiting property of the adjunctness of the adjunct of specification is not present in the object of specification (i.e. when the object of specification does not belong to the same general whole class as the adjunct of specification). Thus the genitive/locative statement '*gavām goṣu vā kṛṣṇaḥ sampannakṣīrāḥ'* and the abltive statement '*narebhyo rākṣ asāḥ śūrāḥ'.* Here while in the first case the delimiting property of the adjunctness such as the cowness is present in the object of specification, i.e. the black cow, (the black cow belongs to the same general class as the cows), in the second case, the delimiting property of the adjunctness such as the humanity is not present in the object of specification i.e. the rakṣasah, (Rākṣasas do to belong to the same general class as the men).

Conclusions

In Sanskrit, the *nirdhāraṇa-* cases such as the genitive and the locative are closely connected with the superlative or the highest degree. And therefore, Pāṇini has ruled the genitive and the locative cases after the words expressing general whole class terms from which the specification or the distinction of individual class terms (P. ii. 3.41) is made.

Indian epistemologists recognized the linguistic fact that the specification or the distinction of a person or a thing delimited by the individual class-property is cognized from the person or thing delimited by the whole

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

class-property *in nirdhāraṇa* -cases; and thus grammarians have proposed that the genitive and the locative cases are used after the generic terms expressing the generic property-delimiteds from which the individual property-delimiteds are distinguised through exclusive property etc. Also Jagadīśa, following grammarians analsis, has defined the specification (*nirdhāraṇa)* as the individual entity possessing the unique property excluded from the general group of people or things consisting of other than oneself.

However, Gadādhara recognized further that in *nirdhāraṇa*-cases, the individual property-delimiteds belonging to the general class of people or things are distinguised from the pure general propery-delimiteds; and hence interpreted the rule as that the genitive and the loctive cases are used after the words expressing the general property-delimiteds from which the general property-delimiteds, qualified by the particular properties, are distinguished.

Also, Gadādhara facilitated the cognition of specific-ation of the particular proprty-delimited from the general property-delimited, devoid of the particular class-property, on the ground that *nirdhāraṇa*-cases can express the exclusion relating to the predicates, whereas the base-meanings can be related to the specification through the indirect relation qualified by the mutual absence of the subject such as the particular property-delimited.

Finally, the ritualists have propounded that the *nirdhāraṇa*-genitive and locative cases are used aftet the adjuncts of specification when the delimiting property of the adjunctness is present in the object of specification and the ablative cases are used after the same when the delimiting property of the adjunctness is not present in the object of specification.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER XV

MEANING OF THE LOCATIVE AND ANALYSIS OF LOCUSHOOD

Introduction

While Sanskrit uses the genitives for expressing the remaining *kāraka* and non-*kāraka*-relationships and ablative etc. for expressing the ablation etc, it uses the locative for expressing the locushood. Consider for instance, 'He goes into the village' (*grāme gantā)*. Here the locushood resident in the village is expressed by the locative. Thus Pāṇini assigns the locative in the sense of the locus (*saptamydhikarṇe ca,* p. ii. 3.36) and defines the same locus as the abode or substratum (*ādhāro' dikaraṇam p*.i. 4.45).

Problem

However, different epistemologists have proposed different theories of the locative-meanings: While the grammarians and the ritualists have proposed that the locushood (*adhikaraṇatva)* is the locative-meaning, the logicians have proposed that the superstratumness (*ādheyatā)* can be the locative-meaning. Also they have differed as to where such as locative-meaning should be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

related. Further, the different epistemologists have presented different analyses of the locushood. While the grammarians and the ritualists have held that the locushood is the being the abode (or the substratum) of the action (or the activity) through the agent or the object, the logicians have held that the locushood is the being be abode (or the substratum) of the superstratum (*ādhārādheyabhāva*). Following is a study of the locative-meaning and the analysis of the locushood.

Meaning of the locative: Grammarians' theory

Since Pāṇini has assigned the locative in the sense of the locushood (*saptmyadhikaraṇe*, p. ii. 3.36), the latter grammarians have proposed that the locative expresses the locushood. Also since the locushood is a *kāraka*-case-meaning, they have proposed that the same should be related to the action through the agent or the object. For instance, consider the same in '*bhūtale vartate ghaṭ aḥ'* and '*gṛhe caitraḥ pacati*'. Here the locushood of the ground in the first instance is related to the action of occurrence through the agent, i.e. the pot, whereas the locushood of the house in the second instance is related to the action of cooking through the object of rice.

Logicians' theory

The logicians have proposed the most significant theory of the meaning of the locative. Since the locushood is to be understood in terms of an item being the abode or substratum of another item, i.e. superstratum, the logicians have held that the locative, asigned in the sense of the locus, expresses the superstratumness (*ādheyatva*) as being the superstratumness in general. And in the statement such as 'Pot occurs on the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ),* the locative base-meaning

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such as the ground is related to the superstratumness through describ-ing. And the superstratumness is related to the nomina-tive base-meaning such as the pot through the relational subjenctness. Thus, one congnizes that the pot has the superstratumness described by the ground. However, Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, vi. 1.) holds that since the superstratumness expressed by the locative is a *kāraka*-case-meaning, the same should be related to the action expressed by the verbal root. And thus in the statements such as 'Caitra cooks at home' (*gṛhe caitaḥ pacati*), the supersratumness of the house needs to be related to the cooking epressed by the verbal root '*pac*'. And the cognition is that Caitra is the abode of the action of cooking describing the superstratumnes resident in the house. However, the problem with such a proposal is that the superstratumness expressed by the locative cannot be related to the action expressed by the verbal root in '*ghaṭaḥ bhūtale vartate*' etc., as there is no distinct verbal action apart from the locative-meaning (both the locative-meaning (the superstratumness), and the root-meaning, (occurrence) are identical). Thus, as an alternative Gadādhara suggests that in such cases the locative can be admitted to expresss the describedness (*nirūpyatva)* (since the describerness (*nirūpakatva)* is the substratum-ness, the describedness can be the superstratumness); and the ground-describedness can vary well be related to the action of occurrence resident in the pot in such cases.

Also as yet another alternative, Gadādhara suggests that the root 'to occur' (*vṛt*) must be admitted to exprss merely the substratumness (*ādhāratva)*, and the locative can be held to express the describing of the locushood of the locative base-meaning such as the gound

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*bhūtalādyadhikaraṇakatva*), which is related to the substratumness. However, it should be noted that even then the usage '*caitras caitre gacchati'* becomes unavoidable (the root-meaning, i.e. going, has Caitra as its locus); and therefore only the substratumness delimited by the indirect relation of being the abode of the abode of the action (*svāśrayāśrayatvena)* should be admitted to be the locative-meaning; and since Caitra does not have the substratumness delimited by the being the abode of the abode of the action of going, the usage '*caitraḥ caitre gacchati'* is avoided; whereas since the ground has the substratumness delimited by being the abode of the abode (Caitra) of the action, *'bhuvi caitro gacchati'* is facilit-ated.

Finally it should be noted that Gadādhara in this last alternative was greatly influenced by the grammarians' analysis that the locative expresses the locushood to be related to the action indirectly through the agent or the object.

Ritualists' theory

However, the ritualists (Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya, p. 158) refute the logicians' position. According to them, when the superstratumness' etc. are admitted to be the meanings of the locative, the rule *'saptamyadhikaraṇe ca'*, (P.ii. 3. 36), which assigns the locative only in the sense of the locushood, would become contraditory. Also sicne the relations of the locative-meanings are not admitted to be uniformal in all cases such as '*gṛhe pacati*' and '*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ'* etc., the locative in the logicians' theory would be required to be assumed as having many expressive powers in many different meanings. Therefore, only one single entity of the locushood needs to be the meaning of the locative.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Although the locushood, described by the relations such as the conact and the inherence, differs in different instances, the locushood, as delimited by the locushoód-ness (*adhikaraṇatva*), can be held to be single and common characteristic of all the loci in general. Also, in '*bhūtale gaṭaḥ*', the locushood of the gruond is related to the activity of being the abode of the existence (occurreence) (*sattvāśrayatva*), i.e. the sense of the implied '*asti*' through the relation of the occurrence in the pot, describing oneself (the locushood); and therefore the convention of *kāraka*-relations is not violated. Also, the locative expresses the locushood as delimited by the particular time in which the action takes place; and therefore the usage '*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ (asti)*' need not be made when the pot does not occur on the ground at present. Further, it should be noted that the locushood is related to the meaning of the *ākhyāta,* the activity, through either the agent or the object. For instance, in '*gṛhe caitraḥ pacati*' the locushood of the house is related to the activity through the occurrence in Caitra, the agent, describing itself (*svanirūpakacaitravṛttitva);* whereas in '*gṛhe odanam pacati*', the same locushood of the house is related to the activity through the describing of the objecthood of the rice describing itself (*svanirūpaka odanakarmatva*). Thus, the grammatical convention that the locushood is related to the action through either the agent or the object is also accommodated.

A point to be noted here is that in the cases such as '*grāme gacchati*' etc. where the object-words are not used, the locushood of the village etc. are to be related to the activity indirectly through the agent such as the possession of the activity conducive to the going existing in the agent (Caitra) describing itself (*caitravṛttigaman-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ānukūla kṛtimattva), as Caitra, who is the abode of the action conducive to the reaching of the village, too can have the village as his abode. Also in the cases such as '*agnau pacati*' etc., where the locus-hood of the fire etc. cannot be related to the activity through either the agent or the object, neither the agent (Caitra) nor the objects (rice) has the fire as their locus. In such cases, the locushood of the vessel, which is understood through assuming an indication for the fire in such a sense, needs to be related to the activity through either the agent or the object.

Cognition in negative usages

Now it may be objected that the verbal cognition cannot be explained in the negative usages such as '*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*' etc. For, in such cases only the cognition that the being the abode of the existence resident in the pot describing the locushood of the ground is the counterpositive of an absence (*bhūatalaniṣ ṭhādhikaraṇatva nirūpaka ghaṭavṛttisattāśrayatvam abhāva pratiyogi*) can be said to be produced; however since such a cognition is necessary even when the pot occurs on the ground (the said being the abode of the existence can be the counterpositive of the absence occurring in something other than the pot (*vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacc-hinābhava*) even when the pot occurs on the ground),the same is not tenable.

Now it may be suggested that the locative-meaning, the locushood, can be related to the root-meaning, i.e. the existence, through describing; and the same root-meaning is related to the *lat ākhyāta-* meaning, i.e. the being the abode of the present time, which is further related to the negative meaning, the absence. And thus,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the cognition produced could be. that the pot has the absence of the being the abode of the existence at the present time describing the locushood of the ground (*bhūtalaniṣṭhādhikaraṇatvanirūpaka vartamānakālasambandhāśrayatva pratiyogikābhāvavān ghaṭaḥ*). However, even such a sugge-stion is not tenable. The locative-meaning would become difficult to be related to the root-meaning directly in such a cognition. Otherwise, the impersonal locative usage such as '*caitre pacyate*' too would become necessary when the agentship is not intended. Thus the Bhāṭṭas propose that the locative-meaning and the nominative-meaning are related to the *laṭ 'ākhyāta*-meaning, i.e. the being the abode at the present time; and the negative indicates the absence as resident in the pot as delimited by the being the abode at the present time (the *laṭ* is merely suggestive). And thus the cognition is that the being the abode of the existence at the present time resident in the pot describing the locushood of the ground is the counterpositive of the absence resident in the pot (*bhūtalādhikaraṇakaghaṭavṛttisattāśrayatvam ghaṭaniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogi*).

Analysis of Locushood : Grammarians' theory

The grammarians follow a distinct criterion in analysing the locushood. According to them, an item is a locus means the same is the abode or the substratum of the agent or the object (*ādhāro' dhikaraṇam*, p. i. 4.45), and therefore is the abode of the action indirectly through being the abode of the agent or that of the object. Thus they hold that the locushood is the being the abode or the substratum of the action indirectly through the agent or the object. For instance, consider the locushood of the ground in 'The pot occurs on the he-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*). Here the ground is the locus of the agent such as the pot and therefore the same is the abode or the substratum of the action of occurrence through the agent, i.e. the pot. And thus the locushood of the ground is the being the abode of the occurrence indirectly through the pot, i.e. the agent.

It should be noted that the grammarians are strictly governed by the epistemological criterion that the *kāraka*-relations are to be analysed in terms of their relations with the actions; and therefore they hold that the locus-hood, which is the meaning of the locative *kāraka*-case, too needs to be analysed in terms of its relation with the action concerned. Thus, their analysis of the locushood as being the abode or substratum of the action concerned is in keeping with their general epistemological convention as well.

Logicians' analysis

Indian epistemologists, especially the logicians were influenced by Pāṇini's analysis of the locushood as being the abode or substratum (p. i.4.45); and hence they have tried to analyse the locushood in terms of something (substratum) being the abode or substratum of something else (superstratum). Consider for instance the locushood of ground in the statement 'The pot occurs on the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*). Here the locushood of the ground is the state of being the abode or the substratum of the pot, i.e. the superstratum.

However, the difficulty in such an analysis is that the locushood cannot be held to be the relatum (*sambandhitva*) by any relation. For, then form and taste would be required to be the loci of each other, as they are related to each other by some relation. Nor can the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

locushood be held to be the being the relatum of its own superstratum (*svādheya sambandhitva*); for, then the super stratumness cannot be defined properly. When the superstratum is defined as the relatum of its own abode or substratum, (*svāśrayasambandhitva*), mutual dependence would occur. Nor can the locushood be defined as the cause (*karaṇatva*). For then even the instrumental cause would become the locus, as it is a cause. Nor can it be held to be an inherent cause (*samavāyikaraṇatva*) For, the ground, the locus of the pot by contact, could not then become the locus, as it does not have the pot through inherence

Thus, to avoid such a difficulty, the logicians (Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya, p. 157) have proposed that the locushood described by the physical occurrence or the falling (*patanādivannirūpitādhikaraṇatva*) is the being material substance possessing the contact preventing the falling of the object while being different from the falling object (*tadbinnatve sati tatpatanapratibandhaka samyoga-vanmūrtatvam*). And in the case of the occurrence of the pot on the ground and in the case of falling of the leaf from the tree to the ground, the ground can be the locus described by the occurrence of the pot and the falling of the leaf as the same is the material substance possessing the contact preventing the falling of the pot and the leaf. Here since the locus is qualified as being different from the falling object, the falling leaf need not become the locus of itself. Also, since the locus is held to be the material substance, the supreme lord, who is the substratum of the contact holding the universe in him, need not become the locus of anything.

Also, it should be noted that the locushood described by the quality etc. is the being the substance

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

possessing the inherence; whereas the locushood described by the inherence is the being the substratum possessed of the self-linking relation of inherence. Thus, the pot in '*ghaṭe rūpaṁ*' and the form in '*rūpe rūpasamavāyaḥ*' etc. can be regarded as the loci.

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, vii, 1) holds that the locushood of the form of the relation of being the substratum and the superstratum (*ādhārādheyabhāva*) cannot be held to be of the form of being the relatum of the contact etc. For, then even the jujube seed which has the contact with the pit in '*kuṇḍe badaraṁ*' would need to become the locus of the pit. Therefore, such a relation of being the substratum and the superstratum needs to be admitted as a distinct class of things as delimited by a particualar relation (*sambandhaviśeṣ āvacchinna padārthāntaraṁ*). And this position is justified by the fact that the conventions such as 'This is the locus by contact' and 'This is the locus by the inherence' prove such a relation to be only the distinct class of things.

Now it should be noted that while the relation of being the substratum as delimited by the inherence (*samavāyenādhikaraṇatva*) can be even the relation of inherence (*samavāyādirūpa*), the relation of being the substratum as delimited by the contact (*saṁyogenādhikaraṇatva*) needs to be the distinct class of things from the contact, as otherwise the jujube seed having the contact with the pit would become the locus of the pit. However, it is suggested that the relation of being the substratum as delimited by the contact (*saṁyogenādhikaraṇatva*) is also of the form of being the contact; and the overpervasion is overcome by holding that only the pit and not the jujube seed is the relational subjunct of the relation of contact between the Jujube seed and the pit.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Also Gadādhara refutes the position that the state of being the substratum (locus) of the particular item such as the pit (*tadādhāratva*) is the state of possessing the contact of the particular item preventing its *own* fall (*patanapratibandhakasamyogavattvam*); and the state of possessing the contact preventing the fall of the pit is not found in the jujube seed, rather only such a state of possessing the contact preventing the fall of jujube seed is found in the pit; and thus the jujube seed need not become the locus of the pit. According to him, such an analysis is faulty as it cannot cover the state of being the substratum (locus) of the item such as the sky which never falls; and thus the sky can never become the locus of the sound in '*ākāśe śabdaḥ*' etc.

Analysis of the locushood based on syntactic criterion

Jagadīśa (Śabadśakti prakāśikā, p. 89), however, has presented an analysis of the locushood based on the syntactic criterion. According to him, the locushood can be analysed as the meaning of the locative which is related to the particular root-meaning (action); and therefore, the same locative-meaning is the locushood with respect to the action expressed by the particular root. For instance, the substratumness, or the superstratumness relating to the action of going expressed by the root 'go' (*gam*) is the locushood with respect to the action of going in '*grāme gantā*' etc.

Ritualists' refutation of logicians' analysis

However, the most serious objection to such an analysis of the locushood by the logicians is that the same is inconsistent and does not present a uniform single nature of the locushood. Further, when the locushood is admitted to be different in different

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

circumstances, the locative case assigned in the sense of the locushood would need to be admitted as expressing different meanings in different instances. Thus, the ritualists (Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya, p. 157) hold that the locushood or the superstratumness, like the conterpositiveness (*pratiyogitā*), must be admitted to be the single indivisible porperty (*akhanḍopādhi*) on the basis of the common cognitions such as 'This is locus' or 'This is substratum' etc. And this position further facilitates the generalization of the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the locative and thus a separate indivisible locushood like the separate instrumentality etc. gets established. However, in the case of the word 'all' (*viśva*), where only a divisible property (*sakhaṇḍa padārtha*) such as the allness appears as the delimitor of the expressedness, assumption of the locushood as an indivisible property is not necessary.

Other Logicians' analysis

However, some later logicians (*Nyāyakośa*) too recognized this difficulty like the ritualists and hence held that the locushood (*adhikaraṇatā*) need not be analysed individually as being the substratum possessing the contact etc., rather the same can be held to be the particular form of self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandha viśeṣa*) on the basis of the common cognition such as 'This is the locus' etc. Thus, the locushood described by the occurrence of pot on the ground is the self-linking relation of the ground based on the cognition that 'The ground is the locus of the pot' in '*bhūttale ghaṭaḥ*' etc. A point to be noted here is that the locushood, which is analysed as the self-linking relation of the locus with the superstratum, can also be analysed as being of the nature of peculiar objectness (*viṣayatāviśeṣa*) of the locus

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

on the basis of the common knowledge such as 'This is the object of the knowledge of being the locus' etc. Thus the locushood of the ground described by the pot is the peculiar objectness of the ground based on the knowledge that 'The ground is the peculiar object of the knowledge of being the locus of the pot'.

Further, it can be noted that the locushood which is analysed as the peculiar objectness can also be analysed as the chief qualificandness (*mukhyaviśeṣyatā*) of the locus on the basis of the qualified knowledge such as 'The locus (ground) is the possessor (qualificand) of the superstratum (pot)'. Therefore, the locushood of the ground described by the pot is the chief-qualificandness of the ground based on the qualified knowledge that 'The ground is the possessor (qualificand) of the pot' (*ghaṭvad bhūtalam*). Thus, the later logicians too tried to generalize the locushood while retaining the individualistic nature of the locushood in the form of the self-linking relation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

द्वितीयाकारकद्वितीयखण्डः

अनुमित्याद्यर्थकधातुस्थलीयद्वितीयार्थः

II (ii)1. अनुमित्याद्यर्थकधातुयोगे विधेयत्वं विधेयित्वं वा द्वितीयार्थः, तेन वह्न्यादिपक्षकानुमितिपरस्य 'वह्निमनुमिनोमि' इत्यादिवाक्यस्य न प्रामाण्यम्। यदि च वह्निसाध्यकपर्वतपक्षकानुमितिपरस्य 'वह्निमत्त्वेन पर्वतमनुमिनोमि' इत्यादिवाक्यस्यापि प्रामाण्यं मन्यते तदा तादृश-धातुयोगे उद्देश्यत्वमुद्देश्यित्वं वा द्वितीयार्थः, तस्य तृतीयान्तो-पस्थाप्यसाध्यविधेयकत्वविशिष्टेऽन्वयः, अतो 'वह्निमत्त्वेन' इत्याद्यसमभिव्याहारे तत्र 'पर्वतमनुमिनोमि' इत्यादयो न प्रयोगाः।

II (ii) 2. विधेयत्वाद्यर्थे तृतीयानुशासनविरहात् तृतीयान्तेन वह्न्यादिवि-धेयकत्वं कथमुपस्थापनीयमिति तु न शङ्क्यम्, वैशिष्ट्यरूपार्थे तृतीयानुशासनसत्त्वाद् विधेयतादेरपि वैशष्ट्य-रूपात्वात्, अत एव 'रजतत्वेन शुक्तिं जानाति' इत्यादौ ज्ञाने रजतत्वादिप्रकारकत्वस्य 'घटत्वेन वह्निर्नास्ति' इत्यादौ सौंदडमतेऽभावे घटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वस्य तृतीयान्ततो बोधः। तृतीयान्तार्थरजतादिप्रकारकत्वद्वितीयान्तार्थ शुक्त्यादि-विषयकत्वयोर्विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यबोधमर्यादयाऽवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावभानम् 'रजतत्वेन शंक्तिं जानाति' इत्यादौ नियतम् केवलमेकत्र द्वय-मितिरीत्या तदुभयबोधस्य तत्राऽव्युत्पन्नत्वात्, अतः 'इमे रङ्गरजते' इत्यादिप्रमापरस्य तादृशवाक्यस्य न प्रामाण्यम्।

II (ii) 3. घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नवह्न्याद्यभावनिष्ठेन वह्न्यदिनिरूपितानुयोगितावि-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

शेषरूपवह्न्याद्यभावत्वेन तदभावनिष्ठघटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वस्याऽवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावः स्वीक्रियते। 'घटत्वे वह्निर्नास्ति, इत्यादौ च तद्बोधस्योक्तरीत्यावश्यकत्वमिति घटत्वावच्छिन्नवह्न्याद्यभावस्य वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नघटाद्यभावसमनियतत्वेन तदभिन्नतया तत्र घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वघटाद्यभावत्वसत्त्वेपि तादृशाभावपरस्य 'घटत्वेन घटो नास्ति' 'वह्नित्वेन वह्निर्नास्ति' इत्यादिवाक्यस्य न प्रामाण्यम्।

II (ii) 4. उक्तस्थलेषु तृतीयान्ताद्यर्थस्य द्वितीयान्ताद्यर्थेऽवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावसंबन्धेनान्वय इत्यपि केचित्, तन्न-विभक्त्यर्थे विभक्त्यर्थान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात्। न च 'रजतत्वेनेदं ज्ञायते' इत्यादावाऽऽख्यातार्थविषयतायां तृतीयान्तार्थप्रकारताया निरूपितत्वसंबन्धेनाऽन्वयान्नोक्तव्युत्पत्तिकल्पनमिति वाच्यम्, तत्र रजतत्वादि प्रकारकत्वविशिष्ठधात्वर्थज्ञाननिरूपितत्वस्याख्यातार्थे भानस्वीकारेणैवातिप्रसङ्गभङ्गात्।

नच 'तस्मात् पचति- 'तस्मात् चैत्रस्य' इत्यदौ विभक्त्यर्थे कृतिसंबन्धादौ हेतु विभक्त्यर्थान्वयदर्शनान्नास्त्युक्ताव्युत्पत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, हेतुविभक्त्यतिरिक्तविभक्त्यर्थस्य विभक्त्यर्थानन्वयनियमात्।

II (ii) 5. न च 'रजतत्वेनेदं जानाति' इत्यादौ तृतीयायाः कारकविभक्तित्वाभावान्न तदर्थस्य क्रियायामन्वयसंभव इत्यगत्या द्वितीयार्थे एव तदन्वय उपगन्तव्य इतिवाच्यम्, मणिकारमते 'तस्माज्जानाति' इत्यादौ ज्ञानादिरूपधात्वर्थे एव हेतुविभक्त्यर्थस्य. 'तस्मात् स्थीपते' इत्यादौ च सर्वमत एव धात्वर्थस्थित्यादौ तस्यान्वयेन षष्ठ्यर्थसंबन्धस्यापि ''गुरुविप्रतपस्विदुर्गतानां प्रतिकुर्वीत भिषक् स्वभेषजैः'' इत्यादौ धात्वर्थेऽन्वयेन च कर्मासमभिव्याहृते 'राजतत्वेन जानाति' इत्यादी धात्वर्थे तृतीयार्थान्वयस्यावश्यकत्वेन, कारकभिक्तिभिन्नविभक्त्यर्थस्य क्रियायामऽनन्वय इत्यनियमात्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II (ii) 6. एवम् 'घटत्वेन वह्निर्नास्ति' इत्यादौ प्रथमार्थो नानुयोगित्वम्-प्रथमायाः संख्यातिरिक्तार्थाऽबोधकत्वनियमात्, अतो नञर्थाभावे संबन्ध एव तत् तत्र च न तृतीयार्थान्वयसंभवः।

मम त्वऽनुयोगितासंबन्धेन वह्न्यादिविशिष्टाभावे तृतीयान्तार्थ-घटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्ववैशिष्ट्यभानाद् विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यबोधमर्यादया वह्न्याद्यनुयोगिकत्वस्थलीयस्यानुयोगितया संबद्धवह्न्यादेस्तादृशप्रतियोगिताकत्वेनावच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावभानोपगमेन सामञ्जस्यात्। अनुयोगिताया नञर्थतावच्छेदकत्वे तत्रैव वह्न्यादेः प्रति-योगिनोऽन्वयः, अतस्तत्र तृतीयान्तार्थघटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगि-ताया निरूपकत्वेनान्वयं स्वीकृत्याऽतिप्रसङ्गवारणं सम्यक् प्रतिभाति।

II (ii) 7. रङ्गेऽभेदेन रजतारोपस्थले 'रङ्गं रजतेन जानाति' इत्यप्रयोगात् तादात्म्य भिन्नसंबन्धावच्छिन्न प्रकारतैव तृतीयार्थः। तत्र च 'रङ्गं रजतं जानाति' इति प्रयोगात् तादात्म्यसंबन्धा-वच्छिन्नप्रकारता कर्मत्वानुशिष्टद्वितीयादेरेवार्थः, तस्याश्च तादृशप्रकारवाचिपदसमानविभक्तिकपदोपस्थाप्यविशेष्यताविशिष्टायामेव ज्ञानरूपक्रियायामन्वयः तेन भेदारोपस्थले 'रङ्गे रजतत्वं जानाति, इतिवदऽभेदारोपस्थले 'रङ्गे रजतं जानाति' इति न प्रयोगः। उक्तस्थले च रङ्गरजताद्योः समानविभक्ति-कपदोपस्थाप्ययोरभेदान्वये साकाङ्क्षत्वेपि नायोग्यतया तादृशान्वयः।

II (ii) 8. नन्वेवं सति रङ्गरजतादिपदयोः सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्? काक्षतिः। न चैवं रजतगतैकत्वबहुत्वाऽविवक्षायाम् 'रङ्गाणि रजतं जानाति इतिप्रयोगस्य 'स्त्रियं पांसुला जानाति' इति प्रयोगस्य च प्रसङ्गः सामानाधिकरण्यस्यैव समानवचनलिङ्गकत्वनियतत्वादिति वाच्यम्, समानाधि करणयोरिव यत्पदार्थविशेष्यकत्वाविशिष्टेऽभेदसंबन्धावच्छिन्न-यत्पदार्थप्रकारकत्वस्यान्वयस्तयोरपि समानलिङ्गवचनत्वनियमात्।

II (ii) 9. यज्ञपतिमातानुयायिनस्तु 'रङ्गं रजतं जानाति' इत्यादौ

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

सामानाधिकरण्यानुरोधाद् रजतादिपदस्य रजताभेदज्ञानविषये लक्षणा, अत एव भ्रान्तिज्ञविशेषदर्शिना प्रयुक्तस्य 'लोहितवह्निं जानाति' इत्यादिवाक्यस्यापि प्रामाण्यनिर्वाहः। न ह्यऽसमासस्थले इव लोहितवह्न्याद्योरभेदाऽविवक्षाज्ञानांशे लोहितादेः स्वातन्त्र्येणान्वयो वासंभवति-कर्मधारयस्य साधुतानुपपत्तेः लोहितपदोत्तरं प्रकारताबोधकविभक्तेरभावात्, धात्वर्थे साक्षान्नामार्थस्य भेदाऽन्वयेऽव्युत्पत्तेः। द्वन्द्वस्थलवत् कर्मधारयोत्तरविभक्तेः पूर्वपदप्रकृतिकत्वाभावात् तस्याः पूर्वपदार्थान्वितप्रकारताबोधकत्वायोगात्। न च द्वन्द्वसमास एवासौ-अल्पाचो वह्निपदस्यपूर्वनिपातप्रसङ्गात्। समाहारपक्षे पुंलिङ्गताया इतरेतरपक्षे चैकवचनस्यानुपपत्तेः।

II (ii) 10. एतन्मते 'शुक्लो वह्निः' इत्यादिप्रमाया लोहिताभेदारोप-विषयवह्निविषयकत्वेपि 'शुक्लो वह्निर्लोहिता जपा 'इति-समूहालम्बनप्रमाया लोहिताभेदावगाहिस्वविषय-वह्निविपय-कत्वेपि च तद्दशायम् 'लोहितवह्निं लोहितं वह्निं वा जानाति' इति न प्रयोगः- तादृशपदोपस्थाप्यविषयताया धर्मिपारतन्त्र्येण द्वितीयार्थविषयतायामभेदसंबन्धेन विशेषणता नियमोपगमात्।

II(ii) 11. अथवा लोहिताभेदविषयतानिरूपितविषतापन्नस्य वह्न्यादेर्ज्ञा-नान्वयिविषयितानिरूपकत्वं भासते। समूहालम्बनादौ च तादृशविषयतानापन्नस्यैव विषयितानिरूपकत्वमिति नाति-प्रसङ्गः। विषयतापन्नस्य निरूपकत्वमित्यस्य च विषयता-वच्छिन्नं निरूपकत्वमित्यर्थः। एतच्च विलक्षणं विपयिता-निरूपकतावच्छेदकत्वमऽविषयस्यापि विषयत्वस्योपेयते 'रक्त-दण्डवान्' इत्यदौ दण्डादिरूपप्रकारांशेऽप्रकारेणापि रक्तत्वादिप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वेन दण्डादिप्रकारताया अवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभाववदित्याहुः। तन्न शोभनम्-उक्तरीत्या विनैव लक्षणानुपपत्तौ तस्या अन्याय्यत्वात्।

II(ii) 12. अथोक्तस्थले आरोप्यारोपविषयबोधकपदयोर्ज्ञानानान्वितार्थकत्वे

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

कर्मप्रत्ययस्थले 'लोहितो वह्निर्ज्ञायते' इत्यादी विशेष्य-भेदाद्वाक्यभेदापत्तिः। न च लोहिताभेदज्ञानविषयो वह्निरित्येव शाब्दधीरुपगम्यते न तु ज्ञाने प्रकारो लोहितो विशेष्यश्च वह्निरिति समूहालम्बनं तथा सति 'शुक्लो वह्निर्लोहिता जपा 'इत्यादावपि तथा प्रयोगप्रसङ्गात्, दर्शितविशिष्टवै-शिष्ट्यबोधस्वीकारे लोहितादिप्रकारकत्वविशिष्टनिरूपित-विशेष्यतायाः शुक्लवह्न्यादौ बाधितत्वेन तादृशप्रयोगापत्ति-विरहादिति वाच्यम्, तत्र लोहितादि-पदोत्तरप्रकारतार्थक-द्वितीयादिविभक्तिविरहेण लोहितादिप्रकारकत्वेन ज्ञानभाना-संभवात्, नामार्थधात्वर्थयोः साक्षादन्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नतया प्रकारितायाः संसर्गतया भानासंभवादिति चेत्?

II(ii) 13. न-यथा हि 'घटो नीलो भवति' 'वृक्षो नौका भवति' काष्ठं भस्म भवति' इत्यादौ धात्वर्थेऽसाधारणधर्मरूपे भावे व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्येण नीलनौकाभस्मादेः साक्षादेवान्वयः- प्रथमाया अन्तरा भासमानार्थकत्वाभावात्, नौकादिपदस्य स्वारम्भकावय-वारभ्यनौकाद्यर्थलाक्षणिकतया प्रकृतिविकृत्योर्भेदमतेपि 'वृक्षो नौका भवति' इत्यादौ योग्यताया उपपत्तिस्तथा धात्वर्थे प्रकृतेपि प्रकारितासंबन्धेन लोहितादेः साक्षा-दन्वयस्या-गत्योपगमात्।

यथा प्रकृतिविकृतिभावस्थले 'वृक्षः पञ्च नौका भवति' इत्यादौ प्रकृतिभूतवृक्षादेर्विशेष्यतया भावनान्वयित्वात् तद्गत-संख्याबोधकतया प्रकृतिवाचकपदसमानवचनत्व-माख्यातस्य तथा 'एको द्वौ ज्ञायते' इत्याद्युभयाभेदारोपस्थलीयवाक्ये एकादिपदार्थस्यारोपविशेष्यस्याख्यातार्थविशेष्यत्वान्वय-विशेष्यतया तत्पदसमानवचनत्वमाख्यातस्य।

II(ii) 14. न चैवम् ''अमानि तत्तेन निजाऽयशोयुगं द्विफालबद्धाश्चि-कुराःशिरस्थितम्'' इत्यत्र कथमारोपशिष्यवाचकपदविरुद्ध वचनत्वम् ''अमानि'' इतिक्रियापदस्येति वाच्यम्,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तत्राऽयशोद्वयस्य वास्तवत्वेन चिकुरभागद्वयस्य राज्ञआरोप्यत्वेन कवेरुत्प्रेक्षितत्वात्, आख्यातार्थविशेष्यतान्वयविशेष्यत्वेनाऽयशोयुगस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात्।

इच्छार्थकधातुस्थले मुख्यविशेष्यत्वरूपं कर्मत्वं द्वितीयार्थः, अतो 'वृष्टिसाध्यं सुखं भवतु' इत्यादीच्छास्थले 'सुखमिच्छति' इत्यादिवत् 'वृष्टिमिच्छति' इत्यादयो न प्रयोगाः।

II(ii) 15. अथ 'अहं सुखी स्याम्' इत्यादीच्छयाः सुखादिविशेषणकतया तत्र 'सुखमिच्छति' इत्यादिप्रयोगानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्? न- 'मम सुखं भवतु' इत्यादिसुखविशेष्यकेच्छाया एवं कदाचित् सुखादिविशिष्टात्मबोधकशब्देन विषयाभिलापात्, स्वकृत्यऽधीनसिद्धिकत्वरूपस्वकृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारकपाकविशेष्यकेच्छाया एव 'पाकं कृत्या साधयामि' इतिपाकसिद्ध्यनुकूलकृत्यनुकूलकृत्यऽभिन्नव्यापारविशिष्टस्वबोधकशब्देन विषयाभिलापवत्।

यदि चोद्दश्यसुखादेर्विशेषणतयापि क्वचिद् भानमानुभविकं तदोद्देश्यादि व्यवहारनियामकः क्वाचित्कविशेषणसाधारणो विषयताविशेषोऽभ्युपेयः। अनुमितौ विशेष्यतया क्वाचित्कभानविषयसाध्यनिष्ठविधेयताख्यविषयतावत्। स एव च 'सुख- मिच्छति' इत्यादौद्वितीयाद्यर्थः।

II(ii) 16. 'ग्राममिच्छति' इत्यादौ ग्रामादिपदं ग्रामस्वत्वादिपरम्। अत एव च सिद्धस्य ग्रामादेर्मुख्यविशेष्यतायाउपदर्शितलिक्षणविषयताया वा विरोहेपि नक्षतिः। ग्रामादेः सिद्धत्वेपि स्वत्वाद्यऽसिद्धोपरक्तस्योच्छायां प्राधान्येन क्वचिद् भानम् विशिष्टस्यासिद्धत्वात् तत्रैव च 'ग्रामिच्छति' इत्यादिप्रयोग इत्यपि वदन्ति।

II(ii) 17 'पाकं चिकीर्षति' इत्यादौ द्वितीयाया विशेष्यतारूपकर्मत्वार्थकतया कृतिप्रकारकपाकविशेष्यकेच्छा प्रतीयते सा च 'पाकं

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

कृत्या साधयामि' इतीच्छा। अथ वा सनो धात्वर्थविशेष्य-केच्छावाचित्वात् कृतिविशेष्यकेच्छा चिकीर्षापदार्थ:सा च 'पाककृतिर्भवतु' इतीच्छैव, प्रवर्तिका च सा भवतु मा वेत्यन्यदेतत्। पाकादेश्च कृतिकर्मत्वमेव द्वितीयया प्रत्याय्यते न त्विच्छाया विषयत्वरूपं कर्मत्वम, गृहस्थितीच्छामादाय 'गुहं तिष्ठासति' इत्यादिप्रयोगापत्ते:। युक्तं चैतत्-सनो धात्वर्थप्रकारकेच्छावाचित्वे ओदनभोजनेच्छादशायाम् 'ओदनं बुभुक्षते' इतिप्रयोगो नस्यात्- तत्र भोजनस्याप्रकारत्वात्।

II(ii) 18. न च कर्मतासंबन्धेन भोजनप्रकारिका यदौदनविशेष्यिकेच्छा तदैवेतादृशप्रयोग:, सा चेच्छा भोजनधर्मिकेष्टसाधनताज्ञानादू भोजनविशिष्टौदनधर्मिकेष्टसाधनताज्ञानादू वा, ओदनस्य सिद्धतादशायामपि विशिष्टधर्मिकेष्टसाधनताज्ञानादू विशिष्टधर्मि-काऽसिद्धत्वज्ञानसहितादू विशिष्टेच्छासंभात्। यत्र भोजन-सिद्धतादशायां भोजनोत्तरकालीनगमनत्वादिप्रकारिका भुक्तौ-दनजन्यपुष्टित्वादिप्रकारिका वेच्छा तत्र 'बुभुक्षते' इतिप्रयोगस्य न प्रसङ्ग:-मुख्यविशेष्यविशेषणतापन्नकर्मत्वांशे इच्छाप्रकार-ताया एव सन्प्रत्ययप्रकृत्यर्थे भानोपगमादिति वाच्यम्।

II(ii) 19. 'भोजनं भवतु' इत्यादिभोजनविशेष्यकेच्छादशायामपि 'बुभुक्षते' इतिप्रयोगस्य सर्वसिद्धत्वेन धात्वर्थविशेष्यकेच्छा-बोधकताया: सन्प्रत्ययस्यावश्यमुपेयत्वात्। न च द्वयी व्युत्पत्तिरेवोपेयतेएकव्युत्पत्त्यैव निर्वाहे व्युत्पत्तिद्वयकल्पने गौरवात्, अतएव च स्थित्यादिगोचरेच्छाया गृहादिविशेष्य-कत्वस्योक्तरीत्या संभवेपि 'गृहं तिष्ठासति' इत्यादयो न प्रयोगा:। भोजनप्रकारकौदन-विशेष्यकेच्छाविशेषदशायाम् 'बुभुक्षते' इति प्रयोगसत्त्वे तूद्देश्यताख्यविषताया एव धात्वर्थे भानोपगमेन तस्य निर्वाहात्।

II(ii) 20. न च धात्वर्थविशेष्यकेच्छाया: सन्प्रत्ययार्थत्वे' पाकं चिकीर्षति' ओदनं बुभुक्षते' इत्यदौ पाकौदनादेर्द्वितीयया

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

कृतिभोजनादिकर्मत्वप्रत्यायनसंभवेऽपि 'पाकश्चिकीर्ष्यते' ओदनो बुभुक्ष्यते' इत्यादौ कर्माख्यातेन तत्प्रत्यायनासंभवः- तत्प्रकृतिभूतसन्नन्तधात्वर्थकृतिभोजनेच्छाकर्मत्वस्यैव तत्प्रत्यायनयोग्यत्वात् प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वाद् इच्छाविषयत्वविशेषितकृतिभोजनादेश्च प्रकृत्याऽप्रतिपादनादिति वाच्यम्, कर्तृप्रत्ययस्थले सन्प्रत्ययार्थेच्छाया धात्वर्थविशेष्यतया भानेपि कर्मप्रत्ययस्थले तस्या धात्वर्थविशेषणतया भनोपगमात् 'चिकीर्ष्यते पाकः' इत्यादाविच्छाविशेषितकृत्यादेरेव सन्नन्तेन प्रतिपादनात् तादृश-कृत्यादिकर्मताया आत्मनेपदादिना' प्रत्यायनसंभवात्। आख्याताद्युपस्थितवर्तमानत्वादेश्च कृत्यादिविषयकेच्छा यत्र प्रकृत्यर्थो यत्र वेच्छाविषयकृतिस्तत्रोभयत्रैवेच्छायामन्वयः, प्रकृत्यर्थैकदेशेपि 'नीलतरो घटः' इत्यादिस्थले नीलरूपादौ तरबाद्यर्थातिशयान्वयानुरोधात्।

II(ii) 21 न चैवं कर्मप्रत्ययस्थलेपि कृतिविशेषितैवेच्छा सना प्रत्याय्यतां विशेषणीभवन्ती कृतिरेव कर्मत्वेनाऽन्वीयताम्, भवन्मते विशेषणीभूतेच्छायां वर्तमानत्वाद्यंपराख्यातार्थान्वयवदिति वाच्यम्, एकत्र विशेषणतयोपरिस्थितस्यान्यत्र विशेषणतयान्वयोऽव्युत्पन्न इति प्रथमान्तार्थविशेषणकर्मत्वे इच्छायां विशेषणतयोपस्थितस्य धात्वर्थस्य विशेषणतयाऽन्वयायोगात्, विशेष्यतया चान्वयस्याप्रसक्तत्वात्। धात्वर्थविशेषणतया इच्छाभानोपि तस्या वर्त्तमानत्वादिविशेष्यतयैव भानेनोक्तव्युत्पत्तिविरोधविरहात्।

एवं धात्वर्थस्येतरविशेषणतयोपस्थितस्य स्वातन्त्र्येण कर्मतादिविशेषणत्वमयुक्ततममेव। प्रकृत्यर्थस्यैकदेशेऽपि प्रकृत्यर्थान्तर्गततया भासमाने एव प्रत्ययार्थान्वयदर्शनात्, नतु स्वातन्त्र्येण भासमाने। इच्छारूपविशेष्यपारतन्त्र्येण कर्मत्वान्वयोपि इच्छायाःकर्मत्वानन्वये दुर्घटः-विशेष्यान्वयिन्येव विशेषणस्य

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

पारतन्त्र्येणान्वयस्य विशिष्टान्वयस्थले व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धत्वाद् न तु विशेष्यानन्वयिनि।

II(ii) 22. अथास्तु विषयतारूपकर्मत्वे 'चिकीर्ष्यते पाकः' इत्यादाविच्छायास्तत्परतन्त्रकृतेश्चान्वयः- उभयत्रैव पाकादेर्विषयत्वात्, स्थित्यादिकर्मत्वाऽप्रसिद्ध्या च 'गृहं तिष्ठास्यते' इत्यादेरप्रसङ्गादिति चेत्?, 'ओदनो बुभुक्ष्यते' इत्यादौ का गतिः?- तत्रेच्छाकर्मताया विषयतारूपत्वाद् भोजनादिकर्मतायाश्च तदन्यत्वात्, विशेष्यीभवदिच्छान्वयिनि कर्मत्वे भोजनाद्यन्वयायोग्यत्वेन विशिष्टान्वयासंभवात्।

II(ii) 23. वस्तुतः 'पाकश्चिकीर्ष्यते' इत्यत्राप्यगतिरेव-कृत्यविशेषणतया पाकनिष्ठेच्छाविषयतायाः कृतिविशेणतया तन्निष्ठकृतिविषयताया भिन्नतया इच्छान्वयिनो विषयत्वरूपकर्मत्वस्य कृत्यन्वयायोग्यत्वात्।

यदि च विशेष्यान्वयिव्यक्तावेव तत्पारतन्त्र्येण विशेषणान्वय इति न नियमः, अपि तु तदन्वयिपतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्ने एवेति तथा च विषयतात्वावच्छिन्नस्योभयान्वययोग्यतया न प्रकृतेप्यन्वयानुपपत्तिः, अत एव "अरुणया" इत्यादावाऽऽरुण्यनिरूपितसाध्यताया गोनिरूपितसाध्यताभिन्नत्वेपि न तृतीयार्थे विशिष्टान्वयानुपपत्तिः, तत्र परम्परया विशेष्यान्वयिसोमक्रयव्यक्तेःपरम्परया विशेषणान्वयिव्यक्त्यभेदवत् प्रकृतेऽपि परम्परयोभयान्वयिकर्मव्यक्त्यभेदो अक्षत एवेत्युच्यते, तदापि भोजनकृतिर्भवतु' पाकश्च भवतु' इति-समूहालम्बनेच्छामादाय 'पाकश्चिकीर्ष्यते' इति प्रयोगस्यकालान्तरीयकृतिविषयतामादाय दुर्वारतैव।

II(ii) 24. विपयितासंबन्धनेच्छाविशेषणीभवत्कृतिव्यक्तिकर्मत्वस्यैव तदिच्छान्वयिनि कर्मण्यऽन्वयान्नायमतिप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्? तथापि तदिच्छाकाले 'पाक इदानीं न चिकीर्ष्यते' इति प्रयोगानुपपत्तिः- अन्वयितावच्छेदककृतिविषयतात्वकृतिगोचरवर्तमानेच्छाविषयतात्वावच्छिन्नाभावयोस्तदा पाकेऽसत्त्वात्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II(ii) 25. न च वर्तमानकालावच्छिन्नकृतिविषयतात्वादाच्छिन्नाभाव एव एक तत्र प्रतीयते स पाकेऽबाधित इति वाच्यम्, यदाऽतीतेच्छाधीनपाककृतिरपि तत्र वर्तते तदा तादृशाभावस्यापि तत्र बाधात्। पाककृतीच्छायामसत्त्यामुक्तेच्छासत्त्वेपि च तथा प्रयोगात्, कृत्यसत्त्वेपि पाककृतीच्छासत्त्वे तथा प्रयोगविरहात्, कृतिविषयत्वाभावमात्रबोधस्य तत्राभ्युपगमाऽसंभावाच्चेति कर्मप्रत्ययस्थले इच्छा धात्वर्थविशेषणमेव।

II(ii) 26. इदं तु तत्त्वम्- कर्मप्रत्ययस्थलेपि धात्वर्थविशेष्यतयैवेच्छा सन्प्रत्ययेन प्रत्याय्यते, तत्कर्मत्वमेव कर्माख्यातार्थः, तच्च धात्वर्थकर्मतया तद्विषयत्वम्। 'ओदनकर्मकभोजनं भवतु' 'पाकविषयककृतिर्भवतु' इत्यादीच्छायांच पाकौदनादीनां तथेच्छाविषयतया तत्कर्मत्वमक्षतम्। गृहस्थित्यादीच्छायां च गृहादेः स्थित्याधारत्वादिनैव विषयत्वमिति न गृहादेस्तिष्ठासादिकर्मत्वम्। अत एव यदोदनव्यक्तिकर्मकभोजनमप्रसिद्धम् अथ च भोजनकर्मकतया तदिष्टं तत्र अयमोदनो बुभुक्ष्यते' इत्यादेः दर्शनादिविषयत्वेन गगनादिगोचरेगच्छास्थलेच 'गगनं दिहयते' इत्यादेश्च प्रयोगस्य नानुपपत्तिः, न वा ओदनादिरूपकर्ममात्रोपरागेण यत्र भोजनादीच्छा दैववशेन च तद्भोजनादिकं विषादि-कर्मकमपि तत्र' विषं बुभुक्ष्यते' इत्यादयः प्रयोगाः।

II(ii) 27. कर्तृप्रत्ययस्थलेपि च तादृशविषयतारूपं कर्मत्वमेवेच्छाविशेषणतया भासते न तु धात्वर्थकर्मत्वम्। धात्वर्थविशेषणतया तत्तत्पदार्थकर्मत्वविशिष्टभोजनादिनिरूपितविषयिताया नियमत इच्छायां भानोपगमेनोक्तस्थले 'विषं बुभुक्षते चैत्रः' इत्यादिप्रयोगवारणेपि 'गगनं दिदृक्षते चैत्रः' इत्यादिप्रयोगस्य दुरुपपादत्वात्।

II(ii) 28. इदं तु बोध्यम्-सन्प्रतिपाद्येच्छायां धात्वर्थकृतिभोजनादेः केवलविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन न विशेषणत्वं तथा सति

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

परकर्तृककृतिभोजनादिगोचरेच्छावति 'अयं चिकीर्षति, बुभुक्षते' इतिप्रयोगप्रसङ्गात्, किं तु विशेष्यतासमानकर्तृकत्वोभयसंबन्धेनैव। उक्तातिप्रसङ्गवारणायेच्छासमानकर्तृकत्वेपि सन्प्रत्ययवाच्यतां स्वीकृत्य क्रियायां तदन्वयोपगमो न साधीयान्-इच्छान्तरसमानकर्तृकत्वमादाय दार्शितस्थलेतिप्रसङ्गतादवस्थ्यात्। स्वसमानकर्तृकत्वस्य वाच्यत्वे तत्तदिच्छारूपस्वपदार्थाननुगमेन व्युत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिः।

II(ii) 29 न च समानकर्तृकत्वस्य संबन्धत्वोपगमे तत्र शक्तिग्राहकानुशासनविरोधः, यतः-''धातोः कर्मणः समानकर्तृकादिच्छायां वा'' इतिसन्विधायकसूत्रं सनः समानकर्तृकत्वार्थकतां न प्रतिपादयति तस्य हि 'इच्छासमानकर्तृकत्वेन च स्वार्थपराद्धातोरिच्छारूपार्थे सन् भावति' इत्येवार्थः। इच्छाधात्वर्थयोः संसर्गतया समानकर्तृकत्वविवक्षायामपि समानकर्तृकत्वोपरक्तार्थपरत्वं धातोर्निर्वहतीति इच्छामात्रे शक्तिग्राहकं तत्सूत्रमिति।

II(ii) 30. सुबन्तोत्तरेच्छार्थविहितक्यच्काम्यजन्तस्य धातोरिच्छार्थकतया सन्प्रत्ययान्ताऽविशेषेपि सन्नन्तधातुवन्न सकर्मकता-तदन्तर्गतप्रातिपदिकस्यैवेच्छाकर्मबोधकतयेच्छायाः कर्माकाङ्क्षाविरहात्। न च 'पुत्रीयति' 'पुत्रकाम्यति' इत्यादौ क्यजादिप्रकृत्यर्थपुत्रादेः क्रियात्वाभावोनाऽकर्मकत्वेऽपि 'आत्मनः पाकमिच्छति पाकीयति' इत्यादौ प्रकृत्यर्थपाकादेः सकर्मकतया सन्नन्तसमुदायवद् क्यजाद्यन्तपाकादिसमुदायस्य सकर्मकताया दुर्वारतया 'तण्डुलं पाकीयति' इत्यादि-प्रयोगापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, कृधातुसमानार्थकयतेरिव सन्नन्त-समानार्थकस्य क्यजन्तादेरपि कर्मताबोधकसुप्साकाङ्क्षत्वानुपगमेन तथाप्रयोगाप्रसङ्गात्। कृदन्तकर्मत्वविवक्षयां तु षष्ठ्या बाधाद् द्वितीयाया अप्रसक्तिः।

II(ii) 31. न च धात्ववयवकृद्योगे ''कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति'' इत्यस्य

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

द्वितीयाबाधकत्वे 'कंसकर्मकवधमाचष्टे कंसं घातयति' इत्यत्र द्वितीया न स्यात् कंसस्याख्यानकर्मत्वायोगेन वधकर्मतयैव तदुत्तरं द्वितीयासमर्थनदिति वाच्यम्, कृदन्तोत्तरं यत्राख्यानार्थे णिच् तंत्र "प्रकृतिवच्च कारकम्" इत्यनेन कृदन्तकारकस्य ण्यन्तप्रकृतिप्रतिपाद्यक्रियाकारकतुल्यत्वातिदेशाद् 'राजानं गमयति' 'सूर्यमुदगमयति' इत्यादौ ण्यन्तधातुयोगे यथा प्रकृत्यर्थक्रियाकर्तुः कर्मत्वं तथा कृदन्तोत्तरणिच्योगे-पीति=आख्येयगत्युद्गत्यादिकर्तुः कर्मतया तदुत्तरं द्वितीयेति ण्यन्त्यधातुयोगे यथा प्रकृतेः कर्मणः कंसादेर्द्वितीयोपपत्तिः, तथा विवक्षायाम् 'तण्डुलस्यपाकीयति' इतिप्रयोग इष्यते एव-कारकविभक्तयर्थस्य वृत्त्येकदेशेनाप्यन्वयस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात्। संबन्धविवक्षायां च न तथा प्रयोगः।

II(ii) 32 वस्तुतः संबन्धविवक्षायामपि तथा प्रयोग इष्यत एव। न च तत्र वृत्त्येकदेशेन षष्ठ्यर्थान्वये "प्रतियोगिपदादन्यद् यदन्यत् कारकादपि" इतिव्युत्पत्तिविरोध इतिवाच्यम्, तादृशव्युत्पत्तेरभेदनान्वयस्थले एव स्वीकारात्, वृत्त्येकदेशं भेदान्वये बाधकाभावात्। अत एव ऋद्धस्य राजमातङ्गः' इत्यादिप्रयोगो नेष्यपते, इष्यते च 'पितुः स्वर्गकामः' इत्यादिप्रयोगः। नच कारकपदप्रतियोगिपदयोर्भेदनिवेश-नमऽफलमिति वाच्यम्, तन्निवेशस्य दृष्टान्तविधयोक्तत्त्वात् यथा प्रतियोगिपदाद्यर्थस्य कुत्रप्यभेदान्वयो न भवति तथा वृत्त्येकदेशेनान्यपदार्थस्येत्यर्थे तात्पर्यादिति ध्येयम्।

II(ii) 33. अभेदविवक्षायाम्-'पण्डितं पुत्रीयति' 'प्रवीरं पुत्रकाम्यति' इत्यादि प्रयोगाभाववत् परपुत्रादिगोचरेच्छावति पुंसि 'पुत्री-यति' इत्यादयो न प्रयोगाः "सुप आत्मनः क्यच्" इत्या-दिना इच्छाकर्तृसंबन्धि यदिच्छाकर्म तद्बोधकसुबन्तात्क्य-च्काम्यचोर्विधानात्। संबन्धित्वं च संबन्धिवेन भातत्वम्, अन्यथा यस्येच्छाकर्तुः पुत्रोऽसिद्धस्तस्यापि स्वीयत्वेन

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

पुत्रेच्छादशायाम् 'पुत्रीयत्ययम्' इत्यादिप्रयोगस्य सर्वसिद्धस्यानुपपत्तेः।

II(ii) 34. उक्तस्थले 'पुत्रीयति' इत्यादिवाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यवारणाय च क्यजाद्यर्थेच्छायां पुत्रादेर्विषयित्वमात्रं न संबन्धः किं तु स्वांशे भासमानसंबन्धस्य प्रतियोगितया यो विषयस्तादृशपुरुषवृत्तित्वसहितमित्युपेयम्। स्वसंबन्धस्य क्यजाद्यऽवाच्यत्वेप्युक्तसंबन्धेनैवेच्छायां सुबन्तार्थस्यान्वय इति व्युत्पत्तिप्रदर्शनायैव सूत्रे ''आत्मनः'' इत्युपात्तम्। ''आत्मनः''इति षष्ठ्यर्थसंबन्धश्च न ''धातोः कर्मणः'' इत्यादिसूत्रानुवृत्तायामिच्छायामन्वेति-अव्यावर्तकत्वादुक्तार्थलाभाऽप्रयोजकत्वात्, अपि तु सुप इत्यर्थे सुबन्तादिचछाकर्तुरिच्छायाम्'' इति वृत्तावपि 'इच्छाकर्तुः सुबन्तात्' इत्येव योजना कार्या-यथाश्रुते दर्शितानुपपत्तेरिति ध्येयम्।

II(ii) 35. 'भृत्यं पुत्रीयति' इत्यादावाऽऽचारार्थविहितक्यजन्तस्य सकर्मकत्वं युज्यते एव, तथा हि- तमिवाचरतीत्यर्थे उपमानवाचिनः क्यच् विहितः, 'तमिवाचरति' इत्यस्य 'तत्तुल्यं जानाति' इत्यर्थः-आचारपदस्य व्यवहारमूलज्ञानपरत्वात्। तुल्यतया ज्ञानं च क्यजर्थस्तच्च सकर्मकमेव, तत्र तुल्यत्वे प्रतियोगितया पुत्रादेरन्वयः। पुत्रादिपदमेव वा गौण्या पुत्रादितुल्यपरम् ज्ञानमात्रं क्यजर्थस्तत्र स्वाभेदावगाहित्वसंबन्धेन पुत्रादितुल्यस्याऽन्वयः।

न चैवं पुत्रादिपदमुपमेयार्थकमेव न तूमानार्थकमिति कथम् ''उपमानादाचारे'' इत्यनेन तदुत्तरं क्यचो विधानं संगच्छते इति वाच्यम्, पुत्रादिपदस्य तुल्यार्थकत्वेपि तुल्यत्वप्रतियोगितयोपमानपुत्राद्यर्थकत्वात्, अत एव तस्य कर्मवाचकत्वं पुत्रादितुल्यस्याचारकर्मत्वात् सम्यगुपपद्यते। पूर्वमते उपमानपदस्य कर्मवाचकत्वमाऽऽचारकर्मविशेषणतुल्यताप्रतियोगिबोधकत्वरूपं बोध्यम्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ii(II) 36 वस्तुतः 'पत्रमिवाचरति' इत्यस्य पुत्रं यथा व्यवहरति तथा व्यवहरतीत्येवार्थः, व्यवहारश्च प्रतिपाल्यत्वादिना ज्ञानं प्रतिपालनादिरूपो व्यापारो वा, एवं च 'पुत्रीयति' इत्यस्य पुत्रकर्मकव्यवहारतुल्यव्यवहारकर्तेत्यर्थः। मुखचन्द्रादेर्यथा स्व-जन्याह्लादस्यतुल्यतयोपमानोपमेयभावस्तथा पुत्रभृत्ययोरपि स्वकर्मकव्यवहारतुल्यतया स इति पुत्रपदस्योपपानवाचिता आचारनिष्ठसादृश्यप्रतियोग्याचारकर्मवाचिरता च। आचार-सदृशाचार एव क्यचोर्थः, प्रथमाचारे कर्मतासबन्धेन पुत्रादेरन्वयः-अमाद्यन्तात् क्यच्प्रत्ययविधानेपि धात्ववयवतया लुप्तस्याऽमादेर्नियमेनानुपस्थितेः कर्मत्वस्य संबन्धतया भानमुपेयते, यथा 'राजपुरुषः' इत्यादिसमारूपप्रातिपदि-कावयवतया लुप्तषष्ठ्यादिप्रतिसंधानाऽनियमाद् विभक्तयन्तार्थ-विशिष्टे पूर्वपदलक्षणोपेयते। द्वितीये आचारे भृत्यस्य कर्मतया क्यजन्तस्य सकर्मकत्वमिति।

ii(II) 37. कुट्यां प्रासादयति' इत्यादावाऽऽधाररूपोपमानवाचिसप्त-म्यन्तोत्तरविहितल्याजन्तस्य न सकर्मकता तत्र च प्रासादा-धिकरणकाचारतुल्याचारः क्यजन्तार्थः स चावस्थानरूप एवेत्यकर्मक एवेति कुट्यास्तत्राधिकरणतया ततः सप्तम्येव। अवस्थानयोःसाम्यं चैकजातीयसुखजनकत्वादिनाऽविशेषज्ञान-विषयत्वेन वा।

'हंस इवाचरति हंसायते-हंसति' इत्यादावुपमानवाचि-कर्तृवाचकपदोत्तराविहितक्यङन्तक्विबन्तधातुरप्यकर्मकः-तत्र हंसादिकर्तृकाचारतुल्याचारस्य गमनादिरूपस्य क्यङन्ताद्यर्थत्वेपि गम्यादिप्रतिपाद्यतावच्छेदकसंयोगादिरूपफलानवच्छिन्नस्यैव तदर्थत्वोपगमात्। शब्दज्ञानदिरूपसविषयकव्यारात्मकस्याचारस्य क्वचित्तदर्थत्वेपि विषयरूपकर्माऽवरुद्धस्यैव तस्य तदर्थत्वो-पगमात्, कर्मावरुद्धस्य च कर्मान्वयंनिराकाङ्क्षत्वादित्यादिकं स्वयमूह्यम्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II(ii) 38. कृत्यर्थकधातुयोगे इष्टसाधनत्वादिज्ञानविशेष्यताप्रयोज्यसाध्यताख्यविषयताविशेष एव कर्मत्वं द्वितीयादेरर्थः, न तु विषयतामात्रम्-यत्र 'घटं करोति' इति प्रयुज्यते तत्र 'कपालं' 'जलाहरणं करोति' इत्याद्यप्रयोगात्। अथैवम् 'काशान् कटं करीति' 'काष्ठं भस्म करोति' इत्यत्र काशकाष्ठादिपदोत्तरद्वितीयानुपपत्तिः- तत्र कृतिनिरूपितोक्तविषयताविरहादिति चेत्? उपादानीयविलक्षणविषयतापि द्वितीयार्थः, सा च द्वितीयान्तपदो पस्थाप्यसाध्यीयविषयताविशिष्ठायामेव कृतावऽन्वेति, अतः-कटादिरूपकर्मान्तराऽसमभिव्याहारे 'काशान् करोति' इत्यादयो न प्रयोगाः।

II(ii) 39. अथैवमपि 'काष्ठं भस्म करोति' 'दुग्धं दधि करोति' इत्यादौ काष्ठदुग्धादेः कर्मत्वानुपपत्तिः-तस्य भस्मदध्याद्युपादानताविरहात् काष्ठदुग्धादिनाशानन्तरमेव तदारम्भकपरमाणुभिर्भस्मदध्याद्यारम्भात्, उत्पत्त्याश्रयस्यैवोपादानत्वात् विभिन्नकालीनयोश्चधाराधेयभावविरहात्

कारणस्यैवोपादानत्वनियमाच्च। न च परिणामवादविद्वेषिणां नैयायिकानां काष्ठादेर्भस्मादिरूपद्रव्यान्तरकारणत्वम् अपि तु प्रतिबन्धकत्वमेव-द्रव्यवति द्रव्यान्तरानुत्पत्तेरिति चेत्? न-कर्म हि त्रिविधं भवति-प्राप्यं प्रकृतिविकृती च। तत्र प्राप्यं कर्म-क्रियाजन्यफलशालि गम्यादेर्ग्रामादि ज्ञानादे-र्विषयश्च। क्रियानिष्पाद्यं यत् तद् विकृतिरूपं यथा-पाकादेरोदनादि यथा वा कृतेर्माल्यादि करादि च। प्रथमे तण्डुलादि रूपपूर्वद्रव्यं विनाश्यौदनादेर्निर्वर्तनम्, ज्ञानदेर्विर्वर्तनम्, द्वितीये पुष्पादिरूपपूर्व-द्रव्यमविनाश्यैव संदर्भादिरूपविशेषनिष्पादनेन विशिष्टस्य माल्यादेर्निर्वर्तनम्, तृतीये च काशादिरूपपूर्वधमिर्णमविनाश्य तत्रैव कटादिरूप- धर्मिनिष्पादनम्, ईदृशं च कर्म प्रकृतेरसमभिव्यवहारस्थले निर्वर्त्यमुच्यते।

II(ii) 40. 'तण्डुलानोदनं पचति' 'कुसुमानि स्रजं करोति' 'काशान्

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

कटं करोति' इत्यादौ प्रत्कृतिसमभिव्याहरस्थलेपि निर्वर्त्यतें निष्पाद्यते यदिति व्युत्पत्त्या यद्यप्योदनादेरपि निर्वर्त्यताऽस्ति तथापि तद्व्यावृत्तमेव पारिभाषिकं निर्वर्त्यत्वम्, तदुक्तमंभियुक्तैः-

सती वाऽविद्यमाना वा प्रकृतिः परिणामिनी।
यस्य नाश्रीयते तस्य निर्वर्त्यत्वं प्रचक्षते।। इति।

यस्य=विकृतिकर्मणः नाश्रीयते=न प्रयुज्यते इत्यर्थः। एवं च तत्र तत्रौदनादेर्विकार्यकर्मण्येवान्तर्भावः, तदुक्तम्-

यदसज्जायते पूर्वं जन्मना यत्प्रकाश्यते।
तन्निर्वर्त्यम्, विकार्यं तु कर्म द्वेधा व्यवस्थितम्।।
प्रकृत्युच्छेदसंभूतं किंचित् काष्ठादिभस्मवत्।
किंचिद् गुणान्तरोत्पत्त्या सुवर्णादिविकारवत्।। इति।

अत्र प्रकृतिरपि ग्राह्या, अन्यथा काष्ठसुवर्णादेस्तुरीयतापत्तेः। विकार्यपदेनैकव्युत्पत्त्या प्रकृतिविकृत्युभयाऽबोधनेप्युभयसाधारणरूपावच्छिन्ने पारिभाषिकमेव विकार्यपदम्।

II(ii) 41. प्रकृतिरूपंकर्म च क्रियया वस्त्वन्तरनिष्पत्तये पूर्वभावविशिष्टस्य यस्याऽसत्त्वरूपो विकारो निर्वाह्यते तद् यथा-पाकदेस्तण्डुलादि कृतेश्च पुष्पकाशादि, तत्र प्रथमस्थले तण्डुलादिरूपधर्मिनाशादेव पूर्वभावविशिष्टतदसत्त्वमोदनादिरूपकर्मान्तरनिष्पादकम्, इतरत्र धर्मिणः काशकुसुमादेः सत्त्वेपि कटसंदर्भादिविरहरूपपूर्वभावासत्त्वेन तद्विशिष्टस्यासत्त्वं कटसंदर्भादिनिष्पादकक्रियातो निर्वहति, एवं च 'तण्डुलानोदनं पचति' इत्यादौ प्रकृतिकर्मोत्तरद्वितीयाया नाशकत्वमर्थः तण्डुलाद्यन्वितं नाशकत्वं च पाकेऽन्वेति। विकृतिकर्मोत्तरद्वितीयायाश्चोत्पादकत्वमर्थ ओदनाद्यन्वितस्य तस्य नाशकत्वविशिष्टे पाकेऽन्वयः। नाशे चोत्पत्तेः प्रयोजन-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

कत्वमुद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेयभावमहिम्रा नियमतो भासते अतः पाकस्य तण्डुलाद्यारम्भकसंयोगनाशजनकत्वेपि तन्नाशस्य द्रव्यन्तरोत्पत्तौ द्रव्यनाशेनाऽन्यथासिद्धतया प्रयोजकत्वबाधेन संयोगमोदनं पचति' इति न प्रयोगः।

II(ii) 42 वस्तुतस्तु निर्वर्त्यकर्मासमभिव्याहारस्थले 'संयोगं पचति' इति प्रयोगवारणाय संयोगनाशद्वारा नाशकत्वमेव द्वितीयार्थो वक्तव्य इति कृतं प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभावबोधनेन।

'तण्डुलमोदनं करोति' 'काष्ठं भस्म करोति' 'दुग्धं दधि करोति' इत्यादावपि प्रकृतिकर्मोत्तरद्वितीयया तन्नाशकत्वं कृतौ प्रत्याय्यते विकृतिकर्मोत्तरद्वितीयया च विषयताविशेष उत्पादकत्वं वा मिलितमुभयं वा कृतौ बोध्यते। 'काशान् कटं करोति' 'कुसुमानि मोक्तिकानि वा स्रजं करोति' इत्यादौ काशादिपदोत्तरद्वितीया कृतौ विषयताविशेषमेव बोधयति-काशाद्युच्छेदकतायास्तत्र बाधात्। 'कटम्' इत्यादौ द्वितीयार्थः पूर्ववत्। स्रगादिपदार्थविन्यासविशेषविशिष्टकुसुमादेर्न कुसुमाद्युपादानककृतिविषयता अपि तु विन्यासादिरूप-विशेषणस्यैव तस्यैवकृत्यधीनोत्पत्तिरिति स्रजमित्यादि-द्वितीया-न्तस्य विशिष्टत्सत्वनिर्वाहकत्वमर्थः, विशेषणोत्पादकस्यापि स्वरूपसम्बनधविशेषरूपं विशिष्टसत्त्व निर्वाहकत्वमक्षतमेव।

II(ii) 43. 'अग्निः श्यामं रक्तं करोति' इत्यादावचेतनकर्तृव्यापारबोधक-करोतिसमभिव्याहृतश्यामादिपदोत्तरद्वितीयाया अपि नोपादान-ताख्यविलक्षणविषयतार्थकत्वसंभवः अपि तु तादृशद्वितीयान्तेन श्यामरूपादिविशिष्टासत्त्वनिर्वाहकतारूपं विशिष्टोच्छेदकत्वं तादृशव्यापारे प्रत्याय्यते। 'घटं रक्तं करोति' इत्यादावपि घटादिपदस्याऽरक्तत्वविशिष्ठघटादिलाक्षीणकतया विशिष्टघटा-द्यसत्त्वनिर्वाहकत्वं प्रतीयते।

प्रकृतिविकृतिभावस्थले कर्माख्यातेन प्रकृतेः कर्मत्वमेव प्रत्याय्यते, अतः 'काष्ठानि भस्मराशिः क्रियन्ते' इत्यादा-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

वाख्यातार्थविशेष्यकाष्ठादिवाचकपदसमानवचनत्वमाख्यातस्य न तु निर्वर्त्यभस्मादिरूपविकारवाचकपदसमानवचनता।

II(ii) 44. अथैवं निर्वर्त्यकर्मवाचकपदात् प्रथमा न स्यादपि तु द्वितीयैवतत्कर्मताया लकारेणानभिधानात्।

यत्तु उभयकर्मत्वमेव लकारेणाभिधीयतेप्रधानाऽप्रधानकर्मसमभिव्याहृतनीवहादिदुहादिरूप द्विकर्मकोत्तरकर्मप्रत्ययस्यैव कर्मत्वद्वयानभिधायकत्वनियमात् प्रकृते च कर्मद्वयस्यैव तुल्यत्वात्। विकृतेराख्यातार्थविशेष्यत्वेप्याऽऽख्यातस्य तत्समानवचनत्वाऽनियमः "गृह्णाति वाचकः संख्यां प्रकृतेर्विकृतेर्नहि" इत्यनुशासनसिद्धप्रकृतिसमभिव्याहृतलकारीयविकारसंख्याबोधकत्वाभावव्युत्पत्तिनिर्वाह्य इत्युक्तस्थले न क्रियापदस्यैकवचनान्तता, तदर्थान्वितसंख्याबोधकस्यैवाख्यातस्य तत्पदसमानचनत्वानियमात् नतु तद्विशेष्यकस्वार्थकर्मत्वादिबोधजनकाख्यातमात्रस्येति।

II(ii) 45. तदसत् - विकारविकाारिणोर्द्वयोराख्यातार्थविशेष्यत्वे वाक्यभेदापत्तेः। 'घटपटौ स्तः' 'घटपटौ दृश्येते' इत्यादौ विशेष्यभेदेपि विशेष्यतावच्छेदकद्वित्वादे रेकधा भानान्न वाक्यभेदः, अत्र च न तादृशविशेष्यतावच्छेदकभानमस्ति येन त त्रेवाऽत्राप्ये-कवाक्यतानिर्वाहः (स्यात्?)। न चागत्येष्यते एवात्र वाक्यभेद इति वाच्यम्, तथा सत्येकवाक्यार्थपरस्य 'काष्ठं क्रियते' 'भस्म क्रियते' इत्येतादृशप्रयोगस्यापत्तेः। 'काष्ठं भस्म क्रियते' इति वाक्यजबोधस्य काष्ठविकृतिर्भस्माऽन्यविकृतिर्वेतिसंशयनिवर्तकतानुपपत्तेः-काष्ठभस्मनोः प्रकृतिविकार-भावाऽभानात्। अस्मन्मते च काष्ठोच्छेदकत्वरूपकाष्ठकर्मकत्व-भस्मनिर्वर्तकत्वरूपतत्कर्मत्वयोरेकविशिष्टेऽपरान्वये एवं पूर्वोपदर्शितरीत्या काष्ठोच्छेदप्रयोज्योत्पत्तिकत्वरूपकाष्ठप्रकृतिकत्वस्य भस्मनि लाभसंभादिति चेत्?

II(ii) सत्यम्-'काष्ठं भस्म क्रियते' इत्यादौ भस्मादिनिर्वर्त्यकर्मताया

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

लकारेणानभिधानेपि तत्कर्मताया धात्वर्थे संसर्गतया भानोपगमेन तादृशकर्मोत्तरं प्रथमायाः साधुता। प्रातिपदिकार्थविशेष्यतया कर्मत्वादिविक्षायामेव द्वितीया-दिभिक्तिसाधुत्वात्। यथा 'अर्घो नमः' इत्यादौ नमः पदार्थत्यागेऽर्घादिकर्मत्वबोधेप्यर्घादिपदात्प्रथमैव-निपातार्थेत्यागे कर्मतासबन्धेनैव नामार्थस्यान्वयात्। एवम् 'भूतले न घटः' इत्यादावपि घटादिसंबन्धस्याभावे संसर्गतया भानात् षष्ठीविषयेपि प्रथमा। न च धात्वर्थे नामार्थस्य साक्षादन्वयोऽव्युत्पन्न इति प्रकृते कर्मतायाः संसर्गतया भानं नसंभवतीति वाच्यम्, 'घटो नीलो भवति' 'काष्ठं भस्म भवति' इत्यादौ भवनादिक्रियायां नीलादेः कर्तृतासंबन्धेन साक्षादन्वयवदत्रापि व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्येण कर्मान्तरविशेषणतापन्नक्रियायामऽपरकर्मणः कर्मतासंबन्धेन साक्षादन्वयोपगमात्।

II(ii) 47. न चैवमपि कर्मत्वस्य प्रकृत्यर्थविशेष्यत्वेन विवक्षया 'काष्ठं भस्मराशिं क्रियते' इत्यादिप्रयोगापत्तिः, कर्मत्वान्तरविशेषणतानापन्नक्रियायामेव द्वितीयया कर्मत्वं बोध्यते इतिं व्युत्पत्तिकल्पने? 'गौर्दुह्यते क्षीरम्' 'अजा नीयते ग्रामम्' इत्यादौ दोहननयनादिक्रियायां क्षीरग्रामादिकर्मकत्वानन्वयप्रसङ्ग इतिवाच्यम्, प्रकृतिविकृत्युभयकर्मस्थले तथा व्युत्पत्तेः। यथोक्तातिप्रसाङ्गवारणाय दर्शिता व्युत्पत्तिः कल्प्यते तथा कर्तृत्वविशेषणतयाऽभासमानायामेव क्रियायां तुतीयार्थकर्तृत्वान्वय इत्यपि व्युत्पत्तिः कल्प्या अन्यथा प्रकृत्यर्थविशेष्यतया कर्तृत्वविवक्षया 'काष्ठं भस्मना भवति' इति प्रयोगस्य दुर्वारत्वात्।

II(ii) 48. उत्पत्तिप्रयोजकनाशप्रतियोगित्वरूपविकार एव काष्ठं भस्म भवति' इत्यादौ धात्वर्थः, आधेयत्वरूपं तत्कर्तृत्वमेव संबन्धमर्यादया भासते। 'काष्ठेन भस्मना भूयते' इत्यादौ भस्माद्याधेयत्वमुत्पत्तौ काष्ठाधेयत्वं च नाशप्रतियोगित्वे

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तृतीयोपस्थाप्ये प्रकारतया भासते। कर्तृत्वविशेषणतया भासमानस्य निरुक्तभवनस्यान्तर्गतायामेवोत्पत्तौ भस्मादेराधेयत्वं संबन्धतया भासते इति व्युत्पत्तेः 'काष्ठेन भस्म भूयेते' इत्यादयो न प्रयोगाः-भावाख्यातस्य कर्तृत्वाबोधकत्वात्। कर्मत्वान्तरविशेष्यतापन्नकृत्यादौ कर्मत्वस्य संसर्गतया भानमऽव्युत्पन्नमिति 'काष्ठं भस्मराशिः करोति' इत्यादयो न प्रयोगाः।

II(ii) 49. ''अधिशीङ्स्थासां कर्म'' इत्यादिना यत्राधारस्य कर्मसंज्ञा तत्राऽऽधारत्वमाधेयत्वं वा द्वितीयार्थः, 'स्थलीमधिशेते इत्यादौ तादृशार्थे द्वितीयायाः स्थल्या अधिशयिता' इत्यादौ कृत्प्रयोगें षष्ठ्याश्च साधुत्वार्थमेव कर्म संज्ञाविधानात्। अथ कृञर्थ-व्यापारान्तरं धात्वर्थैऽन्तर्भाव्य शयनादिरूपफलावच्छिन्नव्या-पारार्थकसोपसर्गशीङ्प्रभृतिधात्वर्थतावच्छेदकशयनादिरूप-फलाश्रयतयाऽऽधारस्य कर्मत्वोपपादनसंभवातत् तादृशसूत्राणां वैयर्थ्यमेव, अध्याद्युपसृष्ट-शीङ्प्रभृतीनामेव च तादृशार्थे निरूढलक्षणा न त्वनुप सुष्टानामतो न 'स्थलीं शोते इन्यादयः सवारसिकाः प्रयोगाः इति चेत् न। धातोर्मुख्यार्थपरत्वेऽपि दर्शितप्रयोग निर्वाहाय भगवता पाणिनिना तादृशसूत्रप्रणयनात्। तदप्रणीतवतां शर्ववर्मप्रभृतीनां मुख्यार्थपराणाम् 'स्थल्यामधिशेते' इत्यादिप्रयोगाणां साधुताया दुर्वारत्वाच्च।

II(ii) 50. कालाध्वदेशानामऽकर्मकक्रियायोगे कैश्चित्कर्मप्रत्यायार्थं विभाषया कर्मत्वमनुशिष्यते। अन्ये तु क्रियान्तराऽन्तर्भावेनोक्तरीत्या तत्र पाक्षिकं कर्मप्रत्ययमुपपादयन्तस्तन्नानुशासति. उक्तं च तैः-

कालभावाध्वदेशानामन्तर्भूताक्रियान्तरैः।
सर्वैरकर्मकैर्योगे कर्मत्वमुपजायते॥ इति॥

तन्मते च ' मासमधीते' 'मासमास्ते' 'योजनं धावति' इत्या-दावभिव्याप्त्यर्थे ''कालाध्वनोरत्यन्तसंयोगे'' इत्यनेन द्वितीया-विधानं यद्यप्यनर्थकम् धात्वर्थेऽध्ययनस्थित्यादिविशेषण तयाऽभिव्यापनात्मकक्रियाया अन्तर्भावेन तत्कर्मतया तत्र तत्र द्वितीयोपपत्तेः, तादृशधात्वर्थे व्याप्त्यनन्तर्भावे 'मासमास्ते'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

इत्यादौ द्वितोयया तद्बोधनेपि' आस्यते मास:' इत्यादौ मासादौ स्थित्यादिव्याप्यत्वलाभाऽनिर्वाहात्, तथापि मासं रमणीया' क्रोशं कुटिला नदी' इत्यादौ भवतीत्यस्याऽनध्याहारेपि द्वितीयाया: साधुतानिर्वाहकत्वेन भाष्यकृतस्तत्सूत्रं सार्थकयन्ति। तत्र हि रमणीयत्वाभिव्याप्यत्वं मासादौ प्रतीयते न च तत्र क्रियासमभिव्याहारोस्ति यत्राभिव्याप्तिरन्तर्भविष्यति तत्कर्मतया द्वितीया च स्यात्। एवम् 'मासमासिता' इत्यादाव-भिव्याप्त्यन्तर्भावेन मासस्य कर्मत्वोपपादनेपि कृद्योगात् षष्ठ्येव स्यान्न द्वितीयेत्यतोपि तत्सूत्रं सार्थकम्।

II(ii) 51. अथ केयमभिव्याप्तिर्याऽत्यन्तसंयोग इत्युच्यते?, न तावद्-व्याप्यवृत्ति: कालिक: संबन्ध: कालिकसंबन्धस्य व्याप्य-वृत्तित्वं व्याप्यकालानवच्छिन्नत्वम्, दिवसादिमात्रवृत्तिर्मासा-दिनिष्ठसंबन्धो दिवसाद्यवच्छिन्न इति तत्र 'मासमास्ते' इति न प्रयोग:। मासपदार्थश्चात्र त्रिंशद्दिनमात्रस्थायी कश्चिदखण्ड: पदार्थो न तु क्रियाप्रचय:-तथा सति दिनैकादिमात्रस्थायिनोपि संबन्धस्य कासुचित् क्रियासु व्याप्यवृत्तितया तत्र तथाव्यवहारापत्तेरिति युक्तम्-'चैत्रो मासं काश्यां तिष्ठति' इत्यादौ-काशीसंयोगस्य मासव्यापकस्यैकस्याभावेऽप्रामाण्य-प्रसङ्गात् संयोगव्यक्तीनां मासनिष्ठकालिक संबन्धस्यावान्तर दण्डाद्यात्मककालावच्छिन्नत्वात्।

II(ii) 52. न च संयोगानां भेदेपि चैत्रयिसंयोगत्वाद्यवच्छिन्न-निरूपितकालिकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नाधारता मासव्यापिकैकैव सा च नावान्तरकालावच्छिन्नेति तत्र तदनवच्छिन्नत्वबोधकमुक्तवाक्यं भवेदेव प्रमाणमिति वाच्यम्, सामान्यघटितविशेषधर्मा-वच्छिन्नाधिकरणताकूटादेव सामान्यधर्मावच्छिन्नवत्ताप्रत्ययोपपत्ते: शुद्धसामान्यधर्मावच्छिन्ननिरूपिताधिकरणतायामतिरिक्तायां मानाभावत्। यत्र त्रिंशद्दिनेषु कमपि कालमधीतं तत्र मासेऽध्ययनसंबन्धस्याऽव्याप्यवृत्तितया 'मासमधीते' इति प्रयोगानुपपत्तिररति न शक्यते वारयितुम्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II(ii) 53. उच्यतेअभिव्याप्तिर्यावदवयवसंबन्धः यत्समुदायो मासादिपदार्थस्त एव तदवयवाः, एवं च त्रिंशद्दिनानां मासपदार्थतया त्रिंशद्दिनेषु किंचित्किचित्कालावच्छेदेनाध्ययनसंबन्धेपि 'मासमधीते' इतिप्रयोगोपपत्तिः। त्रिंशद्दिनसंबन्धश्च दिनपर्याप्तत्रिंशत्त्वव्यापकत्म्, तादृशत्रिंशत्त्वादेश्च मासादिपदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तस्य मासादिपदादेव लाभाद् व्यापकत्वमात्रं द्वितीयार्थः।

व्यापकत्वं च व्याप्यविशेषाऽघटितमखण्डं दुर्वचमिति खण्डशोऽभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वमऽभावश्च द्वितीयार्थः। प्रथमाभावे प्रकृत्यर्थो मासादिराधेयतासंबन्धेनान्वेति। मासादिनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वत्वाच्छिन्नस्य च प्रतियोगितयाऽभावांन्तरेऽन्वयंः, तस्य चान्वयितावच्छेदकचैत्रकर्तृकाध्ययनत्वादिरूपस्वाश्रयघटितपरम्परासंबन्धेनाऽध्ययनादावन्वयः।

II(ii) 54. प्रथमाभावे च प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणत्वं विशेषणमुपादेयम्, तेन त्रिंशद्दिनेष्वेव च यत्राधीतं तत्र दिनावान्तरदण्डादावऽध्ययनाभावेऽप्युक्तप्रयोगोपपत्तिः। मासपदं च त्रिंशद्दिनपरमेव न तु तावत्कालस्थाय्यऽखण्डवस्त्वन्तरपरम्एकदिनाध्ययनस्थलंपि तादृशाखण्डकाले प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणाध्ययनाभावासत्त्वेन मासमधीते' इति प्रयोगापत्तेः। मासघटकं च दिनं सूर्योदयावधि सूर्योदयान्तरपर्यन्तावस्थाय्यऽखण्डवस्तुरूपं न तु क्रियादिप्रचयः-तथा सत्येकैकक्रियादिव्यक्तेरपि मासत्वाधिकरणतया तत्र प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणाध्ययनाभावसत्त्वेन व्यापकत्वरूपद्वितीयार्थस्य बाधापत्तेः।

'दिवसं स्वपिति' इत्यादौ च विदसादिपदं सूर्योदयावधिसूर्योदयान्तरपर्यन्तक्षणकूटपरमेव अतो नैकदण्डादिमात्रस्वप्ने तथा प्रयोगः।

II(ii) 55. अथ व्यापकत्वस्य द्वितीयार्थत्वे एकमासादिव्यापकाध्ययनस्थलेपि मासान्तरेऽध्ययनाभावसत्त्वेन मासत्वादिव्यापकताया अध्ययने बाधेन 'मासमधीते' इत्यादि-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

प्रयोगानुपपत्तिः। न च मासपदेन यत्किंचित्त्रिंशद्दिनमात्र-वृत्तिविशेषधर्मप्रकारेणानुपस्थापनेपि तद्धर्मवत्स्वनिरूपिताधे-यत्वसंबन्धेन मासपदार्थस्याभावेऽन्वयोपगमाद् यत्किं-चिन्मासनिष्ठाभाप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वमन्वयितावच्छेदके लभ्यते इति न काप्यनुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, तत्तन्मासमात्र-वृत्तिधर्मविशेषाणां संबन्धघटकत्वेपि शाब्दबोधे संसर्ग-तात्पर्यज्ञानस्य हेतुतया संसर्गविशेषोपस्थिरपेक्षितत्वात्। संबन्धघटकतादृशधर्मान् विशिष्याऽविदुषः शाब्दबोधानुदयप्रसङ्गात्। न चेष्टापत्तिः- अनुभवविरोधात्। अनागतादिमासवृत्तितादृशधर्माणां विशिष्य ज्ञानसामग्रया असर्वज्ञस्य दुर्लभतयाऽस्मदादीनां सर्वेषामेव तादृशमासत्वव्यापकताबोधोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्।

II(ii) 56. न च तादृशवाक्यार्थतात्पर्यमेव संगर्गतात्पर्यम्, उक्तज्ञाने च वाक्यार्थघटकः संबन्धः संसर्गमर्यादयैव भासते इति विशेष रूपेणानुपस्थितस्यैवोक्तधर्मघटितसंबन्धस्य तात्पर्यज्ञाने बाधाभाव-बलात् शब्दाबोधे च तात्पर्यज्ञानबलादू भानमनपवादमेवेति-वाच्यम्,एकपदार्थविशिष्टापरपदार्थरूपवाक्यार्थविशेषिततत्प्रती-तीच्छारूपतात्पर्यविषयकनिश्चयस्य प्राक् वाक्यार्थनिश्चये दुर्घटतया तस्य शाब्दधीहेतुत्वे च योग्यतासंशयाच्छाब्द-बोधानुपपत्तेर्विश कलितततत्तत्पदार्थतत्तत्संसर्गविषयकत्व-विशेषितप्रतीतीच्छाज्ञानस्येव शाब्दधीहेतुताया उपेयत्वात्, तत्र च तादृशसंसर्गोप-स्थितेरवश्यापेक्षणीयत्वादिति चेत्?

II(ii) 57. सत्यम् मासादिघटकतावद्दिनादिनिष्ठत्रिंशत्त्वादिरूपमासत्वादिर्मा-म्मादिभेदेन नानैव, मासादिपदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तता परमनुगतरूपेण, अन्यथा शक्त्यानन्त्यप्रसङ्गात्, सर्वोपसंहारेण व्युत्पत्तिं विना प्रागप्रतीतमासादेः शाब्दानुभवानिर्वाहाच्च। न च त्रिंशत्त्वादिकं बुद्धि- विशेष-विषयत्वरूपं वाच्यम्-दिनोदेर्द्रव्यानात्मकत्वेन तत्र गुण-रूपसंख्याया असंभवात्, द्रव्यात्मकत्वेपि क्रमिकेषु तेषु संख्योत्पत्तेरसंभवात्, तत्र बुद्धेरनतिप्रसक्तं वैलक्षण्यमनुगतं

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

दुर्वचम्-जातिरूपस्य तस्य संकरप्रसङ्गनिरस्तत्वात्, तत्तद्दिन-विषयकत्वरूपस्य तत्तद्दिनाद्यननुगमेनाऽननुगतत्वादिति वाच्यम्, तावत्कालस्थायिनो द्रव्यस्यापि दिनादिरूपत्वसंभवात्। मीमांसकानुयायिभिरगत्या संख्यायाः पदार्थान्तरत्वोपगमाच्च संख्यादिरूपनानादिननिष्ठानुगतत्रिंशत्त्वादेः सुवचत्वात्।

II(ii) 58. एवम्-मासमधीते चैत्रः' इत्यादावधिकरणतैव द्वितीयार्थः, मासादिपदार्थतावच्छेदकदिनपर्याप्तत्रिंशत्त्वादेर्धर्मिविशेषणतापन्नस्य द्वितीयार्थाधिकरणतायां चैत्रकर्तृकाध्ययनाधारतात्वादिव्याप्य-धर्मावच्छिन्नं स्वरूपसंबन्धरूपमऽवच्छेद्यत्वं संसर्गतया भासते इत्युपगमेन सामञ्जस्यात्, यत्किंचिदेकमासं व्याप्य यत्राधीतं तत्राऽध्ययनाधारतानामवच्छेद्यतावच्छेदकाधारतावृत्त्यऽन्यत-मत्वविशेषादिरूपोक्तधर्मावच्छिन्नानतिप्रसक्तत्वेन तद्वृत्तित्रिंश-त्वेनाऽवच्छेदाद् न्यूनकालाध्ययनस्थले चातिप्रसक्ततया तादृशस्य मासत्वस्योक्तरूपावच्छिन्नाधारताऽनवच्छेदकत्वाच्चाऽप्रसङ्गाति-प्रसङ्गयोरनवाकाशात्। मासादिपदप्रवृत्ति निमित्तधर्मे चैत्राध्ययना धारताया व्याप्यत्वस्य शब्दादलाभेप्यर्थतस्तल्लाभाद् द्वितीयाया अत्यन्तसंयोगार्थपरत्वमिति नानुशासनविरोधः।

II(ii) 59. न च 'भूतले घटः' भूतलं घटवत्' इत्यादिप्रत्ययबला-दतिप्रसक्तोपि धर्म आधेयत्वाधारत्वयोरवच्छेदक इति वाच्यम्, तादृशप्रत्ययेऽवच्छेदकत्वभानानुपगमात्। आधेयताया अतिप्रसक्त धर्मावच्छेद्यत्वे साध्यसामानाधिकरण्यावच्छेदकधर्मात्म-कव्याप्तिशरीरे मिश्रादीनां स्वरूपसंबन्धरूपावच्छेदकत्वनिवेशस्य "व्यभिचारिण्यतिव्याप्त्या न ह्यतिप्रसक्तमवच्छेदकम्" इतित-त्स्थलीयचिन्तामणिपरिष्कारविरोधादऽसंभवदुक्तिकतापत्तेः। आधार-ताया अतिप्रसक्तधर्मावच्छेद्यत्वे "यद्धेत्वधिकरणत्वं साध्या-धिकरणतावच्छेदकम्" इतितल्लक्षणव्याख्यापक्षे स्वरूपसंबन्ध-रूपावच्छेदकत्वप्रवेशं व्यभिचारिण्यातिव्याप्त्या ऽदूषयित्वा "विरूद्धदिक्कालावच्छिन्न-वृत्तिकस्या" इत्यादूषणान्तरेण

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तत्परित्यज्य दीधितिकृतामनतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वरूपावच्छेदकत्वविवक्षाया असंगत्यापत्तेः।

II(ii) 60. अस्तु वाऽव्यासज्यवृत्तिधर्मास्यातिप्रसक्तस्यापि दर्शित-प्रतीतिबलादाधाराधेयभावावच्छेदकत्वम्, व्यासज्यवृत्तेस्त्वति प्रसक्तस्य तदवच्छेदकत्वमप्रसक्तम् 'क्षितिजलोभयं गन्धवत्' 'स्नेहगन्धोभयं क्षितौ' इत्याद्यप्रतितेः।

अथ वा द्वितीयाद्यर्थेऽध्ययनाधारत्वे तत्तन्मासादिरूपप्रकृत्यर्थ-विशेषणतापन्नतत्तन्मासत्वादिव्यक्तीनां व्यापकतासंबन्धेन स्वपारतन्त्र्येण विशेषणत्वमुपेयते, तादृशं च व्यापकत्वं स्वसमानाधिकरणव्याप्यवृत्त्यभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वसंबन्धेन स्वावच्छिन्नस्य योभेदस्तदाश्रयधर्मवत्त्वम् तादृशधर्मश्च 'चैत्रो मासमधीते' इत्यादौ चैत्रीयाध्यनाद्याधारतात्वं विशिष्यैव संबन्धेऽन्तर्भावनीयम्। मासान्तरनिष्ठतादृशाभावप्रतियोगिता-वच्छेदकतादृशधर्मे उक्तसंबन्धेन तत्तन्मासत्वाद्यवचिछन्नस्य यो भेदस्तदाश्रयत्वमक्षतमेवेति यत्किचिदेकमासादिमात्रव्यापा-काध्ययनादिस्थलेपि तादृशप्रयोगनिर्वाहः।

II(ii) 61. 'प्रतिमासंमधीते' इत्यादौ प्रत्यादिशब्दानां मासादिप-दोपस्थाप्यानुगतरूपावच्छिन्नमासत्वादिमन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगिता वच्छेदकत्वसामान्याभावघटितव्यापकताबोधकतया यत्किंचि-देकमासव्यापकाध्ययनादिस्थले न तादृशः प्रयोगः।

II(ii) 62. अथाऽत्यन्तसंयोगार्थकद्वितीयाया एकादिपदं विनापि यत्किंचिदे-कमासादिव्यापकताबोधकत्वे "उपसद्भिश्चरित्वा मासमेक-मग्निहोत्रं जुहोति" इत्यत्रैकपदवैयर्थ्यमितिचेत्? न, तत्र मासाधिककालव्यापकत्वेपि मासव्यापकतयाऽधिककालव्यापकस्य होमस्य शास्त्रार्थतावारणायैकपदोपादानात्, तथा सति तस्य केवलार्थकतया मासमात्रव्यापकतालाभात् तादृशप्रयोजनोपपत्तेः। अत एव च "यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति" इतिश्रुतिबोधिता-ग्निहोत्रानुवादेन सतिलव्रीहिचरुरूपद्रव्यस्य मासैकरूपकालस्य

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

च विधाने वाक्यभेदः स्यादिति तादृशद्रव्यकालोभयविशिष्टस्य गौणाग्निहोत्रपदप्रतिपाद्यस्यकर्मान्तरस्यैव विधायिका तादृशी श्रुतिरिति सिद्धान्ते यावज्जीवकालान्तर्गतमासरूपकालांशेऽप्यनुवादकतासंभवात् प्राप्ताग्निहोत्रानुवादे द्रव्यस्यैव विधानमुचितमिति पूर्वपक्षो निरस्तः-"यावज्जीवम्" इत्यादिश्रुत्या यावज्जीवव्यापकत्वे बोधितेऽर्थतो मासैकव्यापकतालाभेप्युपसच्चरूकरणकत्वविशिष्टहोमे तन्मात्रव्यापकताया अलाभेन तस्यापि विधेयतया वाक्यभेदस्य प्राप्ताग्निहोत्रानुवादेन द्रव्यविधिपक्षे दुर्वारत्वात्।

II(ii) 63. अथ तादृशश्रुतेर्द्रव्यकालोभयविशिष्टस्य गौणाग्निहोत्रपदप्रतिपाद्यस्य कर्मान्तरस्य विधायकत्वेपि न कथं वाक्यभेदः? विधेयभेदस्यैतावताप्यऽपरिहारात्, प्रत्युत धर्मिणोप्यधिकस्य विधानात्, एवं च-

प्राप्ते कर्मणि नानेको विधातुं शक्यते गुणः।
अप्राप्ते तु विधीयन्ते बहवोप्येकयत्नतः॥

इत्यपि निर्युक्तिकमिति चेत्? न -यत्र विधेयांशे युगपदनेकधर्माणां विशेषणतया भानं तत्र विधेयविशेषणभेदेपि विशिष्टनिष्ठविधेयत्वाभेदेन वाक्यभेदविरहात्, अन्यथा 'भूतलं नीलघटवत्' इत्यादावपि 'नीलवद् घटवत्' इत्यादाविव वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात्। अनुवाद्यंशे विशेषणताया यत्रानेकेषां विधानं तत्र तेषां विधेयता भिन्नैवेति वाक्यभेदः।

II(ii) 64. यद्यपि तत्रोपसच्चरुकरणकहोमाधिकरणतात्वेन वाऽधिकारिविशेषकृततादृशहोमाधिकरणतात्वेन या मासैकव्यापकता मासन्यूनकालहोतृकृतहोमाधिकरणतायामप्यन्यान्यदिने पुरुपान्तरकर्तृकहोमाधिकरणतासत्त्वेनाक्षतैव, तत्तत्पुरुषकर्तृकतादृशहोमाधिकरणतात्वेन व्यापकतायाः श्रुतितार्त्पर्यविषत्वे च विधेयान्त्यम्? तथापि विभिन्नपुरुषकर्तृकहोमाधिकरणताद्वयावृत्तितादृशचरुहोमाधिकरणतामात्रवृत्तिधर्मत्वेनाऽनुगतीकृत्य तत्तत्पुरुषकर्तृकतादृशचरुहोमाधिकरणतातात्वावाच्छिन्नव्यपकतानां संसर्गविधया

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

विवक्षितत्वात् न दोषः। तादृशाधिकरणताद्वयावृत्तित्वं स्ववृत्तित्वस्वनिरूपकहोमकर्तृनिष्ठभेद प्रतियोगिकर्तृकहोमाधिकरणता-वृत्तित्वोभयसंबन्धेनाऽधिकरणताविशिष्टान्यत्वरूपमऽनुगतं बोध्यम्।

II(ii) 65. 'मासमधीते' इत्यादावपि चैत्रादिकर्तृकाध्ययनाधिकरणतात्वरूप-व्यापकतावच्छेदकधर्मस्योक्तानुगतरूपेणैवानुगमः कार्यः। अतो मासमधीयानो दृष्टः इत्यादौ विशिष्य चैत्रत्वाद्यनुपस्थितावपि नान्वयबोधानुपपत्तिः। अन्यत् स्वयमूहनीयम्।

II(ii) 66. दण्डं विना न घट उत्पद्यते' रासभं विनापि घट उत्पद्यते' इत्यादौ विनापदार्थोऽभाववान्। तत्पदसमभिव्याहृतद्वितीयाया अभावान्वयिप्रतियोगत्वमनुयोगित्वं वार्थः। अभाववतश्चोत्पत्ता-वाऽऽधारत्वेनान्वयः। तथा च 'दण्डाभाववद्वृत्त्युत्पत्ति-कत्वाभाववान् घटः' 'रासभाभाववद्वृत्त्युत्पत्ति को घटः' इत्याकारको बोधः। यद्यपि निपातार्थे नामार्थस्य साक्षादापि भेदान्वयस्तथापि संभवति सार्थकत्वे विभक्तेर्निरर्थकत्व-मनुचितमिति द्वितीयायाः सार्थकत्वमुपेयते।

II(ii) 67. 'भूतले न घटः' 'चन्द्र इव मुखम्' इत्यादौ प्रथमायाः प्रतियोगिताद्यर्थकत्वे प्रथमैव न साधु स्यात् प्रातिपदिकार्थान्वयि-नोऽन्यपदेनाभिधानस्थले एव ''प्रतिपादिकार्थ'' इत्यादिसूत्रेण प्रथमाविधानादिति तत्र प्रतियेगित्वादिः संबन्धविधयैव भासते इत्युपेयते।

'दण्डं विना न घटोत्पत्तिः' इत्यादौ च विनान्तार्थे घटोत्पत्त्य-द्यभावान्वयेऽनुयोगिविशेषणदण्डाद्यभावस्य च तदनुयोगिता वच्छेदकत्वं भासते-'द्रव्ये न गन्धः' इत्यऽप्रयोगादुपलक्षणी-भूतधर्मावच्छिन्ने न नञर्थाभावान्वय इति व्युत्पत्तेरिति। 'रासभं विना न घटोत्पत्तिः' इति न प्रयोगः' अतिप्रसक्ततया रासभा-भावस्य घटोत्पत्त्याद्यभावानुयोगितावच्छेदकताविरहात्।

II(ii) 68. अथ वाऽभाव एव विनार्थः, दण्डं विना न घटः' इत्यादौ च विनान्तार्थस्याभावस्य नञर्थे घटाद्यभावे प्रयोज्य-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तासंबन्धेनैवान्वयः। अत एव 'रासभं विना न घटः'इत्यादयो न प्रयोगाः। अत एव दण्डाद्यभाववति घटादेर्वृत्तावपि 'जायते' इत्यस्याध्याहारं विनैव 'दण्डं विना न घटः' इति प्रयोगोपपत्तिः। 'रासभं विना घटः' इत्यादौ च विनार्थस्याभावस्य सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेन घटादावन्वयः।

दीधितिकृतापि "अविनाभावो व्याप्तिः" इत्यत्र 'साध्यं विना=साध्याभाववति योऽभावः' इति यद् व्याख्यातं तत्र सप्तम्यन्तेन मतुपा संसर्गविधया भासमानं तदधिकरण-निष्ठत्वमेवोपात्तं न तु विनार्थत्वेनाधिकरणम्, अभावाधिकरण-पर्यन्तस्य विनार्थत्वेपि सप्तम्याऽऽधेयत्वरूपाऽपदार्थविवरण-रूपताया आवश्यकत्वात्।

II(ii) 69. न च विनापदोत्तरलुप्तसप्तम्यर्थ एव 'अभाववति' इति सप्तम्या विवृत इति वाच्यम्, निपातोत्तरविभक्तेर्निरर्थकत्वात्। अत एव सर्वत्र निपातोत्तरं साधुत्वार्थं प्रथमैवेति शाब्दिकाः।

"पृथिव्यामेव गन्धः" इत्यादावेवकारप्रकृतिकसप्तम्या यदाऽऽधेयत्वबोधकत्वमङ्गीकृतं दीधितिकृद्भिस्तत्रापि तेषां न निर्भरः। अस्तु वा तत्र प्रतियोगितया पृथिव्यन्यवृत्ति-त्वभानानुरोधेनैवकारस्यान्यवृत्तित्वार्थकत्वं गौरवादुपेक्ष्य तत्राधेयत्व-वाचकत्वेन क्लृप्तायाः सप्तम्याः कल्पनम्। प्रकृते चाधेयत्वस्य संसर्गतयैवोपपत्तौ विनापदसाकाङ्क्षाधेयत्वार्थकसप्तमीकल्पनं दुष्कल्पनमेव।

II(ii) 70. एवकारस्थले चाऽभावरूपे एवार्थेऽन्यरूपतदर्थान्तरस्याऽ-ऽधेयतासंबन्ध इति न संभवति-आधेयतायास्तद्वत्त्येव संबन्धत्वात् न तु तदभावे। न च तत्राधेयत्वाभावो न प्रतीयते अपि तु तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकपृथिव्याद्यन्याभाव इत्युपेयं तादृशप्रतियोताकत्वमेवाभावेऽन्यस्य संबन्धोस्त्विवति वाच्यम्, आधेयतासंबन्धस्य प्रतियोगिन आधारस्याऽनुयोगिन्याधेये वृत्त्यनियामकत्वेनाऽभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वात्। चैत्रः पचति'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

इत्यादौ कृत्यादिसंबन्धस्याऽपदार्थत्वेपि 'पाककृतिमान्' इत्यादौ मतुबादिपदेन विवरणवद् उक्तस्थले सामानधिकरण्यस्य पदेन विवरणमपि न विरोधमापादयति, विवरणीयार्थस्याप्यनन्य-लभ्यत्वेऽपदार्थतोपपत्तेरित्यलमसदावेशेन।

II(ii) 71. विना वातं वृक्षः पतितः इत्यादौ विनापदार्थस्या-भावस्याश्रयतासंबन्धेन वृक्षेऽन्वयात् 'वाताभावविशिष्टो वृक्षः पतितः' इति शब्दतो लभ्यते, पतनेऽनुभवसिद्धो वातजन्य-त्वाभावलाभश्चाऽऽर्थः-जन्यतायाः पदानुपस्थाप्यत्वात् तदभावस्य तस्य वृत्त्यनियामकसंबन्धत्वात् तदवच्छिन्नवाताभावस्य च शब्देन बोधयितुमशक्यत्वात्।

पुत्रं विना गतः इत्यादौ पुत्रादिपदं लक्षणया पुत्रगमनादिपरम्, विनापदबोध्यतदभावश्च समानकालीनत्वादिसंबन्धेन गमनेऽन्वेति, समानकालीनत्वघटककालनिष्ठं स्वाधिकरणत्वमनवच्छिन्नं बोध्यम्, अतो गमनादिकाले तदनधिकरणदेशावच्छेदेन गमनाद्यभावसत्त्वेपि नातिप्रसङ्गः।

II(ii) 72. केचित्तु-उक्तस्थलेऽसाहित्यमेव विनापदार्थः, तस्य च गमनादिकर्तर्यऽन्वयः। असाहियं च स्वकर्तृकसमभिव्याहृतगमना-दिक्रियासमानकालीनतादृशक्रियाकर्तृत्वरूपसाहित्याभावः। क्रियान्वयि कर्तृकतादृशक्रियाकालीनत्वाभाव एव वा विनार्थः कर्तृत्वे पुत्रादेराधेयत्वेनान्वयः, विभक्तिः साधुत्वार्थैव। अस्तुवाऽऽधेयत्वं द्वितीयार्थः। सप्तम्या आधेयत्वार्थकत्वेपि नात्रसप्तमीप्रसक्तिः तस्याः कारकविभक्तित्वेन क्रियान्वयिस्वार्थबोधकत्वात्, अतः शेषषष्ठीप्रसक्त्या तामेवोपपदविभक्तिर्द्वितीया बाधते इति ''सर्वा उपपदविभक्तयः षष्ठ्यपवादिका:'' इत्यस्याऽविरोध इति। विनासमानार्थकयोर्ऋतेऽन्तरेणेतिनिपातयोरपि दर्शितैव रीतिः। एवं विनायुक्ततृतीयापञ्चमीस्थलेपि।

II(ii) 73. मर्यादाऽभिविध्यर्थकयावच्छब्दयोगेपि द्वितीया दृश्यते। तत्र मार्यादार्थको यावच्छब्दः- आरभ्य तस्यां दशमीं तु यावत्

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

प्रपूजयेत् पर्वतराजपुत्रीम्'' इत्यादौ। मर्यादा=सीमा कालरूपा देशरूपा च कालनिष्ठं तत्त्वं च तत्कालनिष्ठं समभिव्याहृत-कालप्रागभावानधिकरणस्वप्रागभावाधिकरणस्वसजातीय यावत्का-लवृत्तिसमभिव्याहृतक्रियानधिकरणत्वम्। एवं चोक्तस्थले यावच्छब्देन पूजारूपक्रियायां शुक्लदशमीनिष्ठतादृशसीमात्व-निरूपकत्वं प्रत्याय्याते, तावतैवार्थत: शुक्लदशम्यां मार्यादात्वं लभ्यते। तन्निष्ठसीमात्वनिरूपकत्वं च तदवृत्तित्वे सति कृष्ण नवमीप्रागभावानधिकरणशुक्लदशमीप्रागभावाधिकरणतिथि कूटव्यापकत्वम्, तावता षोडशतिथ्यधिकरणकषोडशपूजारूप-स्यैककर्मणो विधेयतया लाभ:।

II(ii) 74. व्याप्यकालसमुदाये सजातीयत्वविशेषणात् पूजायामुक्तविशेषण-द्वयाक्रान्तदण्डादिसमुदायाऽव्यापकत्वेपि न बाध:, अन्वयिता-वच्छेदकरूपेण साजात्यस्य विवक्षणात् उक्तस्थले च 'तिथिम्' इत्यस्याध्याहारेण दशमीपदार्थतावच्छेदकस्य तिथित्वघटितत्वेन वा यावत्पदार्थान्वयितावच्छेदकतया तिथित्वभानात् तेन रूपेण दण्डादेर्दशमीसजातीयत्वाभावात्। तिथिश्चऽखण्डकालविशेषरूपा न तु चन्द्रमण्डलकलारम्भाद्यनुगुणक्रियाप्रचयरूपा' पूजाया-स्तावत्क्रियावृत्तित्वासंभवात्।

II(ii) 75. अत्र च प्रागभाव एव यावत्पदार्थ:। द्वितीयार्थ: प्रतियोगित्व-मनुयोगित्वं वा, तत्र तत्प्रकृत्यर्थदशम्या अन्वय: तावता दशमीप्रतियोगिकप्रागभावलाभ:, तस्य स्वप्रतियोग्यऽवृत्ति-त्वविशिष्टव्यापकतासंबन्धेन पूजारूपसमभिव्याहृतक्रियायामन्वय:। व्यापकत्वं च स्वाधिकरणतिथिनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगितान-वच्छेदक-पूजाविशेषत्ववत्त्वम्। स्वाधिकरणत्वं च स्वाधिकरणकृष्ण-नवमीप्रागभावावच्छिन्नभेदविशिष्टकालिकविशेषणतासंबन्धेन; एतेन कृष्णनवमीप्रागभावाधिकरणप्रतियोगिकभेदस्याऽव्यावर्तकतया तत्सामान्यभेदनिवेशे भाविकृष्णनवमीप्रागभावाधिकरणत्वमादाय नाप्रसिद्धि: तथा सत्यपि तत्तद्दशमीप्रागभावाधिकरणकालस्य

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

स्वाधिकरणकृष्णनवमीप्रागभावावच्छिन्नभेदवत्त्वसंबन्धेन तत्तत्-प्रागभावाधिकरणत्वाक्षतेः।

II(ii) 76. न चैवमपि व्यवहितपूर्वकृष्णनवमीप्रागभावावच्छिन्नभेद-घटितसंबन्धेनाऽव्यवहितपूर्वकृष्णनवमीपूर्वतिथीनामपि तत्तद्दश-मीप्रागभाववत्त्वात् तदधिकरणतिथिव्यापकत्वं पूजायां न संभवतीति वाच्यम्, स्वावच्छिन्नकृष्णनवमीप्रागभावानधिकरण-त्वसंबन्धेन स्वावच्छिन्नभेदस्यैव प्रागभावसंबन्धे निवेशनीयत्वात्। स्वाधिकरणनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वमपि तादृशावच्छेद-कत्वसंबन्धेन स्वावच्छिन्नस्य भेदः, अतस्तादृशावच्छेद-कत्वत्वाच्छिन्नाभावनिवेशेयत्किंचिद्दशमीप्रागभावाधिकरणनिष्ठा-भावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वमादायाऽप्रसिद्धिवारणाय विशिष्य तत्तत् प्रागभावरूपस्वपदार्थस्य संबन्धमध्ये प्रवेश्यतयाऽननुगम इति निरस्तम्।

II(ii) 77. देशरूपा सीमा च 'काशीतः कौशिकीं यावद् याति' इत्यादौ, तत्र कौशिक्या गमनसीमात्वं प्रतीयते तच्च काशीपूर्व-कौशिकीपश्चिमदेशव्यापकगमनानधिकरणत्वम्। यावत्पदेन च कौशिक्यनधिकरणत्वे सति काशीपूर्वकौशिकीपश्चिमदेशव्याप-कत्वं गमने प्रत्याय्यते। तत्र द्वितीयार्थोऽवधित्वमवधिमत्त्वं वा प्रतीच्याद्यऽन्वयि। निष्कर्षः पूर्ववत् स्वयमूहनीयः।

II(ii) 78. अभिविध्यर्थो यावच्छब्दः 'कार्तिकमारभ्य चैत्रं यावच्छीतं भवति' इत्यादौ 'काशीतः पाटलिपुत्रं यावद् वृष्टो देवः' इत्यादौ च। अभिविधिः=तत्पर्यन्ताभिव्याप्तिः। एवं च प्रथमे कार्तिकपूर्वकालोत्तरचैत्रोत्तरकालपूर्वकालव्यापकत्वं चैत्रोत्तरकाला-ऽवृत्तित्वसहितं शीतभवने द्वितीये च काशीपश्चिमदेशपूर्व-पाटलिपुत्रपूर्वदेशपश्चिमदेशव्यापकत्वं पाटलिपुत्रपूर्वदेशावृत्तित्वसंहितं वृष्टौ यावत्पदेन प्रत्याय्यते, विशेषः पूर्ववत्। यावच्छब्द-समानार्थकाऽऽङ्शब्दस्थलेपि दर्शितैव रीतिरवसेया, तद्योगे च पञ्चमी साधुः।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II(ii) 79. यज्ञमनु प्रावर्षत् इत्यादावनुशब्दार्थः कारकत्वरूपं हेतुत्वम्' ''अनुर्लक्षणे'' इत्यत्र कर्मप्रवचनीयसंज्ञाविधायकसूत्रे लक्षणपदस्य कारकहेतुपरत्वात, तत्र च यज्ञान्वितस्याधेयत्व-रूपद्वितीयार्थस्यान्वयः, हेतुतायाश्च निरूपकतासंबन्धेन वृष्टावन्वयः। अन्यत्वं वाऽनुशब्दार्थः, तत्र निरूपितत्वरूप-द्वितीयार्थस्य यज्ञान्वितस्यान्वयः, जन्यतायाश्चाऽऽश्रयत्वसंबन्धेन वृष्टावन्वयः। 'अन्वऽर्जुनं योद्धारः' इत्यत्रापकर्षरूपं हीनत्वमनुशब्दार्थः, अर्जुनावधिकत्वं द्वितीयान्तार्थस्तस्य चापकर्षेऽन्वयः। अविधित्वस्याऽपादानतारूपत्वेपि क्रियान्वयाभावान्न पञ्चमीप्रसक्तिः। अस्मादयं दीर्घः इत्यादौ भवति इत्यस्याध्याहारेणैव पञ्चम्युपपादनात्। अतः षष्ठ्यपवादतानिर्वाहः।

II(ii) 80. वृक्षं प्रति विद्योतते विद्युत्' मातरं प्रति साधुः यो मां प्रति स्यात् वृक्षं वृक्षं प्रति सिञ्चति इत्यादौ ''लक्षणेत्थंभूत॰'' इत्यादिसूत्रानुशिष्टकर्मप्रवचनीयसंज्ञकप्रत्यादिशब्देषु प्रथमे परिचायकत्वरूपं लक्षणत्वं परिचेयत्वरूपं लक्ष्यत्वं वा कर्मप्रवचनीयार्थः, वृक्षप्रकाशेन विद्युद्विद्योतनज्ञानाद् वृक्षस्य परिचायकता, द्वितीयार्थश्चाऽऽधेयत्वं निरूपितत्वं वा। द्वितीये साधुत्वम् = प्रियकारित्वं साधुत्वघटकक्रियान्वयी संबन्धः कर्मप्रवचीनयार्थः, संबन्धान्वयिप्रतियोगित्वं तन्निरूपकत्वं वा द्वितीयार्थः। तृतीये भागः=स्वत्वाश्रयः प्रत्याद्यर्थः तदन्वयी संबन्धो द्वितीयार्थः, इत्थं चाऽस्मत्संबन्धी यो भागःस्यादिति बोधः। चतुर्थे कर्मण्येव द्वितीया षत्वबाध एव संज्ञाफलं प्रतिश्च निरर्थकः-गृहे गृहेऽश्वः' इत्यादाविव व्यापकताया द्विरुक्तिबललभ्यत्वात्। प्रतिशब्दस्य व्यापकतार्थकत्वे उक्तार्थ-कत्वेन 'गृहं व्याप्नुवतेऽश्वाः' इत्यादाविव द्विरुक्तिरेव न स्यात्।

II(ii) 81. न च प्रतिशब्दस्यापि व्यापकतार्थकत्वम् 'प्रतिदिनमधीते' इत्यादौ क्लृप्तं, द्विरुक्तेरपि 'वृक्षं वृक्षं सिञ्चति' इत्यादौ

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

क्लृप्तमिति प्रकृते ''संभेदेनान्यतरवैयर्थ्यम्'' इतिन्यायाद् द्वयोरेव व्यापकताबोधकत्वमऽवर्जनीयमिति वाच्यम्, 'प्रतिमासमधीते' इत्यादावऽव्ययीभावे हि प्रथमातिरिक्तविभक्तेरसाधुत्वेन प्रतिशब्देन मासान्वितव्यापकत्वं क्रियायां बोध्यते विभक्तिः साधुत्वार्था। वृक्षं वृक्षं प्रति सिञ्चति' इत्यत्र तु सेके द्वितीयार्थ-कर्मत्वावरुद्धप्रकृत्यर्थवृक्ष विशेषितव्यापकता बोधयितुं न शक्यतेएकविशेषणत्वेनोपस्थितस्यान्यत्र विशेषणत्वे व्युत्पत्तिविरोधात् कर्मत्वसंबन्धस्यैव च व्यापकताघटकत्वेन स्वीकरणीतया वृत्त्यनियामकस्य तस्य तथात्वासंभवाच्च। तस्य सेककर्मत्वे आश्रयतासंबन्धघटितव्यापकताप्रत्यायनमपि न युज्यते-प्रकृत्यर्थसुबर्थयोरन्तरा नञर्थातिरिक्तभानस्य व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धत्वात्? ''नामूढ़स्येतरोत्पत्तेः'', ''नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात्'' इत्यादौ नञर्थमात्रस्य पञ्चम्यर्थहेतुतायां विशेषणत्वेन प्रकृत्यर्थस्य च विशेष्य- त्वेनाऽन्वयात्, तस्मात् प्रतिरनर्थक एव। द्विरुक्तान्वये तात्पर्यबलाच्च सेचनकर्मत्वे वृक्षादेर्व्यापकत्वं संसर्गतयैव भासते।

II(ii) 82. यदि च वृक्षं प्रति सिञ्चति' इत्यादावुपसर्गस्य प्रतेर्वाच्यो द्योत्यो वा कश्चिदन्योऽर्थः? तदाऽस्तु स एवात्रापि तदर्थः। अत एव तस्येवाऽस्यापि प्रतिशब्दस्य प्रयोगो नानर्थः। वस्तुतः- अनर्थकयोः कर्मप्रवचनीयाधिपरिशब्दयोः प्रयोगवत् तादृशप्रतेरपि प्रयोगस्य प्रयोजनान्तरानुपपत्तिश्चिन्त्या। प्रतेर्यत्र व्यापकतार्थकत्वं तत्र 'प्रतिवृक्षं सिञ्चति' इत्यव्ययीभावसमास एव नियतः-तदर्थकाव्ययस्याऽव्ययीभावसमासविधेर्विभाषा-धिकारीयताविरहेण नित्यत्वात्, अतो वीप्सया 'प्रतिवृक्षं सिञ्चति' इतिवत् 'वृक्षं प्रति सिञ्चति' इति न प्रयोगः। यत्र व्यापकत्वार्थकेनाऽव्ययेनाऽव्ययीभावसमासस्तदुत्तरं सर्वत्र प्रथमा विभक्तिरेव। न तु 'उपकुम्भे गच्छति' इतिवत् 'प्रतिगृहेऽश्वाः' इत्यादिरपि प्रयोगः-उक्तयुक्त्या तत्र प्रतिनाऽ-श्वादौ गृहादिव्यापकताया वोधयितुमशक्यत्वात्। तदा-घराता‌दिरूपसप्तम्याद्यर्थे च समासार्थस्य गृहादि व्यापकत्व-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

स्याश्रयतासंबन्धेन तदर्थस्य व्यापकरूपधर्मिणो वाऽभेद-सबंन्धेनान्वये 'मेयत्वे घटः' 'घटवृत्तौ घटः' इत्यादि-प्रयोगवारणाय कल्प्यायाः सप्तम्यर्थाधारतायामाऽऽश्रयत्व-संबन्धेनाऽभेदसंबन्धेन वा प्रकृत्यर्थाऽनन्वयव्युत्पत्तेर्विरोधात्। 'उपकुम्भे निधेहि' 'उपकुम्भादागतः' 'उपकुम्भेन कृतः' इत्यादौ च विवक्षितस्याऽधारत्वाऽपादानत्वकर्तृत्वादौ कुम्भसमी-पादेराधेयतासंबन्धेनाऽन्वयस्याऽऽधेयत्वादौ निरूपितत्वसंबन्धेन तदन्वयस्य वा बोधे न कश्चिद् व्युत्पत्तिविरोध इत्युपपद्यन्ते तथा प्रयोगा इति ध्येयम्।

II(ii) 83. 'त्वां च मां चान्तरा' इत्यादौ "अन्तरान्तरेण युक्ते" इति द्वितीयाया निरूपितत्वमर्थः, तस्यान्तरापदार्थता-वच्छेदकमध्यत्वेऽन्वयः। एवमन्यत्रापि तदर्थस्तूक्तदिशा स्वयं परिच्छेद्यः।। ।। इति द्वितीया विभक्तयः।।

।।अथ तृतीया।।

III. 1. कारकविभक्तितृतीयायाः क्रियान्वयि कर्तृत्वं करणत्वं चार्थः- "कर्तृकरणयोस्तृतीया" इत्यनुशासनात्। कर्तृत्वं च मुख्यं क्रियानुकूलकृतिरेव, सा च कर्त्राख्यातसमभिव्याहृते 'चैत्रः पचति' इत्यादौ क्रियाविशेष्यतयाऽऽख्यातेन प्रतिपाद्यतें 'चैत्रेण पच्यते तण्डुलः' 'चैत्रेण शय्यते' इत्यादिकर्मभावाख्यातस्थले च क्रियायां विशेषणतया तृतीयया सा प्रत्याय्यते।

III. 2. यत्तु तत्राप्याख्यातार्थ एव कृतिः, तृतीयार्थश्चाधेयत्वम्, तस्य चाख्यातार्थकृतिविशेषणतयाऽन्वयः कृतेश्च क्रियाविशेषणतया। तथा कृतिबोधने चात्मनेपदरूपाख्यातस्य यगादिसमभिव्या-हारज्ञानमपेक्षितम्-'पचति' 'पचते' इत्यादौ तथा कृत्यन्वया-बोधात्। 'चैत्रेण ज्ञायते, गम्यते' इत्यादौ तृतीयाया आधेयत्वार्थकत्वं क्लृप्तमेवेति न तत्कल्पनमऽधिकमिति,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तन्न-'चैत्रेण पक्वम्' इत्यादौ तृतीयायाः कृत्यर्थकताया आवश्यकत्वात्- तत्र कृत्यर्थकाख्यातविरहेण कृतश्चकर्तृ-कर्मवाचकत्वेन कृत्यर्थकताविरहात्।

III 3. यदि च कर्तृकृतः कृतावेव शक्तिर्न तु विशिष्टे, 'ज्ञाता' इत्यादौ त्वाश्रयार्थकतायाः कृतः क्लृप्तत्वेन तत्र कृत्यन्वयादेव कर्तृलाभसंभवादित्युच्यते? तथापि कर्मकृतः कृत्यर्थत्वम-प्रसक्तमेव। उक्तप्रत्ययस्य क्व चित् कर्तृवाचकत्वेपि 'चैत्रेण पाच्यः' 'दुष्पचश्चैत्रेणौदनः' 'चैत्रेणौदनस्य पाकः' इत्यादौ कृतां न कृतिबोधकत्वमिति तत्र कृतिबोधानुरोधेन तृतीयायाः कृतिवाचकत्वमावश्यकम्। एवं च 'चैत्रेण पच्यते' इत्यादावपि तृतीययैव कृतिर्बोध्यते, तत्र चैत्रादेः संबन्ध एवाधेयत्वमित्यत एव निर्वाहे कृतावाऽऽधेयत्वस्य विशेषणतया भानोपगम-स्यानुचितत्वात्, तथा सति तत्संसर्गस्यापि विषयताकल्पना-धिक्यात्। तादृशवाक्यज्ञानघटितशाब्दसामग्र्यामऽधिको-पस्थितिनिवेशेन च गौरवात्।

III. 4. अथ तत्र कृतेस्तृतीयार्थतोपगमे 'चैत्रेण पच्यते न मैत्रेण' इत्यादौ तृतीयान्तार्थमैत्रीयकृतेरभावः पाकेऽन्वेतीत्युपेयं तस्याश्च समावायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नाभावो मैत्रकर्तृकपाकेपीत्यऽतिप्रसङ्गः, जन्यतायाश्च वृत्त्यनियामकतया तत्संवन्धावच्छिन्नाभावः प्रसिद्ध्यत्येव न, मैत्रकर्तृकपाककर्मत्वाभावस्य कर्मणि तण्डुलादौ प्रतीतिश्च कर्मवाचकपदासमभिव्याहारस्थले दुर्घटा, आधेयत्वस्य तृतीयार्थत्वे चाधेयत्वाभावबोध एव कृतावङ्गीक्रियते।

III. 5. न च तथा सति मैत्रचैत्रोभयकर्तृकपाकस्थले चैत्रीयपाककृतौ मैत्रवृत्तित्वाभावसत्त्वात् ' मैत्रेण न पच्यते' इतिप्रयोगापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, 'मैत्रेण न पच्यते' इत्यत्र वर्तमानपाकानुकुलकृति-त्वावच्छेदेन मैत्रवृत्तित्वाभावबोधनाद् उक्तस्थले च तादृश-कृतित्वसामानाधिकरण्येन मैत्रवृत्तित्वसत्त्वात् तादृशवाक्याऽ-प्रामाण्यात्। वर्तमानत्वस्य कृतिविशेषणतया च 'चैत्रेण

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

पक्ष्यतेऽपच्यत न तु पच्यते' इत्युपपद्यते क्रियाविशेषस्य तथात्वाद् यदा मैत्रेणान्यत् क्रियते न तु पच्यते तदा 'मैत्रेण न पच्यते' इति प्रयोगश्च।

III 6. न चाख्यातेन कालस्य कृतिविशेषणतया बोधनात् कालविशेष-विशेषितकृतित्वस्यान्वयितावच्छेदकतया तदवच्छेदेन नञाऽभावः शक्यते बोधयितुं न तु कालक्रियाविशेषोभयविशेषितकृ-तित्वावच्छेदेन, कर्मप्रत्ययस्थले क्रियायाः कृतिविशेषत्वाभावेन तद्घटितधर्मस्याऽन्वयितावच्छेदकत्वाभावादिति वाच्यम्, क्रियाविशेषघटितधर्मस्यान्वयितानवच्छेदकत्वेपि तदव-च्छिन्नत्वविशिष्टविशेषणताया अभावसंसर्गतया भानसंभवेन सामञ्जस्यात्।

III. 7. न चान्वयितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्वमेव विशेषणसंबन्धे भासते इति नियमः, तथा सति 'शरदि पुष्प्यन्ति सप्तच्छदाः' इत्यादौ सप्तच्छदपुष्पोत्पत्तित्वादेः शरद्वृत्तित्वाद्यन्वयितानवच्छेद-कत्वादाऽऽख्यातान्तप्रतिपाद्यतावच्छेदकपुष्पोत्पत्तित्वाद्यवच्छेदेन च शरद्वृत्तित्वान्वयबाधादऽवच्छेदकावच्छेदेनान्वयानुपपत्तेः। अन्वयितावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्यमात्रेण च तदन्वयोपगमे 'शरदि पुष्प्यन्ति सप्तच्छदाः' 'शरदि पुष्प्यन्ति चम्पकाः' इत्यऽविशेषेण प्रयोगापत्तिः।

III. 8. यदि च तत्र शरत्संबन्धः सप्तच्छदविशेषणतया भासते न पुनराख्यातार्थे धातुमात्रार्थे वा पुष्पोत्पत्तौ अत एव तत्र कारकविभक्तिरूपसप्तम्यंनुपपत्त्या कालरूपविशेषणपदोत्तरं स्वातन्त्र्येण सप्तमी शर्ववर्मणाऽनुशिष्टा, एवं च क्रिया-निमित्तत्वरूपकारकत्वगर्भकर्तृत्वस्याख्यातार्थत्वे पुष्पोत्पत्तिनि-मित्तत्वरूपाख्यातान्तार्थस्य विशिष्टान्वयानुरोधेन शरत्सं बन्धेप्यन्वय उपगन्तव्य इति कारकत्वस्याख्यातार्थत्वानुपगमेपि शीतलं सरोऽवगाढतो निदाघदुःखं व्यपैति' इत्यादा-विवोद्देश्यविधेयभावमहिम्नोद्देश्यविशेषणेन शरत्संबन्धेन विधेय-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

भूतपुष्पोत्पत्तेः प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभावस्य संसर्गमर्यादया भानमौत्सर्गिकामिति चम्पकादिपुष्पोत्पत्तौ शरत्संबन्धनिमित्तकंत्वाभावान्नोक्तातिप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तस्थलेऽवच्छेदकावच्छेदेनान्वय एव नोपेयते इत्युच्यते? तथापि तादृशनियमो निष्प्रामाणिक एव।

III. 9. न च तादृशनियमानुपगमे 'इह भवने मैत्रैणैव पक्ष्यते तेमनम्' इत्यत्रैतद्भवनाधिकरणकतेमनपाकत्वेन रूपेण शब्दात् पाकानुपस्थित्या तदवच्छिन्ने मैत्रान्यसमवेतभविष्यत्कृतिविषयत्वव्यवच्छेदबोधासंभवकथनं दीधितिकृतां विरुध्येतेति वाच्यम्, अवच्छेदकावच्छेदेन विशिष्टबुद्धौ धर्मिणि विशेषणतया भासमानमेव रूपं विशेषणेऽवच्छिन्नत्वसंबन्धेन विशेषणमित्याशयेनतेषां तदभिधानात्। विशेषणसंबन्धे तदवच्छिन्नत्वमेव तदवच्छेदेन विशिष्टबुद्धौ भासते इत्युपगमे शब्दानुपस्थितरूपावच्छेदेन विशेषणान्वये बाधकाभावात्।

III. 10. न चावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्वस्यावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन विशिष्टबुद्धौ विशेषणांशे भानमसंभवदुक्तिकम्-'घटो द्रव्यम्-इत्यादौ घटत्वावच्छेदेन द्रव्यत्वादिमत्त्वबुद्धौ द्रव्यत्वादिविशेषणस्य स्वरूपत एव भानादिति वाच्यम्, तादृशशाब्दबोधे द्रव्यत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नस्यैवाऽभेदसंबन्धेन विशेषणत्वात्, घटत्वादिविशिष्टे द्रव्यत्वादिविशेषणकतादृशप्रत्यक्षेऽवच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्वभनानुपगमे क्षतिविरहात्। तथा च 'मैत्रेण पच्यते' इत्यादौ पाककृतित्वस्यान्वयितानवच्छेदकत्वेप्यऽर्थलभ्यतादृशधर्मावच्छिन्नत्वस्य संसर्गांशे भानं निराबाधमेवेति चेत्?

III 11. न-'मैत्रेण न पक्वः' इत्यादौ कृतौ मैत्रादिवृत्तित्वाभावबोधासंभवेन कृतिजन्यत्वस्य तृतीयार्थतां स्वीकृत्य क्रियायां मैत्रादिकृतिजन्यत्वाभावबोधस्यावश्यमुपगन्तव्यतया 'मैत्रेण न पच्यते' इत्यादावपि तद्बोधोपगमेन सामञ्जस्यात्।

न च यदा मैत्रः सुप्तस्तदा 'मैत्रेण पक्ष्यते न तु पच्यते' इतिप्रयोगानुपपत्तिः-मैत्रवृत्तिवर्तमानकृतेरप्रसिद्ध्या तादृशकृतिजन्यत्वा-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

भावप्रत्यायनासंभवात्, वर्तमानत्वाविशेषिततदीयकृतिजन्यत्वाभावस्य च बाधितत्वादिति वाच्यम्, आख्यातार्थवर्तमानत्वादेर्नञ्स-मभिव्याहारस्थलेऽभावांशे एवान्वयस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात्। अन्यथा 'विनष्टघटं न पश्यति' इत्यादौ तादृशघटकर्मकवर्तमानदर्शना-द्यऽप्रसिद्ध्याऽन्वयबोधानुपपत्तेः। प्रकृते च मैत्रीयवर्तमान-कृत्यऽप्रसिद्धावपि वर्तमानकालावच्छिनतज्जन्यत्वाभावस्यैव पाके प्रतीत्या सामञ्जस्यात्। पाकत्वाद्यवच्छेदेनैव मैत्रादिकर्तृकत्वाभाव-बोधोपगमाद् मैत्रादिकर्तृकपाकदशायामन्यकर्तृकपाके मैत्रादिकर्तृ-कत्वाभावसत्त्वेपि ' न पच्यते मैत्रेण' इत्यादयो न प्रयोगाः।

III 12. यत्र मैत्रेणौदनं पच्यते न तु तेमनं तत्र ' मैत्रेण न पच्यते तेमनम्' इत्यादिप्रयोगनिर्वाहाय तेमनपाकत्वाद्यवच्छेदेने-वाऽभावान्वयबोध उपगम्यते न तु शुद्धपाकत्वाद्यवच्छेदेन-बाधितत्वात्। यथा च तेन रूपेण शब्दादनुपस्थितावपि तद-वच्छेदेनान्वयबोधनिर्वाहस्तथोपपादितमाधेयत्वस्य तृतीयार्थत्ववादिनैव।

'घटेन न पच्यते' इत्यादयः प्रयोगाः 'आकाशं न पश्यति' इत्यादिप्रयोगसमानयोगक्षेमा एव मन्तव्याः। अचेतनस्य काष्ठस्थाल्यादेरपि कर्तृत्वविवक्षया 'काष्ठं पचति' 'स्थाली पचति' इत्यादिवत् 'काष्ठेन पच्यते' 'स्थाल्या पच्यते' इतिप्रयोगात् तत्र व्यापाररूपे कर्तृत्वे तज्जन्यत्वरूपे तत्कर्तृकत्वे वा तृतीयाया लक्षणा। एवम्-'चैत्रेण ज्ञायते इष्यते गम्यते' इत्यादावाश्रयत्वरूपे कर्तृत्वे आधेयत्वरूपे कर्तृमत्त्वे वा, नश्यते घटेन इत्यादौ प्रतियोगित्वरूपे कर्तृत्वेऽनुयोगित्वरूपे कर्तृमत्त्वे वा लक्षणा। कर्तृपदमपि व्यापारादिमत्यऽचेतनादौ भाक्तमेव-अचेतनादौ स्वरसतः कर्तृपदाप्रयोगात्, अत एव च कृञो यत्नवाचकत्वम्।

III 13. न च यत्नवत एव कर्तृपदार्थत्वे ''कर्तृकरणयोस्तृतीया'' इत्यादौ कर्तृपदस्य मुख्यार्थत्यागे युक्तिविरहादऽचेतन-काष्ठादिपदप्रयोगे कर्तृप्रत्ययानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, अन्यथा

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तत्प्रणयनवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात्। स्वतन्त्रत्वं च कारकान्तरव्यापारानधीनत्वे सति कारकत्वम्। 'काष्ठं पचति' इत्यादौ स्वातन्त्र्यविवक्षया काष्ठादेः कर्तृत्वम्।

III14. न च स्वातन्त्र्यविवक्षणेपि पुरुषव्यापाराधीनक्रियानुकूलव्यापारवतामेषामन्यव्यापारानधीनक्रियानुकूलव्यापारवत्त्वरूपस्य स्वातन्त्र्यस्य वास्तविकस्याभावात्तद्बोधकविभक्तीनामप्रामाण्यं दुर्वारमेवेति वाच्यम्, समभिव्याहृतक्रियाकारकान्तरव्यापारानधीनतत्क्रियानुकूलस्य व्यापारस्यैव तत्क्रियावाचकपदसमभिव्याहृतविभक्त्यर्थत्वात्। अनधीनान्तविशेषणप्रयोजनं च 'चैत्रः काष्ठैः स्थाल्यां पचति' इत्यादिस्थले ' चैत्रः स्थाली काष्ठानि पचति' इति प्रयोगापत्तिवारणम्। यत्र च 'चैत्रः पचति' 'काष्ठं पचति' इत्यादौ समभिव्याहृतकारकान्तराप्रसिद्धिस्तत्राऽन धीनान्तविशेषणं न प्रतीयत एव, तन्निर्वाहश्च तत्र लकारादेः स्वतन्त्रशक्त्यन्तरकल्पनात्, विशिष्टविषयकशक्त्या विशेषणांशा विषयकबोधाऽजननात्।

III 15. न च 'मैत्रश्चैत्रेण पाचयति' इत्यादौ हेतुकर्तृसमभिव्याहारस्थले कर्तरि तृतीयानुपपत्तिः- कर्तृव्यापारस्य समभिव्याहृतहेतुव्यापाराधीनत्वादिति वाच्यम्, तत्र ण्यन्तप्रतिपाद्यपाचनादिक्रियायामेव हेतोः कारकतया स्वतन्त्रकर्तृव्यापारस्य पच्यादिक्रियायां कारकान्तरव्यापारानधीनत्वात्। स्वतन्त्रं प्रयुञ्जानस्य पुंसो व्यापारस्तण्डुलक्रयणादिवत् पाकादवन्यथासिद्धतया न कारणमिति पाकादिप्रयोजकव्यापारवत्त्वेपि तस्य तत्क्रियाकारकत्वाभावात्, अत एव 'चैत्रो मैत्रेण पाचयति' इत्यादौ ' चैत्रः पचति' इति न प्रयोगः।

III 16. न च ' पञ्चभिर्हलैः कर्षति गृही' इत्यादौ भूमिलेखनरूपकृष्यादिक्रियायां स्वतन्त्रकर्तृन् प्रयुञ्जानस्य गृहिणो व्यापारस्य दर्शितयुक्त्या लकारादिनाऽभिधानाऽसंभव इति 'कर्षति' इति न स्यात् 'कर्षयति' इति च स्यादिति वाच्यम्, तत्र कृषेः

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

प्रतिविधानार्थत्वात्, उक्तं च "याजका यजन्ति" इति यजिर्हवि:प्रक्षेपार्थ:, 'पञ्चभिर्हलै: कर्षति' इति कृषि: प्रतिविधानार्थ:" इति, यजेर्देवतोद्देश्यकद्रव्यत्यागेच्छाविशेषरूपार्थे मुख्यतया तत्र च यजमानस्यैव कर्तृतया हवि: प्रक्षेपरूपलक्ष्यार्थपरत्वं दर्शितं तत्र चर्त्विजामेव स्वातन्त्र्यम्। 'होता' इत्यत्रापि हवि:प्रक्षेप एव हुधातोरर्थो न तु तादृशफलावच्छिन्नस्त्याग:, तथा सति ऋत्विजस्तत्र स्वतन्त्रकर्तृताविरहेण होतृपदेन प्रतिपादनासंभवात्। "धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकफलकर्तृत्वमेव कर्तृप्रत्ययेन प्रतिपाद्यते इति ऋत्विजि होतृव्यवहारो न यष्टरि। अत: प्रतिगृहीतृव्यापारो न स्वत्वजनकस्तथा सति तत्र दातृव्यवहारापत्ते:" इति तु जीमूतवाहन:।

III 17. अथास्तु 'चैत्रेण मैत्रेण पाच्यते' इत्यादौ स्वतन्त्रव्यापारस्य हेतुकर्तृव्यापाराधीनत्वेपि दर्शितरीत्या तस्य स्वतन्त्रकर्तृत्वनिर्वाहस्तथापि तद्वाचकपदोत्तरं तृतीयानुपपत्ति:' कर्तृत्वस्य णिच्प्रत्ययेनाभिधानादिति चेत्? न, कर्तृत्वनिर्वाहकत्वसंबन्धेन पाकाद्यन्वयिनो हेतुकर्तृव्यापारस्य णिजर्थत्वेन स्वतन्त्रकर्तृत्वस्य णिचाऽनभिधानात्। कर्तृत्वरूपफलावच्छिन्नस्य तादृशव्यापारस्य णिजर्थतामतेप्याऽऽश्रयोपरक्तस्य कर्तृत्वस्यान्यतो भानाऽनिर्वाहेण कर्तुरनभिधानात् तृतीयोपपत्ति: आख्यातस्य धर्म्यऽवाचकत्वेपि कृतिविशिष्टबोधकत्वरूपस्य कर्त्रऽभिधानस्याऽक्षतत्वात् 'चैत्र: पचति' इत्यादौ न तृतीया।

III 18. न चैवं मुख्यविशेष्यतया कृतिबोधकत्वरूपस्य कर्त्रभिधानस्य विवक्षायाम् 'चैत्रेण पचति.' इति स्यादिति वाच्यम्, आश्रयातिरिक्तांशेऽविशेषणतया कृतिबोधनस्यैव कर्त्रभिधानरूपत्वात्। तथा तदभिधानं च लकृत्तद्धितसमासानामेवं अत एव तैरेवाभिधानं वृत्तिकृता विवृतम्।

इदं त्ववधेयम्–यद्यपि स्वतन्त्रव्यापारमात्रे एव तृतीयादेरनुशासनं

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तथापि लाघवात् कृतिरूपे एव कर्तृत्वे तृतीयादेः शक्तिः। अचेतनव्यापारे निरूढलक्षणैव। अनुशासनस्यानादितात्पर्य-मात्रग्राहकत्वात् लाघवसहकृतस्यैव तादृशतात्पर्यस्य शक्तिकल्प-कत्वात् व्यापरे तत्सत्त्वेपि गौरवेण शक्त्यसिद्धेः। एवं च कर्तृत्वरूपकृतिबोधस्थले कारकान्तरव्यापारानधीनत्वं न प्रतीयते इति तदन्तर्भावेण शक्तिकल्पने मानाभावः। व्यापारलाक्षणिकेन कर्तृप्रत्ययेन लक्षणया तदन्तर्भावेण व्यापारबोधनादेव पूर्वोक्तातिप्रसङ्गवारणात्। अन्यथा तदन्तर्भावेण कृतिशक्तावपि पूर्वोक्तातिप्रसङ्गस्य दुर्वारत्वादिति।

III 19. 'घटो जायते' 'ओदनः सिद्ध्यति' इत्यादौ सत्कार्यवादविद्वेषिणां नैयायिकानां कारकत्वं कर्तृत्वं च घटौदनादेर्यथाश्रुतसूत्रानुसारेण दुरुपपादमेव। मुख्यं च क्रियाकर्तृत्वं न क्रियानुकूलकृतिमात्रम्। एकक्रियानुकूलकृतितो यत्र नान्तरीयक-क्रियान्तरनिर्वाहस्तत्र तत्कृतिम तस्तत्क्रियाकर्तृत्वाभावात्, अत एव 'मत्तो भूतं न तु मया कृतम्' इति व्यपदेश इति, किं तु तत्क्रियाविषयकत्वे सति तदनुकूला या कृतिस्तदेव तत्कर्तृत्वम्। अन्योद्देशेन नाराचक्षेपाद् यत्र ब्राह्मणवधस्तत्र मरणानुकूलस्य नाराचक्षेपरूपव्यापारस्य कृतिविषयत्वेपि ब्राह्मणमरणानुकूलव्यापारत्वेन तस्याऽनभिसंहितत्वात् तेन रूपेण कृतिविषयत्वं न तादृशव्यापारस्येति ब्राह्मणमरणानुकूलव्यापारत्वेन कर्तृत्वं न तादृशव्यापारकर्तुरिति न तस्य सम्पूर्णप्रायश्चित्तम्।

III 20. अत एव सम्पूर्णप्रायश्चित्तप्रयोजकस्य कर्तृव्यापारस्य लक्ष्यताभिप्रायेण हिंसालक्षणे मणिकृतां मरणोद्देशेनानुष्ठीयमानत्वाऽदृष्टाऽद्वारकत्वविशेषणयोरुपादानमिति मिश्राभिधानसंगतिः। मरणोद्देशेनानुष्ठीयमानस्य व्यापारस्यावश्यं मरणानुकूलव्यापारत्वेन प्रतिसंहितत्वात् तादृशरूपेण कृतिविषयत्वमिति तादृशविशेषणस्य विशिष्टकर्तृतानिर्वाहकत्वात् तद्विशेषणवतो व्यापारस्य नियमेन लक्ष्यत्वात्। तच्छून्यस्य चाऽलक्ष्यत्वनियमात्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

III 21. अथ मरणोद्देशेनानुष्ठितस्यापि व्यापारस्य यत्र खड्गाभिघातत्वादिनैवेष्टसाधनत्वकृतिसाध्यत्वविषयता न तु मरणानुकूलत्वविशेषिततद्रूपेण, तत्र न मरणानुकूलत्वविशिष्टविषयिणी कृतिरिति तादृशव्यापारकर्तुर्न वधत्वविशिष्टकर्तृत्वमिति कथमुक्तविशेषणस्य विशिष्टकर्तृतानिर्वाहकत्वम्? यदि च मरणोद्देशेनानुष्ठीयमानत्वस्य मरणानुकूलत्वेन कृतिविषयत्वमेवार्थ इत्युपेयते? तदा व्यापारे तादृशविशेषणस्य तत्कर्तरि विशिष्टकर्तृतानिर्वाहकत्वेप्युक्तस्थले खड्गाभिघातादौ तादृशलक्षणाऽव्याप्तिर्दुर्वारैव। तत्र संपूर्णप्रायश्चित्तस्य निर्विवादतया लक्ष्यताया आवश्यकत्वात्।

III 22. न च विशेषणीभूतफलनिष्ठोद्देश्यताख्यविषयतानिरूपकत्वे सति व्यापारनिष्ठसाध्यताख्यविषतानिरूपकत्वमेव विशिष्टविषयकत्वं कृतेरित्युपदर्शितस्थलेऽनुकूलतासंबन्धेन मरणवैशिष्ट्यस्य साध्यतारूपकृतिविषयतावच्छेदकताविरहेपि न विशिष्टकर्तृत्वाऽनिर्वाह इति मरणोद्देशेनानुष्ठीयमानत्वस्य मरणकामनाधीन-कृतिविषयत्वरूपतैवेति वाच्यम्, "ब्राह्मणं न हन्यात्" इत्यादौ धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकस्य मरणस्य स्वोद्देश्यकत्वसंबन्धेन कृतावन्वयसंभवे एव निरुक्तविशिष्टकर्तृत्वस्य निषेधविधिविषयत्वसंभवात्, व्यापारविशेषणतयोपस्थितस्य कृत्यंशे विशेषणतयाऽन्वयस्य व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धत्वात्।

III 23. अथ मरणोपलक्षितव्यापारकर्तृत्वस्य तादृशनिषेधविषयत्वेषि न क्षतिः- अन्योद्देशेन नाराचक्षेपस्यापि ब्राह्मणमरणोपधायकस्य नरकसाधनत्वात्, परं तु मरणप्रायश्चित्तविधेरेव तदविषयकत्वमुपपादनीयं तच्च मरणोद्देशेन तदनुकूलव्यापारकर्तृत्वबोधकस्य शब्दस्य तद्विधावन्तर्भावे एवोपपद्यते इति चेत्? एवमपि ब्राह्मणमरणकामनया यत्र न तन्मरणानुकूलव्यापरानुष्ठानमऽपि तु फलान्तरकामनाधीनतन्मरणानुकूलव्यापारत्वप्रकारकचिकीर्षया तदनुष्ठितं तत्राव्याप्तिरेतन्मते दुर्वारैव। तत्रापि संपूर्णस्यैव प्रायश्चित्तस्याऽऽचरणादऽलक्ष्यतोपगमासंभवादिति।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

III 24. मैवम्-यत्र हि मरणानुकूलव्यापारत्वेन कृतिसाध्यताधीस्तत्रेव यत्र व्यापारविशेषत्वेनैव तद्धीस्तत्रापि मरणरूपफलकामनाधीनव्यापरविषयिणी कृतिर्मरणानुकूलत्वेन व्यापारमवगाहते कृते: कामनाविषयफलोपरागेणोपायविषयतोपगमात्, विशृङ्खलफल-भानोपगमे यत्र तृप्तिकामनया भोजनं फलान्तरकामनया च गमनमवगांहमाना समूहालम्बनकृतिस्तत्र 'तृप्तये गमनं करोति' इंति व्यवहारापत्ते:, उपायांशे फलस्यानुकूलत्वं संबन्धः प्रकारो वेत्यन्यदेतत्, एवं च मरणावच्छिन्नव्यापारविषयकत्वमुभयत्रैव कृतेरिति विशेषणावच्छिन्नविषयककृतिमत्त्वरूपं विशिष्टकर्तृत्वमुभयस्थले निष्प्रत्यूहम्। मरणोद्देशेनानुष्ठीयमानत्वमपि मरणानुकूलत्वोपरागेण कृतिविषयत्वरूपमेव लक्षणघटकमिति न काचिदनुपपत्ति:।

III 25. यद्यप्यऽदृष्टद्वारा पाकानुकूलकृतिमतोपि न पाकादिकर्तृत्वमिति तत्क्रियाकर्तृत्वघटककृतिनिष्ठतदनुकूलत्वे एवाऽदृष्टाद्वारकत्वमपेक्षितं न तु क्रियानिष्ठफलानुकूलत्वे तदपेक्षितमिति व्यापारनिष्ठमरणनुकूलत्वेऽदृष्टाद्वारकत्वरूपमणिकारोक्तविशेषणस्य न कर्तृताघटकत्वम्, तथाप्यनुष्ठीयमानत्वप्रविष्टकृतेरेवाऽदृष्टाद्वारकमरणानुकूलत्वं विवक्षितं विशिष्टकर्तृत्वं चाऽदृष्टाऽद्वारकत्वविशेषितमरणानुकूलत्वेन कृतिविशेषणेन घटितमिति मिश्राशय:।

III 26. तथा चैवं पर्यवसितम्- हिनस्ते: प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं मरणरूपफलावच्छिन्नव्यापारत्वमेव '' न हिंस्यात्'' इत्यादौ फलविशिष्टस्वनिरूपितकर्तृत्वसंबन्धेन हिनस्त्याद्यर्थस्यानिष्टविशेषसाधनत्वं प्रतीयते, श्येनस्य हिनस्त्याद्यर्थत्वेपि न तस्य तादृशकारणतावच्छेदकसंबन्धेन क्वचिदपि सत्त्वम् तत्कर्तुरदृष्टाऽद्वारकानुकूलताघटितफलकर्तृत्वविरहेण विशिष्टाकर्तृत्वादिति नानिष्टविशेषं प्रति हिंसात्वेन साधनत्वमिति न क्रियायां विध्यर्थान्वयमतेपि श्येनविध्यर्थबाध:।

III 27. वस्तुत: श्येनानुकूलकृतेर्मरणप्रयोजकत्वमेव न तु मरणकारणत्त्वम्

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

अन्यथासिद्धत्वात्, मरणोपलक्षितान्यकर्तृकखड्गाभिघातादि-रूपवैरिवधं प्रत्येव श्येनस्य हेतुताया वेदेन बोधितत्वात्। क्रियाजन्यकार्ये तत्क्रियानुकूलकृतिहेतुताया नियमेपि खड्गा-भिघातादावेव श्येनकृतेर्हेतुत्वात्। तथा चाऽनिष्टविशेषफल-जनकतावच्छेदकप्रत्यासत्तिप्रविष्टमरणानुकूलत्वं मरणजनकत्वमेव न तु प्रयोजकत्वम्, अतोऽदृष्टाद्वारकत्वं न तत्र निवेशनीयम्, कारणत्वपर्यन्तनिवेशलाभायैव वा तदुपादानम्। यदि च विशिष्टान्वयपरताया वेदे औत्सर्गिकत्वेन वधसाधनताबोधकश्रुत्या विशेषणीभूतमरणसाधनतापि श्येनस्य प्रत्याय्यते तदापि श्येनानु-कूलकृतेर्मरणसाधनत्वमप्रामाणिकमेव क्रियाजनककृतेस्तज्जन्य जनकतानियमस्याऽप्रामाणिकत्वात्।

III 28. अथान्योद्देशेन नाराचक्षेपकर्तुर्विशिष्टविषयककृतिमत्त्वघटित-विशेष्टकर्तृताविरहेपि यथार्धवधजन्यपापप्रायश्चित्तं तथा श्येनकर्तुर्विशिष्टाऽकर्तृत्वात् पापार्धस्यावश्यकत्वाद् बलवद-निष्टाननुबन्धित्वबाधो दुर्वार ऐवेति चेत्? नअकाम-कृतेप्यर्धप्रायश्चित्तस्मरणेन मरणावच्छिन्नव्यापारस्य विषय-तामनन्तर्भाव्य विशिष्टजनककृतिमत्त्वसंबन्धेन न्यूनपापे स्वतन्त्रहेतुत्वकल्पनात् तद्बलेन विशिष्टाकर्तुः श्येन-कर्तुर्हिंसाजन्यपापानुत्पत्तेः। न च लाघवेन मरणोप-लक्षितव्यापारजनकत्वमेव प्रत्यासत्तिमध्ये निवेश्यतामिति वाच्यम्, श्रुत्यर्थबाधापादकलाघवस्याऽप्रयोजकत्वात्। वेदस्थले विशिष्टान्वयस्यौत्सर्गिकत्वेपि श्येनस्य मरणजनकत्वे विध्यर्थबाधप्रसङ्गेन मरणं प्रति श्येनस्यान्यथासिद्धताया एवोपगन्तव्यतया तस्य जनकतागर्भहिनस्त्यर्थतावच्छेदक रूपशून्याताया अपि सूपपादत्वात्।

III 29. न च यदि खड्गाभिधातजनकाऽदृष्टव्यवहितस्य श्येनस्य-मरणेऽन्यथासिद्धत्वं तदा हननकर्तृव्यापारोपि तत्रान्यथासिद्धः स्यात् यश्च व्यापारो मरणेऽव्यवहितसाधनं तत्र तद्धेतुः,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

कृतिरेवान्यथासिद्धेति मरणकारणव्यापारकारणकृतिमत्त्वं न कस्यापि हेतुः स्यादिति वाच्यम्, तण्डुलविक्लित्त्यादिरूपफलव्यवहितस्यापि तुषादिप्रक्षेपस्य तत्करणदशायाम् 'पचति' इत्यादिव्यवहारानुरोधेन यथाऽनन्यथासिद्धत्वं तथा खड्गप्रक्षेपादिकरणदशायाम् 'हन्ति' इतिव्यपदेशानुरोधेन तत्र व्यवहितस्यापि मरणेऽनन्यथासिद्धत्वमवश्याभ्युपेयमिति सामञ्जस्यात्।

III 30. तण्डुलक्रयणदशायाम् 'पचति' इत्याद्यभाववत् खड्गादिनिर्माणदशायाम् 'हन्ति' इत्यऽव्यवहारात् तद्व्यापारो मरणेऽन्यथासिद्धतया न हिंसा। व्याघ्रमरणोद्देशेन कृतो यन्त्रार्पणादिर्यथा तत्र दैवाद्गवादिमरणेपि न हिंसारूपस्तथा न व्याघ्रादिहिंसारूपोपि तत्करणदशायाम् 'हन्ति' इत्यप्रयोगात्। अतथात्वेपि तन्मरणोद्देश्यकाऽदृष्टाद्वारकतन्मरणप्रयोजककृतिजन्यव्यापारस्यापि हिंसावत् पापजनकत्वादुक्तस्थले गोवधाभिसंधाने गोवधप्रायश्चित्ताऽऽचरणमित्यवधेम्।

III 31. एवं च 'चैत्रः पचति' इत्यादौ विषयताघटितकर्तृत्वबोधनिर्वाहाय यथा कृतौ पाकादेरुपधायकत्वविषयित्वोभयसंबन्धेनान्वयः, विषयितायाः संबन्धत्वेप्युपधायकत्वनिवेश आवश्यकःपाकाद्यनिष्पत्तिस्थले 'पचति-पश्यति' इत्यादिप्रयोगस्य प्रामाण्यवारकत्वात्, तथा चैत्रेण पच्यते इत्यादावपि तृतीयार्थकृतेर्जन्यत्वविषयत्वोभसंबन्धेनान्वयो बोध्यः (पाकादौ)। कृतिजन्यत्वस्य तृतीयार्थत्वे जन्यत्वसंबन्धमध्ये एव स्वनिरूपकविषयत्वं प्रवेशनीयम्। कृतिविषयत्वमेव वा तृतीयार्थः, स्वनिरूपकजन्यत्वं विषयतायाः संबन्धमध्येऽन्तर्भावनीयम्।

III 32. 'काष्ठेन पचति' इत्यादौ कारणत्वं तृतीयार्थः, तच्च व्यापारवत्कारणत्वम्, व्यापारे कर्तृव्यापाराधीनत्वं निवेशनीयम्, अन्यथा कर्तुरपि करणतापत्त्या 'चैत्रश्चैत्रेण पचति' 'काष्ठं

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

चैत्रेण पचति' इत्यादिप्रयोगापत्तेः। न च कर्तुश्चेष्टादिरूपव्यापारस्य तदीयकृत्यादिरूपव्यापाराधीनतया तद्विशेषणदानेपि कर्तुः करणत्वं दुर्वारमेवेनि वाच्यम्, स्वभिन्नत्वेन कर्तुर्विशेषणीयत्वात्।

III 33. यत्रैकैव पाकादिक्रिया चैत्रेण काष्ठादिना मैत्रेण तुषादिप्रक्षेपेण निष्पाद्यते तत्र 'चैत्रस्तुषैर्मैत्रः काष्ठैः पचति' इतिप्रसङ्गः समभिव्याहृतकर्तृव्यापाराधीनत्वस्य तत्तत्करणव्यापारे भानमुपगम्य वारणीयः। न च समभिव्याहृतकर्त्रन्तर्भावेण तृतीयार्थत्वे कर्त्रऽसमभिव्याहारस्थले करणे तृतीयाया अप्रयोगापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, तत्रापि ''हेतौ'' इतिसूत्रेण हेतुतामात्रार्थकर्तृतृतीयासंभवात् 'धनेन कुलम्' 'विद्यया यशः' इत्यादिवत्। न हि तत्र करणे तृतीया क्रियायोगाभावात्।

III 34. न चैवमुक्तस्थलै 'चैत्रस्तुषेण पचति' इति प्रयोगस्य ''हेतौ इति सूत्रबलादापत्ताविष्टापत्तिं विनोत्तराभावात् समभिव्याहृतकर्त्रन्तर्भावस्य करणे स्वतन्त्रतृतीयानुशासनस्यैव वा वैयर्थ्यमिति वाच्यम्, उक्तस्थले पाके तुषहेतुकत्वाभावबाधेपि 'चैत्रस्तुषेण न पचति किं तु दारुणैव' इतिप्रयोगोपपत्तये समभिव्याहृतकर्त्रन्तभावेण तृतीयायाः शक्तिकल्पनाया आवश्यकत्वात्, तद्ग्राहकतयैव करणतृतीयानुशासनस्यावश्यकत्वात्। 'शरैः शातितपत्रोयम्' इत्यादौ तृतीयायाः कारकविभक्तित्वे एव तदर्थान्वितार्थकशातितादिपदेन समासस्य साधुतानिर्वाहाच्च। न च तृतीयायाः समभिव्याहृतकर्त्रन्तर्भावेण करणत्वार्थत्वे तत्र समभिव्याहृतकर्त्रऽभावादऽकारकविभक्तित्वं करणे तृतीयानुशासनेपि दुर्वारमेवेति वाच्यम्, एतदनुरोधेन तत्र कर्तुरध्याहरणीयत्वात्।

III 35. वस्तुतः समभिव्याहृतकर्तृव्यापाराधीनत्वे व्यापारवत्कारणत्वे च तृतीयायाः शक्तिद्वयम्, कर्त्रसमभिव्याहारस्थले व्यापारवत्कारणत्वमात्रं प्रतीयते, कर्तृसमभिव्याहास्थले च व्यापारे तद्व्यापाराधीनत्वमपीति सामञ्जस्यम्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

एवं हेत्वनुशिष्टतृतीयाया: "अकर्तर्यृणे" इत्यनेन बाधनात् करणत्वविवक्षायाम् 'धनवता ऋणेन बद्धोऽयम्' इत्यत्र तृतीयाया उपपत्तये करणे तृतीयानुशासनस्यावश्यकता। कारणत्वं च फलोपधानतारूपमेव करणताघटकम्, अन्यथा कुठारादिकरणच्छिदादौ दात्रादेरपि स्वरूपयोग्यतया करणत्वापत्ते:।

III 36. लिङ्गज्ञानस्यानुमितिकरणतामते 'धूमेन वह्निमनुमिनोमि' इत्यादौ धूमादिपदं तज्ज्ञानपरम्, व्याप्तिविशिष्टहेतुज्ञानस्य व्यापारस्तद्विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाही परामर्श:, स चात्ममनोयोगादिरूपानुमातृपुरुषव्यापाराधीन इति तस्य निरुक्तकरणत्वमबाधितमेव। धूमादिलिङ्गकवह्न्यनुमितौ यत्र लिङ्गान्तराद् घटादिभानं तत्र 'धूमेन घटमनुमिनोमि' इति न प्रयोग:अन्वयितावच्छेदकतद्विधेयकानुमितित्वावच्छेदेनैवाऽन्वयितावच्छेदकधूमादिविषयकज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नत्वेन भासमानस्य करणत्वस्य निरूपकत्वभानोपगमात्। निरूपकत्व तु करणतामात्रस्य तृतीयार्थतावादिनां प्राचां मते संसर्ग:, नव्यमते तु करणतानिरूपकत्वस्यैव नञर्थाभावे प्रतियोगित्वेनाऽन्वयानुरोधात् तावत्पर्यन्तस्य तृतीयार्थतया प्रकार एवेत्यन्तदेतत्।

III 37. परे तु लिङ्गज्ञानस्य करणत्वेपि 'धूमेन वह्निमनुमिनोमि' इत्यादौ धूमादिपदं मुख्यार्थपरमेव "हेतौ" इति सूत्रेण तत्र तृतीयाहेतुत्वस्य कारणतावच्छेदकसाधारणप्रयोजकत्वरूपस्य तत्र विवक्षितत्वात्, जनकज्ञानविषयधूमादेश्चानुमितिकारणतावच्छेदकतया प्रयोजकत्वमक्षतमेव। उक्तसमूहालम्बनस्थलेऽतिप्रसङ्गश्च वह्निविधेयकानुमितित्वावच्छेदेन प्रयोजकतानिरूपकत्वभानाभ्युपगमेन वारणीय:।

वस्तुतो जनकादिनिष्ठप्रयोजकतानिरूपकत्वं कार्यस्येव कार्यतावच्छेदकस्याप्याक्षतं प्रतितिसाक्षिकं च, तथा चानुमिति विशेषणतत्तद्विधेयकत्वरूपसुबन्तार्थे एव तृतीयार्थान्वय उपगम्यते। समूहालम्बनानुमितिनिष्ठघटादिविधेयकत्वस्य धूमाद्यप्रयोज्यतया

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

नोक्तातिप्रसङ्ग 'धूमेन वाह्निमनुमिनोमि न घटेन' इत्यादावनुमितौ घटादिप्रयोज्यत्वाभावो नान्वेति, अपि तु नञर्थाभावप्रतियोग्यन्वयिनि वह्न्यादिविधेयकत्वे एव, अतो यत्र धूमादिलिङ्गकवह्न्यनुमितौ घटादिरूपलिङ्गाधीनं द्रव्यत्वादिभानं तत्र 'धूमेन वह्निमनुमिनोमि न घटेन' इति प्रयोगोपपत्तिः, समूहालम्बनरूप तादृशानुमितौ घटादि-रूपलिङ्गप्रयोज्यत्वाभावस्याऽसत्त्वेपि वह्न्यादिविधेयकत्वे तदबाधात्। न ह्यनुमितावपि द्रव्यत्वादिविधेयकत्वावच्छिन्नस्य घटादिलिङ्गप्रयोज्यत्वस्य वह्न्यादिविधेयकत्वावच्छेदेनाऽभावो बाधित इति संभवति-प्रयोज्यताया अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वविरहात्।

III 38. एतेन-अनुमितौ धूमादिलिङ्गज्ञानकरणकत्वं तृतीयया प्रत्याय्यते करणे एव तृतीया तत्रेतिमतं प्रत्युक्तम्-उक्तस्थलेऽनुमितौ नञर्थान्वययोग्यताया अनुपपत्तेः। वह्न्यादिविधेयकत्वे धूमादिज्ञानरूपकरणजन्यतावच्छेदकत्वतदभावौ तृतीयान्ततत्समभिव्याहृतनञ्भ्यां प्रत्याय्येते इत्यपि न सत्-कारकविभक्तयर्थस्य क्रियातिरिक्तेऽनन्वयात्।

III 39. न चोक्तस्थले वह्न्यदिविधेयकत्वावच्छेदेन घटादिरूपलिङ्गज्ञान जन्यतावदऽनुमितिमत्त्वाभावः पुरुषनिष्ठो नञा प्रयाय्यते तादृशानुमितिर्घटादौ वह्न्यादिलिङ्गत्वभ्रमदशायां प्रसिद्धेति वाच्यम्, धूमेन वह्नेरनुमानमिदं न घटेन' इत्यादावनुमितिमत्त्वाद्यभावबोधानुपपत्तेरिति प्राहुः।

III 40. पर्वतो धूमेन वह्निमान्' इत्यादौ क्रियायोगाभावाद्धेतुतृतीयैव, तत्र ज्ञापकज्ञानविषयत्वरूपं हेतुत्वं ज्ञानज्ञाप्यत्वरूपं वाहेतुमत्त्वं तृतीयार्थः हेतुशब्दो यद्यपि कारणपर्यायो न तु ज्ञापकपर्यायस्तथापि हेतौ' इति सूत्रस्थहेतुपदं न समभिव्याहृतनिरूपितहेतुतामात्रपरमऽपि तु समभिव्याहृततज्ज्ञानान्यतरनिरूपितहेतुतापरमेवेति समभिव्याहृतवह्न्यादिज्ञानहेतुज्ञानविषयधूमादिपदादपि तृतीया तत्सूत्रेणानुशिष्यते। गुणहेतौ

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

पञ्चम्या विकल्पेन विधायकसूत्रान्तरमप्यऽन्यतरनिरूपितहेतुता-विषयकमेव अतः 'जाड्याद् बद्धो 'जाड्येन वा' इत्यत्र जाड्यस्य हेतुतावद्' धूमाद्वह्निमान् धूमेन वा' इत्यादौ धूमादेर्वह्न्यादिज्ञानहेतुता प्रतीयते। हेतुत्वं च पूर्वोक्तं प्रयोजकत्वमेव। गुणपदं च न चतुर्विंशतिपरम् धूमादिहेतौ तत्त्वासंभवात्।

III 41. न च यत्र धूमादिपदं तज्ज्ञानपरमेवेति तादृशगुणत्वमेव वह्न्यादिहेतोरिति वाच्यम्, तत्र धूमादिपदस्य ज्ञानलाक्षणिकत्वेपि 'अज्ञानाद्बद्धः' इत्यादावऽभावरूपबन्धादिहेतोस्तथात्वासंभवात्। नापि धर्ममात्रम्, गगनादेरपि कालिकसंबन्धेन धर्मतयाऽव्या-वर्तकत्वात् समवायादिना धर्मत्वं चाऽभावाद्यऽसंग्राहकम्। नापि द्रव्याश्रितत्वम् 'सत्तावान् गुणत्वात्' इत्यादौ पञ्चम्यन्त-स्याऽलाक्षणिकत्वपक्षे पञ्चम्यनुपपत्तेः। किं तु कार्यस्य ज्ञाप्यस्य वाऽऽश्रये आश्रितत्वम्, जाड्यादेः स्वप्रयोज्यबन्धाश्रये धूमादेश्च स्वज्ञाप्यवह्न्याद्याश्रये आश्रितत्वाद् गुणत्वम्। हेतौ तद्विशेषण-प्रयोजनं च 'पितुः पाण्डित्येन पुत्र आहूतः' 'धूमस्य स्वस्मिन् सत्त्वेन पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इत्यादौ पञ्चमीवारणम्।

III 42. ज्ञापकत्वं च तज्ज्ञानजनकप्रमाविषयत्वम् ज्ञाप्यत्वमपि प्रमाजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वम् अतो वह्न्यादेर्व्याप्यताभ्रमेण धूमादिज्ञापकत्वसत्त्वेपि 'वह्निना वह्नेर्वा धूमवानयम्' इत्यादयो न प्रयोगाः। प्रमात्वं च यावद्भ्रमभिन्नत्वरूपं विवक्षणीयं तेन 'धूमव्याप्यो वह्निः' इत्यादिज्ञानस्य वह्नित्वाद्यंशे प्रमात्वमादाय नोक्तातिप्रसङ्गः द्रव्यत्वादेः प्रमेयत्वावच्छिन्नवह्न्यदिज्ञापकत्वेपि विशिष्टद्रव्यत्वत्वादिना वह्नित्वाद्यवच्छिन्नज्ञापकत्वेपि च 'पर्वतो वह्निमान् द्रव्यत्वाद् द्रव्यत्वेन वा' इत्यादिर्न प्रयोगः- अन्वयितावच्छेदकवह्नित्वद्रव्यत्वत्वादिना ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकभावस्य तृतीयादिना बोधनात् तत्र तेन रूपेण ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकभावविरहात्।

III 43. एवं ज्ञाप्यवह्न्यादिमत्त्वान्वयितावच्छेदकपर्वतत्वावच्छिन्नांशे ज्ञापकत्वं ज्ञाप्यत्वं वा प्रतीयते इत्यपि नियमस्तेन 'पर्वतो वह्निमान् महानसत्वात् तेन वा' इतयादयो न प्रयोगाः।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

अत्रेदमवधेयम्-'पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमान्न द्रव्यत्वान्नापि महानसत्वात्' इत्यादौ नञा वह्न्यादौ द्रव्यत्वमहानसत्वादिज्ञानज्ञाप्यत्वाभावबोधने बाधः, तत्र प्रमेयत्वादिना द्रव्यत्वादिज्ञानज्ञाप्यत्वस्य महानसादौ महानसत्वादिज्ञानज्ञाप्यत्वस्य च सत्त्वात् (सत्त्वेपि), वह्नित्वादिना द्रव्यत्वादिज्ञाप्यत्वस्य पर्वतादौ महानसत्वादिज्ञाप्यत्वस्य चाऽप्रसिद्ध्या नाभावप्रत्यायनसंभव इति ज्ञानप्रयोज्यंत्वं ज्ञानजन्यतावच्छेदकत्वरूपं समभिव्याहृतपर्वतादिविशेष्यतानिरूपितं विधेयत्वं च विशकलितं पञ्चम्यर्थः, विशिष्टलाभोऽन्वयबलात्, एवं चोक्तस्थले नञा विधेयतायां द्रव्यत्वमहानसत्वादिज्ञानप्रयोज्यत्वाभावः प्रत्याय्यते, तत्प्रयोज्यत्वं च प्रमेयत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविधेयतायां प्रसिद्धम्।

III 44. न चैवम् 'पर्वतो वह्निमान् न धूमात्' इत्यादेरपि प्रसङ्गः-धूमत्वाद्यविच्छन्नविषयकज्ञानप्रयोज्यतत्तद्वह्नित्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविधेयताया वह्न्यादावऽबाधितत्वादिति वाच्यम्, पर्वतादिविशेष्यतानिरूपितवह्नित्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविधेयतात्वावच्छेदेन विधेयतायां नञाऽभावान्वयबोधोपगमात्।

III 45. यत्र वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नविधेयतात्वमन्वयितावच्छेदकं तत्रैव तदवच्छेदेनेतरान्वयः संभवति, अत्र च वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नत्वाविशेषितं विधेयतात्वमेव तथेति कथं तदवच्छेदेनाभावान्वय इति तु न शङ्क्यम्, पञ्चम्याद्यर्थविधेयताया वह्न्यादौ वह्नित्वाद्यवच्छेदेनाऽन्वयोपगमात् तदवच्छेदेन तदन्वये चावच्छेदकतद्रूपस्य तद्विशेषणांशे धर्मिपारतन्त्र्येण प्रकारत्वात्। प्रकृते स्वरूपसंबन्धरूपवह्नित्वाद्यवच्छिन्नत्वेन सहितस्य विधेयतात्वस्यैवान्वयितावच्छेदकत्वात्।

वह्न्यादिपदमेव तदवच्छिन्नविधेयताशालिज्ञानपरं तदुत्तरमतुबादिप्रत्ययो विशेष्यतारूपसंबन्धपर इति प्राचीनमते तु वह्नित्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविधेयतात्वस्यान्वयितावच्छेउदकत्वमविवादमेव।

III 46. विधेयतायास्तत्तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नविधेयतात्वेन पञ्चम्याद्यर्थत्वं

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

स्वीकरणीयं तेन 'अयं जानाति आत्मत्वान्न द्रव्यत्वात्' इत्यादौ विषयतासंबन्धावच्छिन्नायां प्रकृतविशेष्यतानिरूपितज्ञान-विधेयतायां द्रव्यत्वादिरूपलिङ्गज्ञानप्रयोज्यत्वसत्त्वेपिं नावच्छेदकावच्छेदेनाऽभावान्वयायोग्यत्वम्-संबन्धविशेषावच्छिन्नविधेयतात्वरूपाऽन्वयितावच्छेदकावच्छेदेनाऽभाववत्त्वबोधात्।

III 47. एवं ज्ञानप्रयोज्यत्वप्रविष्टं ज्ञानमपि तत्तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रकारकत्वविशेषितमर्थः, तेन समवायेन हेतुत्वपरस्य' अयं बह्निमान् तद्रूपान्न तु धूमात्' इति प्रयोगस्य नायोग्यता, वह्निविधेयतायां संयोगेन धूमप्रकारकज्ञानप्रयोज्यत्वसत्त्वेतऽपि समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्न-तत्प्रकारताशालिज्ञानप्रयोज्यतात्वरूपान्वयितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नाभावस्याऽबाधात्। संबन्धविशेषघटितधर्मस्यान्वयितावच्छेदकतयाभाननियामकं तु तात्पर्यमेव। वह्न्यादिविधेयताया व्याप्त्यादिघटकाभावादिज्ञानप्रयोज्यत्वसत्त्वेपि 'पर्वतो वह्निमानऽ भावात्' इत्यादिर्न प्रयोगः-मुख्यविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारताया एव निवेशनीयत्वादिति दिक्।

III 48. केन हेतुना कस्मै हेतवे' इत्यादौ विभक्तिभिर्हेतुताविशष्टे हेतुता बोधयितुमशक्या-पौनरुक्तयादिति तु न शङ्क्यम्-हेतुशब्दस्य स्वरूपयोग्यपरत्वात् विभक्तेः फलोपधानपरत्वात्, दण्डवान् रक्तदण्डवान्' इतिवत् कार्यविशेषानुपरक्तहेतुताविशिष्टे कार्यविशेषापरक्तहेतुताबोधेऽनाकाङ्क्षताविरहाच्च। न चान्वयबोधसंभवेपि हेतुशब्दप्रयोगवैर्थ्यम् फलोपधायकतालाभे स्वरूपयोग्यताया अर्थाल्लाभसंभवादिति वाच्यम्, विभक्तेरन्यार्थताया अप्यन्यत्र दृष्टत्वाद् हेतुता-परत्वनिश्चयार्थं तत्प्रयोगात्।

III 49. सहार्थयोगेपि साहित्यप्रतियोगिवाचकपदात् तृतीया-'पुत्रेण सहागतः' इत्यादौ। अथ यदि सहशब्दर्थः समभिव्याहृत-पदोपस्थाप्यक्रियासमानकालीनक्रियान्वयित्वम्, तदन्वयित्वं च समभिव्याहृतक्रियाबोधकपदेन क्रियाया यादृशः संबन्धः साहित्यान्वयिनि प्रत्याय्यते तादृशतत्संबन्ध एव, स च

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'पुत्रेण' इत्यादौ कर्तृत्वम्, 'दघ्ना सहौदनो भुज्यते' इत्यादौ कर्मत्वादिः, तृतीयार्थोपि स एव संबन्धः, तथा च पुत्र कर्तृकागमनसमानकालीनागमनकर्तृत्व दधिकर्मकभोजनसमानकालीनभोजनकर्मत्वादिकं पुरुषौदनादौ तत्रतत्र प्रतीयते इत्युच्यते? तदा सहशब्देनैव तत्तत्क्रियाकर्तृत्वबोधने क्रियापदवैयर्थ्यम्, द्विधा क्रियाभानस्यानुपयुक्तत्वात् क्रियान्वयिनि क्रियान्वयबोधस्योद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेययोरभेदेन निराकाङ्क्षतयाऽसंभवाच्च

III 50. न च तत्तत्क्रियासमानकालीनत्वमात्रं सहशब्दार्थः तस्य च क्रियापदोपस्थापितक्रियायामेवान्वय इति क्रियापदसहितसहशब्दादेवोक्तविशिष्टार्थलाभ इति वाच्यम्, एवं सति 'पुत्रेण सहागतः' इत्यादौ सहशब्दार्थस्य क्रियापदार्थान्वयित्वेनाऽन्यसापेक्षयतया तेन सह पुत्रशब्दस्य समासाऽसंभवेन 'सपुत्रः' इत्यादिप्रयोगानुपपत्तिः, न ह्यत्र समासे सहार्थस्य प्राधान्यं येनान्यसापेक्षत्वेपि समासो भवेत् किं तु बहुव्रीहित्वादन्यपदार्थप्राधान्मेवेति चेत्? न, समभिव्याहृतपदोस्थाप्यक्रियाकाल एव सहशब्दार्थः तस्य क्रियान्वयिनि नामार्थे एवान्वयः। तादृशकालविशिष्टे नामार्थे क्रियान्वये च क्रियायामपि तादृशकालावच्छिन्नत्वं भासते-उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन विधेयान्वयस्य व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धत्वात्, अतः क्रियाद्वयसमानकालीनत्वलाभ इति सामञ्जस्यात्।

III 51. अथ वाऽऽगमनसमानकलीनाऽऽगमनादिकमेव सहशब्दार्थः तस्य कर्तृत्वादिसंबन्धेन पुरुषादावन्वयः, तादृशसंबन्धेन तद्विशिष्टे च 'आगतः' 'आगच्छति' इत्यादिपदोपस्थाप्याऽऽगमनकर्तृत्वादीनामन्वये न व्युत्पत्तिविरोधःविधेयस्योद्देश्यतावच्छेदकप्रकाराऽभेदविरहात्। न च सहशब्दार्थान्वयबलादेव तत्क्रियाकर्तृत्वस्य पुरुषादौ लाभे प्रकारतयापि क्रियापदेन तत् प्रतिपादनमफलमिति तत्प्रयोगो व्यर्थ इति . वाच्यम्, समभिव्याहृतपदेन तत्तत्क्रियाया अनुपस्थाने सहशब्देनापि

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तत्तत्क्रियाघटितसाहित्यस्य शक्यस्य बोधनं न संभवतीति क्रियापदप्रयोगस्यावश्यकत्वात्। सहशब्दार्थक्रियायाः कर्तृत्वादि-संबन्धेन नामार्थेऽन्वयश्च न व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धः, सहशब्दस्याऽधातुत्वाद् निपातत्वाच्च।

III 52. न च "प्रासोष्ट शत्रुघ्नमुदारचेष्टमेका सुमित्रा सह लक्ष्मणेन' इत्यादौ शत्रुघ्नप्रसवलक्ष्मणप्रसवयोः समानकालीनत्वाभावात् क्रियाद्वयसमानकालीनतायाः सहशब्दार्थत्वाऽसंभव इति वाच्यम्, तत्रापि स्थूलकालघटिसमानकालीनत्वसत्त्वात्। न च कालत्वेनैव कालस्य तदर्थान्तर्भावे पुत्रागमनपूर्वमागन्तरि 'आगतोयं न पुत्रेण सह' इति प्रयोगानुपपत्तिः- पुत्रागमनाधिकरणस्थूलकाल-वृत्त्याऽऽगमनकर्तृत्वसत्त्वेनाऽन्वयितावच्छेदकरूपावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकसाहित्याभावबाधादिति वाच्यम्, तत्र क्षणत्वेनैव कालस्य सहशब्दार्थेऽन्तर्भावनीयत्वात्।

III 53. एवं यत्रैककालेपि विभिन्नस्थले भुञ्जानमधिकृतत्य 'न सह भुङ्क्ते' इति प्रयुज्यते तत्रैकशालारूपभोजनाधारोपि सहशब्दार्थेऽन्तर्भावनीयः। अत एव "आलापाद् गात्रसंस्पर्शान्निश्वासात् सहभोजनात्" इत्यादिना पतितभोजन-समानकालीनभोजनमात्रस्य पापजनकत्वं न बोध्यते- एकपङ्क्तेरपि विवक्षाणात्। एवम्-

याजनं योनिसंबन्धं स्वाध्यायं सह भोजनम्।
सद्यः पतति कुर्वाणः पतितेन न संशयः।

इत्यादावेकदैकपात्रभोजनस्यैव सद्यःपातहेतुत्वं प्रतीयते तत्र तादृशार्थस्यैव सह शब्देन विवक्षणात्।

III 54. अथ नामार्थस्यैव सहार्थविशेष्यतयाऽन्वयोपगमे 'पुत्रेण सह नाऽऽगच्छत्ययम्' इत्यादौ सहशब्दार्थपुत्रसाहित्याभाव एव पुरुषांशे नञा बोध्यते इत्युपगन्तव्यं, तच्च नोपपद्यते, तथा सत्याख्यातार्थोद्देश्यतावच्छेदकतयैव नञर्थभानस्योपगन्तव्यतया प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधस्थले निषेधस्य प्राधान्येन भाननियमव्याघातात्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

एवमानागच्छन्तमपि पुरुषमधिकृत्य तथा प्रयोगात् तत्राऽयोग्यता-प्रसङ्गाच्च। एतेन तत्र पर्युदासनञ्वत् क्रियायोगपरित्याग इत्युक्तावपि न प्रतीकार:। न च तत्राऽऽगमनाभावकाल एव पुरुषान्वयी सहशब्दार्थ:, तथा च पुत्राऽऽगमनाभाव-कालावच्छिन्नपुरुषे वर्तमानकालावच्छिन्नाऽगमनकर्तृत्वाभाव: प्रतियते इति न काचिदनुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, यत्रास्य पुत्र आयाति न त्वयं तत्रापि तादृशप्रयोगात् तत्र च पुत्रागमनकालावच्छिन्नस्याऽऽगमनकर्तृत्वाभावस्य सत्त्वेपि पुत्रागमनाभावकालावच्छिन्नपुरुषे वर्तमानकालावच्छिन्नगमन-कर्तृत्वाभास्याऽसत्त्वेनाऽयोग्यतापातात्।

III 55. मैवम्-सहशब्दार्थस्तत्क्रियाकाल: क्वचित् तत्क्रियान्वयिनि प्रथमान्तपदार्थेऽन्वेति क्वचिच्च समभिव्याहृतक्रियायाम्। 'सपुत्र आगच्छति' इत्यस्य 'पुत्रेण सहागच्छति य:' इतिविग्रहात् प्रथमान्तान्यपदार्थे एव पुत्रागमनकालान्वयो न तु क्रियायामिति न समासानुपपत्ति:, न वाऽन्यपदार्थपुरुषाऽलाभ:।

न चैवं समासलभ्यस्य पुत्रागमनकालावच्छिन्नस्य पुंसो विग्रहवाक्येनापि प्रतिपादनाद् बहुव्रीहिमात्रस्यैव नित्यसमासत्वमिति भज्येतेति वाच्यम्, बहुब्रीहिमात्रस्य तथात्वाऽनियमात्। प्रथमान्तानुपस्थाप्याऽन्यपदार्थबोधकबहुव्रीहेरेव तत्त्वाभ्युपगमात्। अत्र चान्यपदार्थस्य पुरुषस्य प्रथमान्तोपस्थाप्यत्वात्। नच प्रथमार्थे बहुव्रीहिरेवाऽसाधुस्तदुक्तम्-" प्रथमार्थे न भावति-'वृष्टे देवे गत:' इति" इति वाच्यम्, "अनेकमन्यपदार्थे" इतिसूत्रानुशिष्टबहुव्रीहावेव तन्नियमात्, अत्र च सूत्रान्तरेणैव समासविधानात्, एतदर्थमेव तत्सूत्रप्रणयनात्। 'पुत्रेण सह नागच्छति' इत्यादौ च क्रियायामेव तादृशसहार्थान्वय इति पुत्रागमनकालीनागमनकर्तृत्वाद्यभाव: प्रथमान्तार्थे प्रतीयते इति सर्वं सुस्थम्, तथापि 'सपुत्रो नागच्छति' इत्यादौ पूर्वोक्तदिशानुपपत्तिर्द्रष्टव्या। भारमनुद्वहन्तं पुत्रमनुद्वहन्त्यामपि

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

गर्दभ्याम्-'सहैव दशभिः पुत्रैः' इत्यादौ 'वर्तमाना' इत्यध्याहाराद्वर्तमानत्वक्रियामादायैव साहित्यबोध इति वदन्ति।

III 56. ''इत्थंभूतलक्षणे'' इत्यनेन लक्षणवाचिपदात् तृतीयानुशिष्यते। लक्षणत्वं च व्यावर्तकत्वम्, तच्च विशेष्यतावच्छेदकसमानाधिकरणाभावाऽप्रतियोगित्वम्, तदाश्रयश्च धर्मो द्विविधः- विशेषणमुपलक्षणं च। विद्यमानं सद् व्यावर्तकं विशेषणम्- पुरुषादौ वर्तमानकालावच्छेदेन विद्यमानो दण्डादिः। अविद्यमानं सद्व्यावर्तकमुपलक्षणम्-तापसादेः कालान्तरीणजटादिकम्। विशेषणस्य संबन्धो मतुबादिभिः प्रत्याय्यते- अस्तीत्यर्थे विहितानां वर्तमानसंबन्धार्थकत्वात्, अतः 'जटाभिस्तापसः' इत्यादावऽविद्यमानत्वस्येव विद्यमानत्वस्यापि प्रत्यायनाद् विशेषणवाचिपदादपि तृतीया यथा- 'ज्ञायमानत्वेन लिङ्गं करणम्' इत्यादौ।

III 57. अथ तत्र ज्ञायमानत्वादिवैशिष्ट्यं तृतीयया लिङ्गादौ न प्रत्याय्यते अपि तु पदार्थैकदेशे करणत्वादावेव तदवच्छिन्नत्वमिति चेत्? तथापि सा विशेषणतृतीयैव अनुशासनान्तराभावात्। वस्तुतो लिङ्गादौ ज्ञायमानत्वादिवैशिष्ट्यबोधनेपि संबन्धविधया कारणत्वज्ञायमानत्वाद्योरवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावभानसंभवादेकदेशान्तरस्वीकारोऽनुचितः। न च संबन्धविधया करणत्वे एकदेशेऽवच्छिन्नत्वभानेप्येकदेशान्वयध्रौव्यमिति वाच्यम्, करणाभेदरूपे करणत्वे करणस्य संबन्धविधया भासमाने ज्ञायमानत्वावच्छिन्नत्वस्याऽवच्छेदकतया भानोपगमेनैकदेशान्वयं विनाप्यवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावभानात्।

III 58. अथ 'दण्डवानयमासीद् दण्डी गतवान्' इत्यादौ दण्डस्याऽतीततया विशेषणत्वासंभावाद् मतुबाद्यनुपपत्तिरिति चेत्? न' प्रकृतशब्दप्रयोगाधिकरणकालावच्छिन्नस्येव विधेयान्तरसमभिव्याहारस्थले तदधिकरणकालावच्छिन्नसंबन्धस्यापि मतुबादिना प्रत्यायनात् तत्राऽतीतकालिकसत्त्वादिरूपविधेयाधिकरणाऽतीता-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

दिकालावच्छिन्नसंबन्धस्यैव मतुबाद्यर्थत्वात्। अविद्यमानोपि दण्डादिर्धर्मान्तरसंबन्धसमानकालीनतया धर्मान्तरान्वयिनि विशेषणम् तत्प्रकारेण भासमाने धर्मान्तरान्वयबोधो विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यमित्युच्यते, न त्वसावऽन्वयिन्युपलक्षणम् न वा तादृशबोधस्तदुपलक्षितान्वयबोध इत्युच्यते।

III 59. क्वचिद्विधेयान्तरसमानकालीनमपि विशेषणं तदनन्वयितया तदन्वयिन्युपलक्षणमुच्यते यथा-' रूपवान् रसवान्' इत्यादौ रूपादिकं रसान्वयिनि, 'सास्नावान् गोपदवाच्य:' इत्यादौ सास्नादिकं गवादिपदवाच्ये। क्वचिद्धर्मिसंबद्धधर्मान्तरसंबन्ध्यपि धर्मो धर्मान्तरसंबन्धितानवच्छेदकतया धर्मान्तरसंबन्धिन्युपलक्षणम् अत: 'दण्डपुरुषौ' इत्यादिसमूहालम्बनबोधो दण्डाद्युपलक्षितपुरुषादिविषयको न तु विशिष्टविषयक इत्युच्यते। विशेष्यसंबद्धासंबन्ध्यपि तत्संबन्धितावच्छेदकतया तद्वति विशेषणम्, अत एव संज्ञाविशिष्टसंज्ञादिज्ञाने संज्ञादेर्विषयत्वमनङ्गीकुर्वतां प्राभाकराणां प्राचीननैयायिकानां च मते तटस्थज्ञानविषयतयैव विपयतावचछेदकत्वात् संज्ञादे: अप्रकारस्य ज्ञानविषयविशेषणत्वम्। अत एव द्वित्वनाशकालीनायाम् 'द्वे द्रव्ये' इतिबुद्धौ न द्वित्वविषयकत्वमपि तु द्वित्वविशिष्टविषयकत्वमेव-द्वित्वरूपविशेषणधीजन्यत्वादित्याचार्या:।

III 60. एवमप्रतियोगित्वाविशेषेपि घटसामान्याभावादिप्रतियोगिनि घटत्वादिकं विशेषणं नीलादिकमुपलक्षणमित्युच्यते। क्वचिच्च विद्यमानमप्यऽतद्व्यावृत्तिन्यूनाधिकवृत्तितया तत्र न विशेषणमित्युच्यते किं तूपलक्षणं यथा विद्यमानापि जटा तापसे उपलक्षणं न तूपलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकशमदमादिवद्विशेषणम्, इत्यलम् प्रस्तुतपरिभाषाविचारबाहुल्येन।

क्वचिदऽविशेषणस्यापि संबन्धो मत्वर्थीयेन बोध्यते 'घटोयं विनाशी' इत्यादिप्रयोगदर्शनादिति दीधितिकृत:, तदसत्-आवश्यकार्थधातूत्तरणिनिप्रत्ययेनापि तत्र विनाशिपदव्युत्पत्तेरिति।।

॥ इति तृतीया॥

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

अथ चतुर्थी

IV 1. 'ब्राह्मणाय गां ददाति' इत्यादौ संप्रदानचतुर्थ्या ब्राह्मणादिसंप्रदानकत्वं दानादौ बोध्यते। संप्रदानत्वं च मुख्यभाक्तसाधारणं क्रियाकर्मसंबन्धितया कर्त्रऽभिप्रेतत्वम्। क्रियाकर्मत्वं क्रियाजन्यफलशालित्वम्। तद्वता संबन्धश्च तन्निष्टफलभागित्वमेव, तथा च क्रियाजन्यफलभागितया कर्तुरिच्छाविषयत्वं पर्यवसन्नम्। "कर्मणा यमभिप्रैति" इतिसूत्रस्याप्ययमेवार्थः-"कमणा यमभिप्रैति" इत्यस्य 'कर्मणा यमऽभिसंबद्धुमिच्छति' इति शाब्दिकैर्विवरणात्। उक्तस्थले त्यागरूपक्रियाजन्यगोनिष्ठ- स्वत्वभागितया दातुरिच्छाविषयो ब्राह्मण इति तस्य संप्रदानत्वम्।

IV 2. अथ निरुक्तस्य संप्रदानत्वस्य कर्मत्वाऽविशेषः-"कर्तुरीप्सित" इति सूत्रेण कर्तुः क्रियया व्याप्तुमिष्टस्य कर्मसंज्ञाविधानात् क्रियया व्याप्तुमिष्टत्वमपि हि क्रियाजन्यफलभागितयेच्छाविषयत्वेमेव। न च "तथा युक्तं चानीप्सितम्" इत्यनेन क्रियाजन्यफलभागितयाऽनभिप्रेतस्यापि क्रियजन्यफलाश्रयस्य कर्मसंज्ञाविधानात् कर्मत्वं क्रियाजन्यफलशालित्वमेव न त्विच्छागर्भम् संप्रदानत्वं त्विच्छागर्भमतो भेद इति वाच्यम्, कर्मत्वस्येच्छयाऽघटितत्वे सूत्रभेदवैयर्थ्यापत्तेः।

IV 3. न च फलाश्रयत्वेनाऽनभिप्रेतस्यापि कर्मत्वे तत्साधारणक्रियाजन्यफलाश्रयतयेष्टस्यापि ग्रामादेः कर्मत्वोपपत्ताविच्छाघटिततसूत्रवैयर्थ्यं दूर्वारमेवेति वाच्यम्, इच्छाघटितस्य निरुक्तरूपस्य यत्र बाधस्तत्र कर्मप्रत्ययेन तादृशमपि रूपं बोध्यते इत्येतत्प्रतिपादनाय सूत्रद्वयप्रणयनात्। अत एव यत्रौदनस्य गलाधःसंयोगेच्छया यो व्यापारस्ततो विषादेरपि गलाधस्संयोगस्तत्र विषादौ क्रियाजन्यफलशालित्वाभावबाधेपि तेन रूपेणेच्छाविषयत्वाभावोऽबाधितस्तत्र 'विषमनेन न भुज्यते' इतिप्रयोगोपपत्तिः। इच्छाद्यऽघटितकर्मत्वतात्पर्येण च 'दैवाद्विषं भुज्यते' इति प्रयोगस्य चोपपत्तिः।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

न च धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकफलशालित्वेनोद्देश्यत्वं कर्मत्वं तदनवच्छेदकफलशालित्वेनोद्देश्यत्वं संप्रदानत्वमिति विशेषः, स्वस्वत्वध्वंसावच्छिन्नत्याग एव ददात्यर्थो न तु परस्त्वरूपफलावच्छिन्नोपीति वाच्यम्, उपेक्षाया अपि ददात्तेर्मुख्यार्थतापत्तेः।

IV 4. मैवम्-फलाश्रयतयेष्टत्वमेव हि कर्मत्वम् फलसंबन्धितयेष्टत्वं संप्रदानत्वम्, ब्राह्मणादिश्च न त्यागजन्यस्वत्वाश्रयतया दातुरिष्टः, अपि तु तन्निरूपकतयैवाऽतो न तस्य कर्मता।

न चाश्रयत्वमपि संबन्धविशेष इति गवादेरपि संप्रदानत्वं दुर्वारम्, आश्रयत्वेनाभिप्रायस्थले कर्मसंज्ञया बाधादन्य एव हि संबन्धः संप्रदानताघटक इति यद्युच्येत? तदा 'वृक्षायोदकमासिञ्चति' 'पत्ये शेते' इत्यादौ सेकजन्यजलसंयोग शयनजन्यप्रीत्याद्यश्रायतयाऽभिप्रेतस्य वृक्षपत्यादेः संप्रदानत्वशरीरे निवेशेन सामञ्जस्यात्। 'वृक्षायोदकमासिञ्चति' इत्यादौ द्रवद्रव्यक्रियानुकूलव्यापारो धात्वर्थः, संप्रदानतानिर्वाहकसंयोगश्च न तादृशधात्वर्थतावच्छेदक इति तदाश्रयत्वं निरुक्ताश्रयता-भिन्नमेवेति तत्प्रकारकाभिप्रायविषयवृक्षादेः संप्रदानतानिर्वाहात्।

IV 5. न च पत्ये शेते' इत्यादौ धात्वर्थतावच्छेदक-फलाऽप्रसिद्ध्या तदनुपपत्तिः- भेदप्रतियोगिप्रविष्टे धात्व-र्थतावच्छेदके फलत्वानिवेशेन प्रसिद्धिसंभावत्। एवं च 'ब्राह्मणाय गां ददाति' इत्यादौ ब्राह्मणनिरूपितत्वे-नेच्छाविषयगोनिष्ठस्वत्वजनकत्यागकर्तेति बोधः। निरूपितत्वेन कर्तुरिच्छाविषयत्वं द्वितीयान्तार्थगोवृत्तित्वान्वयिधात्वर्थतावच्छेद-कस्वत्वान्वायि चतुर्थ्यः, स्वत्वजनकत्यागश्च ददात्यर्थः।

IV 6. अत्र केचित्-ददातियोगे धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकस्वत्वनिरूपकत्वमेव संप्रदानत्वं तदेव मुख्यं तथा च तत्र निरूपितत्वमात्रं चतुर्थ्यर्थो धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकस्वत्वेऽन्वेति, अत एव ''श्राद्धस्य पित्रपेक्षया यागत्वमेव दानत्वं तु ब्राह्मणापेक्षया'' इति

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

शूलपाणिः। तत्र त्यज्यमानेऽन्ने पितृणां स्वत्वानुत्पत्त्या संप्रदानत्वासंभवात्। स्वत्वभागित्वेनोद्देश्यत्वं यदि संप्रदानत्वं स्यात्तदा पितृणामपि तथात्वाऽक्षतेः पित्रऽपेक्षयापि दानत्वं स्यात्, न हि श्राद्धे पितृणां स्वत्वभागित्वेन नोद्देश्यत्वम्- ''पितरेतत्तेऽन्नं स्वधा'' इत्यादिश्राद्धरूपत्यागाभिलापस्वधार्थे त्यागे चतुर्थ्याः स्वत्वभा- गित्वेन पित्रादेरूद्देश्यत्वबोधकत्वात्। स्वत्वभागित्वेनोद्देश्यभूतस्यापि पित्रादेः स्वीकाराभावान्न स्वत्वम्, ब्राह्मणानां तत्रानुद्देश्यत्वेपि स्वत्वं प्रतिपत्तितो जायते। अनुद्देश्यत्वेपि च संप्रदानत्वमुपपा- दितमेव। पितृणामिव ब्राह्मणानामपि च स्वत्वभागित्वेनोद्देश्य- त्वमप्यविरुद्धम्।

IV 7. धात्वर्थतानवच्छेदकफलभागितया यत्र संप्रदानत्वम् 'वृक्षायोदकं सिञ्चति' पत्ये शेते' इत्यादौ तत्रोद्देश्यत्वांशनिवेश आवश्यकः- यत्रान्योद्देशेन क्षिप्तजलस्य दैवाद् वृक्षसंयोगोऽन्योद्देशेन शयनादितश्च पत्यादेः फलसंबन्धस्तत्र तथाप्रयोगविरहात्। अत एव तत्र चतुर्थ्यर्थः स्वनिष्ठतया कर्त्रभिप्रेततत्फलं प्रति जनकत्वं तच्च सेकादिक्रियायामन्वेति, भाक्तं च तत्र संप्रदानत्वम्-उद्देश्यत्वागर्भसंप्रदानत्वे एव लाघवाच्छक्तेः, इतरत्र लक्षणाया अभ्युपगमात्। 'पितृभ्यो दद्यात्' इत्यादावनिर्धारि- तकर्तृकसंप्रदाने चतुर्थी तत्त्वं च तत्र त्यागजन्यस्वत्वभगि- तयोद्देश्यत्वमेव।

IV 8. अथ यत्र जनान्तरस्य वृक्षादिनिष्ठजलसंयोगादिरिच्छाविषयोऽन्येन च जनेनाऽन्योद्देशेन क्षिप्तज़लादेर्वृक्षादिसंयोगस्तत्रापि 'वृक्षायोदक मासिञ्चति जनः' इत्यादि-प्रयोगापत्तिः-तत्तद्व्यक्तित्वस्य पदेनानुपस्थानात् तेन रूपेण विशेष्यभूतकर्तृव्यक्तीनामिच्छांशे भानासंभवाद् उपस्थितजनत्वावच्छिन्नेच्छाविषयत्वस्य च वृक्षसंयोगादावऽबाधात्। एवं तदीयकालान्तरीणेच्छा- मादायाप्यतिप्रसङ्गतादवस्थ्यमिति चेत्? न, वृक्षादिनिष्टत्वेनेच्छैव हि चतुर्थ्यन्तार्थस्तस्याश्च स्वविषयसंयोगादिजनकत्वस्वजन्यत्वो-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

भसंबन्धेन सेकादिक्रियायामन्वयः, उक्तस्थले च यत्क्रियाव्यक्तया जलसंयोगादिर्वृक्षादौ जन्यते तत्र कालान्तरीणपुरुषान्तरीणेच्छायाः स्वविषयसंयोगादिजनकत्वसंबन्धसत्त्वेपि स्वजन्यत्वाभावान्नोभयसंबन्धेनेच्छावैशिष्ट्यमित्यऽयोग्यतैवेति वदन्ति।

IV 9. अत्रेदं बोध्यम्-उद्देश्यत्वाऽगर्भस्यैव त्यागजन्यस्वत्वभागित्वस्य ददातिसंप्रदानतारूपत्वे चैत्रमात्रोद्देशेन यद्दत्तं तत्र तादृशदानेन "दम्पत्योर्मध्यगं धनम्" इत्यतस्तत्पत्न्या अपि स्वत्वस्य प्रामाणिकतया संप्रदानत्वेन 'चैत्रपत्न्यै दत्तम्' इति व्यवहारापत्तेः। न च पत्युः स्वत्वमेव पत्नीस्वत्वं जनयति न तु तत्सामग्रीति वाच्यम्, स्वत्ववति स्वत्वान्तरानुत्पत्तेः, तथा च सर्वत्रैवोद्देश्यत्वान्तर्भावः। भवतु च "पितृभ्यो दद्यात्" इत्यात्रापि मुख्यमेव संप्रदानत्वं चतुर्थ्यर्थः।

IV 10. अस्तु वा स्वस्वत्वेच्छाधीनतत्कत्वमेव मुख्यं दानक्रियासंप्रदानत्वम् पितृस्वत्वाप्रसिद्ध्या न तेषां संप्रदानत्वम्। चतुर्थ्यर्थो धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकस्वत्वान्वयि निरूपितत्वम्, स्वत्वस्य च स्वस्वत्वध्वंसेच्छारूपे त्यागे स्वजनकत्वस्वेच्छाधीनत्वोभयं संबन्धः, तल्लाभश्च विशिष्टस्य धातुशक्यतामते शक्तित एव-तदन्तर्भावेनैव शक्त्युपगमात्। फलव्यापारयोः पृथग् धात्वर्थतामते आकाङ्क्षाबलादेव तादृशसंबन्धलाभः। "पितृभ्यो दद्यात्" इत्यत्र च धात्वर्थान्तर्गतस्वत्वे चतुर्थ्या पित्राद्यन्वयी निरूपितत्वरूपो मुख्योर्थो बाधितत्वान्न प्रत्याय्यते अपि तु निरूपितत्वेनेच्छाविषयत्वरूपो लक्ष्यार्थ एव, ददातिस्तु तत्र मुख्य एव-श्राद्धस्यापि ब्राह्मणापेक्षया दानत्वात्। "श्राद्धे ब्राह्मणस्य संप्रदानतानिर्वाहायाऽस्ति चोद्देश्यतापि ब्राह्मणस्य" इत्यादिकमभिदधानस्य शूलपाणेरपि संप्रदानत्वशरीरे उद्देश्यत्वांशपरित्यागे निर्भरोऽवगम्यते, "कर्मणा यमभिप्रैति" इति प्रणयतो महर्षेः पाणिनेरपि संमतोयमर्थः।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IV 11. ''शत्रवे भयं ददाति'' इत्यादौ जनयतीति भाक्तोर्थः एवं चोत्पादकव्यापाररूपे धात्वर्थे भयरूपं कर्म तद्योगितयोद्देश्य-त्वाच्छत्र्वादेः संप्रदानत्वम्। 'युद्धाय संनह्यते' इत्यादौ संनहनादिक्रियाजन्यफलाऽसंबन्धाद् युद्धादेर्न संप्रदानतानिर्वाह इति नेयं संप्रदानचतुर्थी अपि तु 'एधानाहर्तुं व्रजति' इत्यर्थे 'एधेभ्यो व्रजति' इत्यत्रेव 'युद्धं कर्तुं साद्धुं वा संनह्यते' इत्यर्थविवक्षया ''क्रयार्थोपपद'' इति सुत्रान्तरेण, तस्य च 'स्थानिनोऽश्रूयमाणस्य क्रियार्थोपपदस्य तुमुन्नन्तधातोः कर्मणि= स्वार्थनिष्ठकर्मत्वे विवक्षिते स्वोत्तरे चतुर्थी इत्यर्थस्तथा चाऽऽहरणकरणसहनाद्युद्देश्यकत्वं तादृशचतुर्थ्यर्थ इत्यवधेम्।

IV 12. अथ ''यदग्नये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोति'' इत्यादा-वग्न्यादेरिव ''सर्वभूतेभ्य उत्सृष्टं मयैतज्जलमूर्जितम्'' इत्यादौ सर्वप्राणिनामिव च ''पशुना रुद्रं यजते'' इत्यादावपि त्यागविशेषरूपक्रियायां रुद्रादेरनिराकर्तृसंप्रदानत्वं दुर्वारमिति तत्रापि चतुर्थी स्यादिति चेत्? न-गौरवितप्रीतिहेतुक्रिया यज्यर्थस्तदर्थतावच्छेदकफलं प्रीतिस्तदाश्रयतया रुद्रस्य विवक्षित्वात् कर्मसंज्ञकत्वेन द्वितीयैव न तु चतुर्थी, त्यागात्माकतादृशक्रियायां निरुक्ताऽनिराकर्तृसंप्रदानत्वे सत्यपि तदऽविवक्षणात्। प्रीतिभागितयोद्देश्यत्वरूपसंप्रदानत्वविवक्षायां च 'रुद्राय यजते' इत्यपि प्रयोगः। उभयविवक्षायां परत्वेन कर्मसंज्ञया बाधाद् द्वितीयैव। जुहोत्युत्सृजत्यादेः प्रीतिरूपफ-लावच्छिन्नत्यागाऽबोधकतया त्यागरूपक्रियाजन्य-प्रीतिभागिनो देवतादेस्तत्कर्मताविरहान्नैव 'प्रजापतिं जुहोति' 'भूतान्युत्सृजति' इत्यादयः प्रयोगाः।

IV 13. 'रजकस्य वस्त्रं ददाति' इत्यात्र ददातिर्न त्यागार्थकोऽपि तु परायत्तीकरणार्थको गौणः, तदायत्तीकरणं च प्रकृते तत्कर्तृकनिर्णेजनेच्छाप्रकाशको व्यापारः, तदेकदेशे कर्तृत्वे रजकस्य संबंन्धविवक्षायां शैषिकी षष्ठी।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'हन्तुः पृष्ठं ददाति' इत्यत्र तत्कर्तृकताडनानुमतिप्रकाशको व्यापार एव ददात्यर्थः, तदेकदेशे कर्तृत्वे हन्तुः संबन्ध-विवक्षायां षष्ठी। एवम् 'संवाहकस्य चरणं ददाति' इत्यादावूहनीयम्।

'नारदाय रोचते कलहः' इत्यादौ "रुच्यर्थानाम्" इत्यनुशासनेन प्रीतिजनकतारूपरुच्यर्थघटकप्रीतिभागिनः संप्रदानसंज्ञा विहिता, तत्र चतुर्थ्यर्थ आश्रितत्वं प्रीतावऽन्वेति तादृशक्रियाश्रयतया प्रीतिजनककलहादेः कर्तृता।

IV 14. पुष्पेभ्यः स्पृहयति' इत्यत्र स्पृहाविषयपुष्पस्य "स्पृहेरीप्सितः" इत्यानेन संप्रदानत्वाच्चतुर्थी, तदर्थो विषयित्वं तस्येच्छारूप-क्रियायामन्वयः।

'पुत्राय क्रुध्यति' इत्यत्र "क्रुधद्रुह" इत्यादिसूत्रेण कर्मणः संप्रदानसंज्ञा, तत्रापि चतुर्थ्यर्थो विषयित्वं कोपेऽन्वेति, क्रोधस्य द्वेषविशेषत्माकतया भक्तिश्रद्धादिवज्ज्ञानविशेषरूपत्वेन वा सविषयकत्वात्। एवम् 'शत्रवे द्रुह्यति' इत्यदावपि तनैव संप्रदानत्वम्, द्रोहोऽपचिकीर्षा अहितेच्छेति यावत्, अहित-भागितया येच्छाविषयता तन्निरूपकत्वं चतुर्थ्यर्थ इच्छान्वयी, अहितान्वय्याधेयत्वं वा, अतः "कर्मणा" इत्यादिसूत्र-स्याविषयः। ईर्ष्या=अक्षान्तिः परोत्कर्षाऽसहिष्णुता परोत्कर्षगोचरो द्वेष इति यावत् तद्विषयस्य परस्य तेनैव संप्रदानता। असूया=गुणिनि दोषाविष्करणं तद्विषयस्याप्यनेन संप्रदानता, विषयताविशेषस्तत्र चतुर्थ्यर्थः।

IV 15. 'विप्राय शतं धारयति 'इत्यादौ "धारेरुत्तमर्णः" इत्यनेन धनिकविप्रादेः संप्रदानता।

अथ कोयं धार्यर्थः? न तावद् द्रव्यान्तरदानमङ्गीकृत्य परदत्तद्रव्यादानम् तथा सत्यादानात् परतः 'धारयति' इति प्रयोगानुपपत्तेः- आदानस्याऽवर्तमानत्वात्। न चेष्टापत्तिः

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

आविशोधनं तथा प्रयोगात्। नापि तादृशादानध्वंसः- अधमर्णस्य तदकर्तृत्वात्। न चादानमिच्छाविशेषस्तद्वतः पुंसस्तदाश्रयतया तत्कर्तृत्ववत् तद्ध्वंसाश्रयतया तत्कर्तृत्व-मप्यक्षतमिति वाच्यम्, एवमप्यादानध्वंसस्य परिशोधनोत्तरमपि सत्त्वेन तदानीमपि 'धारयति' इति प्रयोगापत्तेः।

IV 16. न च परिशोधनप्रागभावविशिष्टो निरुक्तादानध्वंसस्तथा-ऋणीकृतद्रव्यान्तरपरिशोधनप्रागभावदशायां परिशुद्धमृणमादाय 'धारयति' इति प्रयोगापत्तेः। न च स्वप्रतियोगिनिर्वाह-काङ्गीकारविषयद्रव्यदानप्रागभावविशिष्टादानध्वंसस्तथा-यद् ऋणं परिशोधितं तावद् द्रव्यं च पुनर्गृहीत्वा पुनः परिशोधनीयं तदादाय 'धारयति' इति व्यवहारापत्तेः, उदीच्यपरिशोधनस्यापि स्वकर्तव्यतया पूर्वाभ्युपगमविषयत्वात् तत्प्रागभावस्य पूर्वरिगृहीत-परिशोधनोत्त रमपि सत्त्वात्।

IV 17. न च स्वप्रतियोग्यादाननिर्वाहकाभ्युपगमविषयीभूतं यद् द्रव्यदानमेकक्षणावच्छिन्नैकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वसंबन्धेन तद्विशिष्टान्य-प्रागभावविष्टादानध्वसस्तथा उक्तस्थले चोदीच्य परिशोधानप्रागभावः प्रथमादानप्रयोजकाभ्युपगमविषयप्रथमपरिशोधनविशिष्टः प्रथमपरिशोधनप्रागभावश्च प्रथमपरिशोधनोत्तरं नास्त्येवेति नोक्तातिप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्, एवमपि यस्य ऋणस्य परिशोधनमप्रसिद्धं तदादानपूर्वकालीनस्य 'एतावद् द्रव्यं मया तुभ्यं देयम्' इत्यभ्युपगमस्य तदुत्तमर्णोद्देश्यकत्वेन स्वकर्तृ-कान्याद्देश्यकतावदद्रव्यदानमेव विषय इत्युपेयम्, तदुत्तमर्णोद्देश्य कतत्कर्तृकतावदद्रव्यदानस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात् तथा चान्योद्देश्यक-तत्कर्तृकतावदद्रव्यादानोत्तरं तदभ्युपगमविषयद्रव्यदानविशिष्टान्यप्राग भावासत्त्वात् 'धारयति' इति व्यावहारानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्?

IV 18. अत्राहुः-ऋणग्रहणेनाधमर्णनिष्ठः परिशोधननाश्योऽदृष्टविशेषो जन्यते तेनैवाऽदृष्टेन ऋणमपरिशोध्य मृतस्य नरकादिकमुत्पद्यते तथा च द्रव्यान्तरदानाभ्युपगमपूर्वकपरदत्तद्रव्यादानजन्याऽदृष्टविशेषवत्त्वमेव

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

धारयतेरर्थः, तद्घटकदानान्वयी कर्तृत्वं तत्र चतुर्थ्यर्थः। न च ऋणापरिशोधनमेव दुरहष्टजनकम्, उपपातकमध्ये तस्य परिगणनात् न तु ऋणाऽऽदानम्तस्य तथात्वे मानाभावादिति वाच्यम्, ऋणादानस्य दुरदृष्टविशेषजनकत्वेपि परिशोधनेन तस्य नाश इति बोधनायाऽपरिशोधनस्य नरकरूपफलोपधानप्रयोजकत्वाभिप्रायेण तस्योपपातकमध्ये परिगणनोपपत्तेः। ऋणमादायापरिशोधकस्य नरकभागितया ऋणादानस्यैव दुरदृष्टसाधनतायाः कल्पनीयत्वात्, गृहीतर्णापरिशोधनापेक्षया लघुत्वात्। अपरिशोधनस्य हेतुत्वे परिशोधनपूर्वकालेप्यऽपरिशोधनसत्त्वेन दुरदृष्टोत्पत्तेरावश्यकतया परिशोधनस्य तन्नाशकताया आवश्यकतयाऽस्माकं तत्कल्पनाधिक्यविरहात्। परिशोधनोत्तरकालं परिशोधनाभावसत्त्वेन तद्बलात् तदुत्तरं दुरदृष्टवारणाय परिशोधनध्वंसस्य प्रतिबन्धकतायाः कल्पनीयतया भवन्मते गौरवाच्च।

न च परिशोधनानुत्तरमरणमेव पापजनकं वाच्यं तथा च नोक्तातिप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्, गृहीतद्रव्यमपरिशोध्य मरणस्थले तद्द्रव्यपरिशोधनाप्रसिद्ध्या तदनुत्तरत्वादिघटितरूपेण हेतुतयाः कल्पयितुमशक्यत्वादित्यलम्।

IV 19. यूपाय दारु इत्यदौ न संप्रदानचतुर्थो अपि तु तादर्थ्ये सूत्रान्तरेण सा, तादर्थ्यं च स एवार्थः=प्रयोजनं यस्य तत्त्वम्। 'समभिव्याहृतपदार्थे तादर्थ्यविवक्षायां तद्वाचकपदाच्चतुर्थी' इति तत्सूत्रार्थः। प्रयोजनत्वं चात्र न जन्यत्वम्-दुःखादेः पापादिजन्यतया दुःखाय पापम्' इत्यादिप्रयोगापत्तेः। नापि जन्यतयेच्छाविषयत्वम्-स्वर्गादेः पुण्यादिजन्यत्वेनेच्छाविषयत्वात् 'स्वर्गीय पुण्यम्' इत्याद्यापत्तेः, न चेष्टापत्तिः-तथा सति 'पक्तुं व्रजति' इत्यर्थे 'पाकाय व्रजति' इति निर्वाहाय ''तुमर्थाच्च भाववचनात्'' इति सूत्रप्रणयनवैयर्थ्यात्पाकादेर्निरुक्तव्रजनाद्यर्थतयैव तद्वाचकपदाच्चतुर्थ्युपपत्तेः। अपि तु समभिव्याहृत-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

पदार्थनिष्ठव्यापारेच्छानुकूलेच्छाविषयत्वं तत्प्रयोजनत्वम्, तत्प्रयोजनकत्वरूपतादर्थ्ये च तदिच्छाधीनेच्छाविषय-व्यापाराश्रयत्वम्, दारुणो यूपेच्छाधीनेच्छाधीविषय-तक्षणादिरूपव्यापारवत्तया यूपार्थत्वमिति तद्विवक्षया यूपपदाच्चतुर्थी इच्छाधीनेच्छाविषयव्यापाराश्रयत्वं चतुर्थ्यर्थः, प्रथमेच्छयां यूपादेः प्रकृत्यर्थस्य विषयतयान्वयः। एवम्ः रन्धनाय स्थाली इत्यादावूह्यम् तत्र तादृश व्यापार-स्तण्डुलधारणादिः।

IV 20. पुण्यादेः स्वर्गेच्छाधीनेच्छाविषयव्यापारानाश्रयतया न 'स्वर्गाय पुण्यम्' इत्यादिप्रयोगः। व्रजनादेः पाकानुकूलव्यापारानाश्रयतया न 'पाकाय व्रजाति' इत्यादावनेन चतुर्थीति "तुमर्थाच्च" इत्यादिसूत्रम्, तदर्थश्च-'तुमुन्तयद्धातुना यादृशोर्थः प्रत्याय्यते समभिव्याहृतक्रियान्विततदर्थपरात् तद्धातुघटिभावकृदान्ताच्चतुर्थी' इति। 'पक्तुं व्रजति' इत्यत्र तुमुन्नन्तेन व्रजने पाकसमानकर्तृ-कत्वसहितपाकविषयकेच्छाधीनेच्छाविषयत्चं बोध्यते- "तुमुन्ण्वुलौ" इति सूत्रेण समभिव्याहृतक्रियायां प्रकृतक्रिया-समानकर्तृकत्वसहिततदिच्छाधीनेच्छाविषयत्वरूपतदर्थकत्वेन विवक्षितायां तुमुन्ण्बुलोर्विधानात्। एतत्सूत्रस्यापि स्वर्गाय पूण्यम्' इत्यादिर्न विषय इति सोऽसाधुरेव।

IV 21. एधानाहर्तुं व्रजति' इत्यर्थे 'एधेभ्यो व्रजति' इत्यत्रैधस्य न व्रजनप्रयोजनत्वम्-सिद्धतया व्रजनेच्छानुकूलेच्छाया अविषयत्वात् व्रजनस्य तदनुकूलव्यापारानाश्रयत्वोच्चेति न तादर्थ्ये इति सूत्रस्य प्रवृत्तिर्नापि "तुमर्थात्" इत्यादेः-एधपदस्य क्रियारूप-भाववचनत्वाभावादिति तत्र "क्रियार्थोपपदस्य" इति चतुर्थी। तदर्थश्च- 'क्रियार्थोपपदस्तुमुन्नन्तो यो धातुरप्रयुक्तस्य तस्य यत्कर्म=तत्प्रयोगं विना तदर्थकर्मतया यद्विवक्षितं तद्वाचकपदाच्चतुर्थी' इति तत्र च 'आहर्तुम्' इतितुमुन्नन्तार्थः समभिव्याहृतक्रियान्वयिस्वार्थकर्मत्वान्वय्याहरणं तादृशार्थ-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

कर्मतयैधस्य विवक्षितत्वात्तत्र चतुर्थी, चतुर्थ्या एवार्थः- तत्कर्मकाहरणप्रयोजनकत्वम्।

'पाकाय व्रजति' इत्यादौ 'पाकं कर्तुम्' इत्यर्थविवक्षायामनेनैव सूत्रेण चतुर्थ्युपपत्तावपि यदा पाककृतीच्छाधीनेच्छाविषयत्वरूपं पाककर्मककरणप्रयोजनकत्वं न व्रजनस्य विवक्षितमऽपि तु पाकेच्छाधीनेच्छाविषयत्वरूपं पाकार्थकत्वमेव तत्रापि चतुर्थ्यु- पपत्तये 'तुमर्थात्' इतिसूत्रम्।

IV 22. अश्वाय घासः' इत्यादावश्वपदस्याऽश्वभोजनपरतया तादर्थ्यचतुर्थ्येव। 'आह्रियते' इत्यस्याध्याहारेण 'अश्वं भोजयितुमाह्रियते' इत्यर्थविवक्षया "क्रियार्थोपपद" इत्यादिसूत्रेण चतुर्थ्युप- पत्त्याऽश्वपदस्य मुख्यार्थपरत्वोपपादनेपि 'अश्वघासः' इत्यत्राश्वपदस्य तद्भोजनपरतायास्तादर्थ्यचतुर्थ्याश्चावश्यकता, अन्यथाऽऽहृतपद-सापेक्षतया चतुर्थीसमासानुपपत्तेः। न च तथापि समासानुपपत्तिः-'रन्धनाय स्थाली' इत्यादौ तद्वारणाय "चतुर्थीतदर्थार्थ" इतिसूत्रेण चतुर्थीसमासे प्रकृतिविकारभावस्य नियामकत्वानुसरणादिति वाच्यम् आवास गृहाऽश्वघासादौ चतुर्थीति योगविभागेन शाब्दिकैः समासोपपादनात्।

IV 23. नमःस्वस्त्यादिशब्दयोगेपि तदर्थविशेषवाचकपदात् "नमःस्वस्ति" इत्यादिसूत्रेण चतुर्थ्यनुशिष्यते। नमःशब्दार्थस्त्यागो नमस्कारश्च 'एषोऽर्घ्यः शिवाय नमः' इत्यादौ त्यागार्थको नमःशब्दः, चतुर्थ्या च तत्र प्रकृत्यर्थस्य शिवादेरुद्देश्यत्वं प्रत्याय्यते त्यागश्च यदि 'शिवस्यायं भवतु' इत्यादिफलेच्छाधीनस्वस्वत्वा- भावेच्छारूपस्तदा त्यागोद्देश्यत्वं त्यागजनकेच्छायाः स्वत्वभागिता विषयत्वम्। यदि च त्यागरूपेच्छैव स्वस्वत्वाभाव- मिवान्यदीयत्वेन त्यज्यमानगतं स्वत्वमपि तत्र विषयीकरोति न तु तज्जनकेच्छा तदा स्वत्वभागितया त्यागविषयत्वमेव तदुद्देश्यत्वम्। शिवादेर्विग्रहवत्त्वेपि स्वीकाराभावात् तदाकारतया ध्यातमन्त्रस्य त्यागोद्देश्यतामते तदभावाच्च, त्याज्यमानोपचारादौ

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

स्वत्वाभावेपि तदीयत्वेन तत्तद्द्रव्ये स्वत्वावगाहिनीच्छा विसंवादिरूपैव-द्रव्यनिष्ठेऽन्यदीयस्वत्वे बाधितं शिवादि-निरूपितत्वं शिवादिनिरूपितप्रसिद्धस्वत्वान्तरे वा बाधितं तत्तद्द्रव्यसंबन्धमवगाहते।

IV 24. न च स्वत्वान्तररूपफलेच्छां विना स्वस्वत्वाभावगोचरेच्छैव न संभवतीति 'शिवादिस्वत्वं त्यागस्यैव विषयः' इतिपक्षोऽसंभवदुक्तिक इति वाच्यम्, स्वस्वत्वाभाव-विषयकेच्छायाः पुण्यादिरूपफलजनकत्वात् तद्विषयस्य पुण्यादिजनकतावच्छेदकस्यापि पुण्यादिफलकत्वात्, अन्यथा तत्स्वत्वस्यापीष्टान्तराऽजनकतया स्वतोऽपुरुषार्थतया च प्रथममपि तदिच्छाया असंभवेन प्रथमकल्पस्यापि हेयत्वापातात्। तत्र च प्रथमकल्पे स्वत्वप्रकारकेच्छाजन्यत्वं, जन्यतासंबन्धेन त्यागान्वयिनी तादृशेच्छैव वा चतुर्थ्यर्थस्तत्र प्रकृत्यर्थस्य शिवादेर्विषयिताविशेषसंबन्धेनान्वयः। द्वितीयकल्पे च विषयिताविशेष एव चतुर्थ्यर्थस्तत्र च निरूपितत्वसंबन्धेन शिवादेरन्वयः, नमःपदार्थत्यागस्य च विषयताविशेषसंबन्धेन द्रव्येऽन्वयः, द्रव्यस्यैव वा विशेष्यतया भासमानत्यागे विषयिताविशेषसंबन्धेनान्वयः।

IV 25. न च प्रथमान्तपदार्थस्य मुख्यविशेष्यतानियमः-'भूतले न घटः' इत्यादौ निपातार्थस्यापि मुख्यविशेष्यतया भानात्। 'शिवायोत्सृजति' इत्यादाविव नात्राऽनिराकर्तृसंप्रदानता-त्यागपदार्थस्य क्रियात्वाभावात्।

नमःपदेन च स्वप्रयोक्तृपुरुषकर्तृकत्वोपरागेणैव त्यागोऽभिधीयते-अन्योच्चरितनमः पदेनाऽन्यदीयत्यागाबोधनात्। तत्पुरुषोच्चरित-नमःपदात् त्यागबोधे सति त्यागे त्यज्यमाने द्रव्ये वान्यदी-यत्वसंशयानुदयात्, अत एव त्यागे तदीयत्वबोधनाय 'अहं ददे' इत्यादिवत् 'अहं नमः' इति न प्रयुज्यते, न वा परकीयत्वबोधनाय 'चैत्रो नमः' इत्यादि। ऋत्विजा च

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

यजमानरूपपुरुषान्तरीयतत्तद्द्रव्यत्यागे स्वीयत्वमारोप्यैव पूजायां नमःपदं प्रयुज्यते, स चारोपस्तस्य विशेषदर्शनदशाया-मप्याहार्यतयोपपद्यते इति प्रतिनिधिप्रयुक्तस्य दानवाक्यस्येव पूजायां तादृशनमःपदघटितवाक्यस्य बाधितार्थत्वेप्यदृष्टजनकत्वं न विरुद्धम्।

IV26. अस्मच्छब्दादिवत्-स्वोच्चारणकर्तृत्वोपलक्षितपुरुषविशिष्ट-वाचकान्नमःपदाद् विशेषरूपेण पुरुषभानम्। अशक्यस्य चेत्रत्वादेर्भानासंभवे तस्यापि वाच्येऽन्तर्भावः स्वीकरणीयः। तदनुगमकं चोपलक्षणीभूतमेककालीनोभयावृत्त्युच्चारयितृशरीर जातित्वम्, स्वत्वाननुगमेपि शक्तयैक्यं कथंचिदुपपादनीयं सर्वनामशक्तयैक्यवत्।

उपलक्षणरूपप्रविष्टमुच्चारणं वेदीयत्वेन विशेषणीयम् अतः पूजाभिन्नयादृच्छिकान्नत्यागबोधनाय 'अन्नं नमः' इति न प्रयोगः। योग्यतासत्त्वेपि तत्र नमः पदप्रयोगस्य वेदाबोधितित्वेन तद्घटिततत्पदशक्यपुरुषोपलक्षणरूपाऽप्रसिद्ध्याऽवाचकत्वात्। अत एव यथा नीचप्रीतिहेतुक्रियास्थले 'पूजयति' इत्यादि प्रयोगवारणाय पूजयतीत्यादिवाच्यप्रीतौ गौरवितवृत्तित्वं स्वसमभिव्याहृतकर्तृपुरुषाऽवधिकोत्कर्षवद्वृत्तित्वरूप मुपलक्षणमुपेयते उक्तस्थले च योग्यतासत्त्वेपि नीचवृत्तिप्रीतेः स्वसमभिव्याहृतकर्त्रऽवधिकोत्कर्षवद्वृत्तित्वरूपोपल-क्षणाऽनाक्रान्तत्वेन, तथा तत्प्रीतिहेतुक्रियावाचकत्वविरहेण तत्तात्पर्येण पूजयति इत्यादिर्न प्रयोगः तथा नीचो द्देश्यकत्यागतात्पर्येण नमः पदाप्रयोगात् तदतिप्रसङ्गवारणाय गौरवितोद्देश्यकत्यागे एव नमः पदशक्तिरित्यानादेयम्-गौरवितोद्देश्यकत्वस्य नमःपदार्थशरीरे निवेशेपि गौरवितोद्देश्य-कपूजातिरिक्तद्रव्यत्यागबोधवारणाय नमःपदप्रयोगवार-णायोक्तविशेषणस्योच्चारणेऽवश्यं निवेशनीयतया तत एव तदतिप्रसङ्गवारणात्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IV 27. इन्द्राय स्वाहा' तुभ्यं स्वधा' इत्यादावग्निप्रक्षेपोपहितदेवोद्देश्य-कत्यागबोधकस्वाहापदपित्रुद्देश्यकत्यागबोधकस्वधापदयोरपि नमःपदवद् देशनादेशितोच्चरणकर्तृत्वोपलक्षितपुरुषीयत्याग-वाचकता, अन्यथा पूर्ववदेवातिप्रसङ्गः। एवं च देवोद्देश्य-कत्वादेरपि न वाच्यान्तर्भावः, अतादृशत्यागतात्पर्येण स्वाहा-दिप्रयोगस्य देशनादेशितत्वविरहेणैवाऽनतिप्रसङ्गात् अत एव तान्त्रिकपूजायामर्घ्याचमनीयादिदानेऽग्निप्रक्षेपोपहितत्वपित्रुद्देश्य कत्वविरहेपि स्वाहास्वधाप्रयोगस्य नाऽसमवेतार्थता एवं च सति नमःस्वाहास्वधाशब्दानामेकस्थानेऽन्यप्रयोगस्यापि वेदबोधि-तत्वाभावेनैव नातिप्रसङ्गः।

IV 28. नतिरूपो नमःपदार्थश्च स्वापकर्षबोधानुकूलः स्वीयव्यापारः, चतुर्थ्या चापकर्षान्वय्यऽवधित्वमऽवधिमत्त्वं वा प्रत्याय्यते स्वमुच्चारयिता तथा च चैत्राद्युच्चारितात् नमो हरये इत्यादिशब्दाद्धर्यवधिकचैत्रापकर्षबोधानुकूलश्चैत्रीयव्यापार इत्याकारको बोधः। 'नारायणं नमस्कृत्य' इत्यादौ नमः शब्दयोगेपि न चतुर्थी द्वितीयया कारकविभक्तित्वेन बलीयस्या बाधात्।

अथात्र नारायणादेर्नमस्कारघटकापकर्षावधित्वमेव, तच्च न कर्मत्वं, कर्मत्वं च क्रियाजन्यफलशलित्वादिरूपमेव तच्चन तस्येति द्वितीयाया नायं विषयः। न चापकर्षबोधरूप-फलाश्रयत्वरूपकर्मत्वं तत्राबाधितमेवेति तद्विवक्षयैव द्वितीयोपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, एवं सति नारायणावधिकाऽपकर्ष-बोधकदण्डवत्प्रणिपातादिलिङ्गकतादृशापकर्षबोधाश्रयतायाः पुरुषान्तरसाधारणतया नारायणप्रणामदशायाम् 'मनुष्यं नमस्करोति' इत्यादिप्रयोगापत्तिः। यदि चापकर्षावधित्व-प्रकारकबोधानुकूलव्यापारो नमस्कारस्तद्घटकबोधविशेष्यतया नारायणादेः कर्मत्वं, क्रियाजन्यफलशालित्वरूपे कर्मत्वे च व्यापारांशेऽनुकूलतासंबन्धेन विशेषणीभूतं फलमेव विवक्षणी-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

यमऽत्र चानुकूलत्वमेव व्यापारांशे विशेषणमित्यपकर्षावधित्वबोद्धुः पुरुषान्तरस्य न कर्मतेत्युच्यते? तदापि 'नारायणं प्रणम्य' इत्यादावेव कर्मत्वमुपपद्यते न तु 'नारायणं नमस्कृत्य' इत्यादौ–नमःपदार्थघटकज्ञानस्य धात्वर्थताविरहेण तद्विषयतायाः कर्मतानात्मकत्वात् कृतिविषयतायाश्च नमःपदार्थव्यापारे एव सत्त्वात्।

IV 29. मैवम्–'नमस्करोति' इत्यादौ कृधातुनैव व्यापारबोधात्, अत्र च स्वापकर्षावधित्वप्रकारकबोधविषयतामात्रं निपातार्थः, अत्र स्वं समभिव्याहृतः कर्ता तथा च तादृशबोधविषयताप्रयोजकव्यापारानुकूलकृतिमानिति समुदायाधीनो बोधः, तादृशविषयताश्रयतया नारायणादेः कर्मत्वम्–यतः 'धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकफलशालित्वं कर्मत्वम्' इत्यत्र धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकत्वं न धातुशक्यतावच्छेदकत्वम् अपि तु व्यापाररूपार्थेऽनुकूलतासंबन्धेन विशेपणतया धातुप्रतिपाद्यत्वम्। प्रकृते च निपातार्थस्य धात्वर्थे साक्षादन्वयेन तादृशबोधविषयत्वरूपस्य नमः पदार्थस्य धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकत्वमक्षतमेव।

IV 30. न चैवं पूर्वदेशादेर्गम्यादिकर्मत्वं दुर्वारम्, विभागादौ क्रियाजन्यत्वसत्त्वेपि निरुक्ताधात्वर्थतावच्छेदकत्वाभावत्, न हि विभागदिर्गम्याद्यर्थे कथमपि विशेषणतया भासते। एवं च नारायणादेः करोतिकर्मत्वेपि नमःपदादिकं विना न तद्योगे नारायणादिपदोत्तरं द्वितीया–तदर्थान्वयिफलोपस्थापकाभावेन तदर्थानन्वयात्। नापि 'नाराणं फलं करोति' इति प्रयोगापत्तिः–फलस्यात्र धात्वर्थव्यापारे साक्षादविशेषणत्वात् निपातातिरिक्तनामार्थस्य धात्वर्थे भेदेनान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात् धात्वर्थे साक्षाद्विशेषणीभवत्येव फले द्वितीयार्थाधेयत्वान्वयात्, अत एव 'पुरस्कृत्य शिखण्डिनम्' इयादावपि शिखण्ड्यादेः कृतिकर्मताधात्वर्थव्यापारविशेषणपुरःपदरूपनिपातार्थाग्रदेशावस्थानरूप फलाश्रयत्वात्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IV 31. 'नारायणो नमस्क्रियते' 'ज्यायान् पुरस्क्रियते' इत्यादौ निपातार्थफलं धत्वर्थव्यापारे विशेष्यतयैव भासते। तदन्वितमाश्रयत्वं कर्माख्यातादिना प्रत्याय्यते।

अथैवमपि कारकविभक्तेः साक्षाद्धात्वर्थान्वयित्वनियमभङ्ग इति चेत्? न, तादृशनियमे निपातातिरिक्तार्थमन्ताराऽकृत्वेत्यस्यैव साक्षादर्थत्वात्। अन्यथा 'घटो दण्डाज्जायते न पारिमाण्डल्यात्- इत्यादौ कारकपञ्चम्या जान्याद्यन्वयिनि नञर्थाभावे प्रतियोगितया स्वार्थप्रयोज्यत्वादिबोधनासंभावत्। पारिमाण्डल्यादिनिरूपितमपि प्रयोज्यत्वं विषयितया तदवच्छिन्नजनकताकज्ञानादौ प्रसिद्धम्। प्रयोज्यत्वविशिष्टोत्पत्तिरेव वा तत्र धात्वर्थः, तत्र पञ्चम्यन्तार्थ- पारिमाण्डल्यनिरूपितत्वस्याभावो नञा बोध्यते। उक्तरीत्या क्रियायोगेन नमस्कार्यस्य कर्मत्वेपि 'स्वयम्भुवे नमस्कृत्य' इत्यादौ चतुर्थी-अपकर्षावधित्वमात्रविवक्षया।

IV 32. केचित्तु नारायणं नमस्कृत्य इत्यादौ नमः पदं नतिकर्मपरं तथा च नारायणं नतिकर्मीकृत्य' इत्यर्थविवक्षया 'घटं शुल्कं करोति शुक्लीकरोति' इत्यादौ घटादेरिव नारायणादेः कृतिकर्मता। 'शिखण्डिनं पुरस्कृत्य' इत्यादौ पुरःपदमग्रस्थित- परम्, एवम् 'घटं साक्षात्करोति' इत्यादौ साक्षात्पदं स्वीयप्रत्यक्षविषयपरं न तु धर्मपरम्। एवम् 'दुःखमाविष्करोति' 'अस्त्रं प्रादुष्कारोति' इत्यादावप्याऽऽविरादिपदं ज्ञानगोचरार्थकमिति सर्वत्र पूर्ववद् द्वितीयानिर्वाह इत्याहुः।

IV 33. तन्न-नमःपदस्य धर्मिबोधकत्वे 'हरिराविर्भवति' इत्यादिवत् 'नमोभवति इतिप्रयोगप्रसङ्गात्, तस्मात् 'नमस्करोति' 'आविष्करोति' 'पुरस्करोति' 'अलंकारोति' इत्यादौ नमःप्रभृतयो निपाता धर्मवाचका एव लाघवात्, तत्तद्धर्माश्रयस्य दर्शितरीत्यैव कर्मतोपपत्तेः। 'आविर्भवति' इत्यादिप्रयोगानुरोधेन चाऽऽविरादिशब्दानां प्रकटताश्रये धर्मिणि लक्षणोपेयते 'शुक्लः

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

पटः' इत्यादौ शुक्लादिशब्दानामिव। अस्तु वा तत्रापि प्रकटनारूपो धर्म एव तदर्थस्तस्यैव धात्वर्थभावे धर्मरूपेऽभेदान्वयः, क्रियायां स्वार्थभेदान्वये आविरादेरेवाकाङ्क्षा स्वीक्रिययते न तु नमःपदादेरिति न 'नारायणो नमो भवति' इत्यादेः प्रसङ्गः।

'शुक्ली करोति' इत्यादौ च्विप्रत्यायान्तस्यापि शौक्ल्यादिधर्म एवार्थः–अभूततद्भावे तदनुशासनात्। अभूततद्भावश्च–अभूतस्य= पूर्वकालावच्छेदेन शुक्लादिभावरहितस्य तद्भावः=शौल्क्यादिः। अस्तु वा 'अभूतः=पूर्वकालावच्छेदेन धर्मिण्यविद्यमानस्तद्भावः= शौल्क्यादिः। 'शुल्की भवति' इत्यादौ तु दर्शिता गतिः।

IV 34. न चाऽभूततद्भावपर्यन्तस्य च्विप्रत्ययवाच्यत्वे गौरवाच्छुल्कादिपदोपस्थाप्य पदार्थतावच्छेदकशौक्ल्याद्यन्वय्यऽभूतत्वमेव च्विप्रत्यायार्थोस्तु, 'शुक्लतरः' इत्यादौ तरबाद्यर्थोत्कर्षस्येव च्व्यर्थस्यापि व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्येण पदार्थतावच्छेदकेऽन्वयसंभवादिति वाच्यम्, मन्मतेपि शौक्ल्यादिभावस्यैव च्विप्रत्ययार्थतोपगमैन गौरवानवाकाशात्, पूर्वकालावच्छिन्नस्वनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वसहितस्याऽऽधेयत्वस्य प्रत्ययार्थे प्रकृत्यर्थसंबन्धतया भानोपगमात् शौक्ल्यादावभूतत्वलाभेनैव 'जलपरमाणुः शुल्की भवति' इतिप्रयोगाऽप्रसङ्गात्। शौक्लायादेर्धर्मत्वेनैव वाच्यता न तुताद्रूप्येणेति न शत्तयानन्त्यम्। प्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकतत्तद्धर्मनिष्ठाधेयताविशेषाणामेव संबन्धतया भानोपगमाद् धर्मान्तरस्याऽभूतत्वमादाय न 'जलपरमाणुः शुक्ली भवति' इत्यादिप्रसङ्गः।

IV 35. प्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकगतप्रागविद्यमानत्वस्य च्विप्रत्यायार्थत्वमते तु 'अशुक्ली भवति' इत्यादौ प्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकशौक्ल्याद्यऽभावस्य प्रागपि क्वचिद् विद्यमानतया च्व्भावान्वये योग्यतानुपपत्तिः। तत्तद्धर्मिण्यऽविद्यमानत्वस्य च्वयर्थत्वे शत्तयानन्त्यमिति पूर्वकालावाच्छिन्नोऽभाव एवाविद्यमानत्वं तस्य च प्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदके सामानाधिकरण्यसहितप्रतियोगित्व-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

संबन्धेनाऽन्वयो वाच्यः, प्रकृत्यर्थे च तादृशसंबन्धेनाभाव-विशिष्टस्य वैशिष्ट्यभानमुपेयम्, अन्यथाऽन्यत्र स्वाभावसमानाधिकरणस्याऽशौक्ल्यादेः सर्वदाऽशुक्ले काकादावपि सत्त्वेन 'काकोऽशुक्लीभवति इति प्रयोगः स्यात्, अत्राऽभावरूप-पदार्थान्तरविशिष्टप्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकवैशिष्यभानं च प्रकृत्यर्थे न संभवतिप्रकृत्या स्ववृत्तिसहकारेण स्वार्थे यादृशविशेषणावच्छिन्नः प्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छदकीयसंबन्धो न प्रत्याय्यते पदान्तर समभिव्याहाररूपाकाङ्क्षयापि पदार्थद्वयसंबन्धभानमात्रप्रयोजिकया प्रकृत्यर्थे प्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकीयतादृशविशेषणावच्छिन्न-संबन्धाऽप्रत्यायनेन प्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छंदकीयसंबन्धे च्विप्रत्ययार्था-भावविशिष्टप्रतियोगित्वरूपविशेषणस्य प्रकृतिवृत्त्याऽभासमानस्य भानासंभवादित्यनुपपत्तिः।

IV 36. अस्मन्मते तु भवत्यर्थे भावे च्विप्रत्ययान्तार्थस्य आधेयतासम्बन्धेन पूर्वकालावच्छिन्नस्वाभावाधिकरणविशिष्ट-स्याऽशौक्ल्यादेः सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेनैवान्वयस्योपगन्त-व्यतया तेन संबन्धेन चाधिकरणविशिष्टाशौक्ल्यादिना विशिष्टस्य भवत्यर्थस्यैवाख्याताद्यर्थे आश्रयत्वे निरूपितत्वसंबन्धेनैव भानात्? तादृशविशिष्टनिरूपिताश्रयत्वस्य च पूर्वकालावच्छेदेनाऽ-शौक्ल्याद्यभावाधिकरणे एव सत्त्वेन नोक्तातिप्रसङ्गः। अन्यत्स्वयमूहनीयम्।

IV 37. 'स्वस्ति भवते' इत्यादावाशीः स्वस्त्यर्थः साच परहितविषयकस्वेच्छा, स्वम्=उच्चारयिता। हितान्वयी संबन्धश्चतुर्थ्यर्थः, एवं च 'भवदीयहितविषयिणी मदीयेच्छा' इति बोधः। कल्याणाद्यर्थकोपि स्वस्तिशब्दः 'स्वस्त्यस्तु मह्यम्' इत्यादौ, तत्रापि चतुर्थ्यर्थः स्वस्त्यर्थान्वयी संबन्ध इत्यलं पल्लवितेन॥

॥ **इति चतुर्थ्यर्थनिरूपणं समाप्तम्॥**

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

अथ पञ्चमी

V 1. वृक्षात् पर्णं पतति' इत्यादौ पञ्चम्याः प्रकृत्यर्थस्य वृक्षादेः पतनादिक्रियाऽपादानत्वं प्रत्याय्यते। अपादानत्वं च स्वनिष्ठाभेदप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकीभूतक्रियाजन्यविभागाश्रयत्वम्। पर्णादेः स्वनिष्ठवृक्षादिविभागजनकस्वपतनाद्यऽपादानत्ववारणाय भूतान्तं क्रियाविशेषणम्। भेदप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वे विभागे च पञ्चम्याः शक्तिद्वयम्। भेदे विभागे च वृक्षादेः प्रकृत्यर्थस्याधेयतासंबन्धेनान्वयः। प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वमाश्रयत्वसंबन्धेन विभागश्च जनकतासंबन्धेन क्रियायामन्वेति। जनकतासंबन्धस्य प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकतया नञा तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नविभागाभावः क्रियायां बोधयितुं न शक्यते इतिचेत्? तर्हि विभागजनकत्वमेव पञ्चम्यर्थोऽस्तु प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वस्येव तस्याप्याश्रयतासंबन्धेन क्रियायामन्वयः, एवं च वृक्षनिष्ठभेदप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतन्निष्ठविभागजनकपतनाश्रयः पर्णमित्याद्याकारक उक्तस्थले बोधः।

V 2. अथ पञ्चमीसमभिव्याहृतनञोक्तयोः पञ्चम्यर्थयोर्द्वयोरेवाऽभावद्वयं बोध्यते, यथायोगमेकतरस्य वा? नाद्यः पक्षः-'पर्णं वृक्षात्पतति न स्वस्मात्- इत्यत्र स्वनिष्ठपतने स्वनिष्ठभेदप्रतियोगितावच्छेकत्वाभावसत्त्वेपि स्वनिष्ठविभागजनकत्वाभावाऽसत्त्वेन, 'वृक्षात्पतति न भूतलात्' इत्यत्र च पतने भूतलादिनिष्ठविभागादिजनकत्वाभावसत्त्वेपि तन्निष्ठभेदप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वाभावासत्त्वेनाऽयोग्यतापत्तेः। नापि द्वितीयः- 'वृक्षात् पत्रं पतति न पत्रात्' इत्यत्र पत्रनिष्ठपतने पत्रनिष्ठविभागजनकत्वस्येव पत्रान्तरविष्ठभेदप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतयापत्रनिष्ठभेदप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वस्यापि बाधाद् योग्यताया निर्वाह यितुमशक्यत्वादिति।

V 3. अत्राहुः-विभागो जनकत्वं च पञ्चम्यर्थः, विभागे प्रकृत्यर्थस्याऽवधिकत्वं संबन्धस्तेन संबन्धेन प्रकृत्यर्थ

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

विशिष्टस्य विभागस्य निरूपितत्वविशेष संबन्धेन जनकत्वेन्वय:, जनकत्वं च फलोपधानरूपम्, विशिष्टनिरूपिततादृशजनकत्वस्य क्रियायाम्, नञ्समभिव्याहारस्थले च क्रियान्वयिन्यऽभावे प्रतियोगित्वेनान्वय:। वृक्षपत्रादिविभागजनकं पत्रादिकर्म च न पत्राद्यवधिकत्वविशिष्टविभागोपधायकम्-पत्रादे: स्वावधिकत्वविशिष्टविभागानधिकारणत्वेन तत्कर्मणि विशिष्टविभागसामानाधिकरण्याभावात्, फलोपधायकत्वस्य सामानाधिकरण्यगर्भत्वान्नोक्ताऽनुपपत्ति:।

V 4. 'वृक्षाद्विभजते' इत्यादावपि वृक्षावधिकत्वं विभागे प्रतीयते-तत्राऽपादानताया अवधितारूपत्वाद्, वृक्षाद्यवधिकत्वविशिष्टविभाग निरूपितमेवाश्रयत्वमाख्याते बोध्यतेऽत: 'वृक्ष: स्वस्माद्विभजते' इति न प्रयोग:। यथा हि स्वप्रतियोगिकत्वविशिष्टसंयोग: स्वस्मिन्न वर्तते तथा स्वावधिकस्य विभागस्य स्ववृत्तित्वेपि स्वस्य न विशिष्टविभागाधिकरणत्वमित्यऽविवादमेव। अवधित्वादिकं च स्वरूपसंबन्धविशेष:।

यद्वा विभागोऽधिकरणता प्रयोजकत्वं च 'वृक्षात् पतति' इत्यादौ पञ्चम्यर्थ:, विभागे स्वावधिकत्वसंबन्धेन प्रकृत्यर्थान्वय: तद्विशिष्टविभागस्य निरूपितत्वविशेषसंन्धेनाधिकरणतायामन्वय: पत्रादिकर्मणि च न तदवधिकत्वविशिष्टविभागनिरूपितान्यमात्रनिष्ठाधिकरणताप्रयोजकत्वम् कारणस्यापि स्वाश्रयनिष्ठकार्याधिकरणतामात्रप्रयोजकत्वादिति सामञ्जस्यम्।

V 5. अथ 'वृक्षात् पतति' 'वृक्षाद्विभजते' इतिवत् ' वृक्षात् त्यजति' इत्यादि: कथं न प्रयोग:-पञ्चम्यर्थस्य विभागजनकत्वस्य विभागवच्छिन्नक्रियारूपत्यागेऽवधिमत्त्वरूपपञ्चम्यर्थस्य च विभागरूपधात्वर्थतावच्छेदकफलेऽन्वये बाधकाभावात्। न च विभागावच्छिन्नक्रियायां विभागान्वयोऽव्युत्पन्न:-उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेययोरैक्यादिति वाच्यम्, जनकतासंबन्धेन विभागावच्छिन्ने प्रकृत्यर्थविशेषितविभागजनकत्वान्वये व्युत्पत्तिविरोधविरहात्। न च पञ्चम्यर्थविभागजनकत्वाऽ-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

वधिमत्त्वयोरन्वयबोधे धातुविशेषाधीनव्यापारविभागोपस्थितेर्हेतुत्वोपगमात्तदभावेन त्यजधातूपस्थिततत्तदर्थे न पञ्चम्यर्थान्वय इति वाच्यम्। त्यजिपत्योस्त्यजिविभज्योश्च पर्यायताभ्रमदशायाम् त्यजत्यर्थव्यापारविभागयोः पञ्चम्यर्थान्वयात् त्यजधातुजन्य तत्तदर्थोपस्थितेरपि पञ्चम्यर्थान्वयहेतुताया अवश्यं वाच्यत्वात्। न च पञ्चम्यर्थविभागजनकत्वान्वयबोधे धातुजन्यविभागरूपफलानवच्छिन्नव्यापारोपस्थितिस्तादृशावधिमत्त्वान्वयबोधे च धातुजन्यविभागमुख्यविशेष्यकोपस्थितिर्हेतुरिति त्यजधातुजन्यविभागावच्छिन्नव्यापारोपस्थितिविषयव्यापारविभागयोः पञ्चम्यर्थविभागजनकत्वावधिमत्त्वान्वयासंभव इति वाच्यम्, फलव्यापारयोः पृथग् धात्वर्थतामते त्यजधातोरपि प्राधान्येन विभागस्य तदनवच्छिन्नस्पन्दस्य चोपस्थित्या तदुपस्थितिविषयतादृशार्थयोरपि तत्तत्पञ्चम्यर्थान्वयसंभवादिति चेत्?

V 6. न-फलावच्छिन्नव्यापारस्य धात्वर्थतामते उक्तरीत्यैव सामञ्जस्यात्, तयोः पृथग् धात्वर्थतामते च फलविषयकव्यापारविषयकबोधं जनयतु धातुपदमित्येतादृशेच्छारूपा, फलव्यापारयोरेकैव शक्तिः पुष्पवन्तादिपदवद् न तु फलविषयकं व्यापारविषयकं च बोधं जनयत्वितिसमूहालम्बनात्मकबोधनिष्ठा तत्तद्विषयकत्वावच्छिन्नविभिन्नविषयताशालिसंकेतरूपा, तथा सति नानार्थत्वाविशेषेण कदाचित् फलव्यापारयोरेकैकपरित्यागेनाप्येकैकस्य बोधप्रसङ्गात् तथा च विभागे पञ्चम्र्थाऽवधिमत्त्वान्वयबोधे संकेतीयबोधनिष्ठविषयत्वांशे विभागेतरविषयकत्वानवच्छिन्त्वावगाहिधातुशक्तिज्ञानं क्रियांशे विभगजनकत्वरूपपपञ्च म्यर्थान्वयबोधे च तादृशबोधनिष्ठविषयतांशे विभागविषयकत्वानवंच्छिन्नत्वावगाहिधातुशक्तिज्ञानं हेतुरुपेयते इति त्यज्धातोस्तादृशज्ञानमभ्रान्तस्याऽसंभवीत्यऽतिप्रसङ्गानवकाशात्। शक्तिद्वयादिवद् दर्शितैकशक्तिरपि कर्मप्रत्ययस्थले फलव्यापारयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभाववैपरीत्येन शाब्दबोधसंभवात्, विशिष्टशक्तावेव विशेषणविशेष्यभावविपर्यासाऽ निर्वाहात्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

V 7. यदि च फलव्यापारयो: शक्तिभेदे एकार्थपरित्यागे-नाऽपरार्थबोधप्रसङ्गवद् उक्तरूपसंकेतोपगमेपि पुष्पवन्त-पदशत्तयविशेषेण तत इव सकर्मकधातुतोपि विशेषण-विशेष्यभावानापन्नस्यैवाऽर्थद्वयस्यान्वयबोध: स्यान्न तु तदापन्नार्थद्वयविषयक इत्युच्येत? तदा संकेतस्य बोधांशे विशेषणतया भासमानयो: फलव्यापारविषयकत्व-योरवचछेद्यावच्छेदकभावावगाहित्वमपि स्वीकारणीयं विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन भासमानयोरेव फलव्यापार-योर्विषयताद्वयमवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावापन्नमिति तथैव तयोर्भानम्। पुष्पवन्तपदसंकेते च चन्द्रसूर्यविषयतयोरवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावो न भासतेऽतस्तयोर्विशृङ्खलमेव भानमिति न काप्यनुपपत्ति:।

V 8. यदि च 'वृक्षात् स्पन्दते' इत्यार्दिन प्रयोगस्तदा सकर्मकधातो: फलविशिष्टव्यापारवाचकतामते पञ्चम्यर्थविभागजनकत्वबोधे विभागानवच्छिन्नफलावच्छिन्नव्यापारविषयकधातुशक्तिज्ञानजन्योपस्थिति: फलव्यापारयोर्वैशिष्ट्यानुपरक्तयोर्धात्वर्थतामते च संकेतीय-बोधनिष्ठविषयतांशे विभागविषयकत्वानवच्छिन्नत्वफलान्तर-विषयकत्वावच्छिन्नत्वोभयावगाहिज्ञानजन्योपस्थिति: कारणमभ्युपगन्तव्येत्यलमधिकेन।

V 9. 'व्याघ्राद्बिभेति' 'दस्युभ्यो रक्षति' इत्यादौ ''भीत्रार्थानां भयहेतु:'' इत्यनेनाऽपादानत्वम्। भयं च परतोऽनिष्टसंभावना, त्राणं चानिष्टनिवृत्त्यऽनुकूलोव्यापार: तदर्थकधातुयोगे तादृशानिष्ट-प्रयोजकमपादानसंज्ञमिति सूत्रार्थ:, एवं च पञ्चम्यर्थस्तत्र प्रयोज्यत्वं तच्च निरुक्तधात्वर्थघटकाऽनिष्टेऽन्वेति।

अथ यस्य व्याघ्राधीनं भयमप्रसिद्धमऽथ च व्याघ्राधीनत्वेनासौ स्वीयमरणादिकं संभावयति तत्पुरुषपर: 'व्याघ्रादयं बिभेति' इति कथं प्रयोग: प्रमाणम्–अनिष्टे व्याघ्राधीनत्वस्य बाधादिति चेत्? भयार्थकधातुयोगे प्रयोज्यताप्रकारकत्वं पञ्चम्यर्थस्तच्चा-निष्टसंभावनायामन्वेति प्रकृते च व्याघ्राधीनत्वस्य तत्पुरुषी-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

याऽनिष्टे बाधेप्यऽनिष्टसंभावनायां तत्प्रकारकत्वमबाधितमेवेति नानुपपत्तिः। एवं च शत्रुभ्रमेण मित्रादपि 'बिभेति' इत्यादि-वाक्यस्यापि प्रामाण्यनिर्वाहः। एवं च भयार्थकधातुयोगे भयहेतुत्वेन संभावितमपादानमित्येकः सूत्रार्थः, अनिष्टविरहानुकूल-व्यापाररूपत्राणार्थकधातुयोगे तदनिष्टप्रयोजकं तदित्यपरः। अनिष्टं च दुःखमेव सर्वत्रानुगतम्।

V 10. यज्जन्यं दुःखं कस्यापि न प्रसिद्ध्यति तादृशस्या-प्यहिकण्टकादेरपादानत्वं कथमिति चेत्? तर्हि यन्निष्ठस्वदुः-खोपधायकव्यापारविरहानुकूलव्यपारस्तदपादानकं स्वकर्मकरक्षण-मिति वक्तव्यम्। घटाद्यचेतनकर्मकं च रक्षणं विनाशोपधायक-व्यापारविरहगर्भं निर्वाच्यम्।

V 11. 'यवेभ्यो गां वारययति' 'कूपादन्धं वारयति' इत्यादौ "वारणार्थानाम्" इत्यनेन यवकूपादेरपादानत्वम्, वारणं क्रिया-प्रतिषेधस्तदर्थकधातुयोगेईप्सितः=तत्तत्क्रियाजन्यफलभागितया तत्तक्रियाकर्तुरभिप्रेतोऽपादानमिति सूत्रार्थः क्रियाच भक्षणगमना-दिरूपा, तात्पर्यवशात् क्वचित् कस्याश्चित् प्रतिषेधो वारयत्यादिना बोध्यते, प्रतिषेधः कर्तृत्वाभावानुकूलव्यापारः। कर्तृत्वाभावरूपधात्वर्थतावच्छेदकफलशालितया गवान्धादेः कर्मता। यवादिपदोत्तरपञ्चम्या यवादिगतत्वेनेच्छाविषयफलकत्वं भक्षणादौ प्रत्याय्यते, इच्छा च भक्षणादिक्रियाकर्तृगवादिनिष्ठा तदर्थेऽन्तर्भावनीया, एवं चोक्तस्थले यवकूपादिनिष्ठत्वेन गवान्धादीच्छाविषयो यो गलाधस्संयोगोत्तरदेशसंयोगार्दिग-वादिनिष्ठतत्तत्फलकव्यापारविशेषकर्तृत्वांभावानुकूलव्यापारानुकूलकृति मानित्याकारको बोधः। अन्धादेर्यद्यपि कूपगमनत्वादिना नेच्छा तथाप्यभिमुखदेशगमनत्वादिना कूपगमनादेरिच्छा वर्तत एवेति, वस्तुगत्या यः कूपादिदेशस्तद्गतत्वेन क्रियाजन्यसंयोगस्य तदिच्छाविष्यत्वमक्षतमेव।

V 12. न च प्रकृते यवकूपादिनिष्ठफविशेषजनकत्वमेव पञ्चम्यार्थोस्तु

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

किमिच्छान्तर्भावेनेति वाच्यम्, यत्र चैत्रादेर्नान्तरीयकतया विषभोजनादिकं प्रसक्तं न तु स्वेच्छातस्तत्र तद्भोजन-विरोधिव्यापारकर्तरि' 'चैत्रं विषाद्वारयति' इति न प्रयोगोऽपितु सविषान्नाद्वारयति' इत्यादिरेव तत्र पूर्वप्रयोगवारणाय सूत्रकृता "ईप्सितः" इत्यत्र सन्प्रत्ययेनेच्छोपादानात्, अत एव यद् यवादिकं केनापि न भुक्तं तत्कर्मकभोजनाप्रसिद्धावपि भोजनफले संयोगविशेषे तद्यवादिगतत्वेनेच्छाविषयत्वप्रसिद्ध्या तद्यवाद् 'गां वारयति' इत्यादिप्रयोगोपपत्तिः। एवं च तत्र भक्षणादौ तद्यवादिकर्मकत्वगवादिकर्तृकत्वोभयाभावबोधाय केषांचित् प्रयासोऽनादेय एवेति।

V 13. पण्डितात् पुराणं शृणोति' 'उपाध्यायाद्वेदमधीते' 'रामा-दधीतसंदेशः' इत्यादावाख्यातुः "आख्यातोपयोगे" इत्यनेनाऽ-पादानता, तत्र प्रकृत्यर्थपण्डितादिकर्तृकोच्चारणाधीनत्वं पञ्चम्यर्थः, तस्य च श्रवणोच्चारणार्थविशेषज्ञानादिक्रियायामन्वयः।

'मृत्पिण्डाद् घटो जायते' इत्यादौ "जनिकर्तुः" इत्यनेना-पादानत्वम्, तत्र प्रकृतित्वं न विकारित्वम्-प्रकृतिविकृति-भावाभावेपि "प्राक् केकयीतो भरतस्ततोऽभूत्" 'वायोर्जातः' इत्यादौ पञ्चमीदर्शनात्। न हि सुतवपुषो मातापितृ-शरीरविकारत्वमऽपि तु तदीयशुक्रशोणितादिविकृतित्वमेव शुक्रशोणितादेः शरीरस्थत्वेपि मलमूत्रादेरिव शरीरावयवत्वाभावात् तदवयावारभ्यत्वस्यैव तद्विकारतारूपत्वात्।

V 14. न च तत्र हेतुपञ्चम्येव नाऽपादानपञ्चमीति वाच्यम् ऋणगुणातिरक्तहतौ पञ्चम्यनुशासनविरहात्, अन्यथा 'दुग्धाद् दधि जायते' 'मृंत्तिकाभ्यो घटो जायते' 'शृङ्गाद् धनुर्जायते' इत्यादेरपि हेतुपञ्चम्यौवोपपत्तौ "जनिकर्तुः" इत्यदिसूत्रस्यैव वैयर्थ्यापत्तेः, तस्मात् कारणत्वमेव प्रकृते प्रकृतित्वम्। 'दण्डाद् घटो जायते' इत्यादयोपि पयोगा इष्यन्त एव। अत एवेश्वरस्य द्रव्यादिकार्याऽप्रकृतित्वेपि "यतो द्रव्यं गुणः कर्म"

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

इत्यादौ पञ्चमी। न च प्रकृतिपदेन कारणमात्रविवक्षायमपि क्रियायोगाऽभावादऽपादानपञ्चम्यनुपपत्तिः हेतुपञ्चमी चोक्तक्रमेण प्रकृतेऽनुपपन्नैवेति वाच्यम्, अगत्या 'जायते' इत्यादिक्रिया-ध्याहारेण तत्र पञ्चम्या उपपादनीयत्वात्।

'हिमवतो गङ्गा प्रभवति' इत्यादौ "भुवः प्रभवः" इत्यनेनाऽ-पादानता, यत्संबन्धात् प्रभवनम्=प्रथमः प्रकाशः स प्रभवः, प्रथमप्रकाश एव प्रभवत्यर्थः। पञ्चम्यर्थः संबन्धाधीनत्वं तादृशक्रियायामन्वेति, संबन्धे च हिमवदादेः प्रकृत्यर्थस्यान्वयः।

V 15. उपाध्यायादन्तर्धत्ते छात्रः' इत्यादौ "अन्तर्द्धौ येनादर्शनमिच्छति" इत्यपादानता। अन्तर्द्धिः=अन्तर्धानं स्वनिष्ठान्यकर्तृक-दर्शनविषयताविरहोद्देश्यको व्यापारः, एवं च व्यापारानुकूलतया-ऽन्तर्द्धानघटको यत्कर्तृकदर्शनविषयताविरहोद्देशः सोऽपादानमिति सूत्रार्थः। उक्तस्थलीयपञ्चम्या अन्तर्द्धिघटकदर्शनान्वयिकर्तृता-निरूपकत्वमेवार्थ इत्युपाध्यायकर्तृकदर्शनविषयताया यः स्वनिष्ठोऽभावस्तदुद्देश्यकव्यापारकर्ता छात्र इति तत्रान्वयबोधः।

V 16. इदं तु बोध्यम्-'अस्मादयं दीर्घः' 'अस्मादयं तारः' इत्यादौ नापादानपञ्चमी दैर्ध्याद्यवधेरपादानत्वस्याननुशासनात्। "ध्रुवमपायेऽ-पादनम्" इत्यनेन ह्यऽपाये=विभागरूपक्रियायां क्रियान्तरजन्य-विभागे च यदवधिभूतं तस्याऽपादानत्वं विधीयते न त्ववधिमात्रस्य। यदि चापायपदं वस्तुमात्रोपलक्षकमुच्यते तदा तदुपादानमनर्थकं स्यात्।

अथ तत्पदेन क्रियामात्रमुपलक्ष्यते 'अस्माद् दीर्घः' इत्यादौ च 'भवति' इत्यध्याहार्यं, दीर्घभवनं च दीर्घतैवेति क्रियायाः सावधित्वम्, आवश्यकश्च क्रियाध्याहारस्तद्योगमन्तरेण कारक त्वस्यानिर्वाहात्। एवं बलाहाकाद्विद्योतते विद्युत्' इत्यादौ द्योतनादिक्रियायाः सावधिकत्वविरहेण 'निःसृत्य' इत्यध्याह्रियते। अत एव नैतदपादानं निर्दिष्टविषयमपि तूपात्तविषयमिति वैयाकरणाः। निर्दिष्टत्वम्=उच्चरितत्वम्। उपात्तत्वम्= अध्याहृ-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तत्वम्। विषयः=अवधित्वनिरूपकः। निस्सरणं च विभाग एवेत्युक्तस्थलेऽध्याहृतक्रियायाः सावधिकत्वमिति चेत्? एवं सति 'वृक्षात् पतति' इत्यादौ वृक्षादेरसंग्रहः। तत्रापि विभागक्रियाऽध्याहृियते इति चेत्? तत्र निर्दिष्टविषयता-प्रवादविरोधः।

एवम् 'अस्माद् दीर्घः' इत्यादौ क्रियाध्याहारे तत्समानशीले माथुराः स्रौघ्नेभ्य आढ्यतराः' इत्यादावपि क्रियाया अध्याहरणीयतया तत्राऽपादानस्यापेक्षितक्रियारूपस्योपात्त-विषयान्तर्भावप्रसङ्गइति तादृशापादानयोरविशेषापत्तिः एवं च-

उपात्तविषयं किंचिन्निर्दिष्टविषयं तथा।

अपेक्षितक्रियं चेति त्रिधाऽपादानमुच्यते॥

इति शाब्दिकविभागविरोधः।

V 17. अथाऽपायपदेन क्रियासामान्यं क्रियाजन्यविभागश्च विवक्षित एवं च 'वृक्षात् पतति' इत्यादौ विभागात्मकक्रियाध्याहार इति तदपादानमपि निर्दिष्टविषयम्। यत्राऽपादानतानिर्वाहार्थमेव-क्रियाध्याहारः बलाहकात् इत्यादौ तदपादानमुपात्तविषयम्, यत्र वाक्यसमापत्यर्थं तदध्याहारस्तत एवं चाऽपादानतानिर्वाहो यथा 'माथुराः स्रौघ्नेभ्यः' 'अस्माद् दीर्घः' इत्यादौ तत्रापोक्षित-क्रियत्वमिति चेत्? एवमपि 'अयमस्मात्तारः' इत्यादावगतिः' तत्र हि तारत्वं जातिर्जातेश्च न सावधिकत्वमिति कुतोऽपादानता। अन्यथा 'अयमस्माद् गौः' इत्याद्यापत्तिः। न च जातेरपि तारत्वस्य 'आयमस्मात्तारः' इतिप्रतितिबलाद् भवत्येव सावधिकत्वमिति वाच्यम्, यदेव ह्येकापेक्षं तारत्वं तदेवान्यापेक्षं मन्द्रत्वम्-समनियतजातिद्वयानभ्युपगमात् समनियताभ्युपगमे जातिसङ्करप्रसङ्गात् तथा च तारत्वादेः सावधिकत्वे स्वापेक्षया यस्तारस्तमपेक्ष्य स्वस्मिन् मन्दव्यवहार इव तारव्यवहारोपि स्यात् स्वापेक्षया यो

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

मन्दस्तमपेक्ष्य तारव्यवहारवत् तमपेक्ष्य स्वस्मिन् मन्दव्यवहारोपि स्यात्।

V 18. अथ तदपेक्षया तारव्यवहारस्तत्सजातीयत्वे सति तत्साक्षात्कार-प्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकजातिमत्त्वमवलम्बतेऽतो न स्वपेक्षया यस्तारस्तदपेक्षया तारव्यवाहरोऽन्यापेक्षया तारेपि भवतीति चेत्? तर्हि 'अस्मात्तार:' इत्यत्र साजात्यसमानाधिकरणसाक्षात्कार-प्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेकजातिरूपतारपदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तघटकसाजात्ये साक्षात्कारे च पञ्चभ्यर्थान्वयो वाच्यस्तावतैव दर्शितातिप्रसङ्ग-वारणसंभवात्। तत्र साजात्यं तद्वृत्तिशब्दत्वजातिस्तस्या: साक्षात्कारस्य च न सावधिकत्वसमिति न सावधिकत्वरूपमऽ-पादानत्वं तत्र पञ्चम्यर्थ:।

V 19. न च साजात्यघटकजाते: सावधिकत्वाभावेपि वृत्ते: सावधिकत्वमस्त्येव, एवं साक्षात्कारो विलक्षणविषयिता-शालिज्ञानं तद्विषयिता च सावधिकैवेति तत्र पञ्चम्यर्थान्वयेन सामञ्जस्यमिति वाच्यम्, यतो वृत्तेर्विषयितायाश्च स्वाधारविषय यप्रतियोगिकत्वमेव न तु तदवधिकत्वम्, तदवधिकत्व-तत्प्रतियोगिकत्वयोर्वस्तुनोर्भेदात्, अन्यथा 'घटे वर्तते, 'घटमवगाहते' इत्यत्र 'घटाद्वर्तते' 'घटादवगाहते' इतिप्रयोगस्य घटस्याऽपादात्वेन दुर्वारत्वात्, अत एव प्रतियोगिताया अपादानत्वानात्मकतयाऽन्यादिशब्दयोगे प्रतियोगिवाचकपदात् पञ्चमी सूत्रान्तरेणानुशिष्टा प्रतियोगित्वस्याऽपादानतारूपत्वे तद्वैयर्थ्यापत्ते:।

V 20. अथान्यादिशब्दार्थभेदादे: क्रियात्वाभावेन कारकत्वासंभव इति मुनि: सूत्रान्तरं प्रणिनायेति चेत्? तत् किं तारादिघटकवृत्त्यादे: क्रियात्वमनुमन्यते भवता? तस्मादत्र पञ्चम्युपपादकं सूत्रान्तरमनु-सर्तव्यमिति।

गुणो द्रव्याद् भिन्न: 'इत्यदौ "अन्यारात्" इतिसूत्रेणैव पञ्चमी अन्यपदस्याऽन्यार्थकपदपरत्वादिति बहव:। न चान्यपदेन

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तदर्थकत्वविवक्षणे तत्समानार्थकेतरपदोपादानवैयर्थ्यमिति वाच्यम्. अन्येतरपदयोरेकस्याऽन्योन्याभावविशिष्टार्थकपरत्वात्, अपरस्य पृथक्त्वरूपगुणविशिष्टार्थकपरतयोपादानसार्थक्यात्। "पृथग्विना" इत्यादिसूत्रे पृथक्पदोपादानं तद्योगे वैकल्पिकतृतीयोपपत्त्यर्थम्। वस्तुतस्तत्र पृथक्पदमऽसाहित्यार्थकं न तु गुणवदर्थकम् "दुनोति चन्द्रात् पृथगप्यनङ्गः" इत्युदाहरणेऽसाहित्यस्यैव प्रतीतेः।

V 21 न चाऽन्यादिपदं नाऽन्योन्याभावार्थकं किं तु पृथक्त्वरूप गुणविशिष्टार्थकं, तथा सति 'घटः पटो न' इत्यादावपि नञस्तदर्थकतया तद्योगे पञ्चम्यापत्तेः, न च तद्विशिष्टार्थकपद-परम्तस्यापि विशिष्टार्थवाचकत्वात्, नञ्पदं च न तथा तदुपस्थिताभावस्य नामान्तरार्थे भेदान्वयसंभवेन लाघवेन तस्य धर्ममात्रवाचकत्वादिति न तद्योगे पञ्चमीप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्, 'द्रव्याद् गुणस्य भेदः' इत्यादौ पञ्चमीनिर्वाहाय भेदार्थक-पदस्यैवोपादेयत्वात् अन्यादिपदस्यापि वाच्यविशेषण-भेदार्थकत्वादित्याऽऽचार्यानुसारिमतम्। तत्र अन्योन्याभाववाचकपदस्य पञ्चम्यनुयोगित्वे 'द्रव्यादन्योगुणः' इत्यादौ पञ्चम्यनुपपत्तेः, गुणादौ पृथक्त्वरूपगुणासंभवेनाऽन्योन्याभावस्यैवान्यपदार्थत्वात्। अन्योन्या-भावार्थकपदप्रयोगस्य पञ्चमीप्रयोजकत्वे तत्र निपातातिरिक्तत्व-विशेषणप्रवेशेनापि नञ्योगे पञ्चमीवारणसंभवात्। वस्तुत-स्त्वन्योन्याभावीयप्रतियोगित्वरूपार्थ विवक्षायां पञ्चमी. नञ्पदोपस्थापिताभावस्य च प्रतियोगिता न विभक्त्या बोध्यते-नञर्थे प्रतियोगितयैवाऽऽधेयत्वातिरिक्तविभक्त्यर्थान्वयस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात् 'न चैत्रस्य' इत्यादौ षष्ठ्याद्यर्थस्य नञर्थप्रतियोगि- त्वादतो न तद्योगे पञ्चमी।

V 22. अथ पृथक्त्वगुणानङ्गीकर्तृमीमांसकमते सूत्रेऽन्येतरपदयोरे-कतरोपादानवैयर्थ्यं दुर्वारम्उक्तरीत्या सार्थकत्वासंभवादिति चेत्? न-तन्मतेप्येकपदस्य प्राधान्येनाऽन्योन्याभाववाचक-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

स्याऽपरपदस्य चान्योन्याभावविशिष्टवाचकस्य संग्राहकतया सार्थक्यात्।

न च 'पटाद् भेद:' इत्यादौ क्रियायोगादपादानपञ्चम्येव, धातूपस्थाप्यपदार्थप्रतियोगिताया अपादानतारूपत्वे 'घटे वर्तते' इत्यादौ पञ्चमीप्रसङ्गस्य परत्वेनाधिकरणसप्तम्यादिना बाधादेवानवकाशात् अभावीयविलक्षणप्रतियोगिताया एव वा तथात्वात्। 'घटादन्यत्वम्' इत्यादौ चाऽपादानत्वासंभवेप्यन्यपद-योगेनैव पञ्चमी तत्रान्यपदाद्विशेषणतया भासमानभेदे एव पञ्चम्यर्थान्वयोपगमात् न तु भावप्रत्यायात् प्राधान्येन भासमाने तस्मिन्, पदार्थैकदेशे इव वृत्त्येकदेशे ससंबन्धिके प्रतियोगि-संबन्धान्वयस्य व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धत्वादिति वाच्यम्। प्राधान्येन भावप्रत्ययाद् भासमानेप्यन्यत्वे घटपटादिप्रतियोगिकत्वान्वय-विवक्षया 'घटादन्यत्वम्' इति प्रयोगात् तन्निर्वाहायैवाऽन्येतर-पदद्वयोपादानात्। अथवा "ध्रुवमपाये" इत्यत्रावधित्वमेव विवक्षितं न तु प्रतियोगित्वम् उभयानुगमकरूपाभावादिति 'पटाद् भेद:' इत्यादौ पञ्चम्युपपत्तयेऽन्येतरपदोपादानम्।

V 23. वस्तुतस्त्वऽन्येतरपदं स्वरूपपरमेव अर्थपरत्वे 'घटादन्य:' इतिवद् 'घटादेक:' इतिप्रयोगापत्ते:।

यदि चैकपदस्यान्यत्वरूपेण नाऽन्यार्थकताऽपि तु समभिव्या-हृतान्यत्वोपलक्षिते वस्तुनि वक्तृबुद्धिविषयतावच्छेदकघटत्वा-दिनैव- 'चैत्र एकमानयति मैत्रश्चापरम्' इत्यादौ घटत्वपटत्वा-दिनैवाऽऽनयनकर्मतादिप्रतीतेर्न तु पटघटान्यत्वादिनाअन्य-त्वान्वयिप्रतियोगिवाचकपदासमभिव्याहारात्, अन्यथा तद्योगे पञ्चम्या असाधुत्वेपि 'घटस्यैक:' इतिप्रतियोगिनि षष्ठ्यापत्ते-र्दुर्वारत्वादित्युच्यते? तदाप्यन्यार्थकतदादियोगे पञ्चमीप्रयोगा-पत्त्याऽर्थग्रहणासंभव इति; तथा च 'पटाद् भिन्नम्' 'घटाद् भिद्यते' इत्यादौ पञ्चमीनिर्वाहाय तत्राऽपादानत्वमेव कथंचिदुपपा-दनीयम्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

V 24. तथा हि-भिद्धातोर्नाऽन्योन्याभावोऽर्थः 'घटाद् भिनत्ति पटः' इतिप्रयोगापत्तेः 'भिद्यते पटः' इत्यादिप्रयोगानुपपत्तेश्च-कर्तरि यगात्मनेपदासंभवात् अदैवादिकत्वात् परस्मैपदित्वाच्च श्यन्कर्त्रात्मनेपदयोरनवकाशात्, अकर्मकधातुयोगे कर्मकर्तृ-विवक्षाया अप्ययोगात्. कस्यचिदकर्मकस्य ण्यर्थान्तर्भावेन कर्मकर्तृत्वमुपपादनीयम्, अन्योन्याभावस्याऽजन्यतया तदर्थक-धातोरर्थेऽपि ण्यर्थान्तर्भावस्य दुष्करत्वात्। 'भिद्यते कुसूलः' इत्यादौ भिदेर्विदारणार्थकत्वेन सकर्मकतया कुसूलादेः कर्मकर्तृत्वसंभवात्, अतोऽन्यत्वेन ज्ञापनं भिदेरर्थः, ज्ञापनम्= ज्ञानविषयताप्रयोजकव्याप्तिपक्षधर्मता तदाश्रयोऽसाधारणधर्म एव भिदादिकर्तृत्वाद् भेदक उच्यते, अन्यत्वप्रकारकानुमितिविषय-तारूपधात्वर्थतावच्छेदकफलाश्रयो भिदादिकर्मतया भेद्यः, एवं च 'पृथिवी तरेभ्यो भिद्यते' इत्यादौ पृथिव्यादेः कर्मतैव न केवलकर्तृता। अन्योन्याभावे साध्ये सर्वतान्त्रिकाणां तादृशप्रतिज्ञालेखनं केषांचिदनवधानेन। प्रतिज्ञास्थवह्न्यादि पदं वहन्यादिज्ञानविपयतार्थकम्। हेत्ववयवस्थपञ्चम्या ज्ञाप्यत्वं नार्थोऽपि तु प्रयोज्यत्वमेवेति। मणिकारादिमतानुसारेण केषांचि-दिति सूक्ष्मविवेचनचतुराः।

V 25. 'अर्जुनः क्रोशाल्लक्ष्यं विध्यति' 'अद्य भुक्त्वाऽयं द्व्याहाद् भोक्ता' इत्यादौ "सप्तमीपञ्चम्यौ कारकमध्ये" इतिपञ्चमी प्रकृत्यर्थयोरध्वकालयोःकारकद्वयव्यवधायकतामभिधत्ते, तथा च स्वाधिष्ठितदेशानन्तरक्रोशात्मकाध्वभागानन्तरदेशस्थं लक्ष्यं विध्यत्यर्जुन इत्यादिः प्रथमस्थले बोधः। समभिव्या-हृतकर्त्रधिष्ठितदेशानन्तर्यं विशेषणतया प्रकृत्यर्थान्वयि, विशेष्यतया प्रकृत्यर्थान्वयि चानन्तरदेशस्थत्वं पञ्चम्यर्थः। स्वीयैकार्थान्विता-परपदार्थन्वितापरस्वार्थबोधकत्वमप्यत्र व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्यादेकपदस्य स्वीक्रियते। भोजनकृत्यधिकरणैतद्दिवसानन्तरद्व्यहानन्तरदिन-वृत्तिभोजनकृतिमानयमित्याकारकबोधश्चरमस्थले। कारकपदेन क्रियानुकूव्यापाररूपकारकपदार्थतावच्छेकस्यापि विवक्षया

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

एकक्रियानुकूलकृत्यन्वयिनः प्रकृत्यर्थकालानन्तरकालीनत्वस्य प्रकृत्यर्थविशेषणीभवदपर क्रियानुकूलकृत्ययधिकरण-कालानन्तर्यस्य च बोधकत्वेपि पञ्चम्युपपत्तिः कारकद्वय-मध्यवर्तिता चात्रकालस्य नोपपद्यते कर्तुरैक्यात् अत एवोक्तम्-''कर्तृशक्तयोर्मध्ये चैकः कालः'' इति॥

॥ इति पञ्चम्यर्थनिरूपणं समाप्तम्॥

अथ षष्ठी

VI 1. स्वसंबन्धविवक्षायां कारकविभक्त्यऽप्रसक्तेः ''शेषे षष्ठी'' इत्यनेन 'चैत्रस्येदम्' इत्यादौ षष्ठी। 'चैत्रस्य द्रव्यम्' 'घटस्य कारणम्' 'चैत्रस्य हस्तः' इत्यादौ स्वत्वनिरूपितत्वा-वयवत्वादीनां संबन्धत्वेनैव षष्ठ्यर्थता न तु विशिष्य, शक्त्यानन्त्यप्रसङ्गात्। संयोगादिसंबन्धसत्त्वेपि 'चैत्रस्य नेदं वासः' इत्यादौ स्वत्वादिसंबन्धविशेषाभाववोधतात्पर्येण यत्र नञ्प्रयुज्यते तत्र विशेषरूषेण पष्ठया लक्षणैव, ''सुब्विभक्तौ न लक्षणा'' इतिप्रवादस्य 'अनुशासनाऽसत्वे एकवि-भक्त्यर्थेऽपरविभक्तेर्न लक्षणा' इत्येतत्परत्वात्। अत एव च ''कृद्योगापि हि षष्ठी संबन्धत्वेनैव बोधयति'' इति मिश्राः। इत्थमेव च संबन्धत्वेन कर्मत्वादिविवक्षया 'मातुः स्मृतम्' इत्यादौ ''अधीगर्थ'' इत्यादिषष्ठ्यनुशासनस्य नियमपरतया सार्थक्योपपादनं वृत्तिकृतामुपपद्यते, संबन्धत्वविशिष्ट-संबन्धविवक्षायाम् ''शेषे षष्ठी'' इत्यस्य षष्ठ्यऽविधायकत्वे तादृशानुशासनस्य विधित्वमेव स्यात्। अत एव च ''आमं शूद्रस्य पक्वान्नं पक्वमुच्छिष्टमुच्यते'' इत्यत्र 'पक्वम्' इत्यत्रानुषज्यमानायाः षष्ठ्याः संबन्धत्वेन कर्तृत्वमर्थो न तु स्वत्वम्-शूद्रकर्तृकवृषोत्सर्गे चरुहोमानुपपत्तेरिति नवीनस्मार्तानां मतमप्युपपद्यते

VI 2. न च तत्र कृद्योगा षष्ठी कर्तृत्वत्वेनैव बोधयतीति वाच्यम्,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

निष्ठायोगे तस्या निषेधात्। अत एव "नाग्निस्तृप्यति काष्ठानां न पुंसां वामलोचना" इत्यादौ कारणत्वादेः संबन्धत्वेन विवक्षया षष्ठ्युपपत्तिः, तृतीयादिविधिविषयतया विशेषरूपेण करणत्वादिसंबन्धविवक्षायां षष्ठ्यनुपपत्तेः।

VI 3. अथ संबन्धत्वेन संबन्धस्य षष्ठीवाच्यत्वे 'पुरुषस्य दण्डः' इत्यादौ 'दण्डस्य पुरुषः' इत्यादिरपि प्रयोगः स्यात्। एवम् 'दण्डी पुरुषः' 'रूपवान् घटः' इत्यादिवत् दण्डरूपादेः पुरुषघटाद्यनाधारत्वेपि 'पुरुषी दण्डः' 'घटवद्रूपम्' इत्यादि प्रयोगो दुर्वारः-'तदत्रास्ति' इत्यर्थे इव 'तदस्य' इत्यर्थेपि मतुपो विधानात् दण्डरूपादिपदोत्तरषष्ठ्या चैत्रघटादिनिष्ठतदर्थ-संबन्धप्रतिपादने तदुत्तरमपि मत्त्वर्थीयस्य प्रसङ्गादिति चेत्? विशिष्य केषांचित्संबन्धानां षष्ठ्यर्थतोपगमेपि 'घटस्य रूपम्' इत्यादिप्रयोगानुरोधेन समवेतत्वादेः षष्ठ्यर्थताया आवश्यकत्वेन 'हस्तस्य चैत्रः' 'चैत्रवान् हस्तः' 'शाखाया वृक्षः' 'वृक्षावती शाखा' इति कथं न प्रयुज्यते? पूर्वप्रयोगाभावादिति समाधानं तुल्यम्।

VI 4. 'नराणां क्षत्रियः शूरो नरेषु वा-' 'अध्वगानां रथगामिनः शीघ्रतरा अध्वगेषु वा' 'गवां कृष्णा संपन्नक्षीरा गोषु वा' इत्यादौ "यतश्च निर्धारणम्" इत्यनेन षष्ठीसप्तम्यौ विधीयेते, तदर्थश्च- 'जात्यादिविशेषणविशिष्टयद्धर्मावच्छिन्नस्य तादृश-विशेषणशून्यतद्धर्मावच्छिन्नव्यावृत्तत्वविशिष्टविधेयवत्तया प्रतिपादनं तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नार्थकपदात् षष्ठीसप्तम्यौ' इति प्रकृते च क्षत्रियत्वा-दिविशेषणविशिष्टे नरादौ तच्छून्यनरादिव्यावृत्तत्वेन शौर्यविशेषादि-रूपविधेयसंबन्धोऽभिमत इति नरादिपदात् षष्ठी। 'नरेभ्यो राक्षसाः शूरतमाः' इत्यादौ राक्षसत्वादिविशेषणविशिष्टे तच्छून्यनरादिव्यावृत्तशूरतमत्वविवक्षायामपि न निरुक्तनिर्धारणम्-राक्षसत्वादिविशिष्टस्यनरत्वादिरूपसामान्यधर्माऽनवच्छिन्नत्वात्।

VI 5. नाराणां क्षत्रियः शूरतमः इत्यादौ क्षत्रियादिनिष्ठशूरतमत्वादौ

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

नरादिसामान्यव्यावृत्तत्वबाधात् शून्यत्वान्तं व्यावृत्त्यवधेर्विशेषणम्। तद्धर्माश्रययत्किंचिद् व्यक्तिव्यावृत्तत्वविवक्षणे द्रव्येषु घटो गन्धवान्' इत्यपि स्यात्-गन्धादेर्यत्किंचित्द्रव्यव्यक्तिव्यावृत्तत्वात्। तादृशविशेषणशून्यसामान्यव्यावृत्तत्वनिवेशे 'नाराणं क्षत्रियः शूरतमः' इत्यादावेव तदसंभवः-शूरतमत्वादेः क्षत्रियत्वादिशून्यराक्षसाद्यऽव्यावृत्तत्वात् अतस्तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नेति।

VI 6. अथ विधेये जात्यादिविशेषणशून्यसाधारणधर्मावाच्छिन्नान्वितं व्यावृत्तत्वं साधारणधर्मावच्छिन्नवाचकपदोत्तरषष्ठ्यादेरेवार्थो वाच्यस्तावता च नरत्वादिरूपसाधारणधर्मावच्छिन्नव्यावृत्तत्वस्यैव लाभः संभवति न तु क्षत्रियत्वादिशून्यत्वविशेषितनरादिव्यावृत्तत्वस्य-प्रकृत्यर्थे नरादौ। तादृशविशेषणशून्यत्वबोधकाभावात्। न च षष्ठ्या एव तदर्थः-शक्तयानन्त्यप्रसङ्गात्।

न च भेद एव षष्ठ्यर्थस्तत्र च क्षत्रियादिपदार्थस्य प्रतियोगित्वेनाऽन्वयात् क्षत्रियाद्यन्यनरादिव्यावृत्तत्वलाभः शक्तिभेदं विनैवेति वाच्यम्, एवमपि संख्यातिरिक्तविभक्तयर्थस्य प्रकृत्यर्थविशेष्यतयैव भानमिति व्युत्पत्तिविरोधाऽपरिहारात्। 'नरेषु क्षत्रियाणामेव शौर्यम्' इत्यादौ क्षत्रियादेर्विभक्तयर्थविशेषणतयोपस्थितस्य भेदे विशेषणतया भानोपगमे व्युत्पत्त्यन्तरविरोधाच्च। अस्तु लक्षणया नरादिपदादेव क्षत्रियान्यनरत्वादिविशेषरूपेणोपस्थितिरितिचेत्? अस्तु।

VI 7. व्यावृत्तत्वं किं तावत्, कुत्र वा तदन्वयः?। व्यावृत्तत्वं तदवृत्तित्वं, शूरतमादिपदोपस्थापिते धर्मे तदन्वय इतिं चेत्? न पदार्थतावच्छेदकेन पदार्थन्तराऽनन्वयात् पदार्थानां जातिमति सत्ता' इत्यादौ जातिमदन्यपदार्थवृत्तित्वसामान्याभावस्य सत्तादौ वारितत्वात्, तादृशपदार्थसमवेतत्वाद्यभावस्य चाऽप्रसिद्धेर्व्यावृत्तिबोधासंभवाच्च। एवम्-'द्रव्येषु कम्बुग्रीवादिमान् घटः' इत्यादौ घटत्वादिधर्मस्याऽन्वयितावच्छेदकरूपेणानुपस्थिततत्वात् तत्र व्यावृत्तत्वान्वयबोधो दुर्घट इति।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VI 8. अत्र केचित्-'नराणां क्षत्रियः शूरः' इत्यादौ क्षत्रिय इव लक्षणया क्षत्रियान्योपि क्षत्रियपदार्थः शूरपदस्यापि शूर इव तदन्योप्यर्थः षष्ठ्यर्थोऽभेदः क्षत्रिये तदन्यस्मिश्चान्वेति तथा च नराभिन्नः क्षत्रियः शूरो नराभिन्नक्षत्रियान्यो न शूर इत्यर्थः। 'नराणां क्षत्रियेषु शौर्यम्' इत्यत्रापि क्षत्रियपदं प्राग्वदुभयार्थकं शौर्यपदं च तत्तदत्यन्ताभावार्थकं, तथा च नराभिन्नक्षत्रिये शौर्यं तदन्यस्मिंस्तदभाव इति बोधः। उद्देश्यविधेययोर्यादृशसंबन्धो, भावान्वयबोधे भासते तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नविधेयाभाव उद्देश्यविधेय-वाचकपदयोर्वैयधिकरण्यस्थले विधेयपदलक्ष्यार्थः, तयोः सामानाधिकरणयस्थले तु विधेयधर्मिभिन्न इति सामान्यतो व्युत्पत्तिरित्याहुः।

VI 9. तन्न शोभनम्-तथा सति 'तस्मै पुरुषोत्तमाय नमः' इत्यत्र तत्पदार्थतदन्ययोरेव पुरुषपदार्थाऽभेदविवक्षणे उत्तमपदेनाऽसामर्थ्यात् समासाप्रसक्तेः "न निर्धारणे" इतिनिषेधाश्रयणेन प्रकाशकृतां निर्धारणषष्ठीसमासखण्डनानौचित्यप्रसङ्गात्। एवम् 'नरेषु शूरस्य क्षत्रियस्येदं राज्यम्' इत्यादौ शूरपदार्थाऽशूरान्वितक्षत्रिय-पदार्थक्षत्रियान्यस्य षष्ठ्यर्थसंबन्धादौ नान्वयः किं तु शूरान्वयिक्षत्रियादेरन्वय इत्येतन्नोपपद्यते-'श्वेतं सैन्धवं भुङ्क्ते' इत्यादौ (तु) कर्मतादिविशेषणतया लवणादिबुद्धौ मुख्यविशेष्यत-याऽश्वादेरभानाद्, एकपदोपस्थापितयोर्द्वयोस्तत्प्रकृतिकविभक्त्यर्थे एकस्य विशेषणतयाऽपरस्य तदविशेषणतया भानस्याऽव्युत्पन्नत्वात्।

VI 10. एवम्-'द्रव्येषु क्षितिपाथसी रसवती' इत्यादौ क्षितिज-लोभयत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नभिन्ने रसवदाद्यन्यत्वबोधो न संभवति-रसादिमत्यपि प्रत्येकमुभयत्वावच्छिन्नभेदसत्त्वात्, नापि प्रत्येकभेदावच्छिन्ने-तथैव बाधात्, नाप्येकभेदविशिष्टा-परभीदावच्छिन्ने-एकपदस्य तादृशभेदावच्छिन्नलक्षकत्वेऽपरपदार्थे रसवदाद्यन्यत्वरूपविधेयानन्वयात्, द्वन्द्वघटकैकपदार्थमात्रे विधेयान्वयस्याऽव्युत्पन्नत्वात्। नापि पदाभ्यां लक्षणया

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तत्तद्भिन्नोपस्थितावऽभेदेनैकभिन्नान्वितेऽपरभिन्ने, तथापि पदार्थद्वये विधेयान्वयाऽनुपपादनात्, द्वन्द्वे समस्यमानपदार्थानां परस्परमऽनन्वयादित्यपि चिन्त्यम्।

VI 11. यत्तु 'नराणां शूरः क्षत्रियः' इत्यादौ शूराद्यन्वय्यऽभेदः षष्ठ्यर्थः, नराभिन्नशूरत्वाद्यवच्छेदेन च क्षत्रियाऽभेदान्वयः, एवं च क्षत्रियान्ये नरेऽर्थतः शौर्यव्यवच्छेदलाभ इति, तदत्यन्तमसत्–'नराणां क्षत्रिये शौर्यम्' इत्यादौ 'क्षत्रियाणां कर्णः प्रचुरं ददाति' इत्यादौ चाऽनिर्वाहात्।

VI 12. इदं तु तत्त्वम्-निर्धारण विभक्तेर्व्यावृत्तत्वमेवार्थः व्यावृत्तत्वं चाऽभेदान्वयिविधेयसमभिव्याहारस्थलेऽन्योन्याभावप्रतियोगित्वं भेदान्वयितत्स्थले चाऽत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं तस्य च विधेयतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेनाऽन्वयोऽतो न द्वित्वाद्यवच्छिन्नाभावमादायातिप्रसङ्गः। अभावे च प्रकृत्यर्थस्य नरादेः क्षत्रियत्वादिरूपोद्देश्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नभेदविशिष्टप्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकनरत्वादिव्यापकाधिकरणतानिरूपिताऽऽधेयतासंबन्धेनान्वयः एतावतैव जात्यादिरूपविशेषणशून्यप्रकृत्यर्थनरादिसामान्यव्यावृत्तेर्विधेयधर्मे लाभः।

VI 13. 'द्रव्याणां क्षितिपाथसी रसवती' इत्यादौ भेदद्वयादिविशिष्टद्रव्यत्वादिव्यापकतैव संबन्धः। विधेयस्य शूरतमादेर्निर्धारणविभक्तिप्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकनरत्वादिविशिष्टतादात्म्यादिरेव संबन्धतया भासतेऽतो 'नराणां राक्षसः शूरः' इत्यादेर्नापत्तिः। अन्यत्स्वयमूह्यम्॥

॥ इति षष्ठ्यर्थनिरूपणं समाप्तम्॥

अथ सप्तमी

VII 1. आधारसप्तम्या आधेयत्वमर्थस्तस्य क्रियायामन्वयः। आधाराधेयभावश्च न संयोगादिरूपसंबन्धात्मकः–कुण्डादिसंयोगिनो बदरादेरपि कुण्डाधारताप्रसङ्गात् अपि तु पदार्थान्तरमेव स च संबन्धविशेषावच्छिन्नः – संयोगेनाधिकरणं समवायेनाधिकरण-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

मित्यादिव्यवहारात्। अथ वोक्तातिप्रसङ्गभिया संयोगेनाधारत्वमेवातिरिक्तं समावायसंबन्धावाच्छिन्नं च समवायादिरूपमेव। न च समवायस्यापि संबन्धत्वेन द्विष्ठतया रूपादेरपि पटाद्यधिकरणताप्रसङ्गः, तथा सति तुल्ययुत्तयाऽधिकरणत्वस्यापि द्विष्ठतया तादृशातिप्रसङ्गस्य दुर्वारत्वात्। यदि चाधारताया आधारेऽनुयोगित्वं संबन्ध आधेये च प्रतियोगित्वामिति संबन्धवैलक्षण्यान्नातिप्रसङ्गः-आधारतानुयोगिताया एवाधारव्यवहारप्रयोजकत्वादित्युच्यते? तदा समवायस्यापि तद्वैलक्षण्येनातिप्रसङ्गवारणादतिरिक्ताधारतायां मानाभावात्।

VII 2. स्पर्शाद्याधारवाय्वादे रूपाद्याधारतावारणायाऽधेयभेदेनाधारत्वमतिरिक्तम्, इति न सत्, आधेयभेदभिन्नाधिकारणतानामऽतिरिक्तसमवायस्य च कल्पनामपेक्ष्याऽऽधेयभेदेन समवायभेदस्यैवोपगन्तुमुचितत्वात्।

अथ संयोगेनाधिकरणत्वमपि संयोगरूपमस्तु कुण्डबदरादिसंयोगानां कुण्डादिकमनुयोगि न तु बदरादिकमिति नातिप्रसङ्गः। न चैवमपि बदरादेः कुण्डादिनिष्ठसंयोगानुयोगितया आधारतापत्तिः-तादृशसंयोगस्य कुण्डादिनिष्ठत्वेपि तत्प्रतियोगिकत्वानुपगमात्, तत्प्रतियोगिकसंबन्धानुयोगिताया एव तदाधारव्यवहारप्रयोजकत्वात्। न चासौ संयोगो बदरादौ कुण्डादिविशिष्टबुद्धिप्रयोजकतयोभयानुयोगिक एवमुभयप्रतियोगिकोपीति वाच्यम्, आधेये संयोगेनाधिकरण-विशिष्टबुद्धेरप्रामाणिकत्वात्, 'कुण्डे बदरम्' इत्यादिविशिष्टबुद्धौ संयोगप्रतियोगिताया एव संबन्धत्वात् 'पटे रूपम्' इत्यादौ समवायप्रतियोगितावत्, अन्यथा तादृशविशिष्टबुद्धिबलाद् रूपादावपि पटादिसमावायानुयोगिताप्रसङ्गादिति चेत्? मा भूत्तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नमप्यतिरिक्तम्।

VII 3. यत्तु तत्पतनप्रतिबन्धकसंयोगवत्त्वं तदाधारत्वं कुण्डादिपतन प्रतिबन्धकसंयोगवत्त्वं च न बदरादौ तत्संयोगसत्त्वेऽपि तस्य पतनादिति। तदसत् यस्य पतनमप्रसिद्धं तदाधारत्वासंग्रहात्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

स्वस्मिन् स्वपतनप्रतिबन्धकसंयोगसत्त्वेन स्वस्यापि स्वाऽऽधारता-प्रसङ्गाच्च। स्वान्यत्वे सति स्वनिष्ठपतनानुत्पादप्रयोजकसंयोगवत्त्वं तदिति चेत्? न, एतदनुपस्थितावप्यधिकरणव्यवहारादित्यलम्।

VII 4. अथाऽऽधारसप्तम्या आधेयतार्थकत्वे 'भूतले वर्तते घटः' इत्यादौ धात्वर्थस्य वृत्तेराधेयतारूपत्वेन तत्र भूतलाद्याधेयत्वा-भावेनाऽयोग्यताप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्? न-तत्र निरूपकत्व-स्यैवाधारतारूपत्वेन निरूप्यत्वस्यैव सप्तम्यर्थत्वात् भूतलादिनि-रूप्यत्वस्य च घटादिनिष्ठवृत्तावऽबाघात्, अत एव "इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे" इत्यादौ हेतौ हेतुतायां चोद्भवपदार्थोत्पत्तिवृत्तित्वाभावेपि हेतुतायामुत्पत्तिनिरूपितत्वसत्त्वेन सप्तम्युपपत्तिः। अथ वा वृद्धातोरप्याधारत्वमेवार्थस्तन्निरूपकत्वमेव घटादेस्तत्कर्तृत्वम् एवं च तादृशधात्वर्थे भूतलाद्यधिकरणकत्वमेव सप्तम्यन्तेन बोध्यते-तत्र तदऽबाधात्।

VII 5. अथाऽऽधारसप्तम्या क्रियायां प्रकृत्यर्थाधिकरणकत्वं यदि बोध्यते तदा 'चैत्रे चैत्रो गच्छति' इत्यदिप्रयोगात्तिः- तत्र धात्वर्थस्य स्पन्दादेः कर्त्रादिवृत्तित्वात्, 'भुवि गच्छति' इत्यदिश्च न स्यात्-चैत्रनिष्ठक्रियाया भुवि बाधाददितिचेत्? न- तत्र कर्तृधटितपरम्परा-संबन्धावच्छिन्नाधारताया एव सप्तम्यर्थत्वेन सर्वसामञ्जस्यात्, परम्परासंबन्धस्यापि प्रतीतिबलेन क्वचिदाधारतानियामकत्वोपगमात्।

अवच्छेद्यताविशेषोप्याधारसप्तम्यर्थो यथा' वीणायां शब्दः' कर्णे शब्दः' 'वृक्षाग्रे कपिसंयोगः' इत्यादौ, एषु कारकतानिर्वाहाय 'भवति' इत्यध्याहारः। अथ वा "सप्तम्यधिकरणे च" इति चकारेणाऽकारकाऽऽधारवाचिनोपि सप्तमी, अत एव "साध्यवद्भिन्नसाध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम्" इत्यत्र "साध्यवद्भिन्ने यः साध्याभावः" इति सप्तमीतत्पुरुषेण व्याख्यानं संगच्छते, तत्र क्रियाध्याहारे सापेक्षतयाऽसामर्थ्येन समासानुपपत्तेः।

VII 6. 'चर्मणि द्वीपिनम्' इत्यादौ "निमित्तात्कर्मयोगे" इत्यनेन सप्तमी प्रकृत्यर्थचर्मादेर्हननादिक्रियानिमित्तत्वं बोधयति। निमित्तत्वं च

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

न कारणत्वम् चर्मादेर्हननादिक्रियाकारणत्वे मानाभावत् पूर्ववर्तित्वेपीच्छाकृत्यादिनाऽन्यथासिद्धत्वात्, अपि तु क्रियाजनिका या विनियोज्यत्वेनेच्छा तद्विषयत्वम्, स्वविषयकतादृशेच्छाधीनत्वमेव तत्र क्रियान्यी सप्तर्म्थः, तदेकदेशविषयितायां निरूपकत्वेन प्रकृत्यर्थान्वयः। चर्मादेर्घात्यव्याघ्रादेः संबन्धश्च न सप्तम्यर्थः अपि तु सप्तम्याः साधुत्वे स्वरूपसन्नऽपेक्षितः

VII 7. 'गोषु दुह्यमानासु गतः' इत्यादौ "यस्य च भावेन" इत्यनेन गवादिपदात्सप्तमी। तत्समानाधिकरणदुह्यमानादिपदाच्च 'नीलं घटमानय' इत्यादौ नीलादिपदाद् द्वितीयावद् विशेषणपदस्य विशेष्यपदसमानविभक्तिकत्वनियमात् सप्तमी। विधायकसूत्रे च भावपदं क्रियापरं तथा च 'यद्विशेषणकृदन्तार्थविशेषणतापन्नक्रियान्तरस्य लक्षणम्=व्यावर्तनं तद्वाचकपदात्सप्तमी, इति तदर्थः, उक्तस्थले गमनादिक्रिया दोहानादिसिमानकालीनत्वादिविशेषणपुरस्कारेण बोध्यतयाऽभिप्रेता अतो व्यावर्तकविशेषण प्रविष्टतादृशक्रियाया अपि व्यावर्तकतया तत्कर्माद्यऽभेदान्वयिगवादिपदात्सप्तमी। अतस्तादृशसप्तम्याः समानकालीनत्वादिकमात्रमर्थस्तत्र दुह्याद्युपस्थापितदोहनादेर्निरूपकत्वेनाऽन्वयादू दोहनसमानकालीनत्वादिकं गमनादौ लभ्यते इति न युक्तम्-दुह्याद्युस्थापितक्रियायाः कृदन्तार्थविशेषणतयोस्थितायाः समानकालीनत्वादिविशेषणत्वासंभवात् प्रकृत्यर्थगवादिनाऽनन्वितार्थस्य सप्तम्या बोधनासंभवाच्च। किं तु समभिव्याहृतदोहनादिक्रियैव सप्तम्यर्थस्तस्याश्च समानकालीनत्वादिकं क्रियान्तरे संबन्धः, तत्र वर्तमानार्थककृत्समभिव्याहारस्थले समानकालीनत्वम् 'दोग्धव्यासु गतः' इत्यादिभविष्यदर्थकृत्स्थले प्राक्कालीनत्वम् 'दुग्धासु गतः' इत्यादावतीतार्थकृत्स्थले उत्तरकालीनत्वं संबन्धतया भसते। 'पाथसि पीते तृषा शाम्यति' इत्यादावतीतार्थककृत्समभिव्याहारात् कार्यकारणभावोपि संबन्धतया भासते इत्यादिकमूहनीयम्।

VII 8. 'गुणान्यत्वे सति सत्त्वात्' इत्यादौ 'सति' इत्यनन्तरम् 'सतः' इत्यध्याहार्यम्, अन्यथा लक्षणीयक्रियाऽभावेनोक्तसूत्राविषयतया

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

सप्तम्यनुपपत्तेः, तत्र चास्धातोरर्थ आधारता, गुणान्यत्वाद्याधारतायाश्च सत्ताधारतायां तद्वन्निष्ठत्वं संबन्धतया भासते इति चिन्तामणिकारोक्तसामानाधिकरण्यलाभनिर्वाहः। शयानेन चैत्रेण भुक्तम्' इत्यादौ शयन भोजनादिक्रिययोः समानकालीनत्वभानेपि तत्र लट्प्रत्ययेनैव समभिव्याहाराद् भोजनादिसमानकालीनत्वं शयनादिक्रियायां बोध्यतेऽतो न सप्तमी-अन्यतस्तदनभिधाने एव सप्तमीविधानात्।।

॥ इति सप्तम्यर्थविवेचनं समाप्तम्॥

अथ संबोधनप्रथमा

VIII 1. 'चैत्र त्वया भुज्यताम्' इत्यादौ "संबोधने च" इति प्रथमा संबोधनमेवाह। तच्च वक्तुरव्यवहितशब्दजन्यबोधाश्रयत्वेनेच्छा। प्रथमार्थतादृशेच्छाया विषयतासंबन्धेन प्रकृत्यर्थविशेषणतया भानम्।

अथ संबोध्यत्वज्ञानं विनापि 'त्वया भुज्यताम्' इत्यादिवाक्याधीनस्य चैत्रादेर्वाक्यार्थबोधस्य भोजनादिप्रवृत्तेश्च निर्वाहात् 'चैत्र' इत्यादिप्रथमान्तपदप्रयोगोऽनर्थक इति चेत्? न-संबोध्यतानुमापकाऽसाधारणाभिमुख्यादिविरहे विशिष्य चैत्रत्वाद्यवच्छिन्ने युष्मत्पदशक्तिग्रहनिर्वाहस्यैव तत्प्रयोजनत्वात्, चैत्रत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नै संबोध्यत्वग्रहं विना संबोध्यतावच्छेदकत्वोपलक्षितधर्मावच्छिन्न वाचकतत्पदस्य विशिष्य चैत्रत्वाद्यवच्छिन्ने शक्तेर्निश्चेतुमशक्यत्वात्।

VIII 2. न चैवमपि यत्रानन्तरवाक्यं न युष्मच्छब्दघटितम् 'चैत्राऽत्र घटोस्ति' इत्यादौ तत्र संबोधनपदसार्थक्यं दुरुपपादमेवेति वाच्यम्, तत्रापि तत्तद्वाक्ये स्वीयवाक्यार्थबोधार्थोच्चरितत्वरूपतात्पर्यनिश्चयार्थमेव तत्पदप्रयोगात्। तादृशतात्पर्यनिश्चयं विना श्रुतादपि तत्तद्वाक्याच्चैत्रादेः शाब्दबोधासंभवात्। चैत्रस्याऽश्वानयनादिबोधाय मैत्रस्य च लवणानयनादिबोधायोच्चरितात् 'सैन्धवमानय' इतिवाक्याद् वैपरीत्येन चैत्रमैत्रयोस्तत्तद्वाक्यार्थबोधवारणाय तदीयतदर्थबोधे तदीयतद्बोधार्थोच्चरितत्वरूपतात्पर्यनिश्चयस्य हेतुताया आवश्यकत्वात्।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VIII 3. ''संख्यातिरिक्तसुबर्थः प्रकृत्यर्थविशेष्यतयैव भासते'' इति नियमे संख्याभेदवत् संबोधनभेदोपि निवेशनीयः अतः संबोधनस्य प्रकृत्यर्थविशेषणतया भानेपि न क्षतिः। सबोधनस्य (अपि) प्रकृत्यर्थविशेष्यतयैव वा भानमुपेयम्। वस्तुतो नामार्थस्य प्रत्ययार्थमन्तरा कृत्वैव क्रियान्वय इत्यनुरोधात् सुबर्थकर्मत्वादेः प्रकृत्यर्थविशेष्यतयैव भानमुपेयते न तूक्तनियमानुरोधेन-उक्तनियमे मानाभावात्। संबोधनविभक्तयन्तप्रकृत्यर्थस्यान्यत्र विशेषणतया-ऽन्वयात् संबोधनस्य विशेष्यतया भानं निर्युक्तिकमिति कृतं विस्तरेण।

॥ इति संबोधनप्रथमार्थविवेचनं समाप्तम्॥

अथ स्त्रीप्रत्ययाः

IX 1. प्रातिपदिकप्रकृतिकाः 'स्त्रियाम्'' इत्यनेन विहिताष्टाबादयः क्वचित् स्त्रीत्वं प्रकृत्यर्थविशेषणतया बोधयन्ति-'अजाऽश्वा शूद्रा श्यामा चपला ब्राह्मणी गौरी सुकेशी गर्भिणी' इत्यादौ। स्त्रीत्वं च योनिमत्त्वम्। न च स्त्रीपरपदात् साधुत्वार्थष्टाबादिप्रत्ययो न तु स्त्रीत्वं तस्यार्थः, क्वचित् स्त्रीत्वबोधश्च स्त्रीप्रत्ययप्रकृतितात्पर्य-विषयत्वरूपलिङ्गज एवेति वाच्यम्, खट्वादौ व्यभिचारेण तादृशहेतोः स्त्रीत्वासाधकत्वात्। प्राणित्वेन विशेषणेपि देवतादौ व्यभिचारात्। वस्तुतस्तु 'अजवत्यप्यऽजा नास्ति' इत्यादिप्रयोगात् स्त्रीत्वस्य नञर्थान्वयितावच्छेदकतया भानमावश्यकम् अन्यथा पुंसाधारणजातिविशेषाद्यवच्छिन्नाभावस्य बाधेन तादृशप्रयोगस्य प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तेः।

IX 2. न च प्रातिपदिकार्थ एव स्त्रीत्वं तस्य च तदर्थे एव जात्यदिमति विशेषणत्वेनान्वयः स्त्रीप्रत्ययास्तु द्योतका एव अत एव-

''स्वार्थो द्रव्यं च लिङ्गंच संख्या कर्मादिरेव च।
अमी पञ्चैव नामार्थास्त्रयः केषां चिदग्रिमाः॥''

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

इति शाब्दिकानां कारिकापि संगच्छते, तत्र-स्वार्थ:=जात्यादिरूपो गावदिपदमुख्यार्थ:, द्रव्यम्=गवादिरूपस्तद्धर्मो तन्मते औपचारिको गवादिपदार्थ:, लिङ्गस्य प्रातिपदिकार्थत्वमावश्यकमेव-'नात्र ब्राह्मणोऽपि तु ब्राह्मणी, इत्यादौ पुंस्त्वबोधकपदान्तराभावेन तद्बोधानुपपत्ते:। ब्राह्मणादिपदाच्च जात्यादेर्द्रव्यस्य च भानं नियतमेव लिङ्गभानं तात्पर्ययोग्यताधीनं क्वाचित्कम्- 'ब्राह्मणी' इत्यादौ पुंस्त्वाद्यबोधादिति वाच्यम्, उक्तयुक्त्या पुंस्त्वस्य प्रतिपदिकार्थ-त्वेऽप्यनन्तानां प्रातिपदिकपदानां स्त्रीत्वार्थकत्वे गौरवात् लाघवेनाल्पीयसां स्त्रीप्रत्ययानां तदर्थकत्वकल्पनौचित्यात् अत एवं स्त्रीत्वसंग्रहाय ''प्रातिपदिकार्थ'' इत्यादिसूत्रे लिङ्गग्रहणम्, अन्यथा प्रातिपदिकार्थे एव तदन्तर्भावेन पृथक् तदुपादानानुपपत्ते:।

IX 3. क्वचित् स्त्रीप्रत्यय: स्त्रीत्वं भार्यात्वेन प्रकृत्यर्थविशेष्यतया बोधयति-'आचार्याणी' 'मनावी' 'शूद्री' इत्यादौ। भार्यात्वं संबन्धविशेष:, तत्रैव च निरूपकत्वेन प्रकृत्यर्थान्वय:। खट्वाऽटवीदेवतादिपदे च स्त्रीप्रत्यया नार्थबोधका:-तत्र प्रकृत्यर्थे योनिमत्त्वरूपस्त्रीत्वस्याऽयोग्यतयाऽनन्वयात्। न च ''शब्दगतं स्त्रीत्वादिरूपधर्मान्तरमेव तत्र परम्परासंबन्धेनाऽर्थगततया भासते'' इतिश्रीपतिदत्तोक्तं युक्तम्-तद्भाने मानाभावात्। ''यूस्त्र्याख्यौ'' इत्यत्र स्त्र्याख्यपदं स्त्रीलिङ्गशब्दपरं न तु स्त्रीत्वविशिष्टार्थकशब्दपरं तेनाऽटव्यादिशब्दानां स्त्रीत्वविशिष्टाऽबोधकत्वेपि न नदीसंज्ञानुपपत्ति:, अत एव श्रीभूप्रभृतीनां स्त्रीप्रत्ययान्तत्वाभावेन स्त्रीत्वविशिष्टाऽबोधकत्वेपि नदीसंज्ञाप्रसक्त्या ''नेयङुवङ्स्थानौ'' इतिनिषेधसंगति:। न चैवम् 'सेनान्ये स्त्रियैइत्यादावपि नदीसंज्ञा स्यात् सेनान्यादिशब्दस्य तत्र विशेष्यनिघ्नतया स्त्रीलिङ्गत्वादिति वाच्यम्, प्रयोगानुसारेण विशेष्यसमभिव्याहारानधीनाया: स्त्रीलिङ्गताया विवक्षणीयत्वादिति संक्षेप:॥

॥ इति स्त्रीप्रत्ययविवेचनं समाप्तम्॥

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

अथ तद्धितप्रत्ययाः

X 1. तद्धितप्रत्ययाअपि नामप्रकृतिकाः क्वचित् प्रकृत्यर्थेन स्वार्थैकदेशस्य क्वचिच्च तेन स्वार्थस्यान्वयबोधं जनयन्ति। तत्र 'गार्गिः' इत्यत्रापत्यार्थविहिततद्धितार्थस्याऽपत्यस्यैकदेशे जन्यत्वे निरूपकतया प्रकृत्यर्थगर्गाद्यन्वयः। गार्ग्यः इत्यादौ तद्धितार्थगोत्रापत्यैक-देशपुत्रत्वघटकजन्यत्वे तथा तदन्वयः। 'गार्ग्यायणः' इत्यादौ तद्धितार्थस्य युवापत्यस्यैकदेशे जन्यत्वे गार्ग्यस्य ''जीवति तु वंश्ये युवा'' इतिपरिभाषितयुवार्थघटकजीवने च गर्गादिरन्वयस्तेन 'गर्गादि-जीवनकालीनो गर्गगोत्रापत्यस्यापत्यमयम्' इति बोधः।

X 2. 'माञ्जिष्ठं वासः' इत्यत्र ''तेन रक्तम्'' इत्यर्थे तद्धितो विहितः; तत्संबन्धाधीनतदीयरूपारोपिविषयत्वं तेन रक्तत्वम्। 'शङ्खः पीतः' इत्यारोपमादाय शङ्खादेरारोप्यपीतिमाद्याश्रयहरितालादिरक्तत्वस्य वारणायाऽधीनान्तमारोपे विशेषणम्। पटादेश्चक्षुरादिना रक्तत्वस्य वारणाय तदीयत्वं रूपविशेषणम्। अत्र च रागकरणस्य मञ्जिष्ठादेः प्रकृत्यर्थस्य तद्धितार्थैकदेशसंबन्धे प्रतियोगितया रूपे चाश्रयतया-ऽन्वयः।

'शूल्यम्' उख्यम्' इत्यादौ तद्धितार्थसंस्कृतैकदेशे पाकादिरूपसंस्कारे शूलोखादेः प्रकृत्यर्थस्याधिकरणत्वेनान्वयः। 'पौषी रात्रिः' इत्यादौ नक्षत्रयुक्तकालार्थे तद्धितः, कालस्य नक्षत्रयुक्तत्वं च तन्नक्षत्रशशिभोगाश्रयत्वं तदेकदेशे शशिभोगे कर्मतया तन्नक्षत्रान्वयः।

X 3. 'पौषो मासः' 'पौषौ वर्षः' इत्यादौ ''साऽस्मिन्' इत्यनेन विहितस्य तद्धितस्य पौर्णमासीघटितत्वावच्छिन्नोऽर्थः, पौर्णमास्यां प्रकृत्यर्थपौष्यादेरभेदेनान्वयः। पौषादिपदं च न केवलं यौगिकम्-'पौषः पक्षः' इत्यादिव्यवहारविरहात्, अतो रूढमपि, अत एव सूत्रे संज्ञाग्रहणम्। रूढिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकं च मासनिष्ठशुक्लप्रतिपदादिदर्शान्ततिथिसमुदायत्वं न तु त्रिंशत्तिथिरूपमासत्वमात्रम्-यत्किंचित्तिथ्यवधिकत्रिंशत्तिथिसमुदाये

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

मासव्यवहारेपि चान्द्रसौरपौषादिबहिर्भूतपौष्यादिघटित-त्रिंशत्तिथ्यन्तर्गततिथिपु पौषादिव्यवहारविरहात्।

X 4. अथैवमपि सौरे पौषादिव्यवहारस्य निर्विवादतया धनु:स्थरवि-विशिष्टत्वमेव न कथं पौषादिपदशक्यतावच्छेदकमुपेयते इतिचेत्? न-सौरे पौषादौ पौष्यादिपूर्णिमाया अलाभे योगरूढिलभ्य-पौषपदार्थविलोपापत्ते:। न च तत्र रूढिमात्रमवलम्ब्यैव पौषादिव्यवहार: सौरपौषादौ मुख्य इति वोच्यम्, तथा सति योगार्थव्युत्पादनवैयर्थ्यात्।

अथ विलुप्यतां वर्षविशेषे पौषादिपदमुख्यार्थ: (व्यवहार:) का क्षति:? लक्षणया सौरमासे पौषव्यवहारस्योपगन्तव्यत्वात् स्थलपद्मादौ पङ्कजव्यवहारवदितिं चेत्? तर्हि तत्र पौषादिपदमुख्यार्थमासनिमित्तकाऽऽब्दिकश्राद्धादिविलोपप्रसङ्ग:।

X 5. यथाश्रुतशूलपाणिग्रन्थानुसारिणस्तु-धनुरादिस्थरव्यारब्धशुक्लप्रति-पदादिदर्शान्तेषु धनुरादिस्थरविसमाप्यमकरादिस्थरविसंक्रान्ति-मन्मासभिन्नधनुरादिस्थरव्यऽधिकरणशुक्लप्रतिपदादिदर्शान्तेषु वा पौषादिपदस्य रूढ़त्वमेव स्वीकुर्वन्ति न तु यौगिकत्वम्-''अन्त्योपान्त्यौ त्रिभौज्ञेयौ'' इतिवचनात्, पौषादिमासीयपौर्णमास्यां पुष्यादियोगस्यानियमात्। न च योगानादरे लाघवात् तत्तद्राशिस्थरं-विविशिष्ठकालरूपसौरादिमासे एव पौषादिपदशक्तिरुचितेति वाच्यम्, ''सा वैशाखस्याऽमावास्या या रोहिण्या संबध्यते'' इत्यादि-श्रुतिबलाच्चान्द्रे एव वैशाखादिपदशक्तिसिद्धे:।

X 6. वस्तुत: ''नक्षत्रेण युक्त: काल:' इत्यत्र नक्षत्रयोगयोग्यत्वमेव विवक्षितम्-पुष्पाद्ययुक्तायामपि पौषादिपूर्णिमायां पौष्यादिव्यवहारात्, अन्यथा ''माध्यां यदि मघा नास्ति'' इत्यादेरसंगत्यापत्ते:। पुष्यादियोगयोग्यता च धुनरादिस्थरव्यारब्धपक्षीयत्वं तद्रूपाक्रान्तपौर्ण-मासीघटितत्वरूपयोगलभ्यतावच्छेदकं नियतमेव पौषादेरिति नोक्तानुपपत्त्या यौगिकत्वनिरा-करणसंभवस्तत्पदानाम्।

अथैवं निरुक्तरूपस्य पुष्याद्यघटिततया तेन रूपेण पूर्णिमाबोधक-पौष्यादिशब्दानां योगिकत्वप्रसक्तिरेव नास्ति, 'पौषी रात्रि:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

इत्यादौ पुष्यादियोग एव प्रतीयते न तु निरुक्तं योग्यत्वम्-मकरादिस्थरव्यारब्धकृष्णपक्षीयरात्र्यादावपि तथाव्यवहारदिति "नक्षेत्रण युक्तः कालः" इत्यत्र योग एव विवक्षणीयो न तु योगयोग्यत्वमिति पौर्णमास्यां पौष्यादिपदस्य न यौगिकत्वसंभव इति चेत्? भवतु पौष्यदिपदं निरुक्तरूपा-वच्छिन्नपूर्णिमारूढमेव। पौषादिपदानां तु तद्योगपुरस्कारेण मासवाचकत्वे बोधकाभावाद् यौगिकत्वं कथं प्रत्याख्येम्?

X 7. न च "सास्मिन् पौर्णमासी "इतिसूत्रस्य' अस्मिन् पौष्यादिपूर्णिमा योग्यता' इत्यर्थविवक्षया धुनरादिराशिस्थरव्यारब्धशुल्क-प्रतिपदादिदर्शान्ते तद्धितान्तसमुदायरूढिग्राहकतयोपपत्तौ योगरुढिस्वीकारोऽनुचित इविवाच्यम्, केवलरूढिपक्षे समुदायश-क्यतावच्छेदकशरीरे आरब्धान्तविशेषणप्रक्षेपेण गौरवात्, पौषतैषमाघादिनानापदानां गुरुधर्मावच्छिन्ने शक्तिकल्पनमपेक्ष्य 'सास्मिन्' इत्यर्थेऽणः प्रत्ययस्यैकशक्तिकल्पनाधिक्यस्योचितत्वात्।

न च योगरूढिपक्षे पौषादिपदानां योगार्थरूढ्यर्था-भेदान्वयबोधजनकत्वकल्पनाधिक्येन गौरवमिति वाच्यम्, भवन्मतेपि तत्तदर्थे यौगिकरूढत्वभ्रमदशायां सति च तत्तदर्थाभेदान्वयपरत्वग्रहे तथान्वयबोधस्य दुरपह्नवतया तत्र तादृशबोधहेतुताकल्पन-स्यावश्यकत्वादिति दिक्।

X 8. 'वैष्णवी ऋक्' 'ऐन्द्रं हविः' इत्यादौ देवतार्थविहिततद्धितस्य तद्देवताकत्वमर्थः। मन्त्रस्य तद्देवताकत्वं तदुद्देश्यकत्यागकरणत्वेन वेदबोधितत्वम्।

अथ मन्त्रस्य त्यागकरणत्वं बाधितमेव-विनापि मन्त्र-मिच्छाविशेषरूपस्य तस्योत्पत्त्या व्यभिचारात्, इष्टसाधनताज्ञान-घंटितक्लृप्तसामग्र्या अन्यथासिद्धत्वाच्चेति मन्त्रस्य करणतां कथं वेदो बोधयेद्? बोधयन् वा प्रमाणं भवेत्? सत्यम्-मन्त्रस्य त्यागकरणत्वं त्यागाङ्गोच्चारणकत्वं न तु तज्जनकत्वमतो न दोषः हविषस्तद्देवताकत्वं च तदुद्देश्यकत्यागकर्मत्वम्-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

तत्त्यागोद्देश्यताया एव तद्देवतात्वपदार्थत्वात्। न चैवं घृतादिसंप्रदानब्राह्मणस्य घृतादिदेवतात्वापत्तिः, उद्देश्यपदेन वेदबोधितद्रव्यस्वामित्व-प्रकरणेच्छाविषयताया एव विवक्षितत्वात् संप्रदाने च स्वामित्वस्याऽबोधितत्वात्।

X 9. न च त्यागोद्देश्यतायाश्चतुर्थ्यापि बोधनात् तद्धितचतुर्थ्योर्देव-तात्वबोधकतायामविशेषात्

तद्धितेन चतुर्थ्या वा मन्त्रलिङ्गेन वा पुनः।
देवतासङ्गतिस्त्रत्र दुर्बलं तु परं परम्॥

इत्यनेन विरोध इति वाच्यम्, त्यागोद्देश्यतायां वेदमेयत्वस्याधिकस्य निवेशनीयतया चतुर्थ्या तदंशाऽबोधनेन तस्योपायान्तरबोध्यतया चतुर्थ्यधीनदेवतात्वबोधस्य विलम्बिततया तद्धितापेक्षया चतुर्थ्या जघन्यतोपपत्तेः। देवतार्थविहिततद्धितेन तु देवतात्वघटकतदंशस्यापि बोधनात्।

X 10. अथ चतुर्थ्या वेदमेयत्वांशस्य साक्षादबोधनेपि त्यागोद्देश्यत्वस्य साक्षाद् बोधनेन पित्रादीनां साहित्यावच्छिन्नानाम् ''पितृभ्यो दद्यात्'' इति चतुर्थ्य धीनत्यागोद्देश्यताबोधस्य ''पितरो देवता'' इति तद्धितसमानार्थकदेवतापदाधीननिरपेक्षत्यागोद्देश्यत्व-बोधापेक्षयाऽविलम्बितत्वेन ''साहित्यावच्छिन्नानां निरपेक्षणां वा श्राद्धोद्देश्त्वम्'' इत्यत्र चतुर्थ्यपेक्षया देवतापदस्य बलवत्त्व-रूपं शूलपाणिपर्यालोचितं विनिगमकं न संगच्छते इति चेत्? न-''पितृभ्यो दद्यात्'' इतिचतुर्थ्या साहित्यावच्छिन्नस्य त्यागोद्देश्यताबोधे तत्र वेदसमानार्थकस्मृतिवाक्यजन्यत्वग्रहे सत्येवाऽप्रामाण्यशङ्कानुदयः तादृशग्रहश्च विलम्बितः। देवतापदात् त्यागोद्देश्यताबोधश्च तदुद्देश्यतांशे वेदबोधितत्वावगाही स्वस्मिन्नऽ-प्रामाण्यशङ्काव्युदासाय न ज्ञानान्तरमपेक्षते-स्वस्यैव स्वात्मकोद्देश्यता बोधांशेऽप्रामाणण्यव्यावर्तकवेदजन्यत्वावगाहनात्, अप्रामाण्य-शङ्काकलङ्कितश्च बोधो जातोप्यऽकिंचित्कर इति देवतापदस्य

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

झटिति निश्चीयमानप्रामाण्यबोधजनकतया बलवत्त्वेन विनिगमनाया उपपत्तेः।

X 11. एवं श्राद्धार्थावाहनप्रकाशकात् ''पितरः'' इत्यादिमन्त्राद् बहुवचनोपस्थापितसाहित्यावच्छिन्नाऽऽवाहनबोधेन साहित्या-वच्छिन्नानां श्राद्धदेवतात्वलाभेपि मन्त्रलिङ्गस्य विपक्षबाधकत-र्कादिसापेक्षव्याप्तिनिश्चयाधीनतया सुतराम् ''पितरो देवता'' इत्यतो दुर्बलतेति बोध्यम्।

X 12. 'कापोतम्' 'राजतम्' 'जनता' इत्यादौ समूहार्थविहितस्य तद्धितस्य पर्याप्तसमुदायत्वावच्छिन्नोऽर्थः, पर्याप्तौ प्रकृत्यर्थकपोतत्वाद्यव-च्छिन्नस्यान्वयः। कपोतशुकसारिकादिपर्याप्तसमुदायत्वस्य पर्याप्तिश्च न न्यूनवृत्तिकपोतत्वादिनाऽवच्छिद्यते अतो न तादृशसमुदाये कापोतादिव्यवहारः। पर्याप्त्यऽवच्छेदकत्वे चाऽन्यूनवृत्तित्वमेव तन्त्रं न त्वऽनतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वमपि अन्यथाऽऽकाशत्वादेरिव घटत्वादेरपि द्वित्वादिपर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकता न स्यात् (तथा च) 'आकाशौ' इतिवत् 'घटौ' इत्यपि न स्यात्। इत्थं च कपोतमात्रवृत्तिशतत्वादिपर्याप्तावप्यऽतिरिक्तवृत्तिकपोतत्वाद्य-वच्छिन्नत्वनिर्वाहात् कपोतशतादावपि कापोतादिव्यवहारोपपत्तिः। पर्याप्त्यतिप्रसक्तधर्मस्य तदनवच्छेदकत्वे गत्यन्तरं चिन्तनीयम्।

॥ इति तद्धितप्रत्ययार्थविवेचनं समाप्तम्॥

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER II

ENGLISH TRANSLATION WITH EXPLANATIONS

THE ACCUSATIVE-MEANING

Accusative-meaning in association with the roots expressing inference

II (i).1. In the accusative statements associated with the roots expressing the sense of inference, the accusatives (must be admitted to) express the state of being what is to be established or predicated upon (*vidheyatva*) or the state of describing the being what is to be established or predicated upon (*vidheyitva*). Consequently, the accusative statement such as 'I infer fire etc. as subject or minor term (*pakṣa*)', need not be valid.

However, suppose it can be admitted that even accusative statements such as 'I infer the mountain as being the possessor of the fire' (*vahnimattvena parvatam anuminomi*), which are intended to refer to the inference having the fire as the probandum or major term (*sādhya*) and the mountain as the subject or minor term (*pakṣa*), are valid, then in the accusative statements associated

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with the roots expressing the sense of inference, the accusatives (can be admitted to) express the state of being the item wherein something is to be established or the subject (*uddeśyatva*) or the state of describing the being the item wherein something is to be established or the subject (*uddeśyitva*). And such an accusative-meaning is to be related to the root-meaning, i.e. the action of inferring, qualified by the state of being what describes the to be establishedness of the probandum or major term obtained from the instrumental word. Consequently, in the event of the non-utterance of the sequence of the instrumental word 'as being the possessor of the fire' (*vahnimattvena),* the accusative statements such as 'I infer that the hill exists' (*parvatam anuminomi)* need not be correct.

Explanation

After having established the accusative-meaning in connection with the statements associated with the roots expressing the perception, Gadādhara begins the second part of the second *kāraka* with the explanation of the accusative meaning in connection with the accusative statements associated with the roots expressing the sense of inference. The Prācyas hold that in the accusative statements such as *'parvate vahnim anuminomi'* the accusatives express the state of being what is to be established or predicated upon (*vidheyatva)*, which is related to the action of inferring through describing. However, since the relation of describing is not an occurrence-exacting relation, the absence of such an accusative-meaning cannot be related to the inferring through such a relation in the corresponding negative statements such as *'parvate vahnim na anuminomi'.* Therefore, the Navyas hold that in such statements, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

accusatives express the state of describing the being what is to be established or predicated upon (*vidheyitva)* which is to be related to the action of inferring through the substratumness which is an occurrence-exaction relation, and hence can be the relation of even the absence of such an accusative-meaning in the negative statements. Also, it should be noted that such a state of describing the being what is to be established is contradictory in the action of inferring in the accusative statement '*vahnim anuminomi*' wherein the fire is the subject (*pakṣa)* but not the probandum (*sādhya);* and hence the same statement stands avoided.

Though when the fire is intended to be the probandum, the accusative statements such as '*parvatam anuminomi*' cannot be valid, the instrument-accusative statements such as '*vahnimattvena parvatam anuminomi*' can be admitted as valid. And since the state of being what is to be established (*vidhyatva)* cannot be existing in the mountain, i.e. the accusative base-meaning, the Prācyas hold that the accusatives express the state of being the item wherein something is to be established or the subject (*uddeśyatva)* which can exist in the mountain, i.e. the subject (*pakṣa),* and is related to the action of inferring through the describing. However, since the describing is not an occurrence-exacting relation, and the absence of such an accusative-meaning cannot be related to the action of inferring through such a describing, the Navyas, like earlier, hold that the accusatives express the state of describing the being the item wherein something is to be established or the subject (*uddeśyitva)* which is to be related to the action of inferring as qualified by the state of being what describes the to be establishedness of the probandum (*sādhyavidheyakatva)* through the substratumness which is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

an occurrence-exacting relation. Here the purpose of qualifying the inferring by such a state is to avoid the incorrect accusative statement '*parvatam* anuminomi' without the instrumental phrase 'vahnimattvena'; and since when the instrumental phrases is not used, the action of inferring cannot be qualified by such a state, the relation of the accusative-meaning becomes untenable with such a qualified inferring, and hence the incorrect statement gets avoided.

Refutation of the objection that vahnividheyakatva cannot be obtained

II (ii). 2. However, it should not be objected that due to the absence of the grammatical rule sanctioning the instrumental case ending in the sense such as the state of being what is to be established or predicateness (*vidheyatva)* etc., the state of being what describes the to be establishedness (i.e. predicateness) of the fire etc. cannot be caused to be recollected from the instrumental word (*vahnimattvena)* etc.

Due to the fact that he grammatical rule sanctioning the instrumental case ending in the sense of the qualification (association) etc. is present (P. ii. 3. 21), such a sense of the state of being what is to be established or the state being what describes the to be establishedness or predicateness can be obtained. For, even such a sense of the state of being what is to be established etc. too is of the from of the qualification (association) only.

That is why in the statements such as 'He knows (perceives) the shell as being the silver' (*rajatatvena śuktim jānāti)*. the state of describing the qualifierness of the silveriness etc. can be cognized in the action of knowing (perceiving) from the instrumental word; and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

according to the theory of Saundaḍa in the statements such as 'The fire does not occur as being the potness' (*ghaṭatvena vahnir nāsti*). the state of describing the counter-positiveness of the potness-delimited etc. can be cognized in the absence from the instrumental word. It should be noted that in the statements such as 'He knows (perceives) the shell as being the silver' (*rajatatvena śuktim jānāti*) etc., the cognition of the relation of being what is to be delimited and what delimits between the state of describing the objectness (qualificandness) of the shell, i.e. the sense expressed by the accusative word (*śuktim*), and the state of describing the qualifierness of the silver, i.e. the sense expressed by the instrumental word (*rajatatvena),* is governed by the convention of the qualificative cognition of the qualifieds. The mere cognition of the two items in the way (form) of collective cognition, wherein the two items are cognized in a single locus, is against the sematical convention in such cases. Consequently, such a statement as 'He knows (preceives) the shell as being the silver', which is intended to produce the valid verbal cognition that 'These two are shell and the silver' (*ime raṅgarajate*), does not have any validity.

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection now as follows: That since there is no grammatical rule assigning the instrumental case ending in the sense of the state of being what is to be established or the predicateness (*vidheyatva*) etc., the same (state of being that is to be established etc.) cannot be cognized from the instrumental as relating to the action of inferring etc. However, Gadādhara refutes such an objection by stating that the rule '*itthambhūtalakṣaṇe*' (P. ii. 3. 21) assigns the instrumental in the sense of the qualification (*vaiśiṣṭya*),

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and the state of being what is to be established or predicateness (*vidheyatva)* is only of the form of such a qualification; and hence such a *vidheyatva* can be cognized from the instrumental.

Also, Gadādhara explains the reason as to why the instrumental should be admitted as expressing the qualification. According to him, in the statements such as *'rajatatvena śuktim jānāti'* and *'ghaṭatavena vahnir nāsti'* etc., the qualification of the state of describing the qualfierness of the silverness (*rajatatvaprakārakatvavaiśiṣ ṭya)* and the qualification of the state of describing the counterpositiveness of the potness-delimited (*ghaṭ atvāvacchnina pratiyogitākatvavaiśiṣṭya)* are cognized in the action of knowing (describing the qualifierness of the silver and the qualificandness of the shell) and in the absence of the fire respectively from the instrumentals *'rajatatvena'* and *'ghaṭatvena'* respectively. Also according to him, in *'rajatatvena śuktim jānāti,* etc., the state of describing the qualifierness of the silverness, expressed by the instrumental *'rajatatvena'* and the state of describing the qualificandeness of the shelleness, expressed by the accusative *'śuktim'* must necessarily be cognized as having the relation of being the delimitor and delimited (*avacchedyāvacchedakabhāva)* by the convention of the cognition of the qualification of the qualifieds (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyabodhamaryādā);* otherwise the same statement such as *'rajatatvena śuktim jānāti'* would become necessary to be made with the intention of conveying the collective cognition (*samūhālambanabodha)* that 'These two are shell and silver' (*ime raṅgarajate)* wherein no relation of being the delimitor and the delimited is cognized between the silver and the shell (here only the two items, shell and silver, are cognized in one locus).

Explanation of qualifications such as the relation of the delimitor and the delimited

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II (ii). 3. Now in the case of the statements such as 'The fire does not exist as being the pot' (*ghaṭatvena vahnir nāsti)*, we admit the relation of qualification, namely, the relation of the delimitor and the delimited between the state of describing the counter-positiveness, which is delimited by the contradictory potness and resident in the absence of the fire, and the state of being the absence of the fire that is of the form of being the subject (ness), described by the fire, which is resident in the absence of fire delimited by the contradictory porperty of the potness. Thus, in the statement 'The fire does not exist as being the pot' (*ghaṭatvena vahnir nāsti)* etc, the cognition of word-meanings involving such a relation of qualification is necessary as stated earlier. Now, since the absence of fire delimited by the contradictory property of the potness is co-extensive (*samaniyata)* with the absence of pot delimited by the contradictory property of the fireness, and hence is identical with such an absence, the state of being the absence of the pot and the state of describing the counterpositiveness of the potness-delimited may be held to be present in such an absence of the fire delimited by the contradictory property of the potness. However, the statements such as 'The pot does not exist as being the pot' (*ghaṭatvena ghaṭo nāsti)* and 'The fire does not exist as being the fire' *(vahnitvena vahnir nāsti)* which are intended to convey such an absence of the fire as delimited by the contradictory property of the potness, need not be valid.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains the relation of qualification, namely the relation of the delimitor and the delimited

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in the statements such as '*ghaṭatvena vahnir nāsti*' According to him, the fire exists in the absence of fire. delimited the contradictory potness (*ghaṭatvādyavacchinn-avahnyabhāva*), through the relation of describing its own counter-positiveness (*svapratiyogitākatvasambandha*); and therefore, the relational subjunctness of the absence of fire described by the fire (*vahnyādinirūpitānuyogitā*) is of the form of the state of being the absence of fire (*vahnyabhāvatva*) only. Now since the state of describing the counter-positiveness delimited by the contradictory potness (*ghaṭatvādyavacchinnapratiyogitākatva*) and the state of being the absence of the fire (*vahnyabhāvatva*) are co-residents in the absence of fire, the same can be admitted to have the relation of qualification, namely the relation of the delimitor and the delimited (*avacched-yāvacchedakabhāva*) between them. The advantage of admitting such a relation of the delimitor and the delimited between such states is that since the verbal cognition produced from '*ghaṭatvena vahnir nāsti*' must necessarily involve a reference to the same relation of the delimitor and the delimited between the same two states, the statements such as '*ghaṭatvena ghaṭo nāsti*' and '*vahnitvena vahnir nāsti*', when intended to convey such an absence of the fire delimited by the contradictory property of the potness, need not become valid due to the fact that such statements refer to the relation of the delimitor and the delimited between the *ghaṭavā-dyavacchinnapratiyogitākatva* and the *ghaṭābhāvatva* and between the *vahnitvādyacchinnapratiyogitākatva* and the *vahnybhāvatva*. This is in spite of the fact that the absences describing the counter-positivenesses delimited by the contradictory properties (*vyadhikaraṇadhar-māvacchinna pratiyogitākābhāva*) such as '*ghaṭaṭvena vahnir nāsti*' and '*vahnitvena ghaṭo nāsti*' are

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

unnegatables and hence are identical; and therefore, the absence of the fire as being the potness-delimited can be claimed to have both the state of describing the counter-positiveness of the potness-delimited (*ghaṭatvādyavacchinnapratiyogitākatva)* and the state of being the absence of the pot (*ghaṭābhāvatva)*.

Refutation of the theory of the Prācīnaikadeśins

II. (ii). 4. Some schollars (the Prācīnaikadeśins) hold here that in the said cases, the meaning expressed by the instrumental word (*vahnimattvena)* is to be related to the meaning expressed by the accusative word (*parvataṁ)* through the relation of qualification, namely, the relation of the delimitor and the delimited.

However, such a theory is not correct. The relation of the meaning expressed by one case ending with the meaning expressed by another case ending is against the accepted semantical convention. Now it may be argued as follows : That in the passive statement such as 'This shell is known as being the silver' *(rajatatvena idaṁ jñāyate*), the qualifierness expressed by the instrumental word is related to the objectness (qualificandness) expressed by the coniugational ending through the relation of describing; and therefore, the assumption of such a semantical convention is itself untenable. However, such an argument is not correct. The undesired contingency of the over-extension can be avoided by merely admitting that in such cases the state of being what is described by the knowledge, the meaning expressed by the verbal root, as qualified by the state of describing the qualifierness of the silverness (the instrumental meaning), is related to the objectness (the qualificandess), i.e. the meaning expressed by the conjugational ending.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Also it may be objected now as follows : In the statements such as 'He cooks (rice) since he is hungry' *(tasmāt pacati)* and 'It belongs to Caitra since he has bought it' *(tasmāt caitrasya)*, the state of describing the causality, i.e. the meaning expressed by the causal ablative, is seen to be relating to the effort (acctivity) and to the relation, i.e. the meanings expressed by the conjugational and the genitive endings ; and therefore, such a semantical convention is not tenable. However, even such an objection is not correct. The semantical convention is merely regarding the untenability of the relation of the meanings expressed by the case endings, that are other than the ones expressing the causality, with the meaning of another case ending.

Explanation

Now, the Prācīnaikadeśins try to explain the cognition of the relation of the delimitor and the delimited *(avacchedyāvacchedakabhāva)*. According to them, in the statement '*rajatatvena śuktim jānāti*' etc. the state of describing the qualifierness of the silverness etc., which is expressed by the instrumental, is related to the state of describing the objectness (qualificandness) of the shell etc., which is expressed by the accusative, through the relation of the delimitor and the delimited *(avacchedyāvacchedakabhāva)*; and therefore in '*vahnimattvena parvatam anuminoti*' etc. too, the relation of the delimitor and the delimited can be cognized by relating the state of being what describes the to be establishedness (i.e. predicateness) of the fire, *(vahnividheyakatva)* to the state of describing the being the item wherein something is to be established (i.e. subjectness) of the mountain *(parvatoddeśyakatva)* through the same relation of the delimitor and the delimited.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, Gadādhara refutes the theory of the Prācīnaikadeśins. According to him, since the relation of the meaning of any case with the meaning of any other case is against the semantical convention, the relation of the state of being what describes the to be establishedness or predicateness of the fire etc., with the state of describing the being the item wherein something is to be established or subjectness of the mountain etc. through the relation of the delimitor and the delimited is untenable. It should be noted that Prācīnaikadeśins try to defend their theory on the ground that in the passive instrumental statements such as '*rajatatvena idam jñāyate*' etc. the qualifierness of the silver etc. expressed by the instrumental '*rajatatvena*' etc. is related to the objectness (qualificandness) etc. expressed by the conjugational ending 'te' etc. through the relation of describing; and hence the meaning expressed by one case ending can be abmitted to be relating to the meaning expressed by another (conjugational) case ending. However, Gadādhara refutes even such a defence. According to him, in such passive instrumental cases, the qualifierness of the silverness etc. expressed by the instrumental is not related to the qualificandness etc. expressed by the conjugational ending etc. through the describing; but rather only the state of describing the qualifierness of the silverness etc., expressed by the instrumental, is related to the root-meaning such as the action of knowing, etc. which is further related to the qualificandness etc. expressed by the conjugational ending through the describing; and hence the over-extension (*atiprasaṅga)* of the form of relation of the meaning of the instrumental with the meaning of the conjugational ending stands avoided.

In the ablative statements such as 'He cooks (rice) since he is hungary' *(tasmāt pacati)* and 'It belongs to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

him since he has bought it' (*tasmāt caitrasya)* etc., the cognitions produced are : that i) the activity conducive to the action of cooking is caused by the hunger and that ii) the ownership belonging to Caitra is caused by the buying etc; and on this ground the Prācīnaikadeśins object that the relation of the meaning expressed by one case ending with the meaning expressed by another case ending cannot be held to be against the semantical convention. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection of the Prācīnikadeśins by admitting a restrictive semantical convention that the meaning expressed by the case ending, which is other than the ablative expressing the causality, cannot be related to the meaning expressed by any case ending directly.

Refutation of the position that meaning of a non-kāraka case cannot be related to the action

II (ii). 5. It may again be held as follows : That in the statement such as 'He knows this shell as being the silver' (*rajatatvena idam jānāti)* etc., the instrumental case does not have the state of functioning as the *kāraka* case; and consequently, the (state of describing the) qualifierness, i.e. the meaning expressed by such an instrumental, cannot be related to the action of knowing, i.e. the root-meaning. Therefore, inevitably due to the lack of any other alternative, the same needs to be admitted as relatings to the objectness, i.e. the meaning expressed by the accusative in such cases.

However, this position too cannot be correct. According to the theory of Gaṅgeśa, the author of Tattva Cintāmaṇai, in the statement such as 'He knows it since he has studied it' (*tasmat jānāti*) etc., the state of describing the causality, i.e. the meaning expressed by the causal ablative, is related to only the action of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

knowing, i.e. the meaning expressed by he verbal root. Also, according to the theories of all, in the statements such as 'He stays since he is invited' (*tasmāt sthīyate)* etc., the state of describing the causality, i.e. the meaning expressed by the causal ablative, is related only to the action of staying, i.e. the meaning expressed by the verbal root, Also, in the statement such as 'The doctor should treat the teacther, the Brahmin, the ascetic and the poor (wretched) with ones own medicine' (*guruvipratapasvidurgatānām pratikurvīta bhiṣak svabheṣ ajaiḥ),* the relation, i.e. the meaning expressed by the genitive, is related to the action of treating, i.e. the meaning expressed by the verbal root. Also, in the statements not associated with any grammatical objects such as 'He knows (this) as being the silver' (*rajatatvena jānāti)* etc., the state of describing the qualifierness, i.e. the meaning expressed by the instrumental, needs to be related to the action of knowing, i.e. the meaning expressed by the verbal root. Thus the convention that the meaning expressed by the case ending that is other than the *kāraka* case is not related to the action, i.e. the meaning expressed by the verbal root, is not tenable to be admitted.

Explanation

The Prācīnaikadeśins try again to prove the position that in *' rajatatvena idaṁ jānāti*'-jñāyate' etc., the state of describing the qualifierness of the silverness (*rajatatva-prakārakatva*) cannot be related to the actions of knowing etc., i.e. the meaning expressed by the verbal roots, but the same must be related to the qualificandness (*viśeṣ yatā)* etc., i.e. the meanings expressed by the conjugational or the other case endings. According to them, since the instrumental etc. in *rajatatvena idam jānati-jñāyate'* etc. are non-kāraka-cases, governed by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the rule *ittambhūtalakṣaṇe'* (P. ii. 3. 21), the same cannot be held to be related to the actions such as knowing etc. expressed by the verbal roots.

However, Gadādhara refutes such a position on the ground that Gaṅgeśa, the author of Tattva Cintāmaṇi, has admited that in statements, such as '*tasmāt jānāti'* etc., which are to be explained as '*yasmād adhītam tasmāt jānāti'* etc., the state of describing the causality (*hetukatva)* etc., expressed by the non *kāraka-* ablatives, must be related to the action of knowing etc. expressed by the verbal roots. Also, he refutes the position on the ground that in the statements such as '*rajatatven jānāti'* etc, which are not associated with any words expressing the objects etc., the state of describing the qualifierness of the silverness (*rajatatvaprakārakatva)* necessarily needs to be related to only the actions such as knowing etc. expressed by the verbal roots, as the same cannot be related to the objectness (qualificandness) (*viṣayatva)* etc. (here no case endings expressing such meanings are present). Thus, Gadādhara establishes his theory that the rule that the meanings expressed by the case endings that are other than the *kāraka*-cases cannot be related to the actions expressed by the roots cannot be maintained.

Gadādhara's own theory

II (ii). 6. This way, therefore, in the negative statements such as 'The fire does not exist as being the pot' (*ghaṭatvena vahnir nāsti)* etc., the meaning expressed by the nominative is not the relational subjunctness. The nominative is ruled (restricted) as not to be expressing the meaning which is other than the number. Therefore, such a meaning of the nominative (i.e. the relational subjunctness) is merely the relation of the relational adjunct (the fire) with the absence, i.e. the meaning

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

expressed by the negative particle (*na*). Thus, the meaning expressed by the instrumental word '*ghaṭatvena*' cannot be related to such a relational subjunctness.

However, for me, Gadādhara, the qualification of the state of describing the counter-positiveness of the potness-delimited, i.e. the meaning expressed by the instrumental word, can be cognized in the absence qualified by the fire etc. through the relation of subjunctness. And therefore, the fire etc., which are related to their absences through the relation of subjunctness in the cases (such as 'The fire does not exist as being the pot), involving a reference to the relation of subjunctness described by the fire etc. in accordance with the rule of the qualificative cognition of the qualifieds, can be admitted to have been cognized to have the relation of the delimitor and the delimited with such a state of describing the counter-positiveness of the potness-delimited. Thus, the avoidance of the overapplication (i.e. relation of the meaning of the instrumental with the meaning of another case) becomes properly explained. However, if the relational subjunctness is held to be the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning (absence) expressed by the negative particle, then the fire etc., i.e. the relational adjuncts, are to be related to the same subjunctness (through describing). Therefore, it seems best that the overapplication is avoided by admitting that in such cases the counter-positiveness of the potness-delimited etc., are related to only the relational subjunc-tness through the state of describing.

Explanation

Just as the meaning of one case ending cannot be related to the meaning of another case ending, in the same way, the same cannot be related to the relation of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a meaning. Therefore, in '*ghaṭatvena vahnir nāsti*' etc., the state of describing the counterpositiveness of the potness-delimited, i.e. the meaning of the instrumental word '*ghaṭatvena*', cannot be related to the relatinal subjunct-ness, the relation of the fire with absence. Also, it should be noted that the relational subjunctness cannot be the meaning of the nominative case as the nominatives are assigned only in the sense of the numbers (P. ii. 3. 46); thus, such a subjunctness is merely the relation of the fire, i.e. the nominative-meaning, with the absence, i.e. the meaning of the negative particle. In this regard, Gadādhara explains his own theory as follows :

That the fire exists through the relation of counter-positiveness; and hence the subjunctness described by the fire is found in the absence of fire. Also, the state of describing the counter-positiveness of the potness-delimited exists in such an absence qualified by the fire through the subjunctness. Now, since in the case of '*ghaṭ atvena vahnir nāsti*' etc., the absence, qualified by the fire through such a subjuntness, has the qualification of such a state of describing the counter-positiveness, the relation of being the delimitor and the delimited (*avacchedyāvacchedakabhāva*) can be admitted to be cognized between the state of describing the counter-positiveness of the potness-delimited and the fire through the absence.

It should be noted here that the state of describing the counter-positiveness of the potness-delimited, i.e. the meaning expressed by the instrumental word, is related to only the absence of the fire; and hence the same is not admitted to be relating to the meaning of any other case ending. Also, in the theory that the subjunctness is not a relation of the fire with its absence, and also

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that the same subjunctness is the delimitor of the absence (by relating the fire to the absence through the counter-positiveness), the fire, i.e. the counter-positive of its absence expressed by the nominative '*vahniḥ*', must be related to the subjunctness through the relation of being described by itself (*svanirūpitatva)*, and the conter-positiveness of the potness-delimited, i.e. the meaning expressed by the instrumental '*ghaṭatvena*', must be related to the same subjunctness through the describing (the state of describing the counter-positiveness of the potness delimited need not be related to the absence). Thus this way too, the over-application (*atiprasaṅga)* of relating the meaning expressed by one case ending with the meaning expressed by another case ending can be avoided.

Meanings of the instrumental and the accusative endings

II (ii) 7. In the case where the silver is superimposed on the shell through the identity (non-deference), the statement such as 'He knows the shell as being the silver' *(raṅgam rajatena jānāti*) is not made. Therefore, only the qualifierness delimited by the relation, which is different from the relation of identity (non-difference), is the meaning of the instrumental case. Since in such a case (where the silver is superimposed on the shell through identity), the statement is of the form that 'He knows the shell to be the silver' (*raṅgam rajatam jānāti),* the qualifierness delimited by the relation of identify (non-difference) is the meaning of only the accusative case enjoined in the sense of the objecthood (*karmaṇi dvitīyā, P. ii. 3. 2)*. Such a qualifierness delimited by identity is related to the action such as the knowing which is qualified by the qualificandness, recollected (expressed) from the accusative words (*raṅgam)* that has

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the same accusative case as that of the other accusative word (*rajatam*) expressing such qualifierness. Consequently, in the case where the identity (non-difference) is superimposed, the statement such as 'He knows the silver in the shell' *(raṅge rajatam jānāti)*, need not be made unlike the statement 'He knows the silverness in the shell' *(raṅge rajatatvam jānāti)* which is made in the case where the non-identity (difference) in superimposed. Also, in the said case (i.e. in 'He knows the shell to be the silver' *raṅgam rajatam jānāti)*, the cognition of the relation of identify is not produced between the silver and the shell which are recollected (expressed) from the words '*raṅgam*' and '*rajatam*' having the same accusative case endings due to the semantical incompetency of such meanings; and this is in spite of the fact that such meanings as the silver and the shell have syntactical expectancy for the verbal cognition of the relation of identity (by being expressed by the words having the same case ending).

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the meanings of the instrumental and the accusative case endings in '*raṅgam rajatatvena jānāti*' and '*raṅgam rajatam jānāti*' etc. According to him, when the silver is superimposed on the shell through the relation of identity (*abheda)*, only the abstract instrumental statement such as '*raṅgam rajatatvena jānāti*' is made, and the non abstract instrumental statement such as '*raṅgam rajatena jānāti*' is not made. Therefore, only the qualifierness delimited by the inherence, which is a relation different from identity (*tādātmyabhinna sambandhāvacchinaprakāratā)*, must be admitted to be the meaning of the instrumental case. Also, according to him, when the silver is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

superimposed on the shell through the identity (*abheda*), the accusative statement '*raṅgam rajatam jānāti*' is made; and therefore, the qualifierness delimited by the relation of identity (*tādātmya sambandhāvacchinnaprakāratā*), which can he conditioned by the Pāṇinis rule '*karmaṇi divitīyā*' (P. ii. 3. 2.) due to its identical form with the objecthood, must be admitted to be the meaning of the accusative.

Now as regards the verbal cognition produced from such an accusative statement. According to Gadādhara, the verbal cognition produced is that the person is the substratum of the knowledge describing the qualifierness resident in the silver delimited by the identity and the qualificandness resident in the shell. In such a cognition, the qualifireness resident in the silver delimited by the identity and the qualificandness resident in the shell are expressed by the two accusatives. Consequently, the locative statement '*raṅge rajatam jānāti*' cannot be imposed with the intention of cognizing the qualifierness resident in the silver delimited by the identity, like the locative statement '*raṅge rajatatvam jānāti*' wherein the cognition of qualifierness of the silverness, delimited by the non-identity, is intented.

Explanation of the *samānaliṅgavacanakatva*

II. (ii). 8. Now it may be objected as follows : That in that case, the grammatical agreement (semantical co-referentiality) would become untenable for the words 'silver' (*rajatam*) and 'shell' (*raṅgam*) in the statement 'He knows the shell to be the silver' (*raṅgam rajatam jānāti*), since they refer to two different entities. However, we shall ask as to what is the loss (harm) in such an eventuality?

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Now it may again be objected as follows : Supposing (the grammatical agreement is not intended and therefore) the numbers, viz. oneness and the manyness are not intended as occurring in the silver etc. in such cases, then the incorrect statements such as 'He knows the shells to be the silver' (*raṅgāṇi rajatam jānāti*) and 'He knows the woman to be licentious' (*striyam pāṁsulāḥ jānāti*) would have the undesired contingency of being imposed. For, only the grammatical agreement (semantical co-referrentiality) is ruled to be invariably concomitant with the state of having the same numbers and the genders regularly. However, this objection too is not correct. The state of having the same numbers and the genders is ruled necessary for the words having the grammatical agreement. Thus, the same state of having the same numbers and the genders is ruled necessary for even the words, of which one of the meanings, i.e. the state of describing the qualifierness of the silver delimited by the relation of identity, is cognized to be related to the action describing the qualificandness of the shell.

Explanation

Now the Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection that when the words '*raṅgam*' and '*rajatam*' in '*raṅgam rajatam jānāti*' etc., are not admitted to express the same meanings, the grammatical agreement or semantical co-referentiality (*sāmānādhikaraṇya)* becomes untenable for them. Also, according to him, when the grammatical agreement or semantical coreferentiality is not intended for the words '*raṅgam*' and '*rajatam*', the state of having the same numbers and the genders (*samāna vacana liṅgakatva)* becomes untenable for them as the same is determined by the grammatical agreement. Consequently, even the incorrect identity-statements without the same numbers and the genders such as '*raṅgāni rajatam jānāti*'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(here the words '*raṅgāni*' has the plural number whereas the word '*rajatam*' has the sigular number), and '*striyam pāṁsulāḥ jānāti*' (here the word '*striyam*' has he faminine gender, whereas the word '*paṃsulāḥ*' has the masculine gender) would become contigent.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection by explaining *samānavacanaliṅgakatva* as follows : In the identity statements such as '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*', the words '*nīlaḥ*' and '*ghaṭaḥ*', which have the grammatical agreement or semantional coreferentiality and express one and the same entity such as a blue pot., are ruled to have the same numbers and genders (*samānavacan-liṅgakatva)* (here the words '*nīlaḥ*', and '*ghaṭaḥ*' have the same singular number and the masculine gender). Similarly, in the identity statements such as '*raṅgam rajatam jānāti*', the words '*raṅgam*' and '*rajatam*', which have the grammatical agreement or semantical coreferentiality and express the two meanings of which, one i.e., the state of describing the qualifierness of the silver through identity (*abhedasambandhāvavcchinna yatpadārtha prakārakatva),* is related to the action of knowing, qualified by the other, i.e. the state of describing the qualificandness of the shell (*yatpadārthaviśeṣyakatva),* can be ruled to have the same numbers and the genders (*samānavacanaliṅgakatva)*. Thus, the incurrect identity statements such as '*raṅgāṇi rajatam jānāti*' and '*striyam pāmsulāḥ jānāti*' (wherein the same numbers and genders are not found) cannot be imposed with the intention of not cognizing the same numbers between the qualifiers and the qualificands.

View of the followers of Yajñapati's theory

II (ii) 9. The followers of Yajanapati's theory hold here as follows : That in the identity statements such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as 'He knows the shell to be the silver' (*raṅgam rajatam jānāti*), the words such as 'silver' (*rajatam)* and 'shell'(*raṅgam)* are found to have grammatical agreement or seamantical coreferenctiality. And in accordance with such an agreement, the words such as 'silver' (*rajatam)* etc. must be admitted to have an indication in the sense of the object of the knowledge of identity with the silver etc. Therefore even the statement such as 'He knows red fire' *(lohitavahnim jānāti)* which is employed by the distinguished scholars recognizing what is an illusion can be explained as valid.

Also, like in the case of non-compound statements (*lohitam vahnim jānāti)*, here in the case of compound statements (*lohitavahnim jānāti)*, the lack of intention to cognize the identity between the red colour and the fire cannot be tenable as then the correctness of the *karmadhāraya* compound cannot be maintained. Also the intention to cognize the relation of the red colour etc with respect to the action of knowing etc. directly cannot be tenable as there is no case ending after the word '*lohita'* that can make us cognize the qualifierness. Further, when the red colour, i.e. the meaning of the nominal base '*lohita',* is admitted to be relating to the knowledge, i.e. the root-meaning directly through non-identity, the semantical convention would become contradicted. Since unlike in the case of *dvandva*-compounds (such as '*dhavakhadirau chinatti'),* the case ending occurring after the *karmadhāraya*- compound (such as *'lohitavahnim jāṇāti)* does not have the state of being the case ending that has the earlier member (*lohita)* as its base, the same cannot be held to be causing the cognition of the qualifierness qualified by the meaning (red colour) of the earlier member (*lohita)*. Nor

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

can it be maintained that such a compound (as *'lohitavahnim')* is only a copulative *(dvandva)* compound; for, in that case, the word 'fire' *(vahni),* which has fewer vowels, would have the undesired contingency of occurring earlier. Nor can it be maintained that such a compound (as *'lohitavahnim')* is either *samāhāra*-copulative compound or *itaretara*-copulative compound; for, in such cases, the masculine gender and the singular number after the compounds would become untenable respectively.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the view of the followers of the Yajñapati's theory which explains the benefits of grammatical agreement or sematical co-referentiallity *(sāmānādhikaraṇya)* in *'raṅgam rajatam jānati'.* According to them, in such a statement, due to the gramatical agreement, the word *'rajatam'* has indication *(lakṣaṇā)* in the sense of the object of the knowledge of identity of silver *(rajatābhedajñānaviṣaya);* and by relating the same with the shell, i.e. the meaning expressed by *'raṅgam'* through identity, one can cognize that the person has the knowledge that describes the qualifierness of the state of being the object of the knowledge of identity of silver and the qualificandness of the shell. Consequently, despite the fact that the fire is white and cannot be red, the statement *'lohitavahnim jānāti'* can be explained as valid by intending to produce the cognition that the fire is the object of the knowledge of identity of the red colour with the fire *(lohitābhedajñānaviṣaya).* Also according to them, when the indication is not admitted, even the lack of speaker's intention to cognize the identity between the red colour and the fire cannot be maintained in the compound

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

statement *'lohitavahnim jānāti'* unlike in the non-compound statement *'lohitam vahnim jānāti'*, as then *karmadhāraya* would become untenable (only the speaker's intention to cognize identity is the determining factor for the *karmadhāraya* compound). Also, according to them, then neither the red colour can be cognized to be related to the action of knowing indirectly through the qualifierness, as the accusative case expressing such a qualifierness is absent after the word *'lohita'*; nor the red colour can be cognized to be related to the action of knowing directly through the relation of the qualifierness, as the relation of a base meaning (red colour) with the action of knowing through a relation of non-identity (such as the qualifierness) is against be sematical convention of relations. Thus, they hold that the word *'lohita'* must be admitted to have an indication in the sense of the object of the knowledge of identity of red colour.

It should be noted that in the statements such as 'He cuts one Acacia Catechu and one Grislea Tomentosa' *(dhavakhadirau chinatti),* the case occurring after the word *'khadira'* expresses the qualifierness of Acacia Catechu *(dhava)* relating to the action of cutting as the same case ending has the earlier member of the *dvandva* compound, i.e. 'Acacia Catechu' *(dhava)* as its base. However, since in *'lohitavahnim jānāti'*, the case occurring after the word 'fire' (*vahni*) does not have the earlier member of the *karmadhāraya* compound 'red' (*lohita*) as its base, the same cannot express the qualifierness of the red colour relating to the action of knowing. Also it should be noted that the compound *'lohitavahnim'* cannot be regarded as the *dvandva*-compound as it can be neither *samāhāra dvandva* nor *itaretara dvandva :* It cannot be the former because the compound has the masculine gender (*samahāra* should

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

have only neuter gender); it cannot be latter because the compound has singular ending (*itaretara* should have only the dual or plural ending). Thus the followers of Yajñapati's theory suggest that the words '*rajatam*' etc. must be admitted to have an indication in the sense of the object of the knowledge of identity with the silver. etc.

Avoidance of the statements '*lohitavahnim*' '*lohitam vahnim vā jānāti*'

II (ii). 10. In the theory of Yajñapati, the valid knowledge such as 'The fire is white' (*śuklo vahniḥ*) can be claimed to have the state of referring to the same objects such as the fire which is the object of superimposition of the identity of the red colour; also the collective type of valid knowledge such as 'The fire is white and the China rose is red' (*śuklo vahnir lohitā japā*) can be claimed to have the state of referring to the object such as the white fire which is the object of the collective knowledge itself involving a reference to the identity of the red colour. However, in the presence of such valid knowledges, the incorrect statements such as 'He knows the red fire' (*lohitavahnim jānāti)* and 'He knows the fire to be red' (*lohitam vahnim jānāti)* cannot be imposed. For, the followers of Yajñapati admit the rule that the objectness of the red colour recollected from such a word as '*lohita*' appears to be the qualifier in the objectness of the fire, i.e. the meaning expressed by the accusative word '*vahnim*', indirectly through the property-possessor (the red colour) by the relation of identity.

Explanation

It may be objected now that, when (in Yajñapati's theory,) the word '*lohita*' is admitted to have an indication in the sense of the object of the knowledge

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(superimposition) of the identity of the red colour, the incorrect statements such as '*lohitavahnim jānāti*' and '*lolhitam vahnim vā jānāti*' would become necessary even at the time of the valid knowledge such as '*śuklo vahniḥ*' and '*śuklo vahnir lohitr japā*'. In view of such an objection, the followers of Yajñapati's theory explain their position as follows : That in Yajñapati's theory, the fire, which is the object of the knowledge produced from '*lohitavahnim jānāti*', can be the object of the valid knowledge produced from 'śuklo vahniḥ' as the fire is same. Also, the fire, which is the object of the knowledge produced from '*lohitavahnim jānāti*' can be the object of the collective knowledge produced from the twin statements '*śuklo vahnir lohitā japā*' which involves a reference to the identity of the red colour. Therefore, the valid knowledges from '*śuklo vahniḥ*' and '*śuklo vahnir lohitā japā*' can be admitted to refer to the object such as the fire, which is the object of the knowledge of the identity of the red colour, (*lohitābhedāropaviṣaya vahniviṣayaka*), and to the object such as the fire, which is the object of the collective knowledge itself involving a reference to the identity of the red colour (*lohitābhed-āvagāhi svaviṣaya vahniviṣya*). However, the followers of Yajñapati admit the rule that the objectness of the red colour expressed by the word '*lohita*', which refers to the red colour to be superimposed, needs to be related to the objectness of the fire expressed by the accusative *vahnim,* indirectly through the property-possessor (i.e. the stem-meaning such as the red colour) by identity; however, since the fire is cognized to have the identity with only the white colour in such two valid knowledges, the objectness of the red colour cannot be related to the objectness of the fire by identity. Thus they avoid the imposition of such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a statement as '*lohitavahnim jānāti*' at the time of '*śuklo vahniḥ lohitā japā*' etc.

Alternative theory

II (ii) 11. As an alternative, the followers of Yajñapati's theory hold here as follows: Or that the fire etc., which have the state of being the objects of the knowledge of fire etc. described by the state of being the objects of the superimposition of the identity of the red colour, are cognized to have the state of describing the object-referrigness relating to the knowledge. In the case of the collective type of valid knowledge etc., only the fire etc., which do not have such a state of being the objects of the knowledge of the fire etc. (described by the state of being the objects of superimposition of the identity of the red colour), are cognized to have the state of describing the object-referrigness relating to the knowledge. Therefore, there is no overapplication i.e. (contingency of making the statement (*lohitavahnim jānāti*). That the fire etc. which have the state of being the objects of knowledge of the fire etc. have the state of describing the object-referringness relating to the knowledge means that the state of describing the object-referringness is delimited by the state of being the objects of the knowledge of fire etc. And such a distincti (peculiar) delimitorship of the state of being the objects of the knowledge of fire etc., which describes the object-referringness, is admitted for even the objectness (of fire) which in itself need not be the object of any other knowledge. And this instance is similar to the instance of the relation of the delimitor i.e. delimitorship of the qualificandness described by the qualifierness of the red colourness which in itself is not the qualifier in the qualifier such as the staff and the relation of the delimited, i.e. delimitedness of the qualifierness of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

staff in the statement such as 'He is the possessor of the red staff' (*raktadaṇḍavān)*. This is the view of the followers of the Yajñapati's theory.

However, this view is not correct. When, the identity statement '*raṅgam rajatam jānāti'* can be explained to have the agreement as stated earlier (ii (ii). 8), without assuming an indication for the word '*rajatam*' etc., the assumption of the indication for the same is not justified.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara presents an alternative position of the followers of Yajñapati's theory; According to them, in '*lohitavahnim*', '*lohitam vahnim vā jānāti*', the fire has both the state of being the object of superimposition of identity and the state of being the object of the knowledge of fire; and therefore, such two objectnesses can be admitted to have the relation of the delimitor and the delimited (*nirūpyaniṛūpakabhāva)* respectively. Thus, in '*lohitavahnim*', '*lohitam vahnim vā jānāti*', the fire which is pereceived to have the state of being the object of the knowledge of fire described by the state of being the object of the super-imposition of the identity of the red colour (*lohitābhedaviṣayatānirūpita viṣayatāpanna)*, describes the object-referringness resident in the knowledge of fire (*jñānānvayiviṣayatānirūpaka)*. However, in the collective statements '*śuklo vahniḥ*', '*śuklo vahnir lohitā japā*', the fire does not have the state of being the object of the superimposition of the identity of the red colour; and therefore only the fire which does not have such a state needs to be admitted as describing such an object-referringness. Thus at the time of the valid knowledge from the collective statements '*śuklo vahniḥ, śuklo vahnir lohitā japā*', the statement *lohitavahnim, lohitam vahnim vā jānāti* cannot be imposed.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It should be noted here that since in '*lohitavahnim, lohitam vahnim vā jānāti*', the fire has the state of being the object of the knowledge of fire described by the state of being the object of the superimposition of the identity of the red colour (*viṣayatāpannaviṣayatā)* and also has the state of describing the object- referringness resident in the knowledge of fire (*viṣayitānirūpakatva)*, such a state of describing becomes delimited by the state of being the object of the knowledge of fire. Also, it should be noted that when the state of being the object of the knowledge of fire, which is only the object of the superimposition of the identity of the red colour, is held to be the describer of (i.e. to be the delimitor of) the object-referringness, there would occur an infinite regress; and therefore such a state, even when it is not the object of the superimposition (knowledge). must be held to be the describer (i.e. to be the delimitor). And this instance is similar to the instance of the qualificandness of the red colour, described by the qualifierness of the red colourness which in itself does not appear as the qualifier in the staff, appearing as the describer of (i.e. as the delimitor of) the qualifierness resident in the staff in the statement '*raktadaṇḍavān*'. Here the staff is the qualifier in the person, i.e. the possessor of the staff; the red colour is the qualifier of the staff; the qualifier, of the person, and the red colourness is the qualifier of the red colour; the qualifier of the staff, and hence the same red colourness is not the direct qualifier of the staff.

However, it should be noted that Gadādhara refutes the position of the followers of Yajñapati's theory on the ground that they admit an indication for the word '*rajatam*' in the sense of the object of the knowledge of the identity of the silver to explain the grammatical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

agreement between '*raṅgam*' and '*rajatam*' in '*rangam rajatam janati;* while such an agreement is possible to explain even without admitting the indication, c.f. II. (ii) 8.

Objection that syntactic unity cannot be cognized

II (ii). 12. Now it may be proposed as follows : That in the case of the said statements such as 'He knows the fire to be red' (*lohitam vahnim jānāti),* the words '*lohitam*' and '*vahnim*', which cause the knowledge of the red colour, i.e. the superstratum of imposition, and the fire, i.e. the substratum of imposition, produce the cognitions wherein their own meanings are related to the action of knowing. However, this proposal is not right. Then in the corresponding passive statements such as 'The fire is known to be red' (*lohito vahnir jñāyate*), the syntactic unity of the statement would become untenable due to the distinction between the two qualificands (the fire and the red colour).

Now it may again be proposed as follows: That in such statements, only the non-collective qualificative verbal cognition of the form that the fire is the object of the knowledge (superimposition) of the identity of the red colour must be admitted; and the collective type of verbal cognition of the form that the red colour is the qualifier in the knowledge and the fire is the qualificand in the knowledge must not be admitted. Otherwise, in that case, such a passive statement as 'The fire is known to be red' (*lohito vahnir jñāyate*) would become necessary even at the time of the collective type of cognition such as 'The fire is white and the Chinese rose is red' (*śuklo vahnir lohitā japā).* Whereas when the said qualificative cognition of the qualifieds (of the form that the fire is the object of the knowledge (superimposition)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the identity of the red colour) is admitted in such a case, the qualificandness described by the knowledge qualified by the state of being what describes the qualifierness of the red colour, becomes contradictory in the white fire, etc., and hence such a passive statement would have no contingency of being imposed.

However, this proposal too is not correct. Since in the passive statement, the accusative case, that can produce the cognition of the meaning of the qualifierness of the red colour, is absent after the word *'lohita'*, the knowledge (superimposition) cannot be cognized to have the state of being what describes the qualifierness of the red colour etc. Also since the cognition of the direct relation between the meanings expressed by the nominal base and the verbal base is contradictory to the semantic convention, the relation of qualifier-reference (describing the qualifierness) cannot be cognized as the relation of the red colour.

Explanation

Some scholars propose here as follows: That like in the case of '*raṅgam rajatam jānāti*', in the case of '*lohitam vahnim jānāti*, the word '*lohitam*' referring to the red colour, i.e. the superstratum of the imposition of identity (*āropyaviṣaya)*, and the word '*vahnim*' referring to the fire, i.e. the substratum of the imposition of identity (*āropaviṣaya)*, can be held to cause the cognition wherein both the red colour and the fire are related to the knowledge that the person possesses the knowledge that has the red colour as the qualifier and the fire as the qualificand (*lohitaprakārakavahniviśeṣyakajñānavān)*. However, the objector refutes such a proposal. According to him, then in the corresponding

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

passive statements such as '*lohito vahnir jñāyate*' etc. only the collective cognitions that the red colour is the substratum of the objectness belonging to the knowledge (*jñānīyaviṣayatāśrayo lohitaḥ*) and the fire is the substratum of the objectness belonging to the knowledge (*jñānīyaviṣayatāśrayo vahniḥ*) would become necessary to be admitted; and therefore, due to the distinction between the qualificands, syntactic unity of the passive statement would become untenable.

Now some other scholars propose again as follows: That in the passive statement '*lohito vahnir jñāyate*', the syntactic unity can be explained by admitting that only the cognition that the fire is the object of the knowledge of the identity of the red colour (*vahniḥ lohitābhedajñāna viṣayaḥ*) wherein only the fire is the qualificand, is produced; and not that the collective type of cognitions that the fire and the red colours are the substratums of the objectnesses belonging to the knowledge (*jñānīyaviṣ aytāśrayo lohito vahniśca*) wherein the qualificands differ, are produced. Such a position, according to them, is necessary, because otherwise (suppose the collective type of cognitions are produced there, then) the usage '*lohito vahnir jñāyate*' would become necessary to be the corresponding passive statement of '*śuklo vahnir lohitā japā*' as both non-collective and collective statements are equal by producing only the collective type of cognition. On the other hand, when the said qualificative cognition of the qualifieds that the fire is the object of the knowledge of the identity of the red colour is admitted in such a case as '*lohito vahnir jñāyate*', the qualificandness of the red colour can be found only in the red fire and not in the white fire; and therefore, the imposition of the usage '*lohito vahnir jñāyate*' can be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

avoided to be the corresponding passive statement in the case of '*śuklo vahnir lohitā japā*'.

However, the objector again refutes such a proposition as untenable. According to him. in the cognition that the fire is the object of the knowledge of the identity of the red colour, the knowledge must be admitted to be describing the qualifierness of the red colour; however since the accusative that can express such a qualifierness of the red colour is absent in the passive statement '*lohito vahnir jñāyate*', the knowledge cannot be cognized as being the describer of the qualifierness of the red colour. Also, the objector refutes the alternative suggestion that in such a qualificative cognition, the knowledge can be cognized to be describing the qualifierness of the red colour by admitting the direct relationship of the red colour with the knowledge through the relation of the describing the qualifierness (*prakāritā),* as the direct relation of a nominal base-meaning (red colour) with the meaning of the verbal base (knowledge) is against the convention. Thus only the said collective type of cognition such as '*jñānīyaviṣayatāśrayo lohito vahniśca*' needs to be admitted; and hence the lack of syntatic unity becomes unavoidable.

Refutation of the objection and explanation

II (ii) 13. However, this objection is not correct. In the case of the statements such as 'The pot becomes blue' (*ghaṭo nīlo bhavati),* ' The tree becomes a boat' (*vṛkṣo naukā-bhavati)* and 'The wood becomes ash' (*kāṣ ṭham bhasma bhavati),* the nominal base-meanings such as the blue colour, the boat and the ash are related directly, by restricting the semantic convention, to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

verbal base-meanings such as the becoming which is of the form of acquiring a peculiar state. This is necessary to be accepted so because the nominative case affixes occurring after such nominal bases cannot refer to the meanings that appear as the intermediate qualificands between the nominal base-meanings and the verbal base-meanings. In the same way in the present context such as 'The fire is known to be red' *(lohito vahnir jñāyate')* too, the nominal base-meaning, red colour, must necessarily be admitted to be related directly to the verbal base-meaning, i.e. the knowledge, through the relation of describing the qualifierness-reference due to lack of any other alternative. Now, it may be held that the modification to be produced (i.e. boat etc.) and the material cause that produces (i.e. tree etc.) are different; however even in such a theory, the word 'boat' *(naukā)* etc. can be held to be indicative of the sense of the boat etc. that are to be produced from the same parts that produce the material cause such as the tree etc; and therefore, in 'The tree becomes the boat' *(vṛkṣo naukā bhavati)* etc., the semantic competency of the relation of the action of becoming (or the tree) can be explained with the boat.

In the case of the statements consisting of the words referring to the relations of the material causes that produce and the modifications that are to be produced, i.e. 'The tree becomes five boats' *(vṛkṣaḥ pañca naukāḥ bhavati)* etc., the tree, that functions as the material cause that produces, is related, as the qualificands, to the action of becoming; and therefore, by producing the cognition of the number (oneness) resident in the tree, the verb 'becomes' *(bhavati)* can have the same singular number as that of the word '*vṛkṣaḥ*' expressing the material cause that produces. In the same way, in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

statements involving the imposition of the identity of the two items on one item such as 'One (moon) is known to be two' (*ekaḥ dvau jñāyate)* etc. too, the word-meaning such as the one item (moon), i.e. the qualificand of the imposition of the two items, functions as the qualificand of the relation of qualificandness (objectness), i.e. the meaning of the verbal ending; and therefore, the verb is known (*jñāyate)* can have the same singular ending as that of the word '*ekaḥ*' expressing the one item (moon).

Explanation

Gadādhara now refutes the objection raised in the previous para (II (ii) 12). According to him, the nominal base-meanings such as the blue colour etc. in '*ghaṭo nīlo bhavati*' etc., are related directly to the action of becoming of the form of acquiring the peculiar state (*asādhāraṇadharma)* expressed by the verbal base, as the nominative after '*nīla*' does not express the meaning that can function as the intermediate qualificand (the nominatives are ruled only in the sense of base-meanings). Similarly, the nominal base-meanings such as the red colour in '*lohito vahir jñāyate*' too, can be related directly to the action of knowing expressed by the verbal base through the relation of describing the qualifierness-reference (*prakāritāsambandha),* as here too, the nominative found after '*nīla*' cannot express any meaning that can function as the intermediate qualificand (i.e. the qualificand of blue colour, and qualifier of becoming). Also according to Gadādhara, despite the distinction between the material cause that produces (*prakṛti)* and the modificantion that is produced *(vṛkṛti)*, the tree etc. in '*vṛkṣe naukā bhavati*' etc., can be claimed to become the boat etc. (and hence identical with the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

boat etc.) as both the tree and the boat are produced from the same atoms. Thus, Gadādhara, by admitting an indication for the words 'boat' (*naukā*) etc., in the sense of the boat etc. that are produced from the same atoms that produce the tree etc., facilitates the direct relation of the base-meanings such as the boat etc., with veral base-meaning such as the action of becoming.

Now Gadādhara explains the rule of agreement between the verbs and the nouns. According to him, the verb agrees with the noun in number provided that the meaning expressed by the same noun (base) is related to the meaning expressed by the verb (base). For instance, in the case of the statement such as '*vṛkṣaḥ pañca naukā bhavati*' consisting of the words referring to the relations of the cause that produces and modification that is produced (*prakṛtivikṛtibhāvasthala*), the tree, the meterial cause expressed by the noun '*vṛkṣ aḥ*', is related to the action of becoming expressed by the verb '*bhavati*' as the qualificand, and hence the same verb '*bhavati*' agreess in number with the noun '*vṛkṣaḥ*' in number. Similarly according to him, in the case of the statements such as '*eko dvau jñāyate*' involving the superimposition of the twoness of the moons on the one moon, the one (moon) expressed by '*ekaḥ*' (which is the subject of superimposition of the twoness) is related, as the qualificand, to the objectness expressed by the *ākhyāta* of the *verb* '*jñāyate*'; and hence the same verb agrees with the noun '*ekaḥ*' in singular number.

Refutation of the second objection

II (ii). 14. It may be objected again now as follows : How is it that in the statement such as 'The king considered the two looks of hair tied on the two

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sides of the forehead as a pair of insults (infamy) existing on the head' (*amāni tattena nijāyaśoyugam dviphālabadhāḥ cikurāḥ śirasthitam),* the verb '*amāni*' has singular ending contradictory to the plural ending of the word '*cikurāḥ*' expressing the qualificand of the superimposition. However, this objection is not correct. In such a case (as '*amāni tattena.....)*, the pair of insults (infamy) on the head is real, and hence is not the object (i.e. the qualificand) of superimposition; whereas the two locks of hair on the two sides are the items to be superimposed by the king; and hence are the objects (i.e. qualificands) of the parable (superimposition) of the poet. Thus, only one single pair of insults (blames) is intended to be the qualificand of the relation of the qualificadness expressed by the *ākhyāta* of the verb 'considered'*(amāni)*.

In the case of the statements consisting of the verbal roots expressing the desire as the meaning, the grammatical objecthood of the form of the primary qualificandness is the meaning of the accusative. Therefore, in the case of the desire such as 'The happyness must be the object accomplished by the rain', the statements such as 'He desires rain' (*vṛṣṭim icchati)* are not made like the statements such as 'He desires the happiness' *(sukham icchati*).

Explanation

If the verb is held to agree in number with the noun expressing the subject of superimposition, i.e. the primary qualificand, then in the case of '*amāni tattena nijāyaśoyugam dviphālabaddhāḥ cirkurāḥ śirasthitam'*, the singular ending after the verb '*amāni*' can be objected to be untenable as only the locks of hair (*cirkurāḥ)* are the subjects of superimposition, i.e. the primary qualificands; and hence the verb '*amāni*' needs to agree

CC-0: In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in plural number with the plural noun '*cikurāḥ*' However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that in the case of '*amāni tattena....*', the two locks of hair tied on the forehead are not real; and hence are not the subjects of superimposition or the primary qualificands.; rather, the state of being the two locks of hair bound on the foreheads is superimposed on the single pair of insults (infamy); and hence the verb '*amāni*' can agree in singular number with the noun '*nijāyaśoyugam*' expressing the single pair of insults.

Gadādhara now proposes the theory that the accusatives associated with the verbs expressing desire (*icchārthakadhātu*) express the objecthood (*karmatva*) of the form of the chief-qualificandness (*mukhyaviśeṣyatva*). Therefore, according to him, one cognizes that one is the substratum of the desire having the happiness as the qualificand (by being the object of desire) from the statement '*sukham icchati*' etc. Now since only the happyness is the chief-qualificand by being the object of desire such as '*vṛṣṭisādhyam sukham bhavatu*', the usage '*sukham icchati*' becomes correct; and since the rain is not the chief qualificand by not being the object of desire such as *vṛṣṭisādhyam sukham bhavatu*', the wage '*vṛṣṭim icchati*' can be avoided as incorrect.

Explanation of the statement '*sukham icchati*'

II (ii) 15. Now it may be objected as follows : That the desire such as 'I should become happy' (*aham sukhī syām*) has the happyness etc. as its qualifier; and therefore, the statement such as 'One desires the happyness' (*sukham icchati*) would become untenable in such cases.

However, this objection is not correct. Sometimes

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the word producing the cognition of the self qualified by the happiness (i.e. *aham)* expresses only the object of the desire such as 'Let there be happiness for me' (*mama sukham bhavatu*) having the happiness as the qualificand. For instance, the word producing the cognition of the self qualified by the operation identical with the effort conducive to the accomplishment of the cooking (i.e. *'sādhayāmi')* in 'I accomplish the cooking through the effort' (*pākam kṛtyā sādhayāmi)* expresses the object of the desire for accomplishing the cooking as the qualificand, and the state of being what is to be accomplished by ones own effort of the form of the state of having the accomplishment produced by ones own effort as the qualifier.

However, suppose sometimes the happiness, i.e. the subject (i.e. the qualificand), is experienced to be cognized as being even the qualifier, then the particular type of the objectness, which is common to the occasional qualifier (i.e. common to both the qualifier and the qualificand) and which determines the usage such as the subject (qualificand), must be admitted. And this instance is similar to the instance of the objectness of the form of the predicatedness (i.e. to be establishedness) resident in the probundum which is the object of the cognition as being the occasional qualificand (i.e. which is the object of the cognition as being both the qualifier and the qualificand) in the inference. Thus, the same objectness is the accusative-meaning in the statements such as 'One desires the happiness' (*sukam icchati)* etc.

Explanation

In the statement such as *'sukham icchati'* consisting of the verb referring to the desire, the objecthood

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(karmatva) of the form of the chief-qualificandness *(mukhyaviśeṣyatva)* is admitted to be the accusative-meaning. However, since the happiness in the case of desire such as '*aham sukhī syām*' etc. appears as the qualifier of the self, it is objected that the statement referring to the desire such as '*sukham icchati*' would become untenable due to the absence of the chief qualificandness in the happiness. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection as baseless on the ground that sometimes the word '*aham*' expressing the self qualified by the happiness in '*aham sukhī syām*' expresses only the happiness, i.e. the object of the desrie such as '*mama sukham bhavatu*' wherein the happiness is the qualificand. Now since both '*aham sukhī syām*' and '*mama sukham bhavatu*', refer to the same object of the happiness, and the happiness has the qualificandness in '*mama sukham bhavatu*', the statement '*sukham icchati*' which produces the cognition of the desire having the happiness as the qualificand, becomes tenable. Gadādhara supports his explanation of the statement '*sukham icchati*' on the analogy of the statement '*pākam icchati*' According to him, the word '*sādhayāmi*', expressing the self qualified by the operation identical with the effort conducive to the accomplishment of the cooking *(pākasidhyanukūl akṛtyabhinn-avyāpāraviśiṣṭatva)* in '*pākam cikīrṣāmi*' refers to the desire for accomplishing the cooking such as '*pākam cikīrṣati*' having the cooking as the qualificand and the state of being accomplished through ones effort *(svakṛtisādhyatva)* identical with the state of having the accomplishment produced by ones own effort *(svakṛtyadhīnasiddhikatva)* as the qualifier.

However, it can be objected again that in the cases such as '*aham sukhī syām*', only the desire for the self

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

having the happiness as the qualifier is cognized, and hence in such cases. the statement of desire such as *sukham icchati* wherein the happiness is the qualificand becomes untenable. Therefore, Gadāhara proposes an alternative theory that only a particular type of objectness *(viṣayatāviśeṣa)* which is common to both the qualifier and the qualificand *(viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇa-sādhāraṇa)* and determines the usage of the subject (qualificand) *(uddeśyavyavahāraniyāmaka)* must be admitted as the accusative-meaning in the statements consisting of the verbs of desire. And Gadādhara supports his theory on the analogy of the *viṣayatāviśeṣa* in the inference '*vahnim anuminoti*. According to him, the objectness of the form of being what is to be established or predicated *(vidheyatākhya)* that appears both as the qualifier in '*parvato vahnimān dhūmat'* and as the qualificand in '*parvate vahnir dhūmāt'* is admitted to be resident in the fire to be established *(sādhya)*. And similarly, the particular objectness common to both the qualifier and the qualificand can be admitted as the accusative meaning in such cases.

'Grāma' in '*grāmam icchati'* is indicative

II (ii). 16. In the statement of desire such as 'He desires (to own) the village' *(grāmam icchati)*, the word 'village' *(grāma)* is intended to express the ownership of the village. Therefore, there occurs no loss (untenability of the accusative) eventhough the already accomplished village cannot have either the chief qualificandness or the said peculiar objectness. However, some state that though the village etc. are already accomplished, the same village as adventitiously qualified by the unaccomplished ownership can appear as the chief qualificand in the desire sometimes, as the qualified

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

village is not already accomplished. Thus, the statement such as 'He desires (to own) the village' (*grāmam icchat*) is made only in such a case.

Explanation

In the statement of desire such as '*grāmam icchati*' the village which is already accomplished cannot be the object of ones desire to accomplish; however, the ownership of the accomplished village can be the object of one's desire. Therefore, the cognition that one is the substratum of the desire having the ownership of the village as the qualificand is to be admitted by accepting the word village as intended to indicate the ownership of the village. Now on this ground it can be stated that since the accusative expresses the ownership of the village, the same accusative after the word '*grāma*' in '*grāman icchati*' becomes tenable even though the village does not have the chief qualificandness or the objectness common to both the qualificand and the qualifier.

Also Gadādhara explains the alternative theory of some, According to them, though the mere village is already accomplished, the village as qualified by the unaccomplished ownership is not already accomplished; and hence the same can appear as the chief qualificand in the desire. Thus the word such as '*grāma*' can be admitted to have the indication in the qualified village and the chief qualificandness can be admitted as the accusative-meaning in such cases.

Accusative-meaning in desiderative statements

II. (ii). 17. In the desiderative statements such as 'One desires to accomplish the cooking' (*pākam cikīrṣati)* etc., the accusative case expresses the objecthood of the form of the qualificandness; and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

therefore, one cognizes the desire for accomplishing the cooking that has the effort as the qualifier and the cooking as the qualificand from such a statement. Such a desire can be described to have the form such as 'I (wish to) accomplish the cooking through the effort' (*pākam kṛtyā sādhayāmi);* or since the desiderative suffix is expressive of the desire that has the root-meaning (such as the effort) as its qualificand, the desire for accomplishing that has the effort as its qualificand can be the meaning of the desiderative form 'desiring to accomplish' (*cikīrṣā*). And such a desire can be described to have only the form that 'Let there be an effort accomplishing the cooking' (*pākakṛtir bhavatu).* It is a matter of difference, however, that whether such a desire is impellant or not. In this alternative, only the objecthood of the form of the qualificandness described by the effort, and not the objecthood of the form of being the object (qualificand) of the desire, is cognized in the cooking from the accusative. Otherwise, by taking into account ones desire for staying at home, even the accusative desiderative statement such as 'He desires to stay house' (*gṛham tiṣṭhāsati*) would become contingent. And this altenative position (that the desiderative expresses the desire that has the root-meaning as its qualificand) is justified; Because, if the desiderative expresses the desire that has the root-meaning as its qualifier, then the desiderative statement such as 'He desires to eat the rice' (*odanam bubhukṣate)* would become untenable at the time of the desire for eating of the rice as the same eating (of the rice) is not the qualifier in the desire in such a case.

Expanation

Now Gadādhara explanins the accusative-meaning in desiderative statements. According to him, in desiderative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

statements such as '*pākam cikīrṣati*', the objecthood (*karmatva)* of the form of the qualificandness (*viśeṣyatā)* is the meaning of the accusative case. And since such a meaning, i.e. the qualificandness, is related to the accusative-meaning, i.e. the cooking, the meaning of the desiderative base (*cikīrṣā)* such as the effort can appear only as the qualifier in the desire; and hence such a statement represents the desire such as '*pākam kṛtyā sādhayāmi*' wherein the effort is the qualifier and the cooking is the qualificand.

However, as an altenative, Gadādhara proposes that the accusative expresses the objecthood of the form of the qualificandness in the effort, i.e. the desirderative base-meaning. According to him, the desiderative form such as 'desiring to do' (*cikīrṣā)* is analysed as 'desiring to accomplish' (*kartum icchā*); and therefore, the qualificandness described by the desire appears only in the effort, i.e. the desiderative base-meaning, and not in the cooking. Thus, the desiderative such as '*pākam cikīrṣ ati*' must be admitted to express the desire such as 'Let there be the effort accomplishing the cooking' (*pākakṛtir bhavatu)* which has the cooking as the qualifier and the effort as the qualificand. However, it must be noted that while the desire such as '*pākam kṛtyā sādhayāmi*' can be considered to be impellent (*pravartikā)*, the desire such as '*pākakṛtir bhavatu*' may not be impellent. Also it should be noted that in this alternative, the qualificandness described by the desire is only in the effort and not in the cooking; and therefore, the accusative expresses only the objecthood of the form of the qualifiandness described by the effort, i.e. the meaning of the desiderative base, and not the same descirbed by the desire, in the cooking in '*pākcam cikīrṣati*' etc.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Otherwise suppose the qualificandness described by the desire is admitted even in the cooking, i.e. the meaning of the non-desiderative base (it is actually found only in the effort), then, the statement '*gṛham tiṣṭhāsati*', like the statement '*pākam cikīrṣati*' would become necessary as the qualificandness described by the desire could be argued to exist even in the house. Gadādhara justifies further his alternative position on the ground that suppose the accusative expresses the objecthood of the form of the qualificandness described by even the desire in the cooking, i.e. the desiderative- base-meaning (i.e. suppose, the desiderative expresses the desire having the base-meaning as its qualifier and the non-base meaning as the qualificand). then the accustive desiderative statement such as '*odanam bubhukṣate*' would become untenable at the time of the desure for eating the rice wherein the rice is the qualificand, as such a statement could be possible only at the time of the desire wherein the rice is the qualifier.

Pūrvapakṣins argument

II (ii) 18. Now it may be argued as follows : That only when there is the desire that has the eating, i.e. the desiderative base- meaning, as its qualifier, and the rice (i.e. the accusative base-meaning) as its qualificand through the relation of the objecthood, such a statement as 'He desires to eat the rice' (*odanam bubhukṣate)* is made. And such a desire is possible either due to the knowledge of being what is the means to the desired end that has the eating as its qualificand (object), or due to the knowledge of being what is the means to the desired end that has the rice qualified by the eating as its qualificand (object). Also even when the eating has the accomplishedness (i.e. is already accomplished), the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

qualificative desire is possible due to the knowledge of being what is the means to the desired end having the qualified rice as its qualificand (object) which (knowledge) is associated with the knowledge of the non-accomplishedness (of the rice) that has the qualified rice as its qualificand (object). Also, there is no contingency of making the desiderative statement such as 'He desires to eat the rice' (*odanam bubhukṣate)* at the time of the accomplishedness of the eating where the desire has either the act of going (ness) belonging to the time subsequent to the eating as its qualifier or the nourishment resulting from the rice eaten as its qualifier. Because, only the qualifierness described as (being) the qualifier in the eating, i.e. the chief-qualificand, can be admitted to be appearing in the eating, i.e. the meaning of the desiderative base.

Explanation

Now the Pūrvapakṣin argues that the desiderative affix need not be admitted to express the desire that has the eating, i.e. the desiderative base-meaning, as its qualificand (*svaprakṛti dhātvarthabhojanaviśeṣyakecchā)*. According to him, the undesired contigency of the desiderative statement such as (*odanam bhoktavyam)* can be avoided by accepting that such a statement is possible only due to the desire for rice cating which has the rice, qualified by the eating through the relation of the objecthood, as its qualificand (*karmatāsa-mbandhena bhojanaviśiṣṭaudanaviśeṣyakecchā)*. And such a desire as '*odanam bhoktavyam'*, which has the rice as the qualificand, is possible either on account of the knowledge of being what is the means to the desired end that has the eating as its qualificand (*bhojanadharmikeṣ ṭasādhanatājñāna)* such as '*bhojanam madiṣṭasādhanam')*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

or on account of the knowledge of being what is the means to the desired end that has the rice qualified by the eating as its qualificand (*viśiṣṭaudanam madiṣṭ-asādhanam*). It should be noted that since the accomplishment is preventive of the desire to accomplish the rice, the same is preventive of the desire that has the rice as the qualificand; and therefore, such desire for accomplishing the rice wherein the fice is the qualificand becomes impossible. However, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, since the rice as qualified by the eating is not accomplished, the knowledge of being what is the means of the desired end (*iṣṭasādhanatājñāna)* that has the rice qualified by the eating as its qualificand can facilitate the qualified desire. Also, it should be noted that when the desiderative affix expresses the desire that has the eating, i.e. the desiderative base-meaning, as its qualifier, the statement such as '*odanam bubhukṣate*' (having the eating as the qualifier) can be imposed enen at the time of the desire for going that has the going (ness) belonging to the time subsequent to the eating as its qualifier such as '*bhojanottarakālikam gamanam bhavaut*' or at the time of the desire for nourishemt resulting from the rice eaten as its qualifier such as '*bhuktaudanajanyapuṣṭir bhavatu*' as the eating is the qualifier in both the cases. However, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, the qualifierness described by the desire (*icchāprakāratā*) that describes the objecthood functioning as the qualifier in the chief qualificand such as the eating (*mukhyaviśeṣye viśeṣaṇatāpannakar-matva)* must be admitted to be accurring only in the eating, i.e. the meaning of the desiderative-base; and therefore the statement '*odanam bubhukṣate*' can be avoided at the time of the desire for going after eating such as *bhojanottarakālīnam gamanam bhavatu*' etc. as the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

qualifierness described by such a desire cannot be found in the eating there (it is found only in the time).

Refutation of Pūrvapakṣin's argument

II (ii) 19. However, this argument is not correct. The statement such as 'He desires to eat' *(bubhukṣate)* is established to be made in every one's theory at the time of the desire for eating such as 'Let there be eating' *(bhojanam bhavatu)* that has the eating, i.e. the meaning of the desiderative base, as its qualificand. Therefore, the desiderative affix must necessarily be admitted to be causing the cognition of the desire having the desiderative verbal base-meaning as its qualificand.

Also, it cannot be proposed that two conventions (that the desiderative suffix expresses the desires wherein the base-meaning is the qualifier and the same expresses the desire wherein the base-meaning is the qualificand) are to be admitted. When the statement (such as *odanam bubhukṣate)* can be managed to be explained by resorting to only one convention namely, that desiderative affix expresses the desrie having the desiderative base-meaning as its qualificand, there occurs heaviness in assuming the two separate conventions. Also therefore, the incorrect usages such as 'He desires to stay the house' (*gṛham tiṣṭhāsati*) are avoided despite the fact that the desire for staying referring to the staying at the house can be, as shown earlier, explanined to have the state of being the desire that has the house etc. as its qualificand. However, suppose the usage such as 'He desires to eat the rice' (*odanam bubhukṣate)* is found to be made even at the time of the particular desire for eating the rice having the eating as the qualifier and the rice as the qualificand, then such a usage should be justified by admitting that only the objectness of the form of the subjectness

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(qualificandness) appears in the eating, i.e. the desiderative verbal base-meaning.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara refutes the Pūrvapakṣin's argument. According to him, the desiderative usage '*bubhukṣate*' is established to be made even at the time of the desire for eating such as '*bhojanam bhavatu*' wherein the eating is the qualificand; and hence the desiderative suffix must be admitted to be expressive of only the desire that has the desiderative base-meaning such as the eating as its qualificand, and not the desire that has the desiderative base-meaning such as the eating as its qualificand as stated earlier.

However, it is experienced that at the time of the desire for eating such as '*bhojanam bhavatu*', the desiderative suffix expresses the desire that has the eating, i.e. the desiderative base-meaning, as its qualificand, and that at the time of the desire for rice such as '*odanaḥ bhojanaviśiṣto bhavatu*', the desiderative suffix expresses the desire that has the catings, i.e. the desiderative base-meaning, as its qualifier. Therefore, it can be proposed now that the desiderative expresses the two types of desirres at the time of the two different types of desires. However, Gadādhara refutes such a proposal. According to him, when the usage such as '*odanam bubhukṣate*' can be explanined even by admitting only a single convention that the desiderative suffix expresses the desire that has the eating, i.e. the desiderative base-meaning, as its qualificand, the admittance of the two conventions that it expresses at times the desire that has the eating as its quakifier, and at other times it expresses the desire that has the eating as its qualificand, is unjustified. Now an advantage in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

admitting the convention that the desiderative suffix expresses only the desire that has the eating, i.e. the desiderative base-meaning, as its qualificand, is that the incorrect statement such as '*gṛham tiṣṭhāsati*' can be avoided from being imposed at the time of the intention for cognizing the desire for staying at the house, as the staying, i.e. the base-meaning, is not the qualificand in such a desire in such cases. However, it must be admitted that the usage such as '*odanam bubhukṣatam*' is made even at the time of the desire for the qualified rice such as '*odanam bhojanaviśiṣṭo bhavatu*' wherein the eating is the qualifier and the rice is the qualificand. Therefore, Gadādhara facilitates such a usage by admitting that the desiderative suffix expresses in such cases the objectness of the form the the subjectness (*uddeśyatākhyaviṣayatā)* in the eating; thus there is no difficulty even if the qualificandness of the form of the objecthood (*karmatākhya viśeṣyatā)* is not cognized in the eating, i.e. the desiderative base-meaning.

Refutation of the objection that the objecthoods described by the eating etc. cannot be cognized

II (ii) 20. Now it may be objected as follows : That in the theory that the desire, that has the desiderative verbal base-meaning as its qualificand, is the meaning of the desiderative suffix; the rice and the cooking can be cognized to have the objecthoods described by the eating and the effort from the accusative in the active statements such as 'He desires to eat the rice' (*odanam bubhukṣate)* and 'He desires to accomplish the cooking' (*pākam cikīrṣati)* etc. However, the same rice and the cooking cannot be cognized to have the same objecthoods described by the eating and the effort from the passive endings in the passive statements such as 'The rice is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

desired to be eaten' (*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*) etc. Only the objecthoods of the desires for the eating and for the effort, i.e. the meanings expressed by the desiderative bases that are the bases of the desiderative affixes, are competent to be cognized from the passive verbal endings as the (desideratve) endings cause the cognitions of their own meanings as qualified by their base-meanings; and the eating and the effort as qualified by the objectnesses (hoods) described by the desires are not expressed by the desiderative bases.

However, this objection is not correct. Although in the active statements, the desire, i.e. the meaning expressed by the desiderative suffix, is cognized as the qualificand of the effort etc, i.e. the meanings expressed by the desiderative bases, the same desire is admitted to be cognized to be the qualifier of the effort etc, i.e. the meanings expressed by the desiderative bases, in the passive statements. Since the desiderative forms produce the cognitions of only the effort etc., as qualified by the desire in the passive statements such as 'The cooking is desired to be accomplished' (*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate)* etc., the passive (*ātmanapada)* endings etc., can produce the cognition of the objecthoods described by such effort etc. Also, the present time etc. recollected from the passive verbal endings are related to the desire in both the active and the passive instances, where the desire as qualified by the effort etc. and the effort etc as qualified by the desire are the respective meanings of the desiderative bases. And this relationship of the time with the desires, i.e. the parts of the meanings of the desiderative, is sanctioned in accordance with the relationship of the excellence, i.e. the meaning of the comparative suffix, with the blue colour, i.e. the part of the meaning of the base, in the comparative statement such as 'The pot is more blue' (*nīlataro ghaṭaḥ*).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanatin

Now the Pūrvapakṣin objects that the theory that the desiderative affix expresses the desire having the cooking etc., i.e. the base-meanings, as the qualificands, is not tenable. According to him, the accusative can be explained to express the objecthood of the cooking etc. as described by the effort etc. in the active statements such as '*pākam cikīrṣati*' etc. However, the passive (*ātmanepada)* endings cannot be explained to express the objecthood of the cooking etc. as described by the effort etc. in the corresponding passive statements such as '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*' etc., as only the objecthood as described by the desire for (accomplishing the cooking by) the effort, etc. i.e. the desiderative base-meanings, is eligible to be expressed by such a passive ending. It should be noted that the derivative affixes are ruled to express their own meanings as qualified by their base-meanings; and therefore, the passive (desiderative) endings must express the objecthood as described by the desire for (accomplishing the cooking by) the effort etc., and not the objecthood of the cooking etc. as described by the effort etc., as the effort etc. as qualified by the desire are not the meanings of the desiderative-bases.

However, Gadādhara refutes the Pūrvapakṣin's objection. According to him, in the active statement such as '*pākam cikīrṣati*', one cognizes that the person has the desire for the effort that has the cooking as the object; and therefore, the desiderative affix expresses the desire as the qualificand of the effort, i.e. the desiderative base-meaning; however, in the passive statement such as '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*', one cognizes that the cooking is the object of the effort, i.e. the object of desire; and therefore, the desiderative affix expresses

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the desire as the qualifier of the effort, i.e. the desiderative base-meaning. Conse-quently, the passive endings can be admitted to express the objecthood of the cooking etc., described by the effort etc., as only the effort etc. as qualified by the desire are the meanings of the desiderative bases. Thus there is no difficaulty in cognizing the objecthood of the cooking etc. described by the effort etc. in the passive usages.

Now it must be noted that the present tense etc. expressed by the verbal endings are usually related to the base-meanings. Thus in order to explain such a relationship, Gadādhara states that in both active (*pākam cikīrṣati)* and passive (*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate)* usages, where the desire is cognized as the qualificand and the qualifier respectively, the present tense is related to the desire, i.e. the part of the meaning of the desiderative-base; and in accordance with the satements such as *'nīlataro ghaṭ aḥ,* the meaning of a word such as the excellence expressed by the comparative suffix (*tarap)* is related to the blue colour, i.e. the part of the meaning of the word '*hīlataraḥ'* and thus the convention that the meaning of a word is related to the meaning of another word and not to the part of the maning of another word (*padārthaḥ padārthena anveti, na tu tedekadeśena)* needs to be restricted any way; and hence there is no violation of such a rule in admitting the relation of the presenttence with desire.

Refutation of the grammarians objection that *kṛtiviśeṣitecchā is the meaning*

II (ii) 21. It may be objected now as follows : Let only the desire qualified by the effort be cognized from the desiderative suffix in the passive statements as well; and let only the effort, functioning as the qualifier (of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the desire), be related to the objecthood of the cooking etc. And this instance of relationship would be similar to the instance of the relationship of the other meaning of the conjugational ending such as the present time with the desire functioning as the qualifier of the effort etc. in your theory.

However, this objection is not correct. Since it is against the semantic convention that the meaning that is recollected (cognized) as the qualifier with respect to some meaning, is related to some other meaning as the qualifier, the effort, i.e. the meaning of the desiderative base, recollected (cognized) as the qualifier to the desire, is nottenable to be related to the objecthood, as the qualifier, when the same is functioning as the qualifier with respect to the cooking etc., i.e. the nominative-meaning. And the question of the relationship of the same (effort) with respect to the objecthood as the qualificand is irrelevant (impractical). Also, though the desire is cognized to be related to the desiderative root-meaning as the qualifier, the same is cognized as only the qualificand with respect to the present tense etc.; and therefore, there in no violation to the said convention of relations in our theory.

Thus. in the passive usages, the effort, i.e. the desiderative root-meaning, recollected (cognized) as the qualifier with respect to the other, i.e. the desire, is not justified in being cognized as the qualifier directly with respect to the objecthood (of the cooking) etc. The meaning of the derivative affix is found to be related to only such a part of the meaning of a nominal base that appears as the essential part included in the base-meaning (pot); however, the same is not found to be related to the part of the meaning of the base that appears independently as the word-meaning. Further, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

relationship of the effort with the objecthood is impossible even indirectly through the qualificand such as the desire as the desire is itself not related to the objecthood. Relationship of the qualifier indirectly through the qualificand is established only with respect to the item related to the qualificand by convention in the case of the qualificative relationship of the qualificand; however, the same is not established with to respect to the item not related the qualificand.

Explanation

Gadādhara first reports the objection of the Pūrvapakṣins. According to them, like in the active usage such as '*pākam* cikīrṣati', in the passive usage such as '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*, too, the desiderative suffix can express the desire qualified by the effort (*kṛtiviśeṣitecchā*); and like the present time expressed by the conjugational ending (*te*), which is related to the desire. functioning as the qualifier to the effort, expressed by the root (*pac*), the effort, functioning as the qualifier to the desire, can be related to the objecthood functioning as the qualifier to the cooking expressed by the nominative '*pākaḥ*'. And thus, the desire can be the qualificand of the effort; hence can be competent in having the relationship with rhe present time in the passive usage.

However, Gadādhara refutes such an objection. According to him, any meaning which is cognized to be a qualifier to some meaning cannot be cognized to be the qualifier to some other meaning; and therefore, the effort, which is cognized to be the qualifier to the desire in the passive '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*', cannot be cognized to be the qualifier to the objecthood in tum cognized to be the qualifier to the cooking, i.e. the norainative-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meaning, also the same effort cannot be cognized to be the qualificand of the objecthood as only the cooking, i.e. the nominative-meaning. can be cognized to be the qualificand of the objecthood. Therefore, according to Gadādhara, the desire must be cognized to be only the qualifier to the effort (*dhātvarthaviśeṣaṇa*) in the passive '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*', so that the same desire can be cognized to be the qualificand of the present time without violating the semantic convention that a meaning cognized to be the qualifier to some meaning, cannot be cognized to be the qualifier to the some other meaning.

Now Gadādhara concludes as follows: That supposing the desiderative can express the desire as the qualificand of the effort, i.e. the root-meaning in the passive, then the same effort cognized to be the qualifier to the desire, cannot be cognized to be the qualifier to the objecthood of the cooking, as it would contradict the said semantical convention. In the identity statement, '*nīlataro ghaṭaḥ*' where the part of the base-meaning, namely, the blue colour, is cognized to be the part and parcel of the meaning included in the other base-meaning, namely the pot, the derivational affix-meaning, namely the excellence, is cognized to have the relation with the part of its base-meaning, namely the blue colour. However, in the desiderative passive usage, '*cikīrṣ yate pākaḥ*', the part of the desiderative base-meaning, the effort, is not cognized to be the part and parcel of the meaning included in the other base-meaning, i.e. namely, the cooking (it is cognized only independently as the part of the base-meaning); and therefore, the objecthood, i.e. the derivative (accusative) affix-meaning, cannot be cognized to have the relation. The meaning which is cognized to be the qualifier to some meaning.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

may be cognized to be the qualifier of some other meaning indirectly through the qualificand. However,´ the effort cognized to be the qualifier to the desire cannot be cognized to related to be the qualifier to the objecthood indirectly, through the qualificand, i.e. the desire, as the same desire in itself is not related to the objecthood. (Here the objecthood of the cooking is described by only the effort and not by the desire). According to the Navya-nyāya, in the case of the qualificative relationship of the qualified (*viśiṣṭ ānvayisthala*), the qualifier is conventionally established (*vyutpattisiddha*) to be related to only the item related to the qualificand *(viśeṣyānvavyi)*. indirectly, and not to the item not related to the qualificand (*viśeṣyānanvayi*).

Icchā and *kṛti* cannot be related to *viṣayatārūpakarmatva*

II (ii). 22. It may be held now as follows : That in the passive usages such as 'The cooking is desired to be accomplished' (*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*) etc., both the desire and the effort dependent on the desire, are to be related to the grammatical objecthood of the form of the objectness (of the cooking). For, the cooking is the object with respect to both the desire and the effort to accomplish it. Since the grammatical objecthood described by the staying etc. is unestablished (unexampled), the contingency of the incorrect desirderetve statement such as 'He desires to stay home' (*gṛham tis ṭhāsyate)* can be avoided.

However, such a position is not correct. We shall ask then as to what is the way of the explanation in the passive desiderative usages such as 'The rice is desired to be eaten' (*odano bubhukṣyate)* etc. For, in such cases the grammatical objecthood described by the desire is of the form of the objectness, whereas the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

grammatical objecthood described by the eating is of the form of what is other than the objectness (i.e. contact with the throat). Since the root-meanings such as the eating etc. are not semantically competent to be related to the objecthood that has the relation with the desire functioning as the qualificand of the eating, the qualificative relation of the qualified is not possible.

Explanations

In the passive desiderative statements such as '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*', the grammatical objecthood (*karmatva)* resident in the cooking can be analysed to be of the form of merely the objectness (*viṣayatārūpa)* as the cooking is the object in both the desire (*icchā*) and the effort (*kṛti)*. Hence it is proposed that the desire is related to the grammatical objecthood of cooking; and, the effort too can be related to the grammatical objecthood of the cooking indirectly through the desire. Also it should be noted that unlike the roots such as '*kṛ'* (to do), the roots such as '*sthā*' (to stay) etc. are not transitive; and hence unlike the root-meanings such as the effort, the staying etc. cannot be related to the home etc. Consequently, the incorrect usages such as '*gṛham tiṣṭhāsyate'* cannot be imposed with the intention of cognizing the relation of the staying etc. indirectly through the desire to the home etc. However, Gadādhara refutes such a proposal. According to him, unlike the grammatical objecthood resident in the cooking, the grammatical objecthood resident in the rice cannot be analysed to be of the form of the objectness. While the objecthood described by the desire (*icchākarmatā)* is of the form merely the objectness (*viṣayatārūpa),* the objecthood described by the eating (*bhojanakarmatā)* is of the form of the contact with the throat (*galādhassamyoga*). Thus, the eating

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cannot be related to the grammatical objecthood resident in the rice through the desire, i.e. the intermediate qualificand; and consequently, the correct usages such as '*odanaḥ bubhukṣyate*' could not be explained with the intention of cognizing the relation of the eating with the grammatical objecthood.

'pākaḥ cikīrṣyate' cannot be explained

II (ii). 23. As a matter of fact, there is no way out to explain the relationship in 'The cooking is desired to be accomplished' (*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*). While the objectness described by the desire and resident in the cooking is not the qualifier with respect to the effort, the objectness described by the effort and resident in the cooking is the qualifier with respect to the effort. Consequently, the objectness described by the effort and resident in the cooking is different from the objectnes described by the desire and resident in the cooking; and therefore, the grammatical objecthood of the form of the objectness and having the relation with the desire (i.e. the objectness not qualifying the effort) does not have the competency of being related to the effort.

It may be held now as follows: That the rule that the qualifier is related to only the individual item (qualificand) having the relation with the intermediate qualificand through such an intermediate is not to be admitted; however, only the rule that the qualifier is related to the individual item (qualificand) delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relative of the intermediate qualificand is to be admitted. Consequently, the objectness delimited by the objectness-hood, does have the competency for the relation with both the desire and the effort; and thus, there is no

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

untenability of the semantical competency of the relation of the objecthood with the effort in the present context of 'The cooking is desired to be accomplished' (*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*). That is why, in the instrumental statement such as 'He buys the Soma plant with the red ....calf' (*aruṇayā....gavā soman krīṇāti),* there is no untenability of the relation of the qualified (red) cow (or the red colour through the qualificand, i.e. the cow) with the accomplishedness, i.e. the meaning of the instrumental; and this is inspite of the fact that the accomplishedness described by the red colour (ness) and resident in the buying and the accomplishedness described by the cow and resident in the buying are mutually different. In such a case, the individual act of buying the Soma, which is related indirectly to the cow, i.e. the intermediate qualificand, has the identity with the individual act of buying the Soma which is to be related indirectly to the red colour, i.e. the intermediate qualifier. Similarly in the present case (*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*) too, the individual objects such as the individual cookings, which are to be related indirectly to both the desire and the effort, have the identity unharmed.

However, such a position is not correct. Then, by taking into account the collective desire such as 'Let there be the cooking (*pākaḥ bhavatu*) and 'Let there be the effort accomplishing the eating' (*bhojanakṛtir bhavatu),* the passive desiderative statement such as 'The cooking is desired to be accomplished' (*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate)* would become unvoidable as both the objectness described by the present desire and the objectness described by the effort belonging to a different (i.e. future) time can be found to exist in the cooking.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara points out that when in the passive

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

usage, the desiderative is held to express the desire functioning as the qualificand of the root-meaning such as the effort; the same (effort), since it is cognized as the qualifier with respect to the desire, cannot be related to the objecthood of the cooking; and hence the passive desiderative statement such as '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*' would become untenable. According to him, the cooking has the objectness (es) described by both the desire and the effort; however, the objectness of the cooking described by the desire is the qualifier of only the desire, whereas the objectness of the cooking described by the effort is the qualifier of only the effort; and hence they differ. Therefore the grammatical objecthood of the form of the objectness of the cooking (*viṣayatvarūpakarmatva),* which is the qualifier of only the desire, cannot be related to the effort as the qualifier (or the effort cannot be related to such an objecthood of the cooking). Thus, in the passive, the desiderative must be admitted to express only the desire functioning as the qualifier of the root-meaning such as the accomplishing effort.

Now the Pūrvapakṣin proposes a convention as follows : That the qualifier of the intermediate qualificand (*viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇa),* which is related to the chief qualificand through the intemediate qualificand need not be related to only the individual chief-qualificand having the relation with the intermediate qualificand (*viśeṣyānvayivyakti)*, but rather it can be related to any qualificand that is delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum of the intermediate qualificand (*viśeṣyānvayitāvacchedakāvacchinna)*. Consequently, dispite that the objectness of the cooking described by the desire and the same described by the effort differ mutually, in the passive '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate'*, the grammatical objecthood of the cooking (*pākakarmatva)* of the form of the objectness

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*viṣayatvarūpa*), as being delimited by the objectness-hood (*viṣayatātvāvacchinna*), can be admitted to have the competency for being related to both the desire and the effort, i.e. the root-meaning; and hence the (desire and the) effort can be related to the grammatical objecthood of the cooking of the form of the objectness through the desire.

Since the qualifier such as the effort is allowed to be related, indirectly through the intermediate qualificand such as the desire etc., to the qualificand delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum of the intermediate qualificand (*viśeṣyānvayitāvacchedakāvacchinna*), the red colour and the calf can be related to the accomplishedness (which differs by being described by the red colour and the calf but is generalised as delimited by the accomplishdness-hood); and hence in the statmement '*aruṇayā gavā somaṁ krīṇāti*' the qualifier such as the buying can have the relation indirectly through the calf with the accomplishedness of the Soma plant, delimited by the delimiting property (the accomplishedness-hood), of the relatedness of the calf, i.e. the intermediate qualificand. It should be noted here that in '*aruṇayā gavā somaṁ krīṇāti*', the act of buying the Soma relating to the calf, i.e. the qualificand (*viśeṣyānvayisomakrayavyakti*) and the act of buying the Soma relating to the red colour, i.e. the qualifier, (*viśeṣaṇānvayi somakrayavyakti*) are admitted to be identical with each other due to the identity of the accomplishedness of the Soma plant described by the calf. Similarly, in '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*' too, the object such as the cooking relating to the desire, and the object such as the cooking relating to the effort are identical due to the identity of the objectness of the cooking described by the desire and that of cooking by the effort.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, Gadādhara refutes the Pūrvapakṣin's position. According to him, when the individual objects such as the cooking relating to the desire and that relating to the effort are held to be identical, the desiderative statement '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*' would become necessary even at the time of the collective cognition such as '*bhojanakṛtir bhavatu*' and '*pākaśca bhavatu*' as both the desire and the accomplishing effort can be related indirectly to the cookings, i.e. the objects of the present desire and the objects of the future effort, generalized as the objects by the objectness.

Even particular objecthood cannot be related

II (ii). 24. Now it may again be proposed as follows : That only the objecthood of the cooking, described by the individual effort that functions as the qualifier with respect to the desire through the relation of the objectness -reference, must be related to the object such as the cooking that has a relation with the desire for the effort; and therefore, the overapplication (contingency) of the usage such as 'The cooking is desired to be accomplished' (*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate)* is avoided during such a collective cognition.

However, even such a position is not correct. Even then the statement such as 'The cooking is not desired to be accomplished now' (*pāka idānīm na cikīrṣyate)* too would become untenable at the time of the said collective cognition of desire (*bhojanakṛtir bhavatu' 'pākaśca bhavatu*). At the time of such a cognition, the absence of the objectness, delimited by the objectness-hood and described by the present desire for the effort functioning as the delimitor of the relatedness of the related, and the absence of the objectness, delimited by the objectness-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

hood and described by the present desire referring to the effort as the object cannot exist in the cooking.

Explanation

Now in the theory that the desire in the passive desiderative statement has only the qualificandness described by the qualifierness of the effort, i.e. the root-meaning, the statement '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*' is proposed to be explained as follows: That only the objecthood of the cooking described by the individual effort functioning as the qualifier in the desire (*icchāviśeṣaṇībhavatkṛtivyaktikarmatva)* is meant to be related to the object such as the cooking through the objectness-reference (*viṣayitā)*; and therefore, when the effort is not the qualifier in the collective cognition of desire such as '*bhojanakṛtir bhavatu pākaśca bhavatu*', such a relationship of the objecthood involving the reference to the future effort is not possible in the cooking; and hence such a statement is avoided.

However, Gadādhara refutes such a proposal. According to him, in such a theory even the expected negative statement '*pāka idānīm na cikīrṣyate*' would become untenable at the time of such a collective cognition of desire. Since the cooking is the object of the present desire in such a collective cognition of desire, the absence of the objectness of the cooking described by the desire (*icchāviṣayatvābhāva)* cannot be cognized in the cooking. This is inspite of the fact that since the effort for accomplishing the cooking is not the object of the collective cognition, the absence of the objectness described by the effort (*kṛtiviṣayatvābhāva)* can be cognized in the cooking. It should be noted that in Gadādhara's theory, the desire in the passive desiderative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

has only the qualifierness described by the qualificandness of the effort, i.e. the root-meaning; and since the objectness described by the effort is absent in the cooking, the expected statement '*pāka idānīm na cikīrṣyate*' which refers to such an absence becomes tenable.

Kṛtiviṣayatātvāvacchinnābhāva cannot be cognized

II (ii) 25. It may again be proposed as follows : That in such a case, only the absence of the objectness, delimited by the objectness-hood, and described by the effort delimited by the present time, is cognized; and such an absence is unharmed, i.e. not contradictory to the cooking. However, even this proposal in not correct. When in the said collective cognition, the effort for accomplishing the cooking belonging to the past time is found to exist, even such an absence (of the objectness-hood described by the effort delimited by the present time) would become harmed, i.e. contradictory to the cooking. Though the said collective cognition of desire is present, such a statement (as 'The cooking is not desired to be accomplished now') is made provided that the desire for the effort accomplishing the cooking is present. Also, though the effort is absent, such a statement is not made provided that the desire for the effort accomplishing the cooking is present; therefore, only the absence of the objectness described by the effort cannot be admitted to be cognized in such a case (as *pāka idānīm na cikīrṣyate)*. Thus, in the passive desiderative statements, the desire must be admitted to appear as the qualifier of the root-meaning such as the effort.

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣin proposes again as follows : That

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in '*pāka idānīm na cikīrṣyate*', only the absence of the objectness delimited by the objectness-hood in general, and described by the effort delimited by the present time (*vartamānakālāvacchinna kṛtiviṣayatātvāvacchinnābhāva*) can be admitted to be related to the cooking, and such an absence is definitely not contradictory to the cooking at the time of the collective cognition of desire such as '*bhojanakṛtir bhavatu pākaś ca bhavatu*'; and hence there is no untenability of the expected statement '*pāka idānīm na cikīrṣyate*' at the time of the collective cognition.

However, Gadādhara refutes even such a proposal. According to him, when during the said collective cognition of desire, the effort accomplishing the cooking due to the past desire (*atītecchādhīnakṛti*) is present, the absence of the objectness described by the present effort (*vartamānakṛtiviṣayatvābhāva*) cannot be related to the cooking; and this is in spite of the fact that the effort accomplishing the cooking due to the present desire is absent (*vartamānecchādhīnapākakṛtyabhāva*). Thus the untenability of the passive desiderative usage '*pāka idānīm na cikīrṣyate*', remains as before. Also according to him, in such a usage is '*pāka idānīmna* cikīrṣyate' merely the absence of the objectness described by the effort (*kṛtiviṣayatvābhāva*) cannot be addmitted to be cognized in the cooking. For, such a usage in made even at the time of the collective cognition of the desire for cooking (*uktasamūhālambanecchā*) provided that the desire for the effort accomplishing the cooking is absent; however, since the objectness described by the past effort can be possible in the cooking during such a collective cognition of desire, the usage becomes untenable. Thus, Gadādhara establishes that in such a passive statement, the desiderative affix must express only the desire which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

functions as only the qualifier to the root-meaning such as the effort.

Justification that desire is the qualificand

II (ii). 26. The following is the essence of the theory. In the case of the passive desiderative usage too, the desiderative affix expresses the desire as only being the qualificand of the root-meaning such as the effort. And the grammatical objecthood described by such a desire is the meaning of the desiderative passive affix. Here such an objecthood is the being the object of the desire as being the object of the root-meaning. In the case of the desires such as 'Let there be the eating having the rice as its object' (*odanakarmakabhojanam bhavatu*), and 'Let there be the effort having the cooking as its object' (*pākaviṣayakakṛtir bhavatu),* the rice and the cooking become the objects of such desires; and therefore, the same obtain the objecthood described by such desires. However, in the case of the desire for staying at home such as 'He desires to stay at home' (*gṛhe tiṣṭāsati*), the home etc. are the objects of the desire for staying only as being the substratum of staying; and therefore, the same home etc. do not obtain the objecthood described by the desire to stay.

That is why in the case where the eating having some particular rice as its object is unestablished, but nevertheless the same rice is desired as being the object of eating, the desiderative usage such as 'This rice is desired to be eaten' (*ayamodano bubhukṣyate*) is not untenable; also that is why in the case of the desire where the sky is the object of desire as being the object of perception, the desiderative usage such as 'The sky is desired to be seen' (*gaganam didṛikṣate)* is not untenable. Also, according to this theory, in the case of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the desire where the eating is the object of desire as consisting of only the objects such as the rice, but however, by chance the eating consists of even the poison as its object, the usage such as 'He desires to eat the poison' *(viṣam bubhuksate)* is not possible to be imposed.

Explanation

Gadādhara now justifies the theory that the desire is cognized as the qualificand of the root-meaning such as the effort in the passive desideratives. According to him, the desiderative suffix can be admitted to express the desire as the qualificand of the root-meaning, i.e. the effort, in the passives such as '*pākaḥ cikīrṣyate*' etc. And only the grammatical objecthood described by such a desire is the meaning of the passive endings. And the same objecthood should be defined as the being the object of desire as being the grammatical object of the root-meaning (*dhātvarthakarmatayā tadviṣayatvam*). Now since in the desires such as '*odanakarmakabhojanam bhavatu*' and '*pākaviṣayakakṛtir bhavatu*', the rice and the cooking are cognized as the objects of desires that have the root-meanings such as the eating and the effort as the objects, the same secure the grammatical objecthoods described by the desires; and therefore, the passive usages such as '*odano bubhukṣyate*' and '*pākaḥ cikīṣyate*'become tenable.

It should be noted here that in the desire for staying at home such as '*gṛhādhārakasthitir bhavatu*', the home is cognized only as the object of the desire that has the home as the substratum of staying and not as the object of staying; and therefore, the same home does not secure the grammatical objecthood. Thus, the incorrect passive desiderative statement such as '*gṛhaṁ tiṣṭhāsyate*' instead of the correct statement of '*gṛhe tiṣṭhāsyate*' cannot be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

imposed. Also, since the grammatical objecthood described by the desire is defined as the being the object of the desire as being the grammatical object of the root-meaning, the passive desiderative statement such as '*ayamodano bubhukṣyate*' is not untenable when some particular rice is not established to be the object of eating (due to inedibility) but some times the same rice is desired as being the object of eating. This is so because, in such cases the same rice can be the object of the desire as being the grammatical object of the eating, i.e. the root-meaning. Also, that is why, when the desire for eating rice qualified by the state of being what has only the rices as its object (*odanamātrakarmakatvaviśiṣṭabhojanecchā)* is present, however by chance the eating includes (has) even the poison as its object due to the fact that rice may consist of some unknown poisonous element, the passive desiderative statement, '*viṣam bubhukṣyate*' can be avoided. This is so because, the poison does not have the state of being the object of desire as being the object of eating (*bhojanakarmatvena icchāviṣayatva*).

Karmatva is the qualifier of the desire

II (ii). 27. In the case of the active desiderative usages too, the grammatical objecthood of the form of being the object of the desire as being the object of the root-meaning, is cognized as the qualifier of the desire; however, the grammatical objecthood described by the root-meaning does not appear so. Otherwise, by admitting that the object-referringness described by the root-meaning such as the eating qualified by the objecthood of the individual item such as the rice, which appears as the qualifier of the root-meaning (such as the eating), is cognized invariably in the desire, the incorrect usage

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such as 'Caitra desires to eat the poison' (*viṣam bubhukṣ ate caitraḥ)* can be avoided in the said case of the desire. However, the correct usage such as 'Caitra desires to see the sky' (*gaganam didṛkṣate caitraḥ)* would become untenable to explain.

Explanation

In the active desiderative usage such as '*pākam cikīrṣati caitraḥ'*, the cognition produced is that Caitra is the substratum of the desire which has the root-meaning (effort) as its qualifier and describes the objecthood of the form of the objectness resident in the cooking (*tādṛśaviṣayatārūpakarmatvanirūpaka dhātvar-thaprakārakecchāśvayaḥ)*. And in such a cognition, the objecthood described by the desire (*icchākarmatva)*, which is of the form of being the object of the desire as the being the grammatical object of effort, i.e. the desiderative base-meanings (*dhātvarthakarmatvena icchāviṣ ayatva)*, is found to be the qualifier in the desire through the describing. It should be noted, however, here that merely the objecthood described by the root-meaning (*dhātvarthanirūpitakarmatva)*, which is not in agreement with the state of being the object of desire (*icchāviṣ ayatvasamānādhikaraṇa)*, cannot be the qualifier in the desire. Otherwise, suppose such an objecthood described by the root-meaning is the qualifier in the desire, then the incorrect usage such as '*viṣam bubhukṣate caitraḥ'* may be avoided at the time of the desire for eating the rice (where by chance even the poison is eaten and hence becomes the object of eating) by holding that in such cases the object-referringness described by the eating, which is qualified by the objecthood of the rice through the describing (*tattatpadārthakarmatvaviśiṣṭa bhojanā-dinirūpita viṣayitā)*, is cognized in the desire;

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and the desire for eating the rice does not have such an object-referringness described by the eating qualified by the objecthood of the poison. However, the correct usage such as '*gaganam didṛkṣate caitraḥ*' becomes untenable because the object-referringness described by the seeing and qualified by the objecthood of the sky (*gaganakarmatvaviśiṣṭa darśananirūpitaviṣyitva)* cannot be related to the desire for seeing through the describing.

Explanation of the relation of the desiderative root-meaning with the desire

II (ii). 28. The following point must be borne in mind. That the desiderative root-meanings such as the eating and the effort cannot be admitted to be the qualifiers in the desire expressed by the desiderative affix merely through the relation of the qualificandness. For, in that case when a person such as Maitra has desires (that other person should eat and accomplish), that have references to the eating and the effort undertaken by the other agents such as Caitṛa as their objects, the incorrect desiderative statements such as 'This one (Maitra) desires to eat' (*ayam bubhukṣate)* and 'This one (Maitra) desires to accomplish' (*ayam cikīrṣati)* would become contingent (necessary). Rather, therefore, the same root-meanings need to be admitted to be the qualifiers through the relation of both the qualificandness and the state of having the same agents.

Now in order to avoid the said overapplication (undersired contingency), the expressedness of, i.e., the expressive power of desiderative can be admitted even in the state of having the same agent as that of the said desire; and then the same can be related to the root-meanings (actions) such as the eating and the effort. However, such an option is not possible to be justified.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

By taking into consideration the state of having the same agent (Caitra) as that of some other desire (found in Caitra), the overapplication (undesired contingency) of the incorrect statements would remain unsolved as before in the said case. On the other hand, supposing the state of having the same agent as that of the same desire itself is admitted to have the expressedness, i.e. the expressive power then the knowledge of the expressive power for the desiderative affix would become untenable due to the non-generalization of the meaning of the word 'itself', i.e. the individual desire.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the exact relation between the desiderative root-meanings such as the eating and the desiderative affix-meanings such as the desire. According to him, both the qualificandness (*viśeṣyatā)* and the state of having the same agent as that of the desire *(samānakartṛkatva*), and not merely the qualificandness, are the relations of the root-meanings with the desire. Otherwise, supposing only the qualificadness is the relation, then the desiderative statements such as '*ayam (maitraḥ) bubhukṣate*' etc. would become necessary even with respect to Maitra, who has a desire for eating to be undertaken by some other agent (Caitra) (*parakartṛkabhojanagocarecchā)* such as '*caitraḥ odanabhojanavān bhavatu'*, as the eating undertaken by some other agent (Caitra) is also the object of Maitras desire; and hence the qualificandness described by the eating undertaken by some other agent (Caitra)(*parakartṛka bhojanādinirūpitaviśeṣyatā*) can be related to the Maitra's desire.

Also, the undesired contingency of such usages as '*ayam (maitraḥ) bubhukṣate'* cannot be avoided by merely

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

proposing that the desiderative root-meanings such as the eating etc. are not related to the desire through the qualificandness (*viśeṣyatā*), but the state of having the same agent as that of the desire (*icchāsamānakartṛkatva*) is also the expressed meaning of the desiderative suffix. Although in the said case, the eating undertaken by some one else (Caitra) etc, does not have the state of having the same agent as that of the desire of Maitra, the same eting etc., undertaken by Caitra himself, can be claimed to have the state of having the same agent (Caitra) as that of another desire (of Caitra for seeing etc.) (*icchāntara-samānakartṛkatva*); and hence the undesired contingency of the statement '*ayaṃ (maitraḥ) bubhukṣate*' would remain unsolved at the time of Maitra's desire for Caitra's eating. Also it cannot be suggested that the desideratives express only the state of having the same agent as that of the desire relating to the root-meanings such as the eating itself (*sva icchā samānakartṛkatva*). For, although then the undesired contingency can be avoided by preventing the relation of the root-meanings with the desire due to the untenability of *sva icchā samānakartṛkatva* in the root-meanings such as the eating, the expressive power of the desiderative affix becomes untenable to be established in any desire as the individual desires of various agents cannot be generalized.

Non-contradiction to the grammatical rule

II (ii). 29. Also, in admitting the state of having the same agent as that of desire (*samānakartṛkatva)* to be the relation of the root-meanings (with the desire), there occurs no contradiction to any grammatical rule (P. iii. 1. 7) establishing the expressive power of the desiderative affix in the desire. The grammatical rule assiging the desiderative suffix (*san*) such as 'The

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

affix '*san*' is optionally attached in the sense of wishing after the root expressing the object wished and having the sense of the agent of the action as wisher thereof.' (*dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samānakartṛkād icchāyām vā,* P. iii.1.7.) does not teach the state of having the same agent as that of the desire as the sense for the desiderative affix. And such a rule teaches only the sense that the desiderative affix is used in the sense of the desire after the verbal root intended to convey its (roots) own meaning that has the objecthood described by the desire and the state of having the same agent as that of the desire as its qualifiers. Even in the theory that the state of having the same agent as that of the desire appears as only the relation between the root-meanings and the desire, the roots can be maintained to be intended to express their meanings as qualified by the state of having the same agent as that of the desire; and therefore the rule (P. iii. 1-7) must be admitted to help the people in grasping of the expressive power for the desideratives merely in the desire. This is the theory.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara states that when the state of having the same agent as that of the desire (*samānakartṛkatva*) is included in the category of the relation of the root-meanings with the desire, the grammatical rule (P. iii.1.7) assigning the desiderative suffix need not be contradicted. According to him, the grammatical rule (P. iii.1.7) that assigns the '*san*'-*affix* after the roots expressing the objects of desire need not fix the expressive power of the *san*-affix in the sense of the state of having the same agent as that of the desire (*samānakartṛkatva*) which would render the inclusion of the same under the category of the relation contradictory.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Rather, Gadādhara explains that the rule (P.iii.1.7) means to assign the *'san'*-affix only in the sense of the desire after the verbal roots expressing their meanings that have both the objecthood described by the desire (*icchākarmatva*) and the state of having the same agent as that of the desire (*icchā samānakartṛkatva*) as the qualifiers (*prakāra*). Also, the Vṛtti *'san pratyayo vā syād icchāyām'* (on P.iii.1.7) supports the view that *'san'* expresses only the desire. Also now it should be noted that *samānakartṛkatva* is only the qualifier of the root-meaning (*dhātvarthaviśeṣaṇa*) but not the qualifier of the desire (*icchāviśeṣaṇa*); and hence cannot be the meaning of the *san*. affix. Also, since the item functioning as the relation of the root-meaning can be admitted to be the qualifier of the root-meaning, the desideratve roots can be maintained to express their meaning (actions) as qualified by the *samānaprakārakatva*.

Denominatives (*kyackāmyajantas)* are intransitive

II (ii) 30. The denominative roots such as 'He desires to have a son' (*putrīyati*) and 'He desires to have a son' (*putrakāmyati*) ending in '*kyac'* and *'kāmyac'* affixes, which are assigned after the nominals such as '*putra*', are expressive of the sense of desire; and hence are not distinguishable from the desideratives. However, unlike the desideratives, they are not transitives. Since the bases included in such denominative roots themselves express the objects of the desire, the desires expressed by such roots do not have any expectancy for any other object separately.

Now it may be objected as follows : That in the denominatives such as 'He desires to have a son' (*putrīyati*) and 'He desires to have a son' '*putrakāmyati'*,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the son etc., which are the meanings of the bases (*putra*) etc.) of denominative affixes such as '*kyac*' and '*kāmyac*' etc., are not actions; and therefore such denominatives may not have the transitivity. However, in the cases of secondary denominative roots such as 'He desires to cook by himself' i.e. 'He desires to cook' (*ātmanaḥ pākam icchati pākīyati),* the cooking etc., expressed by the secondary bases such as '*pāka*' etc., are transitive; and hence denominative roots such *'pākīyati'* ending in '*kyac*' and *'kāmyac'* affixes like the desideratives cannot be avoided the transitivity. Consequently, the incorrect accusative usages such as 'He desires to cook the rice' (*taṇḍulam pākīyati)* would become contingent. However, such an objection is not correct. Like the roots 'to exert' (*yam*) etc., which are synonymous with the roots 'to do' (or make)' (*kṛ)* etc., the denominative roots ending in the '*kyac*' etc., i.e. *'pākīyati'* etc., which are synonymous with the desideratives, too would not be admitted to have syntactic expectancy for the accusatives expressing the objecthood; and hence the contingency of such accusative usages is avoided. Also, while expecting the objecthood, as described by the primary derivatives such as *pāka* (the bases of the denominative roots), in the rice etc., the accusative would not have any contingency, as the same is prevented by the ensuing genitive.

Explanation

Gadādhara now sets out to examine the denominative usages (*kyac kāmyajantas*). According to him, the denominatives ending in *'kyac'* and *'kāmyac'* suffixes are, unlike desiderative, intransitives (*akarmaka)*. Since the *kyac* and *kāmyac* are assigned in the sense of desire (by the rule *'supaḥ ātmanaḥ kyac kāmyac ca'*, (P.iii.1.8.) after the nominal words such as *'putram'* ending in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

case endings which express the objects of desire connected with oneself, there is no distinct expectancy for any objects *(karmākāṅkṣā)* for the denominatives; and hence, the accusative statements *'ātmānam putrīyati'* etc. are not made.

It should be noted that in the denominative usages such as *'putrīyati', 'putrakāmyati'* etc. the nominal bases such as *'putra'* etc. do not expresses the transitive actions *(sakarmaka)* expecting any objects (*karmākāṅkṣā*); and hence, the transitive usages such as 'ātmānam putrīyati' need not be made. However, in the denominative usages such as *ātmanaḥ pākam icchati,—pākīyati* etc., the nominal bases such as *pāka* etc. do express the transitive actions *(sakarmaka)* expecting objects *(karmākāṅkṣā);* and hence, it can be objected that the transitive denominative usages such as *taṇḍulam pākīyati*, like the transitive desiderative usages such as *pākam cikīrṣati,* would become necessary. However, Gadādhra refutes the objection on the ground that the denominatives ending in *kyac* and *kmyac* affixes such as *putrīyati* and *putrakāmyati,* though synonymous *(samānārthaka)* with the desiderative such as *'cikīrṣati* in expressing a desire are to be admitted as intransitive. Accordng to him, such a position is justified by the fact that the roots *yam* etc., though synonymous *(samānāarthaka*) with the roots '*kṛ'* etc., are admitted as intransitive and hence, denomintives synonymous with the desideratives need not be transitive. Further, the incorrect accusative usages such as *taṇḍulam pākīati* are avoided even when the rice etc. are intended to be the objects of the *kṛdata* words such as *pāka* etc. which are transitive on the ground that the rule *artṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti* (P. ii. 3.65) assigns only the genitive in such cases.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation of the accusative in *kamsam ghātayati*

II(ii) 31. It may be objected now as follows : That supposing the rule the genitive is used after a word in deonting the agent and the object used along with a primary derivative *(kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti,* P. ii-3-65) contradicts (opposes) the accusatives after the objects in asociation with the primary derivatives such as *pāka* constituting the parts of the denominative roots (*pākīyati etc.),* then the accusative in the statements such as 'He tells the killing that has Kamsa as its object, i.e. He tells the killing of Kamsa' (*kamsakarmakavadham ācaṣṭ e-kamsaṃ ghātayati)*. would became untenable. Since Kamsa cannot have the objecthood described by the action of telling, the accusative after such a word as *'kamsa'* needs to be justified only by referring to the objecthood described by killing.

However, this objection is not correct. In the case where the causative affix (*ṇic*) is assigned after the primary derivatives such as '*vadha*' in the sense of telling, the semantical item (*kāraka)* of the action expressed by the primary derivative is taught the transfer of the state equal to the state of the semantical item (*kāraka*) of the action expressed by the causative base by the rule (*'prakrtivacca kārakam'* p....). Therefore, just as the agents of the primitive actions expressed by the primitive bases are the objects in association with causative roots in causatives such as 'He makes the king go' '*rājānam gamayati*' 'He makes the sun climb up' *sūryam udgamayati'*, in the same way, the agents of the actions expressed by the primary derivatives too are the objects in association with the causative affixes assigned after the primary derivatives. Now, just as the primitive

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

agents of the primitive actions such as telling, the going and the moving up become the objects in association, with the causatives, and therefore, the words expressing such agents receive the accusative case endings after them, in the same way, the agents of the primary derivatives too become the objects of the denominatives endings in the causative affixes, and hence words expressing them receive the accusative ending Thus, the words '*kamsa*' etc. which express the objects of the denominatives too can have the accusative ending s. However, when the rice is intended to be merely the object of the primary derivative, only the genitive usage such as 'He desires the cooking of the rice' '*taṇḍulasya* pākīyati' is desired. The relation of the meaning of a *kāraka* case ending is established to be semantically tenable with even a part of the compound word. However, when the rice is intended to have only the non-*kāraka* - relationship with the cooking, such a genitive usage is not desired.

Explanation

It is objected here that when the rule *'kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti'* (P.ii.3.65) is held to prevent the accusative after the words expressing the objects of primary derivatives such as *pāka,* in *'pākīyati'* etc., the accusative would become untenable after the word '*kamsa*' in '*kamsakarmakavadham ācaṣṭe -- kamsam ghātayati*', as Kamsa, not being the object of telling expressed by the *ṇic*-ending in the denominative, i.e. *ghātayati,* needs to be explained only as the object of killing expressed by the primary derivative such as '*vadha*'; and hence the accusative statement such as '*kamsam ghāayati*' too would become untenable.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, Gadādhara refutes such an objection on the ground that the rule read in the tenth class of *cur*, *'ākhyānāt kṛtas tadācaṣṭe .. prakṛtivacca kārakam'* (P.....) teaches the transfer of the status of the objecthood to the agent of the primary derivative (*kṛdantakāraka)* like the transfer of the objecthood described by the causative action such as 'making one go' to the agent (king) of the primitive action such as going in '*rājānam gamayati'* etc. According to him, in the case of '*kamsakarmakavadham ācaṣṭe - kamsam ghātayati'*, where the causative '*ṇic'* is assigned after the primary derivative such as *'vadha'*, the accusative can be explained after the word '*kamsa'* expressing the object of killing due to the transfer of the objecthood described by the action of telling expressed by the *ākhyānārtha ṇic;* and this instance is similar to the instance of the causative usage *rājānam gamayati* etc. where the accusative is explained after the word '*rājan'* expressing the agent of the primitive action of going due to the transfer of the objecthood described by the causative action of making one to go expressed by the causative '*ṇic'*.

Now it should be noted that when the rice is intended to be the object of the action expressed by the primary derivative such as the cooking *(kṛdantakarman)*, only a genitive is assigned by the rule '*kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti'* (P. ii. 3. 65) after the word 'rice' (*odana*) expressing the object; and therefore, the genitive statement such as '*taṇḍulasya pākīyati'* is acceptable. And since the meaning of a *kāraka*-case is admitted to be related to even a part of the compound word-meaning (*vṛttyekadeśa*) and the objecthood expressed by the genitive-*kāraka* can be related to even the cooking, i.e. the part of the meaning of the desiderative word '*pākīyati'*, the convention that the meaning of a word is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

related to the meaning of another word and not to the part of the meaning of another word is not violated. However, when the rice is not intended to be the object of the primary derivative, but is intended to have merely the non-*kāraka* -relation with the same, the genitive usage, wherein the genitive does not express the objecthood, but expresses only a relation, is not acceptable.

Gādādhara's own position

II (ii). 32. As a matter of fact, such a genitive usage as 'He desires the cooking of the rice' *(taṇḍulasya pākīyati)* is acceptable even when the rice is intended to have only a non-*kāraka*-relationship. It cannot be objected now that when the non-*kāraka*-relationship expressed by the genitive is related to the cooking, i.e a part of the meaning of the derivative word '*pākīyati*', the semantic convention that the meaning, which is other than a *kāraka* item and a relational adjunct, cannot be related to the part of the meaning of another word would become contradicted. For, such a convention would be admitted only in the case where the word-meanings are related through identity. Thus, there occurs no contradiction if the meaning of a word is related to the part of the meaning of another word through non-identity. That is why the statements such as 'The royal elephants of the rich' *(ṛddhasya rājamātaṅgāḥ)* are not acceptable; whereas the statements such as 'Desirous of heaven for the father' *(pituḥ svargakāmaḥ)* are acceptable.

However, it should not be argued that the inclusion (mention) of the words 'relational adjunct' (*pratiyogi)* and 'semantical item' (*kāraka)* separately in the convention is pointless. The distinct inclusion (mention) of the word 'relational adjunct' is justified as an example. Thus it

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

should be pondered over that what the convention means is that just as the meaning of the relational adjuct-word is not related to any meaning through identity, in the same way the meaning of what is other than a *kāraka*-word is not related to a part of the meaning of another word through identity.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains his own position. According to him, the genitive denominative usage such as '*taṇḍulasya pākīyati*' can be admitted even when the rice is not intended to have the objecthood, but rather is intended to have only the non-*kāraka*-relationship, as there cannot be any rule prescribing genitive only in the sense of the objecthood. Now an objection to such a position is that then the rule '*pratiyogipadādanyat yadanyat kārakādapi*', which prevents non-*kāraka*-items from being related to the part of the meaning of the compound word (*vṛttyekadeśa*) such as the cooking (*pāka*), becomes violated.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection by holding that such a rule is intended to prevent only the relationship of the non-*kāraka*—item with the part of the meaning of compound word through identity but not through non-identity. Thus the genitive statement such as '*ṛddhasya rājamātaṅgāḥ*', wherein the rich (*ṛddha),* i.e. the non-*kāraka*-item, is intended to be related to the king, i.e. the part of the meaning of the compound word '*rājamātaṅgāḥ*' through the identity, is not acceptable; whereas the genitive statements such as '*pituḥ svarga-kāmaḥ*', wherein the father (*pitṛ),* i.e. the non-*kāraka*-item, is intended to be related to the heaven, i.e. the part of the compound word '*svargakāmaḥ*' through non-identity, is acceptable.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It may be objected here that the word '*pratiyogipada*' in the conventional rule '*pratiyogipadādanyat yadanyat kārakādapi*' conveys only a non-*kāraka*-item, and hence separate mention of the same word is not necessary. However, Gadādhara justifies the mention on the ground that the same serves as an example; and hence the convention means that just as the relational adjunct such as the moon (*candra)* in '*candramukham*', is related to the part of the meaning of the compound, i.e. similarity, through non-identity, in the same way the non-*kāraka*-item such as the rice (*taṇḍula*) in *'taṇḍulasya pākīyati'* is related to the part of the meaning of the derivative, i.e. the cooking through non-identity.

Avoidance of '*putrīyati'*

II (ii) . 33. When the speaker intends that a non-*kāraka*-item should be related through identity, the accusative denominative statements such as 'He desires to have the scholar as the son' (*paṇḍitam putrīyati)* and 'He desires to have the hero as the son' (*pravīram putrakāmyati)* are not made. Similarly when a person desires that someone else should have a son, the desiderative denominative statements such as 'He desires to have a son' (*putrīyati)* are not made. This is so because, the desiderative denominative affixes such as *kyac* and *kāmyac* are assigned, by the rules such as 'The '*kyac*' and *'kāymac'* are assigned in the sense of wishing after the words ending in a case affix denoting the object of desire connected with oneself' (*supaḥ ātmanaḥ kyac*. P. iii. 1.8), after the words expressing the objects of desire belonging to the agent of the desire. Here the state of (being the object as) belonging to the agent of desire (*icchākartṛsambandhitva)* is to be understood as the state of being what is cognized to be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

belonging to the agent of desire; Otherwise the desiderative denominative statements such as 'He desires to have a son' (*putri-yatyayam),* which are established in every ones theory, would become untenable at the time of the desire of the person who does not have a son, but nevertheless entertains a desire for a son as belonging to oneself.

Explnation

The accusative desiderative denominative statements such as '*paṇḍitam putrīyati'*, and '*pravīram putra-kāmayati'*etc. are made only at the time when the scholar etc. can be related to the object of desire (son), i.e. the part of the meaning of the compound word, through non-identity, but not at the time when the same are related to the object of desire (son) through identity. However, the denominative usages such as '*putrīyati'* etc. are made only when the person (speaker) entertains a desire for a son for himself, but not at the time when the speaker entertains a desire for a son for some one else. Thus Gadādhara avoids the usage on the ground that the rule P. iii. 1. 8. assigns the '*kyac'* and '*kāmyac'* affixes after the words expressing the objects of desire (*icchākarman)* which are perceived as belonging to oneself, i.e. the agent of desire (*icchākartṛsambandhi).* However, it should be noted here that the denominative usages such as '*putrīyatyayam'* are acceptable even when the son does not exist but the speaker (father) wishes for a son; and in order to facilitate such usages, the state of being the object as belonging to the agent of desire (*icchākartṛsambandhitva)* must be regarded as the state of being what is merely cognized to be belonging to the agent of desire (*icchākartṛsambandhitvena bhāsamān-atvam),* as otherwise such a state cannot be related to the son when son does not actually exist.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation of the rule p. iii. i.8

II (ii). 34. Since the validity of the desiderative denominative statements such as 'He desires to have a son'(*putrīyati)* needs to be avoided in the said case, merely the unqualified object-referringness (*viṣayitva)* cannot be admitted to be the relation of the son etc. (i.e. the denominative base-meaning) with the desire, i.e. the meaning of the '*kyac'* affix; rather the same associated with (qualified by) the occurrence in such a person (speaker) as the father, who, as the relational adjunct, is the object of the relation of ones (speakers) ownness appearing in respect of oneself (the son), must be admitted as the relation. The word as belonging to oneself (*ātmanaḥ)* is used in such a rule (*supaḥ ātmanaḥ kyac* P. iii. 1.8), only to indicate the convention that when although the relation of ones (speakers) ownness in respect of 'oneself' (the son) is not the expressed meaning of the '*kyac'* affix, the meaning of the nominal word (i.e. the son) is related to the desire (i.e. the meaning of the *kyac)* only through the said qualified relation. However, the relation expressed by the genitive as belonging to oneself' (*ātmanaḥ)* is not further related to the desire which is continued from the rule '*dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ.....'* (P.iii. 1.7), as it would not serve the purpose of distinguishing (excluding) the desire of any particular individual (speaker) and also as it would not be conducive to the obtainment of the said (intended) meaning of the rule. Therefore, the same relation expressed by the genitive is related to only the meaning of the nominal word ending in the case expressing the object of desire, i.e. the son expressed by the nominal '*putra*'. Such a nominal word as '*putra*' is expressive of the sense of the son, i.e. the object of the desire as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the being the item belonging to the agent of desire. Thus, inspite of the explanatory construction of the rule (by the *Vṛttikāra)* that the *kyac* affix is assigned in the sense of the desire of the agent of desire after the nominal word expressing the object of desire; only the construction of the rule that the '*kyac*' affix is assigned in the sense of the desire after the nominal word expressing the object of desire such as the son as the being the item belonging to the agent of desire must be resorted to. It should be pondered over that in the natural construction of the rule by the Vṛttikāra, the earlier demonstrated untenability cannot be avoided.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the rule '*supaḥ ātmanaḥ kyac*' (P. iii. 1.8). According to him, when the agent such as Cairtra has the desire that someone else (Maitra) should have a son (*paraputragocarecchā*), the denominative statement '*putrīyati*' needs to be avoided. However, when the son, i.e. the denominative base-meaning, is admitted to be related to the desire, i.e. the *kyac* meaning, through the object-referringness (*viṣayitā),* the said statement '*patrīyati*' cannot be avoided as the son is the object of Cairtra's desire that someone else (Maitra) should have a son, and hence can be related. Thus the son must be related to the desire through the object- referringness that is qualified by the occurrence in such a person (agent) as the father (*tādṛśapuruṣ avṛttitva)* who, as the relational adjunct, is the object, of the desire of ones ownness appearing in oneself, i.e. the son (*svāmśe bhāsamānasambandhasya pratiyagitayā viṣayaḥ)*. Since such a desire does not occur in the father, the son cannot be related to the desire through such a qualified relation; and therefore, the statement '*putrīyati*' is avoided in such a case.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Now, it should be noted here that the relation of the base-meaning such as the son cannot be the expessed meaning of the '*kyac*'-affix as the same is ruled merely in the sense of desire, and therefore, the word '*ātmanaḥ*' is used in the rule (P.iii.1.8) to facilitate (suggest) the fact that the relation of the base-meaning such as the son to the desire is through only such a qualified object-referringness.

Now as regards the construction of the rule (P. iii. 1. 8). The relation of beloging to the self (agent) expressed by the genitive '*ātmanaḥ*' in the rule is not to be related to the desire expressed by the *kyac* in the rule. Since then the rule would mean that *kyac* is used in the sense of the desire of any one (agent) without distinguishing it as belonging to the particular person (agent), such a construction would be pointless. Therefore, such a relation of belonging to the self (agent) must be related to the son, i.e. the meaning of the denominative base suggested by the ablative after the nominal word' (*supaḥ)*. Here the denominative base-word '*putra*' (expressed by '*supaḥ'*) is meant to convey only the sense of the son who is the object of the desire as being the item belonging to the agent of desire (*icchākartṛsambandhitayā icchāviṣaya)*; and hence '*kyac*' cannot be assigned when the agent has the desire that someone else should have a son. Thus, although the Vṛttikāra has explained (construed) the rule as assigning the '*kyac*' affix in the sense of the desire of the agent of desire after the word expressing the object of desrie (*icchākarmaṇaḥ subantāt icchākartur icchāyām kyac syāt)*, the same must be explained (construed) only as assigning the '*kyac*' affix in the sense of the desire after the word expressing the object of desire, i.e. the son, as being

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the item belonging to the particular agent of desire (*icchākartuḥ subantād icchākarmaṇaḥ kyac syād icchāyām*). Otherwise if the rule is construed as *icchākaramaṇaḥ subantāt icchākartur icchāyām*, then the convention that the '*kyac*' is assigned only in the case when the agent has a desire that he should have a son for himself cannot be maintained as even Maitra's son can be the object of Caitra's desire.

Explanation of the denominative usage '*bhṛtyam putrīyati*'

II (ii). 35. In the case of the denominative usages such as 'Master treats his servant like his own son' (*bhṛtyam putrīyati) etc,* the denominatives ending in '*kyac*' affixes that are assigned in the sense of treating, can be justified to be transitive. This can be explained as follows : That the *kyac*-affixes are assigned, after the words expressive of standard of comparison, in the sense of one treating someone like ones own one (*tamiva ācarati*) (*upamānād ācāre*. P. iii.1.10). And the expression 'one treating someone like onesown one' denotes the sense that one is considering someone like ones own one (*tattulyam jānāti*). This is so because, the word 'treating' is intended to convey the sense of the knowledge (considering) causing the kind behaviour. Here the knowledge (of some one) as being equal to ones own is the meaning of the '*kyac*'-affix; and such a knowledge is necessarily transitive, The son etc., i.e. the denominative- base-meanings, are related in such cases to the equality as being the relational adjuncts. Or as an alternative, it can be admitted that the denominative bases such as '*putra*' etc. themselves convey, through indication, the sense of person equal to the son and only the knowledge can be admitted to be the meaning of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'*kyac*'-suffix; and therefore, the person equal to the son etc. can be related to the knowledge through the relation of the state of referring to the identity of the son found in the person (servant) equal to oneself (son).

Now it may be objected as follows : That the denominative base-words such as '*putra*' etc. are expressive of the sense of only the objects of comparison and not the sense of the standards of comparison etc; and therefore how can it be proper that the rule '*upamānād ācāre*' (P. iii. 1. 10) assigns the '*kyac*'- affix after such a word as '*putra*' expressing the standard of comparison. However, this objection is not correct. Despite the fact that the denominative base-words such as '*putra*', etc. are expressive of the person (servants) equal to the son, the same can be held to be referring to the sense of the standards of comparison, namely, the son, by way of referring to the relational adjunct of equality (comparison), i.e. the son, That is why, such a word as '*putra*' can justifiably be explained as expressing the object of treating, as the person equal to the son, i.e. the servant, is the object of treating. In the earlier theory (that knowledge of some one as being equal is the meaning of '*kyac*'), the state of being expressive of the object of treating for the word such as *putra*, expressing the standrad of comparison, must be pondered over to be of the form of being what is conducive to the cognition of the relational adjunct of the quality (comparison) which is the qualifier in the object of treating.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains the transitive denominative usages (*kyajantas*) such as '*bhṛtyam putrīyati*' wherein

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the '*kyac*'-affixes are assigned in the sense of treating (*ācārārthaka*) by the rule *upamānād ācāre,* (P. iii. 1. 10). According to him, although the denominative desideratives such as '*putrīyati*' are intransitive (*akarmaka),* the denominatives with the '*kyac*'-affixes assigned in the sense of treating are transitives (*sakarmaka),* as the objects of comparison (*upameya)* can function as the objects of treating expressed by the '*kyac*'-affix as used after the words expressing the standrads of comparision (*upamānavācaka*). He explains that '*kyac*' affix is assigned after the words expressing the standards of comparison in the sense of one treating some one like ones own one (*tam iva ācarati)* which means that 'one is considering some one as equal to ones own one' (*tattulyam jānāti*). And since the word 'treating' (*ācāra)* in the rule is indicative of the knowledge (consideration) causing the kind treating (behaviour) (*vyavahāramūlajñāna),* the kyac-affix expresses the knowledge (consideration) of someone as being equal to ones ownone which is transitive. And by relating the son, i.e. the denominative base-meaning, as the relational adjunct (*pratiyogitayā)* to the equality (comparison), one can cognize in '*bhṛtyam putrīyati*' that the agent treats (considers) the servant as equal to his own son. As an alternative, it is suggested that the denominative base such as '*putra*' indicates the person equal to the son and *kyac* refers to merely the consideration. And since the consideration refers to the person (servant) as equal to, i.e. as identical with, the son, the person equal to the son can be related to the knowledge (consideration) through the state of referring to the identity of the son with the person equal to the son. (*svābhedāvagāhitva*). Thus, one can cognize from '*bhṛtyam putrīyati*' that the master treats, i.e. considers, the servant as equal to or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

identical with the son. It is objected now that whatever is equal *(tulya)* is only the object of comparison *(upameya)* and not the standard of comparison *(upamāna);* and therefore, when the denominative base such as '*putra*' is held to convey the person equal to the son *(putrāditulya),* the '*kyac*', assigned after the word expressing the standard of comparison, becomes untenble after the word '*putra*'.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection. According to him, though the word '*putra*' conveys the person equal to the son, the relational adjunct of comparison *(sādṛśyapratiyogi)* is ruled to be the standard of comparison; and therefore, the word '*putra*' conveying the person equal to the son, i.e. the relational adjunct, can be held to refer to the standard of comparison, making the '*kyac*' affix possible after it. Also in the earlier theory that the '*kyac*' conveys the knowledge of some one as being equal *(tulyatājñāna),* the objecthood described by the knowledge of equality is possible only for the servant (*bhṛtya*) and not for the son (*putra);* and therefore, the '*kyac*' should be explained after the word '*putra*' by admitting that the same word '*putra*' express the object of treating (*ācārakarmavācakatva*) which (expressing) is of the form of conveying the relational adjunct of equality (comparison) functioning as the qualifier in the servant, i.e. the object of treating (*ācārakarmaviśeṣaṇatulyatā pratiyogibodhakatva);* and hence the objecthood is posible in the son *(putra).*

Gadādhara's own position

II (ii). 36. As as matter of fact, 'Master treats him (servant) like his son' (*putram ivācarati*) expressess only the sense that master treats the servant in the same way as he treats his son'. And treating is the knowledge

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(consideration) that the servant is to be protected like his son, or the activity (operation) of protecting the servant like his son etc. Thus, the denominative 'Master treats the servant like his son' (*purtiyati),* has the sense that 'Master is the agent of the treating of the servant which is equal to the treating that has his son as its object'. Just as the moon and the face have the state of being the standard of comparison and the state of being the object of comparison, repectively, due to the eqality in the delights produced by themselves; in the same way the son and the servant too have the same states due to equality in the treatings that have themselves as the objects; therefore, the word '*putra*' has both the state of being what is expressive of the standard of comparison and the state of being what is expressive of the object of treating (comparison), i.e. the adjunct of the comparison, resident in the treating of the servant.

Here, only the treating equal to the treating is the meaning of the '*kyac*'-affix. The son is related to the former action of treating through the relation of the objecthood. Although the '*kyac*'- affix is assigned after the accusative word, the accusative, being the part of the denominative root, gets lost; and hence cannot be recollected (reinstated) always in the denominative form. Consequently the objecthood (not being expressed by the accusative) can be accepted to appear merely as the relation. This instance is similar to the instance of accepting the indication for the former member of the compound word (*rājan)* in the sense of the item qualified by the kings' relation to be expressed by the genitive in 'He is a royal person' (*rājapuruṣaḥ),* as the recollection (reinstatement) of the lost genitive is not necessary due to being the part of the base such as the genitive

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tatpuruṣa-compound. Since the servant is the object with respect to the latter action of treating, the denominative '*putrīyati*' has the transitivity.

Explanation

Gadādhara explains his own position regarding the denominative usage '*bhṛtyaṁ putrīyati*' here. According to him, the denominative '*putrīyati*' which is explained as '*putraṁ ivācarati*' must be understood to mean that 'Master treats the servant in the same way as he treats his own son' (*putraṁ yathāvyavaharati tathā vyavaharati*). And since the action of treating (behaving with) is either the knowledge that the servant is to be protected like the son (*pratipālyatvādinājñāna*) or the activity of protecting the servant like the son (*pratipālanādirūpa vyāpāra*), the donominative '*bhṛtyaṁ putrīyati*' means that the master is the agent of the activity of treating (protecting) the servant that is equal to the treating (protecting) having the son as its object (*putrakarmaka-vyavahāratulyavyavahārakartā*). It should be noted that the moon and the face have the states of being the standard and the object of comparison (*upamānopameya bhāva*) because of the equality in the delights produced from them (*mukhacandrajanyāhlādatulyatā*); and similarly the son and the servant can be said to have the states of being the standard and the object of comparison because of the equality in the treatings (protectings) that have the servant and the son as the objects (*putra-bhṛtyakarmakavyavahāhtadtulyatā*). Consequetly, the word '*putra*' in '*putrīyati*' can be expressive of the standard of comparison (*upamānavācaka*) and also expressive of the object of the treating of the son functioning as the adjunct of comparison found in the treating of the servant (*ācāraniṣṭhasādṛśyapratiyogyācārakarmavācaka*). Thus

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

according to Gadādhara, the '*kyac*'-affix can be admitted to express merely the treating (of the servant) which is similar to the treating (of the son) (*ācārasadṛśācāra*). Now since the son is the object of the former treating, the same son, expressed by the denominative base (*putra*), is related to the former treating through the relation of the objecthood (*karmatva*). It should be noted that although the '*kyac*' -affix is assigned after the accusative word '*putram*' in '*putrīyati*' competent in expressing the objecthood, the same objecthood is not expressed here by the accusative as the accusative, functioning as the part of the denominative base (*dhātvavayava*) after which '*kyac*' is assigned, is lost by the rule '*supo dhātu prātipadikayoḥ*' (P.ii. 4. 71); and hence can appear as the relation of the son with the treating. Also since the sarvant functions as the object of latter treating, the same can be related to the latter treating as the object. Thus, the denominative being transitive, the accusative statement '*bhṛtyam putrīyati*' becomes tenable.

ādhārārthaka- denominatives *'kuṭyām prāsādayati'* are not transitive

II (ii). 37. In the denominative usages such as 'He behaves in the hut as being in a palace' (*kuṭyām prāsādayati*), the denominatives, which have the '*kyac*'-affix assigned after the locative words expressing the standard of comparison such as the locus (substratum), are not transitive. In such usages, the denominatives express the act of behaving in the hut that is similar to the act of behaving that has the palace as its substratum; and since such a behaving is merely staying in the palace, denominatives expressing such a behaving are only intransitive. Consequently, the hut, being only the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

locus (substratum) of staying there, has only the locative after it. Here the similarity (equality) between the stayings (in the palace and in the hut) is due to the state of producing the same type of pleasures or due to the state of being the objects of non-distinct knowledge.

In the denominative usages such as 'He acts like a swan' (*hamsaivācarati)*,i.e. 'He behaves like the swan' (*hamsāyate*) or 'He behaves (moves) like the swan' (*hamsati*), the denominative roots ending in *kyaṅ* and '*kvip*' suffixes, which are assigned after the words expressing the agents that denote the standards of comparison, too are intransitive. Though in such cases, the behaviour of the person similar to the behaviour, having the swan as the agent which is of the form of going (moving), is the meaning of the denominatives ending in *'kyaṅ*' and '*kvip'* affixes, only the act of going (moving) which is not delimited by the effect such as the contact, i.e. the delimiting property of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the root 'go' (*gam),* would be admitted as the meaning of such denominatives. Although sometimes the behaving of the form of the activity of making the sound or knowing referring to the objects such as the sound is the meaning of the denominatives ending in '*kyaṅ'* and *kvip*, only the same behaving, i.e. the activity of making the sound or knowing associated with the objects such as the sound would be admitted as the meaning of such denominatives. Since the meaning that is associated with an object cannot have the expectancy for another object again, the same denominatives can be intransitives. These and other points should be pondered over by the scholars on their own.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the denominatives such as '*kuṭyām prāsādayati*' etc. wherein '*kyac*'-affixes are used after the words expressing the locus or substratum (*adhikaraṇācca, Vār* on P. vi. 4. 5). According to him, the words such as '*prāsāda*' express the standards of comparison only as being the locus, and hence the '*kyac*' after such words can express only the act of behaving in the hut similar to the behaving that has the palace as its locus, (*prāsādādhikaraṇakācāratulyācāra)*. Since such an act of behaving is nothing but staying in the hut, and staying expects only a locus and not the object, the denominative usages '*kutyām prāsādayati*' etc. have only the locative case after the locus '*kuṭi*'.

Also Gadādhara explains the denominative usages such as '*haṁsāyate*' and '*hamasati*' which have '*kyaṅ*' and '*kvip*' affixes used after the agentive words expressing the standards of comparison by the rule '*kartuḥ kyaṅ salopaśca*'(P. iii. 1. 11). According to him, such denominatives express the act of behaving of people similar to the act of behaving that has the swanas as the agent, i.e. standard of comparison, (*upamāna haṁsakartṛkācārasadṛśācāra);* however, since the act of behaving expressed by the denominatives would be admitted to have the form of going (moving) (*gamanādirūpa)* not delimited by the effect such as the content, i.e. the delimiting property of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the root 'go' (*gamyādipratipādyatāvacchedakar-ūpānavacchinna)*, the denominatives need not be transitives (only those which express their actions as delimited by the effects are transitives). Now, a point to be noted here is that sometimes in '*paṇḍitāyate*' etc. the denominative ending in '*kyaṅ*'-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

affix, expresses the act of behaving of the form of an activity such as the knowing or making the sound which has a reference to the object such as the sound (*śabda jñānādirūpasaviṣayakavyāpārātmakācāra);* however since the act of behaving is expressed only as associated with as object such an the sound (*viṣayarūpakarmāvaruddha),* the same does not expect any further object, and hence the same can be explained as intransitive.

Accusative-meaning in '*kaṭam karoti*' etc.

II (ii). 38. In the cases of statements associated with the roots such as to do (*kṛ),* the objecthood is the meaning of the accusative; and such an objecthood, which is of the form of the particular objectness, is the state of being what is to be .accomplished by the qualificandness described by the knowledge of the state of being the means to the desired end; however, the objectness in general is not the meaning of the accusative. This is so because, in the case where the statement 'He makes a pot' (*ghaṭam karoti)* is to be made, the statements such as 'He makes the pot halves' (*kapālam karoti),* and 'He makes the bringing of the water' (*jalāharaṇam karoti)* are not made.

It may be objected now as follows : That in the statements such as 'He makes (weaves) *kāśa*-grasses into the mat' *(kāśān kaṭam karoti),* and 'He makes (turns) the wood in to the ash' (*kāṣṭham bhasma karoti)* etc., the accusatives after the words '*kāśa*' and '*kāṣṭha*' etc. would become untenable. This is so because, the said objectness of the form of the state of being what is to be accomplished (by the qualificandness) described by the accomplishing effort cannot be explained to exist in such cases in the *kāśa*-grasses and in the wood. However, this

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

objection is not correct. In such cases even the peculiar objectness belonging to the material cause is to be admitted as the meaning of the accusatives. And such an objectness can be related to the accomplishing effort qualified by the peculiar objectness, that belongs to the accomplished item recollected (cognized) from the other accusative word. Therefore, in the event where the word expressing the other object to be produced such as the 'mat' *(kaṭa)* is not uttered, the single accusative usage such as 'He makes the *kāśa*-grasses' *(kāśān karoti)* is not made.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains the accusative usages involving the roots such as '*kṛ*' etc. In the knowledge of the state of being what is the means to the desired end such as '*ghaṭo madiṣṭasādhanam*', both the qualificandness described by the knowledge of the state of being what is the means to the desired end, and the objectness (of the form of the state of being what is to be accomplished) caused by such a qualificandness are present in the pot; and since the state of being what is to be accomplished *(sādhyatā)* is to be caused by the knowledge of the state of being what is the means to the desired end *(iṣṭasādhanatājñāna)*, the same is to be caused by the qualificandness described by such a knowledge. Therefore, Gadādhara holds the objectness *(viṣayatā)* of the form of the state of being what is to be acomplished to be the accusative-meaning. Otherwise, he states, suppose the objectness in general is the accusative-meaning, then at the time of the knowledge that '*ghaṭo madiṣṭasādhanam*' even the statement '*kapālam karoti*' instead of '*ghaṭam karoti*' would become

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

necessary as the objectness in general is present even in the pothalves.

It should be noted that when only the objectness of the form of the state of being what is to be accomplished is held to be the accusative-meaning, the accusative after '*kāśa*' in '*kāśān kaṭam karoti*' would become untenable, because the *kāśa*-grasses, being already accomplished (*siddha)*, cannot have the state of being what is yet to be accomplished. Therefore, Gadādhara states that even the peculiar objectness of the form the state of being the material cause already accomplished (*upādānīyavilakṣaṇaviṣayatā)* that can exist in the meaterial cause such as the *kāśa*-grasses must be admitted as the accusative-meaning. Now since such an objectness of the *kāśa*-grasses is related to the act of accomplishing which is qualified by the objectness of the form of being what is yet to be accomplished of the mat, the single accusative-statement such as '*kāśān karoti*' wherein the word *kaṭam* expressing the item to be accomplished (*mat)* is absent, is avoided.

Three Types of Objects

II (ii) 39. It may be objected now as follows : That even then in the statements such as 'He makes (turns) the wood in to the ashes' (*kāṣṭham bhasma karoti)*. 'He makes (sets) the milk into the curd' (*dugdham dadhi karoti)* etc., the wood and the milk would become untenable to be the objects. This is so because, the wood and the milk do not have the state of being the material causes of the ash and curd. Only upon the destruction of the wood and the milk, the ash and the curd are produced by means of the atoms that produce the wood and the milk. Only the cause that is the abode of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

origination can be the material cause. The items that exist at two different times cannot have the state (realation) of being the superstratum and the substratum (abode). Only the cause is ruled to be the material cause. The logicians who are the oppenents of the theory of the evolution (transformation) cannot admit that the wood etc. are the causes of the other substances such as the ash etc. by transformation; on the contrary they need to admit that the same are the preventing factors as no other substance can be produced in the atoms of the original substance.

No, this objection is not correct. Objects are three types: The object to be reached, the material object, and the produced (transformed) object. Among them, the object to be reached is what possesses the effect produced by the action. For instance, the village is the object to be reached by going and the object such as the pot is the object to be preceived by seeing. The produced (transformed) type of object is that which is accomplished through the action. For linstance, the rice is the produced object accomplished by cooking; or for instance the garland and the mat are the produced objects accomplished through making, i.e. through wreathing or weaving. In the first instance, the rice etc. are accomplished only upon the destruction of the former substance such as the (paddy) gains; however, in the second instance, the distinct garland etc. (compositions of many flowers etc.) are accomplished even without destroying the former substance such as the flowers by merely bringing into existence the distinction such as the entwinning. In the third instance, the property-possessors such as the mat are accomplished without destroying the former property-possessors such as the *kāśa*-grass in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

same *kāśa*-grass. Such objects, however are called the mainfested objects in the cases where the (words denoting the) material objects are not uttered.

Explanation

Now the Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection as follows : That suppose in '*kāśān kaṭam karoti*' etc., the *kāśa*-grasses are the causes by being the material causes, and the accusatives after such words express the objectness of the form of being the material cause (*upādānatākhyaviṣayatā),* then in '*kāṣṭham bhasma karoti*' etc. the accusative after the words '*kāṣṭha*' etc. would become incompetent to express such an objectness of the form of being the material cause; and therefore the '*kāṣṭha*' etc. would become untenable to be the objects. According to him, the '*kāṣṭha*' etc. cannot be explained to be the material causes as only the causes that exist at the time of the effects and hence have the origination procuced in them are the material causes; and unlike *kāśa*-grasses the '*kāṣṭha*' etc. do not exist at the time of the effect (*bhasma etc*). and hence do not have the origination produced in them. The effects such as the *bhasma* etc. are produced only upon the destruction of the material causes such as the '*kāṣṭha*' etc. through the atoms that produce the *kāṣṭha* etc. Further, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the possible suggestion that the *kāṣṭha* etc. can have the objectness of the form of evolution or transformation (*pariṇāmitva)*; and hence the accusative can express such as objectness, on the ground that the logicians do not recognize the theory of evolution (*praiṇāmavāda);* and hence *kāṣṭha* etc. cannot be the evolutionary causes (*pariṇāmi kāraṇa)* of distinct effects such as the *bhasma* etc. The *bhasma* etc. cannot be produced in the atoms that produce the *kāṣṭha* etc. as the existence of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

kāṣṭha etc. in the atoms prevents the orignination of another substance such as the *bhasma* etc. in the same.

However, Gadādhara explains the objecthood for the *kāṣṭha* etc. by explaining threefold division of the objects. According to him, the objects are threefold : The object to be reached *(prāpya),* ii) the meaterial object *(prakṛti)* and the produced object (*vikṛti*).The object to be reached *(prāpya)* is that which possesses the effect produced by the action *(kriyājanyaphalaśāli)*; for instance, the village in '*grāmam gacchati'* is the object to be reached as it possesses the contact produced by the action of going but does have any distinction. (*kyriyākṛtaviśeṣāṇām siddhir yatra na gamyate, Vākyapadīya. iii. 7.51)*. The material object (*prakṛti*) is the material cause such as flower. The produced object *(vikṛti)* is that which is produced by the action (*kriyāniṣpādya)*; for instance, the rice in '*odanam pacati'*, the garland in '*puṣpam mālyam karoti'*, and the mat in '*kāśān kaṭam karoti'* are the produced objects as they are produced by the actions such as the cooking, the making etc. It should be noted that the difference in the three types of produced objects is that while the first type, i.e. the rice, is produced only upon the destruction of the material cause namely, the (paddy) grains, the second and the third types, i.e. the garland and the mat, are produced without destroying the material causes such as the flowers and the *kāśa*-grasses by bringing about a peculiar distinction of entwinning and the property of weaving. Also it should be noted that the same rice, the garland, and the mat etc. are called the manifested objects (*nirvartya)* as opossed to the produced object (*vikṛti)* when the words expressing the material causes are not used.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The term nirvartya karman is conventional

II (ii). 40. Even in the case of the statements such as 'He cooks the (paddy) grains into the rice' (*taṇḍulān odanam pacati*), 'He entwines the flowers into the garland' (*kusumāni srajam karoti*) and 'He makes (weaves) the *kāśa*-grasses into the mat' (*kāśān kaṭam karoti*) etc., where the words expressing the material causes are uttered, the rice etc., i.e. the produced objects, have the nature of being the manifested object by the analysis such as that which is accomplished, i.e. manifested, is the manifested object. However, the state of being the manifested object is merely conventional (*pāribhāṣika*) quite distinct from such produced, i.e. transformed objects.

The scholars (Vākyapadīya, III. 7. 147) have stated in justification of this theory as follows : That the produced object, of which the existing or the non-existing evolutionary material cause is not resorted to in the sentence, is called the manifested object. Here the term 'of which' means of which produced object' and 'is not resorted to' means 'is not used in the sentence'. Therefore, in such cases the rice etc., are to be included in the category of produced or transformed objects only.

The scholars (Vākyapadīya, iii. 7 49) further state in this regard as follows : That which is produced without existing before and that which is brought into existence by birth, is the object to be mainfested. However, the produced objects are of two types; Something which is produced by the destruction of its material cause; for instance, the ash produced by the destruction of the wood etc., or something which is produced by the origination (bringing into existence) of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a distinct property, for instance, the ear ring produced by the origination of the distinct property in the gold.

Here the term 'produced' (*vikṛti)* is meant to include even the material cause (*prakṛti),* as otherwise the material causes such as the wood and the gold would have the contingency of becoming the fourth type of object. Although both the material object and the produced object cannot be cognized from the word 'produced object' (*vikārya)* through a single analysis, the word 'produced object' is only conventional in the sense of the object delimited by (i.e. consisting of) the properties common to both.

Explanation

As a matter of fact, the produced objects (*vikṛti)* such as the rice etc. can be argued to be the manifested objects (*nirvartya)* in '*taṇḍulān odanaṃ pacati*' etc. (the produced objects are to be held as the manifested objects in '*odanaṃ pacati*' etc. where the words '*taṇḍulān*' etc. expressing the material objects are not used as the rice etc. are the same in both cases). However, Gadādhara explains the status of the produced objects (*vikāryatva)* for the rice etc. in such cases by explaining the term 'manifestated object' (*nirvartya)* to be merely conventional (*pāribhāṣika)* and not etymological (*yaugika)* as that which is produced or transformed is the manifested object (*nirvartyate niṣpādyate yat tannirvartyam)*. According to him, Bhartṛhari's statement that '*satī vā vidyamānā vā prakṛtiḥ pariṇāminī, yasya nāśrīyate tasya nirvartyatvaṃ pracakṣate*' (Vākyapadīya, III. 7. 147) establishes the fact that the produced objects such as the rice etc. are called the manifested objects in '*odanaṃ pacati*' etc., where the words expressing the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

material objects are not used in the sentence. Thus Gadādhara concludes that such objects as rice etc. in '*odanam pacati*', etc., although called as manifested objects (*nirvartya),* are to be included in the main category of produced objects only. Further, he explains that such produced objects can further be divided into two types as the ash etc. produced by destroying the material cause such as the wood and as the earring etc. produced without destroying the material cause such as the gold. However, it should be noted that according to Gadādhara, the objects are only of three types as the reached (*prāpya)*, the material (*prakṛti),* and the produced (*vikṛti)*; and therefore, though the produced object (*vikṛti)* is itself of two types, and hence the material object (*prakṛti)* becomes the fourth type, along with the reached (*prāpya)* and the two types of produced (*vikṛti*), the separate fourth category is avoided by including the material object (*prakṛti)* under the produced (vikṛti) or the transformed (*nirvartya)* objects only.

Nature of material object (*prakṛtikarman)*

II. (ii). 41. The material type of object is that, the transformation of the form of the destruction of which, qualified by the earlier (original) state, is effected for the production of another substance through the action. For instance, the (paddy) grain is the material object of cooking in producing the rice; and the flowers and the *kāśa*-grasses are the material objects of making (entwining and the weaving) in producing the garland and the mat. Here, in the first case, the non-existence (transformation) of the (paddy) grain, which is qualified by the earlier (original) state, is the producer of the other object such as the rice only upon the destruction of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

original property -possessor such as the (paddy) grain; whereas in the other cases, though the property-possessors such as the flowers and the *kāsa*-grasses are present (not destroyed), the non-existence (i.e. the absence) of the flowers and the *kāśa*-grasses as qualified by the absence of the entwining of the flowers and that of the making or weaving of the mat is effected through the actions conducive to the entwining of the flowers and the weaving of the mat due to the non-existence of the earlier (original) states of the flowers and the *kāśa*-grasses such as the prior absences of the entwining of the flowers and that of the weaving of the mat.

Thus, in the statements such as 'He cooks (paddy) grains into the rice' (*taṇḍulān odanam pacati)*, the accusative, occurring after the word '*taṇḍula'* expressing the material cause, denotes the sense of the state of being the destroyer (i.e. destroyership). And the destroyership having semantic relation with the (paddy) grains is related to the act of cooking, i.e. the root-meaning. Whereas the accusative, occurring the after the word '*odanam'* expressing the produced object, denotes the sense of the state of being the producer (i.e. the producership). And the producership, having semantic relation with the rice, is related to the act of cooking qualified by the destroyership. The state of being what is conducive to the origination is invariably cognized to be relating to the destruction through the power of relation of being the, delimitor of the subjectness and that of the predicate. Therefore, though the act of cooking is the producer of the destruction of the contact of parts that originates the (paddy) grains, the incorrect statement such as 'He cooks the contact of parts in producing the rice' (*samyogam odanam pacati*) etc. cannot be imposed due to the fact

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that the destruction of the contact of parts is rendered redundant by the destruction of the substanece (grains) in the production of another substance (rice); and hence does not possess the state of being what is conducive to the origination.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains the nature of material cause *(prakṛtikarman)*. According to him, the material object is destroyed and looses its original state in producing the another substance; and hence, is defined as the cause, the transformation of the form the destruction of which qualified by the original state *(yasya pūrvabhāvaviśiṣṭasya asatvarūpavikārah)* is effected by the action for producing another substance. For instance, in '*taṇḍulān odanam pacati'* the (paddy) grain(s) is the material cause of the act of cooking, because the transformation of the form of the destruction of the same grains qualified by the earlier state *(pūrvabhāvaviśiṣṭatadasattva)* is effected by the cooking for the production of the other substance, i.e. the rice *(karmāntaranispādana)*. However, here the destruction of the grains produces the other substance only when accomplished by the action of cooking through the destruction of the property-possessor such as the grains *(taṇḍulādirūpadharminâśa)*. Whereas in '*kāśān kaṭ am karoti'* the *kāśa*-grasses etc. are the meaterial causes of making (weaving) etc. because the transformation of the form of the destruction or absence of the *kāśa*-grasses qualified by the absence of the weaving of the mat *(kaṭasandarbhādyabhāvaviśisaṭa tadasttva)*, is effected by the action producing the weaving etc. for he production of the other substance, i.e the mat etc. However, here since the material causes such as the *kāśa*-grasses etc. are present, i.e. are not actually destroyed, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

destruction or the absence of the *kāśa* grasses, produces the other substance only when accomplished by the action of making (producing the weaving of the mat) through the destruction or the absence of the earlier (original) state such as the prior absence of the weaving of the mat (*kaṭasandarbhādirūpa pūrvabhāvāsattva*).

Now Gadādhara establieshes that since the material causes are destroyed in producing the *vikṛtis,* the accusative after the words expessing the material causes such as '*taṇḍula*' denotes the state of being the destroyer (*nāśakatva)*; and since the produced objects (*vikṛti)* are effected, the accusative after the words expressing the produced objects such as '*odana*' denotes the state of being the producer (*utpādakatva)* in '*taṇḍulān odanam pacati*' etc. However, it should be noted here that while the *nāśakatva* is related to the pure action of cooking, the *utpādakatva* is related to the same cooking as qualified by the *nāśakatva*. Since the origination of the rice is predicated upon (paddy) grains, wherein the destruction occurs, the destruction (*nāśa)* is the qualifier of the paddy grains, i.e. the subject, and the origination (*utpatti*) is the predicate, Also, therefore, the destruction and the origination have the relation of being the delimitor of the subjectness and the relation of predicate (*uddeśyatāvacchedakavidheyabhāva)*. Further, since only the delimitor of the subjectness, i.e. the dstruction, is conducive to the predicate, i.e. the origination, the state of bing what is conducive to the origination (*utpattipra-yojakatva)* is invariably cognized in the destruction by the power of the relation of the delimitor of the subjectness and that of the predicate. Thus, due to the fact that the destruction of the contact of the parts is rendered redundant (*anyathāsiddha)* in producing the rice

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by the destruction of the substance (grains), the statement '*saṁyogaṁ odanaṁ pacati*' instead of '*taṇḍulān odanaṁ pacati*' becomes avoided.

Alternative theory

II (ii). 42. As a matter of fact, in the case of non-uttering of the word expressing the manifested object such as the rice, the incorrect statement such as 'He cooks the contact of parts' (*saṁyogaṁ pacati*) needs to be avoided. Therefore, only the state of being the destroyer (of the substance) through the destruction of the contact of parts must be said to be the meaning of the accusative after the *prakṛtikarman* . Thus there is no need to admit the cognition of the relation of the producer and the produced there

In 'He cooks the (paddy) grains into the rice' (*taṇḍulaṁ odanaṁ pacati*), 'He makes (turns) the wood into the ash' (*kāṣṭhaṁ bhasma karoti)* and 'He makes (sets) milk into the 'curd' (*dugdhaṁ dadhi karoti*) etc., the accusatives occurring after the material causes denote the state of being the destroyer of the material causes with respect to the acomplishing activity. The accusatives in such cases, occurring after the produced objects, denote either the paculiar objectnes (accomplishedness) or the state of being the producer or both together with respect to the accomplishing activity. However, in 'He makes (weaves) the *kāśa*-grasses into the mat' (*kāsān kaṭ am karoti),* 'He makes (entwines) the flowers or the pearls into the garland' *(kusamāni mauktikāni vā srajaṁ karoti),* the accusatives occurring after the words '*kāśa*-grasses' etc. denote only the peculiar objectness (material objecthood) with repect to the accomplishing activity. For, the state of being the destroyer of the *kāśa*-grasses etc. is contradictory to the activity there. The meaning of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

accusatives occurring after the words 'mat' (*kaṭam)* etc. is the same as earlier. The flowers etc., that are qualified by the peculiar arrangement of things, i.e. the meaning of 'garland' etc., do not have the objectness (of the form of accomplishedness) described by the accomplishing activity that has the flowers etc. as the material causes. However, only the qualifiers such as the arrangement of things etc. have such an objectness; and therefore only the same arrangement of things etc. are originated from the accomplishing activity. Consequently, the accusative word such as '*srajam'* expresses the sense of the state of accomplishing (obtaining) the origination of the flowers qualified by the arrangement. The activity that accomplishes the qualifier, has the state of accomplishing the origination of the qualified entity of the form the particular self-linking relation unharmed.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains that though the incorrect statement such as '*saṁyogaṁ odanaṁ pacati'* is avoided due to the redundaney (*anyathāsiddhi)* of the destruction of the contact of parts (*saṁyoganāśa),* the incorrect statement such as '*saṁyogaṁ pacati*', wherein the maifested (produced) object such as '*odanaṁ*' is not uttered, cannot be avoided due to the fact that the destruction of the contact of parts (*saṁyoganāśa*) cannot be held to be rendered redundant in producing the rice as there is no rice to be produced at all. Thus, he proposes the alternative theory that the accusative can be held to express the state of being the destroyer through contact (*saṁyogadvārā nāśakatva);* and since the quality such as the contact cannot be admitted in another quality such as the state of destroying through contact, the accusative base-meaning cannot be related to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

accusative-meaning; and therefore the incorrect statement '*saṁyogaṁ pacati*' stands avoided. Also, therefore, the admission of the cognition of *prayojya-prayojaka-bhāva* is not necessary to avoid the incorrect statement '*saṁyogaṁ odanaṁ pacati*'.

Next Gadādhara explains the usage '*taṇḍulaṁ odanaṁ karoti*' etc. According to him, in such cases too, the accusatives after the words expressing the material objects can be admitted to express the state of being the destroyer (*nāśakatva)*, and the accusatives after the words expressing the produced objects can be admitted to express the peculiar objectness of the form of the accomplishedness (*sādhyatākhyaviṣayatāviśeṣa)* or the state of being the producer (*utpādakatva)* which are related to the accomplishing activity (*kṛti),* expressed by the verbal root '*kṛ*', by the relation of substratumness (*āśrayatā)* and that of describerness (*nirūpakatā)* respectively. It should be noted, however, that in '*kāśaṁ kaṭaṁ karoti*' etc. where the material objects are not destroyed before producing the manifested objects, the accusatives occurring after the words expressing the material objects can be admitted to express the peculiar objectness of the form of the material cause (*upādānatākhyaviṣayatāviśeṣa),* and the accusatives occurring after the words expressing the produced objects can be admitted to express the peculiar objectness of the form of the accomplishedness *(sādhyatākhyaviṣayatāviśeṣa)* as earlier, and the same are related to the accomplishing activity as earlier. However, Gadādhara distinguishes the mat etc. from the garland etc. According to him, in *kusumāni srajaṁ karoti* etc., the flowers etc., which are qualified by the particular arrangement of things of the form of garland (*padārthavinyāsa*), i.e. the meanings of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

words 'garland', etc., are not produced from the activity having the flowers as the material cause; rather only the arrangement of things, i.e. the qualifier, is produced from the accomplishing activity; therefore, only the arrangement of things has the objectness (of the form the the accomplishedness) described by the activity having the flowers as the material cause (*upādānakakṛtiviṣayatā*). Thus, the accusative after the word '*srajam*' expressing the produced object expresses only the state of being the producer of the origination of the flowers as qualified by the arrangement (*viśiṣṭasattvanirvāhakatva*) which is related to the accomplishing activity. Now since Nyāya permits that what produces the qualifier can produce the origination of the qualified entity (*viśeṣaṇotpādakasya viśiṣṭasattvanirvāhakatva*), the accomplishing activity that produces the arrangement, can produce the origination of the flowers, qualified by the arrangement. i.e. the garland.

Passive usages

II (ii). 43. In the statements such as 'The fire makes (turns) the blue pot into the red pot' (*agniḥ śyāmam rakatam karoti*), the accusative occurring after the word 'blue' (*śyāma*), uttered along with the verb 'makes' (*karoti*) expressing the operation of the inanimate agent, cannot be held to be expressive of the sense such as the peculiar objectness of the form of being the material cause. However, the word ending in such an accusative can be held to express the state of being the destroyer of the pot qualified by the blue colour which is of the form of being the producer of the non-existence of the pot qualified by the blue colour in such an inanimate operation. Since in 'The fire makes (turns) the pot into the red' (*ghaṭam raktam karoti*) too, the words

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'pot' (*ghaṭa*) etc., are indicative of the pot etc. as qualified by the non-redness, the state of producing the non-existence of the pot as qualified by the non-rednesss is cognized from the accusative word in the activity.

In the case of passive usages involving the relation between the material object and the produced object, the passive conjugational ending denotes only the objecthood of the material object. Therefore, in the case such as 'The woods are made (turned) into the heap of ash' (*kāṣṭhāni bhasmarāśih kriyante)*, the conjugational ending has the same plural number as that of the word '*kāṣṭ hāni'* expressing the woods, i.e. the qualificands of the meaning expressed by the conjugational ending; however, the same conjugational ending does not have the same singular number as that of the word '*bhasmarāśiḥ'* expressing the produced object such as the ash which is to be mainfested.

Explanation

In the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, an entity is held to be produced only upon the destruction of its material cause; and hence the blue pot cannot be the cause of the red pot (only the destruction is the cause) in '*agniḥ śyāmaṃ raktaṃ karoti*'. Therefore, Gadādhara explains that the accusative after the word '*śyāma'* expressing the material cause expresses only the state of being the destroyer of the pot qualified by the blue colour (*viśiṣṭ occhedakatva)* which is of the form of the state of being the producer of the destruction of the pot qualified by the blue colour (*śyāmarūpaviśiṣṭāsattvanirvāhakatva);* and the same is related to the operation of the inanimate agent such as the fire through the substratumness. Also, according to him, in '*ghaṭaṃ raktaṃ karoti'*, the word

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'*ghaṭa*' has indication in the pot qualified by the non-redness; and therefore the accusative expresses only the state of being the producer of the destruction of the pot qualified by the non-redness (*viśiṣṭaghaṭāsattvanir-vāhakatva);* and the same is related to the operation of the inanimate agent such as the fire through the substratumness.

Now Gadādhara sets out to explain the meanings of the passive conjugational endings (*karmākhyāta)* in the passive usages involving the relation between the material object and the produced object (*prakṛtivikṛtibhāva)*. According to him, such endings express only the objecthood of the material objects (*prakṛtikarmatva)*; and therefore, only the material objects have the qualificandness described by the meaning of such conjugational endings. Thus, the conjugational ending (*kriyante)* has only the plural number agreeing with the word '*kāṣṭhāni*' expressing the material objects; and not the singular number agreeing with the word '*bhas-marāśiḥ*' expressing the produced object there.

Argument that '*bhasmarāśiḥ*' cannot have the nominatve ending

II. (ii). 44. Now it may be argued as follows : That in that case, the nominative case cannot be possible after the word expressing the manifested (produced) object; rather only the accusative would be nessary after it; for, the objecthood of such a manifested object is not expressed by the passive conjugational ending.

However, some other hold here as follows : That the passive conjugational ending expresses the objecthoods of both the objects. Only the passive conjugational ending occurring after the double accusative verbal roots such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as 'to lead' (*nī*), 'carry' (*vah*) and 'to milk' (*duh*), which are associated with the primary and the secondary objects, are ruled not to express the objecthoods of both the objects. However, in the present case, both objects can be equal, i.e. cannot be distinguished as primary and secondary. Also, here the produced object is certainly the qualificand of the meaning expressed by the conjugational ending; however, the lack of the same number as that of the produced object is to be explained for the conjugational ending by the convention that the conjugational ending uttered together with the material object and the produced object has the absence of the state of being what is expressive of the number of the produced object; here such a convention is established by the teaching of Bhartṛhari that the conjugational ending expressive of the objecthood takes (agrees in) the number of the material object but not that of the produced object. Therefore, in the said case, the verb does not end in the singular number. Only the passive conjugational ending, which expresses the number as related to the meaning of the particular word, is ruled to have the same number as that of the word expressing such a meaning, However, the passive conjugational ending in general, which produces the cognition of its meaning, i.e. the objecthood, as having (relating to) many objects as its qualificands, is not ruled to have the numbers as that of the words expressing the qualificands.

Explanation :

According to the rule '*anabhihite*' (P. ii. 3. 1), the word expressing the object, whose objecthood is expressed by the conjugational ending, receives the nominative case; and since the objecthood of the heap of ashes is not expressed by the conjugational ending in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'kāṣṭhāni bhasmarāśiḥ kriyante', it is argued now that the word *'bhasmarāśiḥ'* expressing such a manifested object cannot have the nominative case ending, but rather should have only the accusative ending.

However, some scholars refute such an objection on the following ground : That in *'kāṣṭhāni bhasmarāśiḥ kriyante'* the passive conjugational ending (*te*) can be held to express the objecthoods of both the material object (wood) and the produced object (ash); and hence the nominative can be explained after the word *'bhasmarāśiḥ'* i.e. the accusative need not be necessary after it. Also the rule is that in *'ajā grāmam nīyate'* etc., where the passive endings occur after double accusative roots such as *'nī'* etc. associated with the primary and the secondary objects, the objecthoods of both cannot be expressed by the conjugational endings; but in *'kāṣṭhāni bhasmarāśiḥ kriyante'* etc., where the passive endings occur after the single accusative roots such as *'kṛ'* etc. associated with the meaterial and the produced objects, both the objecthoods can be expressed by the conjugational endings. Though when the objecthood of the produced object (the ash) is expressed by the conjugational ending, the produced object (the ash) becomes the qualificand of the meaning of the conjugational ending (the objecthood), the conjugational ending need not have the same singular number as that of the word *'bhasmarāśiḥ'* expressing the produced object. This is so because, the rule *'gṛhṇāti vācakaḥ saṃkhyām prakṛter vikṛter nahi' (Vākyapadīya,)* establishes the convention that the passive conjugational ending uttered along with the material and the produced objects (*prakṛtivikṛti samabhivyāhṛtalakāra)* does not have the state of producing the cognition of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the number of the produced object (*vikārasaṃkhyābodhakatva);* and therefore, the passive conjugational ending need not be agreeing in singular number with '*bhasmarāśiḥ*'. Finally, the scholars establish the convention that only the passive conjugational ending, which produces the cognition of the number as relating to the meaning of a particular word (*tadarthānvitasaṃkhyābodhaka),* is required to have the same number as that of the word expressessing the meaning to which is related the number expressed by it (*tadvācaka padasamānavacana);* however, the passive congugational ending in general is not requaired to have the sme number(s) as that of the words expressing the qualificands of its meaning (*ākhyātārthaviśeṣyamātra-vācaka padasamānavacana)*

Refutation of some scholars' position

II (ii). 45. However, this position of some scholars is not correct. Supposing both the producing (material) object and the produced object are the qualificands of the meaning expressed by the congugational ending, then there would arise the syntactic spilit. Although in the statements such as 'The pot and the clothings exit' (*ghaṭapaṭau staḥ)*, and 'The pot and the clothing are seen' (*ghaṭapaṭau dṛśyete)* etc., the qualificands differ, the syntactic split does not arise due to the fact that the twoness, i.e. the delimiting property of the qualificandness of such qualificands, is cognized only once (i.e. is single). However, since in the present case, such a delimiting property of the qualificandness of the qualificands is not cognized only once (i.e. is not single), the syntactic unity could not be explained like in the other cases.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Also, it is not correct to state that due to the lack of any alternative, synatactic split is only desired in the present case. If the syntactic split is admitted, then the twin statements such as 'The wood is made' (kāṣṭham *kriyate*) and 'The ash is made' *(bhasma kriyate),* which are intended to produce syntactically unified sense like '*kāṣṭhāni bhasmarāśiḥ kriyante',* would become necessary. Also, then the cognition produced from the sentence 'The wood is made (turned) into the ash' (*kāṣṭham bhasma kriyate),* could become untenable to be the remover of the doubt as to whether the ash is the product of the wood or is the product of something else, as the relation of the material and the produced objects is not cognized between the wood and the ash respectively. In our theory, however, the state of dscribing the objecthood of the wood of the form of the state of being the dstroyer of the wood, and the state of describing the objecthood of the ash of the form of the state of being the producer of the ash, need to be related to the action in such a way that one is related to the action which is qualified by the other; and therefore, the state of having the wood as the material cause which can be described to have the form of the state of having the origination caused by the destruction of the wood, is possible to be obtained in the ash.

Explanation

Gadādhara now refutes the some scholars' theory. According to him, the position that both the material and the produced objects (*vikāravikārin)* are the qualificands of the objecthood expressed by the conjugational ending (*ākhyātārthaviśeṣya)* is not tenable as it would lead to syntactic split of the sentence (*vākyabheda*) in '*kāṣṭhāni bhasmarāśiḥ kriyante'.* An important semantical fact to be noted here is that syntactic unity (*ekavākyatā)* can

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be maintained where the delimiting property of the qualificandness of the qualificands is single; thus in '*ghaṭ apaṭau dṛśyete*', despite the distinction between the qualificands, the syntactic unity is maintained due to the singleness of the delimiting property, i.e. the twoness. Whereas in '*kāṣṭhāni*..., the syntactic unity cannot be maintained since the delimiting properties, i.e. the *kāṣṭ hatva* and the *bhasmatva,* differ. Also another fact to be noted here is that syntactic split (*vākyabheda)* cannot be admitted as intendd in '*kāṣṭhāni...*' even due to the lack of alternative. For, then the statements '*kāṣṭham kriyate*' and '*bhasma kriyate*', instead of '*kāṣṭhāni bhasmarāśiḥ kriyante*', would become necessary as the syntactice split would be same. Also, when syntactic split is admitted, the relation of cause and effect between the material and the produced objects (*prakṛti vikṛtibhāva)* cannot be cognized from the sentence '*kāṣṭham bhasma kriyate*'; and therefore, the state of being the remover of the doubt (*samśayanirvartakatva)* as to whether the ash is the product of the wood or of same other entity, would beome untenable in the cognition. On the contrary, in Gadādhara's theory, since there is no syntactic split, the objecthood of the ash of the form of the state of being the producer of the ash (*bhasma nirvartakatva)* can be related to the accomplishing activity expressed by '*kriyate*', which is qualified by the objecthood of the wood of the form of the state of being the destroyer of the wood (*kāṣṭhocchedakatva);* and thus, the state of being the remover of the doubt can be possible in the cognition by cognizing the state of having the wood as the material cause (*kāṣṭhaprakṛtikatva)* of the form of the state of having the origination caused by the destruction of the wood (*kāṣṭocchedaprayojyotpattikatva)* in such a case.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Reply

II (ii). 46. If you argue so, we shall reply : yes it is true. In the statements such as 'The wood is turned into the ash' (*kāṣṭham bhasma kriyate)* etc., the objecthood of the produced (manifested) object such as the ash etc. is not expressed by the passive conjugational ending; however, the same objecthood of the ash would be admitted as the relation (of the ash) with the activity, i.e. the sense expressed by the verbal root; and therefore, the nominative case ending becomes proper (justified) after such a word as '*bhasma'* expressing the produced object. The accusative case etc. are proper (justified) only when the objecthood etc. are expected to be the qualificands of the nominal base-meanings. For instance; although in the usages such as 'The respectful offering is to be made (given)' (*argho namaḥ)* etc., the objecthood of the offering is cognized as relating to the giving expressed by '*namas*', only the nominative is used after the words such as '*argha'*. This is so because, the nominal meaning (offering) is to be related to the giving expressed by the indeclinable word '*namaḥ'* only through the relation of the objecthood. Similarly in the usages such as 'The pot does not occur on the ground' (*na bhūtale ghaṭaḥ)* etc., the relation of the pot etc. is cognized with the absence only as the relation (and not as the referent-qualifier); and therefore, only a nominative case is used after the word '*ghaṭa'* in the sense of the relation to be expressed by the genitive.

Now it may be objected as follows : That the direct relation of the meaning of a nominal with the meaning of the root is against the semantic convention; and therefore, the objecthood cannot be admitted to be cognized as the relation in the present case.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, this is not correct to state. In the statements such as 'The pot becomes the blue pot' (*ghaṭ o nīlo bhavati),* and 'The wood becomes the ash' (*kāṣṭ ham bhasma bhavati)* etc., the meanings of the nominals such as the pot etc. are related to the action of becoming etc. directly through the relation of the agenthood; similarly here in the present case too, the other object such as the ash could be accepted as relating directly to the accomplishing activity, functioning as the qualifier to the other object such as the wood, by restricting the semantic convention.

Explanation

Gadādhara now replies to the argument raised in the section II (ii). 44. According to him, in '*kāṣṭham bhasma kriyate*', the produced (maṇifested) object (*nirvartyakarman)* such as the ash is related to the accomplishing activity, i.e. the root-meaning, through the relation of the objecthood (*karmatā);* and since then the activity can be cognized to be descirbing the objecthood of the produced object such as the ash (*nirvartyakarmatānirūpakatva*), there is no need to express the same objecthood by the conjugational ending. Thus, although the objecthood of the ash is not expressed by the verbal ending, the accusative need not be used after the word '*bhasma*' expressing such produced object; and therefore, nominative can be justified. Moreover, according to Gadādhara, the accusative is necessary after a noun only when the objecthood is expected to be the qualificand of the meaning of the nominal word; and since here the objecthood is only a relation (it is not the qualificand of the meaning of the nominal), the accusative is not neceassary. Also Gadādhara justifies his theory on the ground that in '*argho namaḥ*' etc. too, the word such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as '*argah*' expressing the offereing, has only the nominative and not the accusative (here the offereing expressed by the *nipāta* word '*argha*' is related to the action of making (giving) expressed by the indeclinable word '*namaḥ*', through the relation of objecthood); and hence the non-expression of the objecthood by the ending cannot be the determining factor of the accusative, but rather only the non-cognition of the same can be so.

A possible objection to the theory is as follows : That although as an exception the relation of a nominal base-meaning can be allowed with the meaning of an inndiclinable, the relation of the produced object, i.e. the ash, cannot be allowed with the accomplishing activity expressed by the root, through the relation of the objecthood, as then the established covention of cognition of non-identity (cf. I. 62) gets voilated; and hence the objecthood, when not expressed by conjugational ending, cannot be admitted to appear as a relation. However, Gadādhara refutes even such an objection on the ground that the direct relation of the produced object, i.e. the ash, can be allowed with the activity, i.e. the qualifier of the objecthood of the material object, viz. the wood, through the relation of objecthood by restricting the semantic convention (established in I. 62); and also that the restriction of the convention is necessary because otherwise in '*ghaṭo nīlo bhavati*' etc., the pot etc., i.e. the nominative base-meanings, cannot be related to the action of becoming expressed by the root '*bhū*' through the relation of the agenthood.

Refutation of the objection that '*kāṣṭham bhasmarāśim kriyate*' cannot be avoided

II (ii). 47. Also it may be objected as follows :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

That even then, with the intention of cognizing the objecthood (of the heap of ash) as the qualificand of the nominalbase-meaning such as the heap of ash, the incorrect accusative statement such as 'The wood is made into the heap of ash' *(kāṣṭham bhasmarāśim kriyate)* would become contingent. Aslo, suppose a separate convention that the accusative produces the cognition of the objecthood only in the activity not functioning as the qualifier to the other objecthood is assumed, then in the statements such as 'The cow is milked the milk'*(gaur duhyate kṣīram),* and 'The goat is lead to the village' *(ajā nīyate grāmam)* etc., the state of describing the objecthood of the milk and that of describing the objecthood of the village would have the contingency of absence of-relations with the actions such as the milking and the leading.

However, this objection is not correct to state. Such a convention holds good only in the case of statements which involve the material and the produced objects as grammatical objects. Also, then like the demonstrated semantic convetion which is assumed to avoid the said overapplication (of making the statement' *kāṣṭham bhasmarāśim kriyate),* a seprate semantic convention that the agenthood, i.e. the sense expressed by the instrumental, is to be related to only the action that does not function as the qualifier with respect to the other agenthood, needs to be assumed; otherwise the incorrect active usage such as 'The wood becomes by means of the ash' *(kāṣṭham bhasmanā bhavati)* would become necessary with the intention of cognizing the agenthood as the qualificand of the base-meaning, i.e. the ash.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Now an objection that can be raised is that the statement such as *'kāṣṭham bhasmarāśim kriyate'*, wherein the word *'bhasmarāśim'* has an accusative, becomes necessary when the objecthood is not expected to be the mere relation (*samsarga*) but to be the qualificand of the nominal base-meaning (ash) (*prakṛtyarthaviśeṣya)*. Now a separate covention that the accusative expresses the objecthood only when intended to be related to the activity that does not function as the qualifier with respect to another objecthood (*karmatvāntaraviśeṣaṇatānāpanna)* can be assumed to avoid the difficulty; and since in *'kāṣtham bhasmarāśim kriyate'*, the activity functions only as the qualifier to the objecthood of the wood, the objethood of the ash cannot be related to the activity, and hence the statement is avoided. However, the problem is that then the statement such as *'gaur duhyate kṣīram'* too would become untenable due to the fact that the activity of milking etc. too functions as the qualifier with respect to the objecthood of the cow etc., and hence the objecthood of the milk cannot be related to it.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that such a separate convention will be assumed only in the case of statements *'kāṣṭham bhasma kriyate'* etc. which involve only the material and the produced objects as the grammatical objects; and since the statements such as *'gaur duhyate kṣīram'* etc. do not involve the material and the produced objects as the grammatical objects, the same can be tenable. Also according to him, on the line of the present convention, yet another covention that the instrumental expresses the agenthood only when expectecd to be related to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

120162

activity that does not function as the qualifier with respect to the another agenthood (*kartṛtvaviśeṣ aṇatānāpauna)* is to be assumed so that the incorrect active statement such as '*kāṣṭham bhasmanā bhavati'* can be avoided due to the impossiblity of relating the agenthood of the ash to the activity functioning as only the qualifier with respect to the agenthood of the wood.

Final conclusive theory

II (ii). 48. In the statements such as 'The wood becomes (turns into) the ash' (*kāṣṭham bhasma bhaviti)* etc., only the production of the form of the counter-positiveness described by the destruction (loss) conducive to the origination is the meaning of the root 'to become' (*bhū)*. And the agenthood described by such a root-meaning, which is of the form of the superstratumness, is cognized only as a relation through the power of relations (relational seam). In the passive statement such as 'It is remained by the wood (i.e. has remained) as the ash' (*kāṣṭhena bhasmanā bhūyate)*, the superstratumness of the ash and the superstratumness of the wood, which are expressed as the referent-qualifiers from the instrumentals, are cognized as relating to the origination and the counter-positiveness described by the destruction (loss) respectively. Here the convention is that the superstratumness of the ash etc. are cognized as the relation with the origination which is included as a part of the said becoming which in itself is cognized as he qualifier with respect to the agenthood of the wood; and therefore, the incorrect usages such as 'It is remained by the wood into the ash' (*kāṣṭhena bhasma bhūyate)*. are not made. This is so because, the impersonal (passive) endings are not expressive of the agenthood.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Since the cognition of the objecthood as the relation with respect to the activity functioning as the qualificand of the other objecthood is against the established convention, the statement 'The wood and the heap of ashes makes' (*kāṣṭham bhasmarāśaḥ karoti'*) etc. are avoided.

Explanation

Gadādhara here concludes the section dealing with the usages involving a relation between the material and the produced objects (*prakṛtivikṛti bhāva*). According to him, the root such as '*bhū*' in '*kāṣṭham bhasma bhavati*' etc. expresses the production (manifestation) (in the wood) such as the counter-positiveness described by the destruction (of the wood) conducive to the origination (in the ash) (*utpattiprayojakanāśapratiyogitvarūpavikāra*). And since the nominative case ending does not express the agenthood of the wood of the form of the superstratumness of the production in the wood (*ādheyatvarūpakartṛtva*), the same is cognized as a relation with the production, the root-meaning, through the power of relations or relational seam (*sambandhamaryādā*). However, since in the corresponding passive impersonal usages such as '*kāṣṭhena bhasmanā bhūyate*' the instrumental case endings can express the agenthood of the wood of the form of the superstratumness of the production in the wood (*ādheyatvarūpakartṛtva*) and the genthood of the ash of the form of the superstratumness of the origination in the ash (*ādheyatvarūpakartṛtva*), the same are cognized to be related to the counter-positiveness described by the destruction (*nāśapratiyogitva*) as qualifiers (*prakāratayā*).

Here the incorrect statement '*kāṣṭhena bhasma bhūyate*' is avoided by holding as follows : That in such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a case, the agenthood of the form of the superstratumness of the origination in the ash should be admitted as relating to the origination, a part of the root-meaning functioning as only the qualifier with respect to the agenthood of the other agent (the wood); however since the impersonal passive endings do not express any agenthood, and also the root-meaning cannot function as the qualifier to that, such a relationship is impossible. Also here the incorrect statement '*kāṣṭham bhasmarāśiḥ karoti*' is avoided as follows : That the objecthood of the ash (only as a relation) must be admitted to be relating to the making, i.e. the root-meaning, not functioning as the qualificand of the objecthood of the wood; however since the root-meaning, i.e. the making, functions only as a qualificand of the objecthood of the wood, the objecthood appearing as a relation cannot be related to such an action.

Usages involving locus as objects and justification of the rule p. i. 4.46.

II (ii). 49. In the cases where the locus is assigned the designation of object by the rule 'That which is the locus of the verbs to lie down (*śī),* to stand (*sthā)*, and to sit (*ās)* when preceded by the preposition '*adhi*' is, however, called the object' (*adhiśīṅ sthāsām karma*... p.i.4.46), the locushood (substratumness) or the superstratumness is the sense expressed by the accusative. Only for the sake of justifiying the accusative and the gentitive cases in the sense of the locushood (substratumness) in the statements associated with finite and primary derivative forms of '*adhiśī*' etc. such as 'He lies on the ground' (*sthalīm adhiśete),* and 'He is lying on the ground' (*sthalyā adhiśayitā*), Pāṇini has assigned the designation of object to the locus.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It may be argued now as follows : That such rules (P.i. 4. 46) are useless. By including an additional operation, i.e. the sense to be expressed by '*kṛ*', in the meanings of such roots as '*śī*' (to lie down) etc., the locus can be explained to be the object on account of being the abode of the effects such as the lying down, i.e. the delimiting properties of the expressedness of the expressed meanings of the roots such as '*śī*' with the preposition '*adhi*' that are expresseive of the sense of the operations as delimited by the effects such as the lying down etc. Here only the roots such as '*śī*' (to lie down) etc. that are associated with the prepositions such as '*adhi*' must be admitted to have the conventionally established indication in the sense of such operation, and not the roots such as '*śī*' etc. that are not associated with the prepositions such as '*adhi*'; and therefore , the usages such as 'He sleeps the ground' (*sthalīm śete)* cannot be imposed as natural usages. However, this argument is not correct to state. The blessed sage Pāṇini has composed such a rule (P. i. 4. 46) to explain the said usages (*sthalīm adhiśete* etc.) even when the roots such as '*śī*' etc, associated with '*adhi*', are intended to convey merely their primary expressed senses. Moreover, otherwise in the theories of the other grammarians such as Śarvavarman etc., who have not composed such rules, the correctness of the locative usages such as 'He lies down on the ground' (*sthalyām adhiśete*) which are intended to convey only the primary expressed sense, cannot be avoided.

Explanation

Gadādhara now sets out to explain the accusative usages involving the locus. According to him, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

accusatives in '*sthalīm adhiśete*' etc., where the locus (substratum) such as the ground is assigned the designation of 'object' by the rule (P.i.4. 46), should be admitted to express the locushood (substratumness) (*ādhāratva*) or (since the same cannot be related to he action through the describing in the negative statements) the superstratumness (*ādheyatva*). Also Gadādhara justifies the composition of the rule (P. i. 4. 46) on the ground that the same is required to facilitate the accusative in the finite usages '*sthalīm adhiśete*' and the genitive in *kṛdanta* usages '*sthalyā adhiśayitā*' as otherwise only a locative after the words '*sthalī*' etc. expressing the locus would become necessary.

Now the Pūrvapakṣins raises an objection. According to them, the rule P. 1. 4. 46 is not necessary because the ground etc. in '*sthalīm adhiśete*' etc. can be explained to have the designation of 'object' due to being the abodes of the effects such as the contact with the ground etc. (*phalāśraya*) by including an additional operation in the root-meaning and hence by analysing the lying down (*śayana*) as the operation conducive to the contact with the ground (*bhūpṛṣṭhādisamyogānukūlavyāpāra*). Thus, the operation delimited by the lying down or the contact with the ground (*śayanādirūpaphalāvacchinnavyāpāra*) is the meaning of the root '*adhiśī*'. Also, the Pūrvapakṣins hold that the incorrect statements such as '*sthalīm śete*' can be avoided from being imposed by admitting the roots such as '*śī*' etc. as associated with the proposition '*adhi*' and not just the roots such as '*śī*' etc. have an indication in the operation conducive to (delimited by) the lying down; and hence the ground etc. in '*sthalīm śete*' etc. cannot have the designation of ''object'' due to not being the abode of the effects such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as the lying down etc. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the rule P. i.4. 46. is necessary to explain the designation of 'object' to the ground etc. when the roots such as '*śī*' etc. asociated with '*adhi*' are not admitted to have any conventional indication (*nirūḍhalakṣaṇā*) in the sense of the operations delimited by the effect of lying down etc. but expresses merely the lying, etc. Also it should be noted that the rule is necessary as otherwise Śarvavarman etc., who have not composed any such rule, cannot explain the accusative usage '*sthalīm adhiśete*' (instead of the locative usage *sthalyām adhiśete*) due to the lack of the designation of 'object' for the locus there.

Explanation of '*māsam āste*'

II (ii). 50. Some (Vārtikakāra etc.) rule optionally the objecthood for the time, the action, the distance and the region in association with the intransitive actions (verbs) for explaining the affixes expressing the object after the words of time, action, distance and region. Others (Pāṇini, ii. 3. 2.), however, do not rule the objecthood for the same while explaining the affixes expressing the object by way of including an additional operation in the root-meanings as stated earlier. Thus, they state in this regard as follows : That the objectood is produced in the loci such as the time, the action, the action, the distance and the region in connection with the intransitive roots due to the additional operation included in the root-meanings. In their theory, the assigning of the accusative by the rule that the accusative is used after the words expressing the time and the distance in the intense contact (p. ii. 3.5) is actually useless in the sense of the intense contact in the cases

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such as 'He studies for a month' (*māsam adhīte*), 'He stays for a month' (*māsam āste*), and 'He runs for a yojana' (*yojanam dhāvati*) etc. For, by including the operation such as the intense, or complete pervading as the qualifier with respect to the root-meanings such as the study and the staying etc., the accusative can be made tenable after the words such as 'time', 'distance' etc. due to being the objects of such pervading (p.ii. 3. 2.). However, when the intense pervading is not included in such root-meanings, then in the passive usage such as 'The month is stayed for' (*māsa āsyate*) etc., the state of being pervaded (pervasion) by the staying is not possible to be obtained (cognized) in the objects such as month etc. And this is inspite of the fact that in the active usages such as 'He stays for a month' (*māsam āste*) etc., the objecthood can be cognized from the composition of such a rule on the ground that the same explains the correctness of the accusatives even in the absence of supplying the verbals such as 'is' (*bhavati*) in 'The forest (is) beautuful for a month' (*māsam ramaṇīyā vanarājiḥ*), and 'The river (is) crooked for a krośa' (*krośam kuṭilā nadī*) etc. In such cases the state of being intensely pervaded by the beautifulness etc. is cognized in the month etc; however, there is no utterance of the action wherein the intense pervading can be included; and therefore, the accusative can be tenable after the words expressing 'time' (*māsa*) etc. due to being the objects of such pervading. Similarly, in the cases such as 'He is the stayer for a month' (*māsam āsitā*) etc., the month etc. can be explained as being the objects of pervading by including the intense pervading in the action of staying; however, only a genitive and not the accusative would be necessary after the words expressing the month (*māsa*) etc. due to their association

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with the primary dervivative; and on this ground too the Bhāṣyakāra justifies the rule.

Explanation

The Vārtikakāra and the Bhāṣyakāra explain the accusative usages such as *'māsam āste'* etc. by assigning the designation of object, for the time (*kāla*), the action (*bhāva*), the distance to be traversed (*adhva*) and the region (*deśa*) in connection with the intransitive roots such as *'as'* etc. (*akarmakadhātubhiryoge desaḥ kālo bhāvo gantavyo' dhvā ca karmasamjñakaḥ,* on P. i. 4. 51.). However, others (P. ii. 3. 2) explain the usages *'māsam āste'* etc. even without assigning the designation of 'object' to the 'time' etc. According to them,. the intransitive verbal actions such as 'staying' etc. can be said to include an additional operation such as the intense pervading (*abhivyāpti*); and therefore, the time etc. can be explained to be the optional objects of such intence pervading itself by the rule (P.i.4.49); and so the accusative after 'time' etc. can be facilitated even without the designation of object. As a matter of fact, it is not necessary that the rule *'kālādhvanor atyantasamyoge'* (P.ii.3.5) should enjoin even the accusative case after the words expressing the time and the distance to be traversed etc. in the sense of intense pervading (*abhivyāpti*) as the same accusative can be explained after the words expressing the time and the distance etc. as being the objects of intense pervading included in the actions such as the staying etc. Further it should be noted here that the explanation of the designation of 'object' for the 'time' etc. by including the intense pervading in the root-meanings such as the staying etc. is absolu:ely' necessary as otherwise in the passive statements such as *'āsyate māsaḥ'*, where there are no

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

accusatives, the intense pervading cannot be obtained from the accusatives; and hence the month etc. cannot be cognized as pervaded by the staying etc.

However, (the Vārtikakāra and) the. Bhāṣyakāra justify the rule P.ii.3.5 on the gound that when no verbal action is supplied in '*māsam ramaṇīya vanarājiḥ*' etc. the accusative cannot be explained after '*māsa*' etc. due to the lack of the objecthood (in the 'month' etc.) which in itself is to be caused by the action of intense pervading included in the original action of being etc. It should be noted that the rule is necessary to facilitate also the accusative by annuling the genitive in '*māsam āsitā*' etc. involving the primary derivatives wherein only a genitive after the word expressing the object, i.e. '*māsa*', is effected by the rule '*kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti*' P....

Definition of '*abhivyāpti*'

II (ii). 51. Now what is this intense pervading (*abhivyāpti*) which is called the intense contact?. It may be stated now that it is the temporal relation of pervasive occurrence; and the pervasive occurrence of the temporal relation is the state of not being delimited by the pervaded parts of time. And in the case where the temporal relation of staying resident in the month is delimited by the pervaded parts of the month such as the individual days etc. due to occurring only in particular days, the statement 'He stays for a month' (*māsam āste*) is avoided due to the lack of such pervasive occurrence. Here the meaning of the word 'month' is a continuous period of time lasting for all the thirty days; however the same is not a collection of the sun's movements. In that case, even the temporal relation resident in merely a single day would have the pervassive

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

occurrence in few of the suns movements; and therefore even in the case of the stay for a single day, such a statement (i.e. *māsam āste*) would become necessary.

However, this definition of intense pervading is not justified. In the case of usages such as 'Caitra stays in the *kāśi* for a month' (*caitro māsam kāśyām tiṣṭhati),* the contingency of invilidity cannot be avoided in the event of the absence of the single cantact with the kāśi, which pervades the entire month. For, the temporal relation of the individual contacts resident in the month is only delimited by the intermediate periods of time (month) such as the *daṇḍa* etc.

Explanation

Gadādhara now takes up the issue of defining the intense pervading *(abhivyāpti)* or the intense contact (*atyantasamyoga)* admitted to be the accustive-meaning. Here some scholars hold that the intense pervading can be defined as the temporal relation which has the pervasive occurrece (*vyāpyavṛttiḥ kālikaḥ sambandhaḥ).* When the same is defined so, the pervasive occurrence (*vyāpyavṛttitva)* of the temporal relation needs to be viewed to be the state of not being delimited by the pervaded parts of time (month) such as the days etc. (*vyāpyakālānavacchinnatva).* And since in the case of the study in an entire month, the study occurs pervasively in the entire month through the temporal relation, the pervasive occurrence can be explained for the temporal relation in '*māsam adhīte';* and also since in the case of the study only for a few days, the study cannot occur pervasively in the entire month, the pervasive occurrence cannot be explained for the temporal relation in '*māsam adhīte*' (the temporal relation is only delimited by the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

pervaded parts of time such as the days etc.). Also the same scholars point out that month (*māsa)* must be unterstood to be only a continuous period of time (*akhaṇḍapadārtha)* lasting for all the thirty days but not merely the collection of the sun's movements (*kriyāpracaya)*; otherwise since the temporal relation resident even in a single day could be pervading the collection of a few movements constituting the month, the statement '*māsam adhīte'* would become impossible to avoid.

However, Gadādhara refutes such a definition of *abhivyāpti*. According to him, when the continuous period of time lasting for all the thirty days is held to be the month, the validity of the statement '*caitro māsam kāśyām tiṣṭhati'* would become untenable as the single contact of the *Kāśi* that could be pervasively (continuously) occurring in all the thirty days is impossible due to the destruction of the earlier contacts; and thereby the temporal relation of the contacts resident in the month becomes only delimited by the intermediate periods of time such as the *daṇḍas (avāntara daṇḍādyātmakakālāvacchinna)*.

Refutation of argument

II (ii) 52. It may be argued now as follows : That despite the fact that the individual contacts differ, the substratumness delimited by the temporal relation of Kāśi and described by the cantactness-delimited of Caitra can be single pervading the entire month. Since such a substratumnesss is not delimited by the intermediate parts of time such as *daṇḍas,* the said statement (*caitro māsam kāśyām tiṣṭhati)*, which produces the cognition of the state of not being delimited by such intermdiate parts of time in such a substratumness, should be valid.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, this argument is also not correct to state. Since the cognition of the substratumness possessed (described) by the generic property (contactness)-delimited can be tenable on account of the (cognition of) the collection of the individual substratumnesses described by the individual property (individuality)-delimiteds consisting of the generic property (contactness), the distinct substratumness described by only the pure generic-property-(contactness)-delimited cannot be admitted as valid. Also, since in the case where the study occurs for only a few hours of time in each of the thirty days, the temporal relation of the study is of the nature of non-pervasive occurrence with respect to the entire month, the untenability of the usage 'He studies for the month' (*māsam adhīte)* would become impossible to be avoided.

Explanation

Though in the case of '*caitro māsam kāśyām tiṣṭ hati*', the individual contacts (*samyogavyakti)* differ due to the differrence between the intermediate periods of time such as the *daṇḍa* etc., the substratumness (*ādhāratā)* resident in *Kāśi*, which is delimited by the temporal relation (*kālikasambandhāvacchinna)* and described by the contactness-delimited (*samyogatvāvacc-hinnanirūpita)*, can be single and pervading the entire month due to the fact that all the individual contacts are one as generalized by the contactness. Therefore, it is argued now that the usage '*caitro māsam kāśyām tiṣṭ hati'*, which conveys the state of not being delimited by the intermediate periods of time such as the *daṇḍa* (*daṇḍādyanavacchinnatvabodhaka)* in the said substratumess of the *kāśi* pervading the entire month, could be explained to be valid.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, Gadādhara refutes the argument on the ground that the invalidity of the sentence cannot be avoided. According to him, the cognition of the collection of the substratumnesses described buy the individual property-delimiteds (*viśeṣadharmāvacchinnanirūpitādhikaraṇatākūṭa)* can facilitate the cognition of the substratumness described by the generic property (contactness)—delimited (*sāmānyadharmāvacchinnanirūpitādhikaraṇatā);* and therefore, the single substratumness described by merely the generic property (contactness)—delimited (*śuddhasāmānyadharmāvacchinnanirūpita)* and pervading the entire month cannot be possible in the *Kāśi* when the substratumness differs due to the difference in the individual contact-possessors (the individual contacts differ due to the difference between the intermediate peroids of times). Thus the single contact pervading the entire month cannot be cognized from '*caitro māsam kāśyām tiṣṭhati*'. Also according to him, when the month is a continuous period of time, the desired statement '*māsam adhīte*' in the case of the study for a few hours in each of the days becomes untenable, as the relation of the study cannot be pervading the entire month of the form of the continuous period of time.

Nature of *abhivyāpti* :conclusion

II (ii). 53. Here, we state our conclusion regarding the nature of the intense pervading. The intense pervading is the relation with all the parts; and which ever collection of days constitutes the sense of the month, the same are the parts of the month. Now since the (collection of) thirty days cognstitute the sense of the month, the usage 'He studies for the month' (*māsam adhīte)* becomes tenable even when the relation of the study is found with respect to only one or other periods

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of times in all the thirty days. The relation (of the study) with the thirty days is the state of being hte pervader of the thirtyness pervasively occurring in all the thirty days. Since such thirtyness etc., which are the causes (bases) of the uses of words 'month' etc., are obtained (cognized) from the words 'month' etc., merely the state of pervading is the meaning of the accusative.

However, the state of pervading, which is continuous (undivided whole) and not consisting of the distinct pervaded entity, is hard to define. Therefore, the state of being the delimitor of the counterpositiveness described by an absence and another absensce are to be admitted separately as the two meanings of the accusative. The month etc., i.e. the meaings of the base 'month' etc., are related to the first absence through the relation of superstratumness. Whereas the entity delimited by the state of being the delimitorness of the delimiting property of the counter-positiveness described by the absence occurring in the month etc. is related to the other absence as the counter-positive. And such a second absence is related to the study etc. through the indirect relation consisting of one's own substratum such as the state of bieng the study having Caitra as the agent that functions as the delimiting property of the qualificandness of the qualificand.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains the nature of intense pervading (*abhivyāpti*). According to him, the intense pervading is the relation with all the parts of the pervaded (*yāvadavayavasambandha*); and the collection of thirty days which constitute the month are the parts of month. Thus, he explains that since the thirty days

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

constitute the month, the relation of the study can be established with the entire month when the study is carried out some time on each of thirty days, and hence the usage '*māsam adhīte*' becomes tenable. It should be noted that the intense pervading or the relation with the thirty days, i.e. the parts of months (*triṃśaddinasambandha*), is to be analysed as the state of pervading the thirtyness that pervassively occurs in all the thirty days (*dinapar-yāptatriṃśatvavyāpakatva*); and since the cause or basis of word-usage (*pravṛttinimitta*) (of Śaktivāda,I), such as the thirtyness is the meaning of the word '*māsa*' itself, the accusative assigned by the rule (P.ii.3.5) expresses only the state of pervading.

Further, Gadādhara explains the nature of the state of pervading (*vyāpakatva*). According to him,if the state of pervading is defined to be the state of not being the counterpositive of the constant absence occurring in the same locus as that of the monthness (*māsatvasamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvāpratiyogitva*),then it would consist of even the pervaded (the thirtyness) as the constituent. Therefore only the state of being the delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the absence (*abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatva*) and another absence (*abhāva*) which does not consist of the monthness must be admitted as the state of pervading. Since the month does not have the absence of the study, the absence of the state of being the delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the absence occuring in the month (*māsaniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatva*) can be said to relate to the studyness and hence indirectly to the study. Thus, the statement '*māsam adhīte*' becomes tenable. Also, it should be noted here that since such an absence is to be related to the study having Caitra as its agent

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*caitrakartṛkādhyayana*), the same study, which has the studyness, i.e. the immediate abode of the second absence (*svāśraya*), becomes the qualificand or the relatun (*anvayi*); whereas the studyness becomes the delimitor of the qualificandness (*anvayitāvacchedaka*).

Meanings of 'māsa' and 'dina'

II (ii). 54. The state of not sharing the same locus with, i.e. contradictory to the conter-possitive must be admitted as a qualifier with respect to the first absence. Consequently, the said usage can be tenable even in the case where the study is carried out sometimes in all the thirty days, but the absence of the study occurs in the intermediate parts of days such as the *daṇḍa*-periods. The term 'month' (*māsa),* however, is intended to convey only the thirty days; and the same is not intended to convey the distinct entity such as the undivided (continuous) period of time existing in all the thirty days. Then in that case, where the study is carried out only in a single day out of the thirty days (month), the absence of the study which is not sharing the same locus with, i.e. contradictory to the counter-positive, cannot be cognized in such an undivided (countinuous) period of time; and therefore, the usage 'He studies for a month' (*māsam adhīte)* would become necessary. However, the day, constituting the month, is the period of time of the form of an undivided (coninuous) entity beginning from one sun-rise to another sun-rise and not the collection of sun's movements. In that case, since each of the movement-individuals is the substratum of the monthness, the absence of the study which is not sharing the same locus with, i.e. untradictory to the counter-positive, can exist in hte *daṇḍas* (the delimitor of such movements); and therefore, the meaning of the accusative, namely the state of being the pervader, would be contradictory.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In the statements such as 'He sleeps durring the day' *(divasam svapiti)* etc., the word 'day' is intended to convey the collection of movements beginning from one sun-rise to another sun rise, and therefore, when the sleep occurs only in a single *daṇḍa*-period, such a usage need not be made.

Explanation

When the study is carried out for some times in each of the thirty days of a month continuously, the usage '*māsam adhīte*' is desired. And in order to facilitate the same, Gadādhara stipulates that the first absence constituting the *vyāpakatva* must be viewed as only not sharing the same locus with, i.e. contradictory to the counter-positive *(patiyogivyadhikaraṇa)* but not as sharing the same locus with the counter -positive *(pratiyogisamānādhikaraṇa)* such as the study. Since the absence of the study that occurs in the thity days is only sharing the same locus with the study, i.e. the conterpositive, the same is not to be taken by the first absence constituting the *vyāpakatva*. Thus the usage '*māsam adhīte' becomes tenable*. Aslo it should be noted that when the month is viewed to be a distinct entity such as one continuous period of time existing in all the thirty days *(triṁśaddinasthāyyakhaṇḍavastvantara)*, the statement '*māsam adhīte*' becomes necessary even when the study is carried out in only one of the thirty days as the study existing in a single day could be argued to exist in such a continuous period of thime. Therefore, Gadādhara stipulates that the month is a period of thirty days; and since the study carried out in a singlle day cannot be existing in all the thirty days of the month, such a usage is avoided. Further, it should be noted that the study needs to be perceived as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

pervading (*vyāpaka)* the entire month even when the study occures actually some times in all the thirty days; however if the day (*dina)* is held to be a collection of sun's movements (*kriyāpracaya),* then the state of pervading the month (*māsavyāpakatva)* would become impossible in the study in '*māsam adhīte*' as the absence of the study, that is not sharing the same locus with, i.e. contradictory to the counterpositive (*pratiyogivyadhikaraṇa),* can be established in the *daṇḍa* peroids that constitute the delimitors of the individual movements possessing the monthness. Thus, Gadādhara stipulates that the day (*dina)* must be admitted to be a continuous period of time such as the undivided (continuous) entity existing from one sun rise to the other sun rise; and since the absence of the study cannot be established to be contradictory to the counterpositive in such a day of continuous entity, the state of prevading the month is possible in the study in '*māsam adhīte*'.

Objection that *vypākatva* cannot be the meaing of accusative

II (ii). 55. It may be objected now as follows : That suppose the state of pervading is the meaning of the accusative, then the usages such as 'He studies for a month' (*māsam adhīte)* would become untenable even in the case where the study is carried out pervassively in an entire month. Since in such a case too the absence of the study can exist in another month, the state of pervading the monthness etc. becomes contradictory to the study as such. Howerver, it may be couter-objected now as follows : That although the individual month is not recollected (cognized) from the word 'month' as having the individual property (the individual monthness) occurring in a particular span of thirty days as the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

qualifier, the month, i.e. the sense expressed by 'month', can be admitted to relate to the absence through the relation of the superstratumness described by the individual month possessing the individual property of the monthness. And therefore, the state of not being the delimiting property of the counter-positiveness described by the absence occurring in one individual month can be obtained (congnized) in the delimiting property of the qualificandness of the qualificand. Thus, their occurs no untenability of any usage as such.

However, this counter-objection is not correct to state. Although the individual properties (the individual monthness etc.) that exist in only the individual months are constituents of only the relation, the knowlege of the speaker's intention for cognizing the relation is the cause of the cognition; and therefore, the recollection (cognition) of the particular relation consisting of sunch individual properties (individual meanings etc.) would be required for the cognition. Also the contingency of the non-production of the verbal cognition of the state of being the pervader of the individual monthness would arise for the person who does not know such individual properties as constituting the relation distinctly. Also such a contingecy cannot be termed as desired. The same is contradictory to the experience. Since the totality of causes of the verbal cognition (i.e. of the recollection) of such properties occurring in the future months etc. in particular is not possible to obtain for the non-omniscient, there would arise the contingency of the loss of the cognition of the state of being the pervader of such a monthness for all the people like us.

Explanation

When the state of pervading (*vyāpakatva*) is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

admitted to be the accusative-meaning, and the state of pervading the month (*māsavyāpakatva*) is to be cognized in the study, the statement '*māsam adhīte*' could be objected to become untenable even when the study is carried out in an entire month as all the months have the monthness and the state of pervading the monthness-delimited (*māsatvāvacchinnavyāpakatva*) (i.e. all the months) is untenable in the study.

However, with a view to explain the state of pervading the monthness-delimited, a counter-objection is raised here as follows : That although the individual month as qualified by the individual property of the individual monthness occurring in a particular thirty days (*yatkiñcittrimśaddinamātravṛttiviśeṣadharmaprakāreṇa*) cannot be cognized from the word '*māsa*', and therefore, the state of pervading the individual month cannot be cognized in the study, the month can be held to be related to the first absence constituting the *vyāpakatva* through the relation of the superstratumness described by the individual month possessing the individual monthness (*taddharmavatsvanirūpitādheyatva*), i.e. the individual month can be constituting the relation; and therefore, the studyness, i.e. the delimiting property of the qualifican-dness (*anvayitāvacchedaka*) can be cognized not to be the delimiting property of the counter-positiveness described by the absence occurring in an individual month (*yatikiñcinmāsaniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitānavacc-hedaka*), i.e. the study can be cognized to be the pervader of the individual month. However, Gadādhara refutes the counter-objection on the ground that the knowledge of the speaker's intention to cognize the relation (*saṃsargatāttparyajñāna*) is the cause of the verbal cognition; and therefore, the individual properties

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such as the individual monthnesses occurring in the individual months (*tattanmāsamātravṛttidharmaviśeṣa)*, consitituting the relation, too need to be cognized from the words as the referenet—qualifiers; and thus, the cognition from the usage '*māsam adhīte*' becomes untenable for the ordinary people not cognizing the individual properties.

Argument that cognition of the relation is not untenable

II (ii). 56. It may be argued now again as follows : That only the speaker's intention to cognize such a sentence-meaning in general can be admitted to be the speakers intention to cognize the relation (involved in the sentence-meaning in particular). In the said knowledge of speaker's intention, the relation constituting the sentence-meaning (verbal cognition) appears (is cognized) only through the power of relations (relational seam); and therefore, the cognition of the relation consisting of the individual property (the individual monthness), not recollected (cognized) in the particular form, is not objectionable (untenable) in the knowlege of speaker's intention on the strength of the absence of contradictory knowledge, and is not objectionable (untenable) in the verbal cognition on the strength of the knowledge of the speaker's intention.

However, this argument is not correct to state. The determinate knowledge referring to the speaker's intention of the form of the desire for the cognition of the sentence-meaning as qualified by the sentence-meaning of the form of the one word-meaning qualified by the another word-meaning is impossible to obtain before the determinate knowledge of the sentence-meaning as such; and therefore, when the same knowledge of the speaker's intention is held to be the cause of verbal cognition, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

same verbal cognition would become untenable due to the doubt regarding the semantic competency of word-meanings. Consequently, only the knowledge of the speaker's intention to cognize the sentenc-meaning as qualified by the state of being the knowledge referring to the unrelated particular relations (such as the supetsratumness) and to the unrelated particular word-meanings (such as the state of being the pervader etc.) needs to be admitted as the cause of the verbal cognition. However, in such a causality of speakers intention, the recollection (cognition) of such relations referring to the individual properties from words is expected to be necessary.

Explanation

The (knowledge of) speaker's intention to cognize the sentenc-meaning (*vākyārthatātparya)* from *'māsam adhīte'* does not essentially differ from the (knowledge of) speaker's intention to cognize the relation between the word-meanings (*samsargatātparya)* as both refer to the same. Therefore, it must be admitted that the superstratumness of the study described by the individual month possessing the individual property of the monthness (*taddharmavatsvanirūpitasambandha)* constituting the sentenc-meaning appears only through the power of relations (*samasargamaryādā)* in the knowledge produced from *'māsam adhīte'*; and consequently it can be argued that such a relation of the superstratumness consisting of such a property (*uktadharmaghaṭ itasambandha)*, though not recollected as the individual property of the monthness from the word (*māsa)*, can appear in the knowledge of speaker's intention; and therefore can appear in the cognition of sentence-meaning from the knowledge of speaker's intention itself.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument on the ground that only one word-meaning qualified by the other word-meaning (*ekapadārthaviśiṣṭāparapadārtha)* constitutes the sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha)*; and therefore the determinate knowledge of the speaker's intention of the form of the desire for cognizing such a sentence-meaning (*tatpratīticchārūpatātparyaviṣ ayakaniścaya)*, which is qualified by the sentence-meaning by referring to it, is impossible to obtain before the obtainment of the determinate knowledge of the sentence-meaning as it is dependent on the same. Moreover, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, suppose the determinate knowledge of the said speaker's intention is held to be the cause of the verbal cognition, then the established convention that the verbal cogniton (senence-meaning) is produced even at the time of the doubt regarding the semantic competency of the form of one word-meaning. as qualified by another word-meaning becomes untenable as the determinate knowledge of the speaker's intenton referring to the said sentance-meaning is impossible at the time of the doubt regarding the semantic competency. Thus, the Pūrvapakṣin esstablishes that only the knowledge of speaker's intention to cognize the sentence-meanings (*pratīticchājñāna)* as qualified by the state of being the knowledge of the unrelated word-meaning and the relations (*viśakalitatattatpadārtha tattatsaṃsargaviṣ ayakatvaviśiṣṭa)* needs to be admitted as the cause; and therefore the recollection of the relations referring to the particular properties is necessary.

Gadādhara's reply

II (ii). 57. Yes it is true. The monthness etc. of the form of the thirtyness resident in the thirty days constituting the month etc. do differ as the months etc.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

differ. However, the state of being the cause (or basis) of the usage of the word 'month' etc. is to be admitted for the same in the unified form of being the monthness. Otherwise the contingency of endlessness of expressive powers would arise. Also, then the verbal cognition of the month etc. which are not cognized earlier would become difficult to be explained without the knowledge of the expressive powers of all the months put together. Now it can be argued that the thirtyness etc. must be stated to be of the form of being the objects of the peculiar mental faculty of counting. Since the thirty days etc. are not of the nature of substance, the number of the form of the quality cannot be possible in such thirty days. Also, even in the theory that the days etc. are of the nature of substance, the origination of the number thirtyness is impossible in such days as they are successive. Moreover, in the case of *'māsam adhīte'*, the non-over extensive (non over-pervasive) distinction that is uniform and common to the knowledge of the thirthness of the particular set of thirty days cannot be stated. The distinction of the form of the generic property cannot be tenable as the same is refuted on account of the contingency of cross-connection. And the distinction of the form of the state of being the knowledge referring to the peculiar days is not common (not continuous) due to the non-consecutiveness (non-continuity) of the particular days.

However, this argument is not correct to state. Even the substance continuing to exist from one sunrise to another sunrise can be explained to be of the form of day etc. Also, the followers of the ritualists' theory have to admit that the number is a distinct category of substance due to the lack of any other alternative. Thus,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the common (continuous) thirtyness etc. of the form the number that exists in the many (thirty) days is tenable to state.

Explanation

Gadādhara now replies to the objection raised with '*atha*' (c.f. II (ii) 51. According to him, the monthness (*māsatva)*, which is of the form of a generic property common to all the months, need not be admitted in the month in '*māsam adhīte*'. Rather only the monthness, which is of the form of the number thirtyness (*triṁśatva)* of thirty days and differs as the months differ, can be admitted to be in the months; and therefore, the study can be cognized as the pervader of the monthness-delimited when the same study is carried out in an entire month. However, there is no contingency of the endlessness of expressive powers (*śaktyānantya)* of the word 'month' as the monthness appearing as delimited by the common monthness-hood can be admitted as the cause or basis of the usage of the word 'month' (*māsādipadapravṛttinimitta*); here unless the common monthness is admitted as *pravṛttinimitta,* the cognition of the future months would become untenable without cognizing the expressive powers for all the different months.

Now the Pūrvapakṣin raises an argument. That since the thirtyness (the monthness) of the form of the number cannot be admitted in the month (the days consitituting the month are collections of sun's movements but not the substances*)*, the same must be admitted to be of the form of the state of being the object of the peculiar mental faculty of counting (*apekṣ ābuddhiviśeṣaviṣayatva)*. Also even when the days are considered to be substances, the number cannot be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

admitted in them as they are successive (*kramika*) and do not occur together as one single entity. Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the claim that the knowledge of the thirtyness as found in the particular thirty days could be generated by a non-deviating (non-overpervassive) common distinction (*anugatavailakṣaṇya);* and the same could be considered as the thirtyness found only in the individual thirty days, on the ground that the distinction cannot be a generic property (*jāti)* due to the cross-connection (*samkara*) with some other property.

However, Gadādhara refutes the argument on the ground that the substance (*dravya)* continuously existing from one sunrise to another sunrise (*sūryodayāvadhisūr-yodayāntarasthāyin)* can be considered as the day (*dina*); and therefore, the number of the form of the thirtyness can be originated in the days of successive substancees. Also since in the ritualists' theory, the number is a separate category, the thirtyness of the form of the number can exist even in the thirty days which are not substances; and thus according to Gadādhara, the thirtyness generalized as the thirtyness-hood can be admitted in the individual months of the individual thirty days.

Alternative theory that *adhikaraṇtva* is the meaning

II (ii). 58. Also in 'Caitra studies for a month, (*māsam adhīte),* only the substratumness can be the meaning of the accusative. And the delimitedness of the form of the self-linking relation, which is delimited by the property pervaded by the substratumness-hood described by the study having Caitra as its agent, can be admitted to appear as the relation of the thirtyness etc. pervassively occurring in the rhirty days and functioning as the delimitors of the expressedness of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

expressed meanings of the 'month' with respect to the substratumness, i.e. the accusative meaning. And thus the convention can be justified.

Also in the case where the study occurs pervassively in a single month, the substratumnesses described by the study can be admitted to be delimited by the thirtyness occurring in the individual months, and hence '*māsam adhīte*' does not become untenble, Here the thirtyness does not overpervade the month delimited by the said property (thirtyness) which is of the form of the particular property of being any one of the entities occurring in the substratumness, and functions as the delimiting property of the delimitedness of the delimited (the relation). Also in the case where the study occurs in the period less than a single month, the monthness of the form of such a thirtyness, being an overpervading property, does not function as the delimiting property of the substratumness (described by the study) delimited by the said property (the particular property of being any one of the entities); and therefore there is no possibility of imposing the statement '*māsam adhīte*'. Although the state of being pervaded by the substratumness, described by Caitra's study, is not obtained (cognized) from the word as occurring in the monthness, i.e. the property functioning as the cause (basis) of the use of the word 'month', the same can be obtained (cognized) by the implication; and consequently the grammatical rule (P.ii. 3. 5.) is not contradicted as the accusative can be explained to be intended to express the intense contact (intense pervading).

Explanation

After explaining the state of pervading (*vyāpakatva)* as the accusative-meaning in '*māsam adhīte*', Gadādhara

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

now explains the substratumness (*adhikaraṇatva)* as an alternative meaning of the accusative. In this theory, one cognizes that Caitra is the agent of study describing the substratumness of the month from '*māsam adhīte*'. Here the thirtyness pervasively occurring in the thirty days (*triṁśaddinaparyāptatriṁśatva)* and functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of 'month' (*māsādipadārthatāvacchedaka)* is to be related to the substratumness functioning as the qualifier to the property-possessor such as the month (*dharmiviśeṣ aṇatāpanna)*. And the same is to be related through the delimitedness (*avacchedyatva)* of the form of the self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandha)*, which in turn is delimited by the state of being any one of the entities (*anyatamatva)* pervaded by the substratumness-hood of the substratumness described by Caitra's study (*caitraka-ratṛkādhyayanādhāratātvavyāpya)*. Here since the thirthness, i.e. the qualifier to the month (thirty days), is related to the substratumness indirectly through the month by the delimitedness, the convention that an entity functioning as the qualifier to something is not related to something else as the qualifier is not violated.

Now Gadādhara states the purpose of such a relationship. According to him, since the substratumness described by the study is delimited by the thirtyness of the month (both the substratumness and the thirtyness are present in the month and hence one is delimited by the other), the statement '*māsam adhīte*' becomes tenable when the study occurs in all thirty days of a single month. Here the monthness of the form of the thirtyness, occurring in the entire month, and overpervading the substratumness described by the study, cannot be the delimiting property of the substratumness; and therefore,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the statement '*māsam adhīte*' need not be imposed when the study occurs in less than thirty days of month. Also Gadādhara explains that when the thirtyness is related to the substratumness described by the study, the same thirtyness becomes possible to be cognized to have the pervadedness described by the substratumness of the study; and therefore the grammatical rule *kālādhvanor atyantasamyoge (P. ii. 3. 5).* which assigns the accusative in the sense of the intense contact (pervading) does not become contradicted.

Avoidance of '*māsam adhīte*' when study occurs for less than a month

II (ii). 59. Now it may be objected as follows : That on account of the conventional uses such as 'The pot occurs on the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ)* and 'The ground is the possessor of the pot' (*bhūtalam ghaṭvat)* etc., even the overextensive (overpervasive) property needs to be admitted as the delimiting property of the superstratumness and the substratumness.

However, this objection is not correct to state. We do not admit the cognition of the delimitorship for any property in such usages. Suppose the superstratumness is held to be delimited by the overpervasive property, then Miśra's inclusion (Tattva cintāmaṇi), Anumāna khaṇḍa, P. 158) of the delimitorship of the form the self-linking relation in the body of th pervasion of the nature of the delimiting property of the relation of having the same substratums as that of the *sādhya* (mojor term) would become an impossible task to justify. This would be so because of the contraction to the modification introduced by the Cintāmaṇi in the context of the pervasion that the overpervading property cannot be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

admitted to be the delimiting property, as the same would lead to the overpervasion in the case of deviating middle terms. Also suppose the substratumness is held to be delimited by the overpervasive property, then Raghunātha's (*Dīdhitikāra's)* position in considering the delimitorship of the form of the non-overpervasive occurrence would become untenable. Here such a position is admitted by abandoning the inclusion of the delimitorship of the form of the self-linking relation on account of another fault such as "the one having the occurrence in the entity (substance) delimited by the contratictory time and cardinal points"; but not on account of the fault such as "the overpervasion in the case of deviating middle terms" by commenting on (explaining) the definition of the pervasion such as "that which is the state of being the substratum of the middle term (*hetu*) is the delimiting property of the substratumness of the substratum of the major term" (*sādhya)*.

Explanation

In *'bhūtale ghaṭaḥ'*, the superstratumnes occurring in the pot is delimited by the potness which is over pervasive by occurring in many pots devoid of the superstratumness; also in *'bhūtalam ghaṭavat'*, the substratumness occurring in the ground is delimited by the groundness which is overpervasive occurring in many grounds devoid of substratumness. Thus, on the basis of the delimitaion by such overpervasive potness etc., all the overpervastive properties (*atiprasaktadharma)* can be argued to be the delimiting properties of the superstratumness and the substratumness.

However, Gadādhara refutes the argument on the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ground that in such usages no property needs to be admitted as the delimitor. Also according to him, the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*) cannot be admitted to have been delimited by the overpervasive property. Miśra has recognized that the smookness, i.e. the delimiting property of the state of having the same substratum as as that of fire (*vahnisāmānādhikaraṇyāvacchedaka),* has only the delimitorship of the form of self-linking relation (*svarūpa-sambandharūpāvacchedakatva);* however, if an overpervasive property is admitted to be the delimited property of the superstratumness, then such an admittance of Miśra would become pointless as it would contradict his statement (in the Cintāmaṇi) that the overpervasive property cannot be the delimiting property. Also according to Gadādhara, the substratumness (*ādhāratā)* cannot be admitted to have been delimited by the over pervasive property. Raghunātha (*Dīdhitikāra)* has stated that the state of bieng the substratum of the *hetu (hetvadhikaraṇatva)* is the being the delimitor of the substratumness of the substratum of the *sādhya (sādhyādhikaraṇatāvacchedakatva)* and its delimitorship is of the form of only non-overpervasive occurrence (*anatiriktavṛttitva)*; however, if an overpervasive property is admitted to be the delimiting property of the substratumness, then Raghunātha's considering the non-overpervasive delimitorship as occurring in the state of being the substratum of the *hetu* would become pointless. Thus, in the present case, the monthness, which is an over pervasive property by occurring in the months having the study carried out for a few days, cannot be the delimiting property of the substratumness of the subsrtatum of study; and thus the contingency of such a usage as '*māsam adhīte*' is avoided when study occurs for less thatn a month.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Alternative Explanation

II. (ii) 60. Or let it be admitted that even an overpervasive property which is not adhering to each other's loci in its occurrence is the delimiting property of the relation of the superstratumness or that of the substratumness on account of the said conventional usages. However, the overpervasive property which adheres to each other's loci in its occurrence cannot be admitted to be the delimiting property; for, the usage such as 'Both earth and water are the possessors of smell' (*kṣitijalobhayam gandhavat) and* 'Both fluidity and smell are in the earth' (*snehagandhobhayam kṣitau*) are never made.

Or as an alternative, it can be admitted that even individual items such as the particular monthness etc. functioning as the qualifiers to the base-meanings such as the particular months, etc.are the qualifiers to the substratumness, i.e. the meaning expressed by the accusative etc., indirectly (i.e. through their property possessors) through the relation of pervasiveness. And such a pervasiveness can be held to be the possesson of the property (such as *adhyayanādhikaraṇatātva),* which is the abode of th difference from the property such as *nṛtyādhikaraṇatātva,* delimited by the paricular monthness, through the relation of the state of being the delimiting property of the counter-positiveness described by the absence (of the *nṛtyādhiaraṇatā)* pervasively occurring in the month and sharing a common locus with the particular monthness. And in 'Caitra studies for a month' (*caitro māsam adhīte),* such a property i.e. the state of being the substatumness described by the study of Caitra, must be included in the body of the relation only as the particular property. Although the state of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

being the delimiting property of the counter-positiveness described by such an absence (of *adhyayanādhāratā)* occurring in some other month is present in such a property, the state of being the abode of the difference (mutual absence) of the substratumness (described by dance), delimited by the particular monthness through the said relations, is unharmed in such a state (of the substratumness described by the study) not functioning as the delimiting property of the contuer-positiveness described by the absence (*of nṛtyādhi-karaṇatā)* having the common locus with the particular monthness. Thus, such a usage (*māsam adhīte)* is explained even in the case where the study occurs pervasively in only one particular month.

Explanation

In view of the usages *bhūtāle ghaṭah* and *bhūtalam ghaṭavat,* Gadādhara approves that even an overpervasive property can be the delimiting property of the superstratumness and the substratumness. However, he is opposed to the idea of the delimitorship for the properties that adhere to each other's loci in their occurrence (*vyāsajyavṛtti)*, as then the usage such as *kṣ itijalobhayam gandhavat* would become necessary on the ground that the twoness of the earth and the water could be the delimiting property of the subsstratumness described by the superstratumness of the smell. Thus, the monthness, adhering to each other's loci, i.e. month in its occurrence, cannot be the delimiting property of the substratumness described by the study when the same does not occur in the entire month.

However, as an alternative, Gadādhara suggests that the substratumness described by the study (*adhyayanādhāratva)* can be admitted as the meaning of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

accusative (c.f. II (ii). 58). According to him, such a substratumness described by the study (*adhyayanādhāratva*) is the pervader of th eparticular monthness (*tattanmāsatva*); and therefore the same monthness can be the qualifier with respect to the substratumness through the pervasiveness (*vyāpakatva*). Hence the being the pervasiveness (*adhyayanādhāratātva)* is the state of possessing the substratumness described by the study (*adhyayanādhāratātva)* is the state of possessing the substratumness described by the study functioning as the abode of the mutual absence of the substratumness-hood described by the dancing (*nṛtyādhikaraṇatātva)* delimited by the particular monthness (*svāvacchinna)* through the relation of being the delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the absence pervasively occurring in the month, i.e. the common locus of the substratumness (*svasamānādhikaraṇavyāpyavṛtty abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka)* (c.f. the pervasiveness is usually the state of not being the delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the absence occurring in the locus of itself *svādhikar-aṇavṛttyabhāvapratiyogitānavacchedakatva)*. Now in the case of the study occurring in a full month, the state of being the substratumness described by the study can be explained to be the non-delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the absence of the dance having the common locus with the monthness (*tattanmāsatvasamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitānavavacchedaka);* and therefore '*māsam adhīte*' can be explained by the fact that the same state of being the substratumness described by the study can have the difference from the particular monthness-delimited (*tattanmāsatvāvacchinnabheda)* through the pervasiveness (the same has the state of not being the delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the absence having the common locus with the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

particular monthness *tattanmāsatvasamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitānavacchedakatva)*.

Avoidance of '*pratimāsam adhīte*'

II (ii) 61. It should be noted that in the case of the usages such as 'He studies for every month' *(partimāsam adhīte)* etc; the words such as 'every' *(prati)* etc. are denotative of the pervaderness consisting of the total absence of the state of being the delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the absence occurring in the monthness-delimited expressed by the words 'month' etc. Consequently, such usages are not made in the case where the study occurs pervasively only in one particular month etc.

Explanation

Gadādhara now avoids the usages such as, *pratimāsam adhīte* in the case of study for only one particular month. According to him, while the pervaderness *(vyāpakatva)* is the relation *(samsarga)* in *māsam adhīte,* the same is the referent-qualifier *(prakāra)* expressed by '*prati*' in '*pratimāsam adhīte*'. Also according to him, the pervasiveness is of the nature of the state of possessing that which is other than the delimiting property of the counter-positiveness described by the constant absence occurring in the *monthness-delimited (māsatvāvacchinnaniṣṭhātyantābhāva pratiyogitānavacchedakadharmavattva);* and therefore, the usage '*pratimāsam adhīte*' cannot be imposed unless the study occures in all the twelve months of the year.

Eka is meaningful

II (ii). 62. Now it may be objected as follows : That suppose the accusative expressing the sense of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

intense contact is held to be denotative of the pervaderness of any one particular month without the use of the word 'one' (*eka)* etc,. then, the use of the word 'one' (*eka)* in 'Having offered with Upasad-pudding, he offers Agnihotra sacrifice for one full month' (*upasadbhis caritvā māsam ekam agnihotram juhoti)* would become meaningless.

However, this objection is not correct. In such a usage, the word 'one' (*eka)* is used to avoid the state of being the sense expressed by the scriptural injunction for the perfomance of the Agnihotra-scrifice when the same pervades the time longer than a month as even the Agnihotra sacrifice pervading a time longer than a month can be the pervader of month's time. When the word 'one' (*eka)* is used, however, the same can convey only the sense of the mereness; and therefore, such a purpose of avoiding the prescription of such a scrifice is possible due to the obtainment of the state of being the pervader of only a single month as its sense. From this the following prima facie view too gets refuted. That there would occur split of sentence (syntactic split) in prescribing the time limit such as one single month and the oblation materials such as the rice pudding accompanied by the paddy and sesame by repeating (continuing) the Agnihotra-sacrifice expressed by the scriptural statement such as 'He performs the Agnihorta sacrifice for his entire life'*(yāvajjīvam agnihotram juhoti);* and therefore the conclusive theory established is that such a scriptural statement is prescriptive of only another performance of Agnihotra qualified by both the time and the material that can be expressed by the secondary term '*agnihotra'*. And in such a conclusion, the repetition (continuation) is possible even for the month long time

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

included as the constituent in the life long time; and therefore, by continuing the already obtained Agnihotra-sacrifice along with the month long time, the scriptural statement is justified in enjoining only the material, and thus there is no syntactic split'. When the scriptural statement 'He offers Agnihotra scrifice for ones entire life' *(yāvajjīvam)* expresses the state of pervading the life long time in the Agnihotra sacrifice, the state of pervading one single month is also obtained by imlication in the Agnihotra sacrifice. However, the state of pervading the one single month is not obtained in the Agnihotra sacrifice that has Upasad-pudding as its means. Therefore, even the one month long time needs to be enjoined (prescribed) separately; and thus the syntactic split becomes unavoidable in the case of the view that supports the prescribing of the materials by continuing the already obtained Agnihotra-sacrifice.

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣin objects now that when the accusative in '*māsam adhīte*', assigned in the sense of intense contact *(atyantasmyoga),* is held to express the sense of the stâte of being the pervader of one single month *(ekamāsamātravyāpakatā)* for the study, the accusative in '*māsam ekam agnihotram juhoti*' needs to be held to express the state of being the pervader of one single month for the Agnihotra sacrifice; and thus the word '*eka*' in the scriptural statement would become meaningless.

However, Gadādhara refutes such an objection. According to him, the Agnihotra sacrifice which pervades more than a month too can be claimed to pervede one month *(māsavyāpaka)*; and therefore, to avoid the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

undesired contingency of the Agnihotra pervading more thatn a month, the word '*eka*' needs to be used in the scriptural statement (when the word '*eka*' is used in the statement, the Agnihotra becomes the pervader of only one single month, as the word '*eka*' is expressive of only a single month; and therefore, the contingoney of the Agnihotra pervading more than a month is avoided). It should be noted here that the establihed conclusion in this case is that when the statement '*māsam ekam agnihotram juhoti*' prescribes both the material such as the sesame and the time such as the month by continuing the Agnihotra sacrifice from '*yāvajjīvam agnihotram juhoti*', the syntactic split (*vākyabhda)* would be contigent as two separate things need to be prescribed; and therefore, to avoid the undesired contingency, the same statement '*msam ekam........*' needs to be admited as prescribing only the secondary Agnihotra-sacrifice as qualified by the material (sesame) and the time (month). However, since Gadādhara has refuted the Pūrvapakṣin's objection, the following objection too stands refuted. That the statement '*māsam ekam.....*' need not be held to prescribe both the materials and the time exposing the statement to syntactic split, but rather the same can be admitted to prescribe only the materials such as the sesame by continuing the Agnihotra as qualified by the single month from the statement (*yāvajjīvam....)*. This is so because the state of being the pervader of only one single month (*māsaikamātravyāpakatā)* cannot be obtained for the Agnihotra-sacrifice that has Upasad - pudding as its means. Only the state of bieng the pervader of ones life long period of time (*yāvajjīvavyāpakatā)* can be obtained in the sacrifice from '*yāvajjīvam.....*; and therefore, by prescribing both the materials and the time, syntactic split would become

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

unavoidable in the theory proposing the continuance of Agnihotra-sacrifice and the prescription of the materials.

Explanation of syntactic unity

II (ii). 63. Now it may again be objected as follows : How is it that the syntactic split does not occur in the view that such a scriptural statement as '*māsam ekam agnihotram juhoti*' prescribes totally another action (Agnihotra-sacrifice) qualified by both the materials (se same etc.) and the time (month) as expressed by the secondary word *'agnihotra'*. Even while admitting such a view, the distinction between the predicates (materials and time) is not avoided; on the contrary, a distinct subject (secondary Agnihotra) is prescribed additionally. Thus even the statement (Vākyapadīya......) that "when the object (subject) is already obtained (continued), many qualities (predicates) cannot be predicated upon; however, when the object (subject) is not already obtained (continued), many qualities (predicates) too can be predicted upon by a single effort (expression)" too becomes unjustified.

However, this objection is not correct. In the case where many qualities appear simultaneously as the qualifiers in a single predicate, syntactic split (split of sentence) is avoided due to the identity of the predicateness occurring in the qualified predicates although the qualities of the predicates are different. Otherewise, syntactic split would become contigent even in the predication of the qualified predicates such as "The ground is the possessor of blue pot" (*bhūtalam nīlaghaṭavat)* like in the case the predicating distinct predicates such as 'The ground is the possessor of the blue and the pot' (*nīlavat ghaṭavat*). In the case where

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

many predicates (materials and time) are to be predicated as the qualifiers in a single continued subject (Agnihotra), syntactic split occurs due to the fact that the predicateness (es) of such predicates are distinct.

Explanation

Now the Pūrvapakṣin again raises the objection that the proposal that statement '*māsamekam agnihotram juhoti*' prescribes a secondary Agnihotra-sacrifice as qualified by both the materials (sesame) and the time (month) does not avoid the syntactic split. According to him, even in such a proposal, both the materials and the time remain to be the predicates and the Agnihotra sacrifice remains to be the subject; and therefore, the Vākyapadīya statement that when the object (subject) is continued, many qualities cannot be predicated; however, when the object (subject) is not continued, many qualities can be predicated by a single expression (*prāpte karmanṇi.....*) becomes untenable.

However, Gadādhara explains syntactic unity of the statement '*māsamekam..*' on the following ground : That in the predication of the qualified Agnihotra-sacrifice, the qualities (*viśeṣaṇa*) such as the materials and the time are not predicated separately by separate expressions; and therefore, the predicateness (*vidheyatva*) does not differ in the predicates. According to him, the syntactic split occurs only in the case of the predication of separate qualities (*viśeṣaṇavidhāna*) such as '*nīlavad ghaṭavad*' and not in the case of the predication of the qualified predicate (*viśiṣṭavidhāna*) such as '*bhūtalam nīlaghaṭavat*'; and therefore, the same syntactic split cannot be imposed in the predication of the qualified predicate in '*māsam ekam..*'.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation of Vyāpakatā

II(ii). 64. In the case of the preformance of the Agnihotra-sacrifice for less than a month, the state of being the pervader of one single month is unharmed for the substratumness described by the sacrifice performed by the sacrificer (*Caitra*) for the time less than a month either as being the substratumness described by the sacrifice having the *Upasad*-pudding as its means or as being the substratumness described by such a sacrifice performed by a particular qualified peson; for, the substratumness described by the sacrifice, that has some other persons (Maitra etc.) as its agents, is very much present even in the days that are other than those in which Caitra performs the sacrifice. Also there occurs endlessness of predicates in the assumption that the state of being the pervader of the month is intended by the scripture for the substratumness only as being the substratumness described by the sacrifices that have the particular persons (Caitra etc.) as its agents.

However, even then the state of being the pervader of the month found in the substratumness delimited by the state of being the substratuness described by the Agnihotra-sacrifice of *Upasad*-pudding having the particular persons (Caitra etc.) as the agents can be intended to be merely a relation; and hence there is no difficulty of endlessness of predicates. Here such a state of being the pervader is to be generalized by the property occurring in only the substratumness described by such a sacrifice of *Upsad*-pudding but not occurring in the two different substratumnesses described by the sacrifices having the two different persons as the performing agents. Also here the state of not occurring in the two different subtratumnesses is understood to be generalized

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(common) in the form of being the state of being the pervader that is other than the state of bieng the pervader qualified by the substratumness as both the occurrence in itself (the substratumness) and as the occurrence in the substratumness described by the sacrifice having the agent who is the counter-positive of the mutual absence occurting in the particular agent of the sacrifice describing the substratumness.

Explanation

It should be noted that in the case of *māsāgnihotra* performed by Caitra for less than a month, the state of being the pervader of the month (*māsaāvyāpakatā*) is tenable in the substratumness described by the Agnihotra-sacrifice performed in the time either as the being the substratumness described by the Agnihotra-sacrifice having *upasad*-pudding as its means (*upasadcarukaraṇaka homādhikaraṇatā*) or as the being the substratumness described by the Agnihotra-sacrifice performed by some other qualified person (*adhikāriviśeṣakṛtahomādhi-karaṇatā*). This is so because, in the (days of the) month when Caitra has not performed the Agnihotra, the substratumness described by the Agnihotra performed by Maitra can always be present, as the Agnihotra is the same everywhere. Also, the state of being the prevader of the month cannot be restricted for the substratumness described by the Agnihotra performed by any single agent such as Caitra as then the predicates (Agnihotras) would become endless due to the difference between the performing agents.

However, Gadādhara avoids the over-extension on the ground that the different states of being the pervaders of the month, that are delimited by the state of being

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the substratumness described by the sacrifice performed by Caitra etc. (*caitrādikartṛkatādṛśahomādhikaraṇatā-tvāvacchina*), can be regarded to be merely the relations in the substratumness described by the Agnihotra-sacrifice; and therefore, the endlessness of the predicates (Agnihotras) due to the difference between the performing agents can very well be avoided. Here the state of being the pervader of the month occurent in the substratumness must be generalized by the property (state) occurring in only the substratumness described by the sacrifice of *upasad*-pudding (*caruhomādhikaraṇatāmātravṛtti*) but not occurring in the two substratumnesses described by the sacrifices having two different persons as the agents (*vibhinnapuruṣa-kartṛkahomādhikaraṇatādvayāvṛtti*).

Atyantasamyogārthaka dvitīyā : a conclusion

II (ii). 65. In the cases such as 'He studies for a month' (*māsam adhīte*) etc., too, the property delimiting the state of being the pervader of the month, namely the state of being the substratumness described by the study having Caitra as the agent, must be generalized by the same generic form as stated above. Therefore, in the case such as 'The person studying for a month is seen' (*māsam adhīyāno dṛṣṭaḥ*) etc., the cognition of semantic relations does not become untenable though the individual properties of the agents such as the Caitraness etc. in particular are not recollected. Other relations are to be guessed by scholars on their own.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara concludes the section on *atyantasamyogārthakadvitīyā*. According to him, in '*māsam adhīte* etc. too, the property that delimites the state of being the pervader (*vyāpakatāvacchedaka*) such as the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

state of being the substratumness described by the study of Caitra etc. (*caitrādikartṛakādhyayanādhāratātva*) needs to be generalized by the consecutive property such as the *vibhinnakartṛkādhyayanādhāratātva* and the *caitra-kartṛkādhyayanādhikaraṇatāmātravṛttitva*; however, such a generalized state of being the pervader can be included in the category of relations (*saṃsargakoṭi*) only. Thus, in '*māsam adhīyāno dṛṣṭaḥ*' etc., though the particular properties of the agents such as the Caitraness etc., are not recollected from words, verbal cognition involving such properties becomes tenable as the same can appear as the part of the relations (*samarga*) only.

Meaning of the accusative in connection with '*vinā*'

II (ii) 66. In the cases such as 'The pot is not produced without the stick' (*daṇḍam vinā na ghaṭa utpadyate*), 'The pot is produced even without a donkey' (*rāsabhaṃ vināpi ghaṭa utpadyate*) etc., the meaning of the indiclinable 'without' (*vinā*) is the possessor of the absence. And the accusative associated with such an indiclinabe (*vinā*) expresses either the counter-positiveness or the subjunctness related to the absense as its sense. The possessor of the absence is related to the origination (production) as the being the substratum. Thus the cognitions produced are that the pot is the possessor of the absence of the state of (having the) origination occuring in the time (or space) having the absence of the donkey. The meaning of the nominal base is possible to be related, directly throught the non-identity, to the meaning of the indeclinable particle; however, when the case ending is possisble to be explained as being meaningful, the meaninglessness is unjustified for the same ending; and therefore, the accusative case ending needs to be admitted as being meaningful.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Now Gadādhara sets out to explain the meaning of the accusative associated with the indeclinable without (*vinā*). According to him, the indiclinable 'without' (*vinā*) expresses the possessor of the absence (*abhāvavān*) which can be either time (*kāla*) or space (*deśa*) (here the absence is intended to be that of the meaning of the accusative base). Also according to him, the accusative in such cases expresses the counter-positiveness (*pratiyogitā*) or the subjunctness (*anuyogitva*) relating to the absence of the accusative base-meaning through the describing or the substratumness; and the possessor of the absence, i.e. the time or the space, is related to the root-meaning such as the origination (*utpatti*) (the time and the space are substratums of the origination). Thus, in '*daṇḍam vinā na ghaṭa utpadyate*', the accusative base-meaning such as the stick is related to the absense, the absense to time or space, the space or time to the origination and the origination to the absense expressed by the negative particle. It should be noted here that in fact the accusative base-meaning such as the stick can be related to the possessor of the absense directly through the non-identity; and therefore, the accusative case need not express any meaning; however, in order to facilitate the convention that when a case ending can be admitted to be meaningful (*sārthaka*), the same need not be regarded as meaningless (*nirarthaka*), the accusactive is held to be meaningful (*sārthaka*).

***Prathamā* cannot express the *pratiyogitva* etc.**

II. (ii). 67. Suppose in the cases such as 'The pot does not occur on the ground' (*bhūtale na ghaṭaḥ*), and 'The face is like the moon' (*candra iva mukham*) etc.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the nominative is held to be expressing the sense of counter-positiveness etc., then the nominative itself would become untenable. For, only in the case where the meaning relating to the nominal base-meaning is expressed by some other grammatical word, the rule '*prātipadikārtha..*'(P. ii. 3.46) assigns the nominative ending. Thus, in such cases the counter positiveness etc. would be admitted as appearing only in the form of relations. In the statement such as 'There is no origination of the pot without the stick' (*daṇḍam vinā na ghaṭotpattiḥ*) etc., where absense of the origination of the pot etc. are related to the meaning of the possessor of the absense, the meaning of of '*vinā*', i.e. the absense of the stick, which functions as the qualififer with respect ot the sub-stratum subjunct (time), appears as being the delimiting property of the subjunctness of the absence, Since the uasge 'The smell does not occur in the substance' (*dravye na gandhaḥ*) is incorrect, a convention must be admitted that the absence expressed by the negative particle is not related to the item delimited by the adventitious properrty. However, the usage 'There is no origination of the pot without the donkey' (*rāsabham vinā na ghaṭotpattiḥ*) is not necessary. Since the absence of the donkey is an overextensive (over pervading) item, the same does not have the state of being the delimitor of the subjunctness described by the absence of the origination of the pot.

Explanation

In '*bhūtale na ghaṭaḥ*' like in '*daṇḍam vinā na ghaṭaḥ*,' the absence that describes the counter-positiveness of the pot is cognized; and therefore the noninative, like the accusative, too could be argued to be expressive of the counter- positivenness etc. However, Gadādhara

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

refutes such an argument on the ground that the rule '*prātipadikārtha*..' assigns the noninative case only when it is intended to express the base-meaning etc.; and therefore, the *kāraka*- relations such as the objecthood etc. relating to the base- meanings are not the nominative-case-meanings (they are expressed by other grammatcal elements).

A point to be noted here is that in '*daṇḍam vinā na ghaṭotpaṭṭiḥ*', the absence of the origination of the pot (*ghaṭotpattyabhāva*) can be related to the time or the space, i.e. the possessor of the absence of the stick expressed by *vinā*; and therefore, the same absence of the stick (*daṇḍābhāva*) becomes the delimitor of the subjunctness of the subjunct of the origination of the pot (*ghaṭotpattyabhāvānuyogitāvacchedaka*) due to sharing the common substratum, in the form of the time or space which is the subjunct (*anuyogi*). It should be noted here that only such an absence and not the timeness or the spaceness appears as the delimitor, as the absence expressed by the negative particle (*nañarthābhāva*) can not be related to the item delimited by an adventitious property such as the timeness or the spaceness (*upalakṣaṇībhūtadharmāvacchinna*) (otherwise the usage *dravye na gandhaḥ*' too would become necessary by admitting the relation of the absence of the smell to the water delimited by the adventitious property of the substancesness.)

Alternative theory

II (ii). 68 As an alternative, only the absence can be admitted to be the meaning of the indiclinable '*vinā*'. In the usages such as 'The pot is not produced without the stick' (*daṇḍam vinā na ghaṭaḥ*) etc., the absence,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

i.e. the sence expressed by '*vinā*', is related to the absence of the pot, i.e. the sence expressed by the negative particle, through the conduciveness. Therefore, the usages such as 'The pot is not produced without the donkey' (*rāsabham vinā na ghaṭaḥ*) etc. cannot be imposed. That is why, though the pot etc. have an existence in the time or the space having the absence of the stick etc., the usage such as 'The pot is not (produced) without the stick' (*daṇḍam vinā na ghaṭaḥ*) is tenable to be explained even without the supplying of the verb 'is produced' (*jāyate*). In the positive statement, 'The pot (is produced) without the donkey' (*rāsabham vinā ghaṭaḥ*), the absence expressed by the indiclinable '*vinā*' is related to the pot through the relation of the community of locus.

Even Raghunātha, the author of Dīdhiti, (on Tattvacintāmani, 2.), while commenting upon 'inseparable existence or invariable concomitance is pervasion', has stated that without major term means,the absence occurring in the locus of the absence of the major term is the pervasion; and in such a commentary, the locative word (*sādhyābhāvavati*) conveys the state of residing (of the absence of the middle term) in the locus of the absence of the major term only in the form of the relation asexpressed by the possessive suffix; however, the same does not convey the same state of residing in the locus of the absence as the meaning of the indiclinable '*vinā*'. Although in the commentary (*sādhyābhāvavati*), upto 'the locus of the absence (of the major term)', is the meaning of the indiclinable '*vinā*', the locative case (in '*abhāvavati*') needs to be admitted as being explanatory of only the non-meaning (i.e. relation) such as the superstratumness.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains an alternative theory of the meaning of '*vinā*'. According to this theory, instead of the possessor of the absence (*abhāvavat*), only the absence (*abhāva*) can be admitted as the meaning of '*vinā*'. Since the absence of the pot is accomplished and the absence of the stick is what accomplishes, the relation between them is that of being what is to be accompolised and what accomplishes (*prayojya-prayojakabhāva*). Also, since such a relation is lacking between the absence of the pot and the absence of a donkey, the statement '*rāsambham vinā na ghaṭaḥ*' is avoided; whereas since such a relation is possible between the absence of the pot (and not the absence of the origination of the pot) and the absence of the stick, the usage '*daṇḍam vinā na ghaṭaḥ*' is possible even without the verb '*jāyate*' which expresses the origination.

Also Gadādhara supports the theory that the meaning of the term '*vinā*' is only absence (*abhāva*) and not the possessor of the absence (*abhāvavat*) by quoting Raghunatha's commentary (*Vyāptivāda*, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, 2.). According to him, the expression 'without the major term' (*sādhyam vinā*) in the context of 'inseparable existence i.e. invariable concomitance is pervasion' (*avinābhāvo vyāptiḥ*), is commented upon as 'The absence in the locus of the absence of the major term is the pervasion' (*sādhyābhāvavati yo abhāvaḥ sa vyāptiḥ*); and in such a commentary, the locative word '*sādhyābhāvavati*' is intended to convey the state of residing (of the absence of the middle term) in the locus of the absence of the major term (*sādhyābhāvādhikaraṇaniṣṭhatva*) only as the relation (*samsarga*) and not as the meaning (*artha*) of any word; and therefore,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the alternative position that only the absence and not the possessor of the absence is the meaning of the indiclinable '*vinā*' is justified. Also according to him, since the locative case after the possessive word '*sādhyā bhāvavati*' needs any way to be interpreted as conveying the superstratumness, i.e. a relation, and hence a non-meaning of any word (*apadārtha*), the interpretation that the possessive word '*sādhyābhāvavat*' conveys the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*), i.e. a relation, and hence a non-meaning (*apadartha*), is not contradictory.

Case ending after *'vinā'* is meaningless

II (ii). 69. Also it cannot be argued now that the locative in the possessive word 'in the possessor of the absence' (*abhāvavati*) explains only the sense to be expressed by the lost locative after the indiclinable 'without' (*vinā*); for, the case after an indeclinable such as '*vinā*' is ruled to be meaningless. Therefore, the grammarians hold that everywhere only the nominative case is to be used after the indeclinable for the grammatical correctness of the word.

In the case such as 'The smell occurs only in the earth' (*pṛthivyām eva gandhaḥ*) etc., the auther of the Dīdhiti has admitted the position that the locative having the word 'only' (*eva*) as its base, expresses the superstratumness; however, he does not have much affection for even such a position. In accordance with the cognition of the occurrence in something different from the earth as the counterpositive, the indeclinable 'only' (*eva*) may be overlooked from being considered as expressive of the occuence in something different (from the earth) due to heaviness; and consequently the locative, which is established to be expressive of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

superstratumness, can be assumed to have the expressive power in such a sense of the occurence. However, in the present case (*of sādhyam vinā = sādhyābhāvavati*), the superstratummness is tenable to be considered as appearing as only the relation; and therefore, the assumption of the locative as having syntacical expectancy for the indeclinable '*vinā*' and as expressing the sense of the superstratumness, can only be a wrong (evill) assumption.

Explanation

In '*sādhyābhāvavati yo abhāvaḥ sa vyāptiḥ*', the locative can be argued to express the state of residing in the locus of the absense of the major term, i.e. the meaning to be expressed by the lost locative after '*vinā*' (*padārtha*) and not merely a relation (*apadārtha*). However, Gadādhara refutes such an argument on the ground that the case endings after the indeclinables are meaningless (*nirarthaka*).

Nevertheless, Gadādhara has difficulty in explaining the meaninglessness of the locative occurring after the indeclinable '*eva*' in '*pṛthivyāmeva gandhaḥ*'. Thus, he states that though Raghunātha admits the superstatumness as the meaning of the locative there, he (Raghunatha) does not have any particlar affection for such an admission. A fact to be noted here is that the indeclinable '*eva*' is used to express exclusion from the association with others (*anyayogavyavaccheda*); which is to be analysed as the absence of occurrence in the others (*anyavrttitvābhāva*) and in '*pṛthivyām eva gandhaḥ*', the occurrence in what is other than the earth (*pṛthivyanyavṛttitva*) is congnized as a counter-positive (*pratiyogi*) relating to the absence of occurrence in the other (*anyavṛttitvābhāva*) However, since there occurs

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

heaviness in assigning the expressive power for '*eva*' in the sense of the absense of occurrence in the other (*anyavṛttitvābhāva*), the indeclinable base '*eva*' needs to be assumed, as an exception, to have the expressive power only in the absence (*abhāva*) and the other (*anya*) by allowing the lacative after '*eva*' to express the occurrence (*vṛttitva*). Thus, Gadādhara concludes that in other cases sush as '*sādhyam vinā*' (explained as '*sādhyābhāvavati yo abhāvaḥ....*') the locative after '*vinā*' need not express the supertratumness.

Superstratumness cannot be the relation in *evakārasthala*

II (ii).70. The position that in the case of the statements involing 'only' (*eva*), the superstatumness (occurrence) is the relation of the other, i.e. one of the meanings of 'only', with the absense, i.e. the second of the meanings of 'only', is however, not tenable. The superstatumness can function as the relation only with respect to the possessor of the superstatumness, and not with respect to the absence of the substratum (such as the earth),Also. it cannot be admitted that in such a case (as *pṛthivyām eva gandhaḥ*), the absence of the (other through the) superstatumness is not cognized (in the smell); but rather only the absence of what is other than the earth describing the counterpositiveness delimited by the relation of the superstratumness is cognized; and the state of describing such a counter-positiveness can be the relation of the other with the absence. This is so because, the relation of the spuerstratumness cannot be the delimiting relation of the counter-positiveness described by the absence of the other (than the earth) due to being a non-occurrence-exacting relation in the superstratum (the smell), i.e. the relational subjunct of the substratum (i.e. the other) which is the counter-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

positive of the absence. In 'Caitra cooks' (*ciatraḥ pacati*) etc., the relation of the effort leading to the cooking is a non-word-meaning (i.e. relation); however it is explained as a meaning expressed by the possessive word in the expression 'He is the possessor of the effort leading to the cooking' (*pākakṛtimān*). Thus in the present case too, the occurrence in the same locus, though a relation, does not bring about any contradiction when explained to be a meaning expressed by the word. Also, the sense to be expresed by a word, when not obtained by any means, can be tenable to be a relation (non-word-meaning.) Thus, enough of imposing non-existent (wrong) agruments.

Explanation

Now it is proposed that in the case of the statements involving '*eva*' (*pṛthivyām eva gandhaḥ*) too, the superstratumness (*ādheyatva*) can appear as a relation; and therefore, the two separate meanings of '*eva*' ('the other than the earth' and 'the absence') can be related to each other through the superstratumness. However, Gadādhara refutes the proposal on the grond that the superstratumness cannot be the relation of the counter-positive with the absence. In '*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*', the ground is related to the pot occuring on the ground that has the superstratumness through the superstratumness; however, the same is not related to the absence of the ground that does not have the supestatumness through the superstratumness., Also, it is proposed again now that in '*pṛthivyām eva gandhaḥ*', the absence of what is other than the earth describing the counter-positiveness as delimited by the superstratumness (*ādheyatvasambandhāvacchinnapratiyogitākapṛthivyādyanyābhāva*) can be cognized to be related to the smell; and therefore, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

supertstratumness can appar as the delimiting relation of such a counter-positiveness. However, Gadādhara refutes even such a proposal on the ground that the super-stratumness is not an occurrence-exating relation (*vṛttyaniyāmaka*); and therefore, the same cannot be the delimiting relation of the counter-positiveness. Here in '*pṛthivyām eva gandhaḥ,*' the absence of other than the ground (earth) is to be related to the same; and therefore, the other, i.e. the substratum of the smell, is the counterpositive of the absence; and the smell, i.e. the superstratum in the other, is the relational subjunct of the absence.

Now a point to be noted is that Raghunātha's explanation of '*avinābhavo vyāptiḥ*' by such words as '*sādhyasāmānādhikaraṇyam vyāptiḥ*' (Dīdhiti on Vyāptivāda, Tattvacintāmaṇi II). is not contradicatory as the same. though a relation (*apadārtha*), cannot be obtained through any other means, and hence can be expressed by words. Such an instance is similar to the expression of the effort, a relation, by the expression '*pākakṛtimān*' in '*caitraḥ pacati*'.

Cognition of relations in '*vinā vātam vṛkṣaḥ patitaḥ*'

II (ii) 71. In the cases such as 'The tree has fallen without the wind' (*vinā vātam vṛkṣaḥ patitaḥ*), the absence, i.e. the meaning expressed by the indeclinable '*vinā*', is to be related to the tree through the relation of the substratumness; and by such a relation the idea that the tree, which is qualified by the absence of wind, is obtained by means of words. However, the idea of relation of the absence of the state of being what is produced from the wind with the falling, which is established by conventional experience, is to be obtained

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by implication. Since the producedness is not to be recollected from the word, and also since the producedness is the non-occurrence-exacting relation, the absence (describing the counter-positiveness) delimited by the same producedness cannot be conveyed by the word.

In the cases such as 'He left without his son' (*putram vinā gataḥ*) etc., the word 'son' (*putra*) is intended to convey the going of the son by indication. The absence of such a going of the son expressed by the word 'without' (*vinā*) is related to the going through the relation of the state of occurring at the same time. Here the state of being the locus of the absence of the going of the son, resident at the time that constitutes the state of occurring at the same time, should be understood as not delimited by the same space (region). Consequently, there occurs no over extension (contingency of the usage '*putram vinā gataḥ*') at the time of the going of the son with the father though the absence of going of the son can occur in the region which is not the locus of the going of son.

Explanation

In '*vinā vātam vṛkṣaḥ patitaḥ*', the accusative after '*vātam*' expresses the counter-positiveness relating to the absence expressed by '*vinā*'. Therefore the cognition that the tree qualified by the absence of the wind has fallen (*vatābhāvaviśisto vṛkṣaḥ*) needs to be produced from words. However, actually one cognizes that 'the falling of the tree has the absence of the state of being produced from the wind' (*vṛkṣakartṛkam patanam vātajanya-tvābhāvavat*); and such a cognition is facilitated by implication as the absence of the state of being produced from the wind cannot be recollected from any word; and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

hence cannot be cognized from the word. Also since the producedness (*janyatva*) is not an occurrence-exacting relation, the absence of the wind describing the counter-positiveness as delimited by the producedness cannot be cognized from the word; and therefore, *vātajanyatvābhāva* is only implied in the falling.

It should be noted that since in '*putram vinā gataḥ*', the word '*putra*' conveys the going of the son (*putragamana*), the statement means that 'The father goes at the time of the absence of the going of the son' (*putragamanābhāvakāle gataḥ*). Also since here the absence of the going of the son is related to the going of the father through the state of occurring at the same time (*samānakālīkatva*), the going of the father is qualified by the absence of the going of the son through the state of occurring at the same time (*samānakali-kātvasambandhena putragamanābhāvaviśiṣṭam gamanam*); and thus, such a statement need not be made at the time of the going of the son along with his father.

Alternative theory of some

II (ii). 72. Some hold here as follows : In the said case (*putram vinā gataḥ*), only non-association is the meaning expressed by the wor p-2 d 'without' (*vinā*). And such a meaning is related to the agent of going etc. Non-association is the absence of association of the form of the agency described by such an action of going (of the son) occuring at the same time as the action of going having oneself (father) as the agent and expressed by the word uttered together.

Or only the absence of the state of occurring at the time of the action of going having oneself (the son) as the agent that relates to the action of going of the father

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is the meaning expressed by the word 'without' (*vinā*). The son etc. are related to the agency through the substratumness. And therefore the accusative case (after *putra*) is used only for the grammatical correctness. Or as an alternative, it can be admitted that the superstratumness is the meaning of the accusative. Though the locative too conveys the sense of the superstratumness, the same locative need not be applicable here. Since the locative is a *kāraka*-case, the same needs to be expressive of the sense that is related to the action. Now also since only the *śeṣa*-genitive becomes applicable, the accusative to be added on account of the nominal base, i.e. *vinā*, prevents the same. Consequently, the convention that all the cases added on account of any nominal base, are exception to the *śeṣa*-genitives also remains noncontradicted. Also, the same methodology must be adopted in explaining the meanings of the indeclinables 'excepting' (*ṛte*), and 'except' (*antareṇa*) which are synonymous to 'without' (*vinā*). Also in the cases involving the words ending in instrumental and ablative cases associated with the indeclinable 'without' (*vinā*), the same methodology must be adopted.

Explanation

Gadādhara explains now an alternative theory that is not burdended with the assumption of indication (*lakṣaṇā*) for '*putram*' in the cases such as '*putram vinā gataḥ*' etc. According to him, only non-association (*asāhitya*) relating to the agent of going is the meaning of '*vinā*'; and therefore one cognizes that the father qualified by the non-association with the son goes in such cases. Here non-association is the absence of the association of the form of the agency of going occurring at the same time as that of the action of going having

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

onself (father) as the agent (*svakartṛkagamanakriyāsamānakālīnatādṛśakriyākartṛtvābhāva*).

However, by following the convention that only an absence is the meaning of '*vinā*' everywhere, Gadādhara presents yet another alternative theory that only the absence of the state of occurring at the time of the action of going having oneself (son) as the agent relating to the action of going of the father (*kriyānvayisvakartṛkatādṛśakriyākālīnatvābhāva*) is the meaning of the indeclinable '*vinā*'. It should be noted here that since the son, i.e. the accusative-basemeaning, can be related to the agency through the superstratumness, the accusative case after '*putra*' can be admitted to be meaningless. Or if the accusative needs to be meaningful, then even the same superstratumness can be admitted to be the accusative-meaning. However, the locative, despite conveying the same superstratumness, need not be applicable with '*vinā*' as the same is a *kāraka*-case; and *kāraka*-case conveys only the sense relating to the action (here the superstratumness is related to only the agency). Also, since the superstratumness does not relate to the action, the accusative added on account of the nominal base such as *vinā* (i.e. the *upapada*-accusative) avoids the *śeṣa*-genitive (*svarvāḥ upapadavibhaktayaḥ ṣaṣṭhyapavādikāḥ*).

Usages with '*yāvat*'

II (ii). 73. Accusative is found used in association with the word "till until' (*yāvat*) expressing the sense of limit (or boundary) and total pervasion. Here the word 'till until' (*yāvat*) expressing the sense of limit (or boundary) is found used in the usages such as 'Beginning from the ninth day till the tenth day one should worship

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the daughter of the king of the mountains' (*ārabhya tasyām daśamīm tu yāvat prapūjayet parvatarājaputrīm*). Limit is the boundary of the form of the time and the space. The limitness resident in the time is found in the 'Āśvina white tenth day'; and is the state of not being the locus of the action (worshipping) uttered together and occurring in the entire stretch of time (from Āśvina black ninth day to Āśvina white ninth day) of the same class as of oneself (tenth day) which is the locus of the prior absence of oneself (the white tenth day) and not the locus of the prior absence of the black ninth day uttered together. Thus in the said case, the word 'till until' (*yāvat*) conveys the state of describing such a limitness resident in the white tenth day with respect to the action such as worshipping. From this alone the limitness is obtained in the white tenth day by implication. Here the (*pūjā*'s) state of describing the limitness resident in the white tenth day is the state of not occurring in the white tenth day while being the pervader of the group of days that are the loci of the prior absence of the black ninth day. This way a single act of the form of the sixteen worships, that have the sixteen days as their loci, can be obtained as the predicate.

Explanation

Gadādhara now sets out to explain the usages invloving the indeclinable 'till until' (*yāvat*) which expresses the limit or boundary (*maryādā*) and total pervasion (*abhividhi*). And limit is either temporal (*kālarūpa*) or spatial (*deśarūpa*). In '*ārabhya tasyām daśamīm tu yāvat prapūjayet parvatarājaputrīm*' the word '*yāvat*' expresses temporal limit. Here the temporal limit found in the white tenth day is the state of not being the locus of the action of worshipping uttered together

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

occurring in the time (beginning from 'Āśvina black ninth day to Āśvina white ninth day) of the same class as that of the tenth day which is the locus of the prior absence of the white tenth day but which is not the locus of the prior absence of the black ninth day uttered together (*samabhivyāhṛta kālaprāgabhāvānadhikaraṇa svaprāgabhāvādhikaraṇasvasajātīyayāvatkālavṛttisama-bhivyāhṛtakriyānadhikaraṇatvam*).

Here since the Āśvina black tenth day is not the locus of the action of worshipping (*kriyānadhikaraṇa*), the same is the temporal limit; and also since the indeclinable '*yāvat*' conveys the state of describing the temporal limitness of the tenth day in the action of worshipping, the cognition of the temporal limiteness in the tenth day is obtained by implication. A point to be noted here is that the worshipping is the describer of the temporal limitness of the tenth day means that the same is not occurring in the tenth day while being the pervader of the group of sixteen days (from black ninth day to white tenth day) that are the loci of the prior absence of the white tenth day but not the loci of the prior absence of the black ninth day; and therefore, the fact that only single worshipping stretching all the sixteen days is predicatged upon all the sixteen days (*vidheyatā*) becomes known.

Explanation of the pervaderness

II (ii). 74. Since the qualifier, namely the state of occurring in the time of the same class, is included in the group of pervaded days (time), the pervaderness is not harmed in the act of worshipping; and this is despite the same not possessing the state of being the pervader of the group of *daṇḍas* covered by the said two qualifi-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ers. The state of occurring in the time of the same class is intended only in the form of the dayness, i.e. the delimitor of the relatedness of the related (the sixth days). Also in the said case, only the dayness is cognized as the delimitor of the relatedness of the meaning related to the meaning expressed by the word 'till until' (*yāvat*) either on account of the fact that the word 'day' (*tithim*) is supplied or on account of the fact that the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the 'tenth day' consists of the dayness; and therefore, the *daṇḍa*-time etc., does not have the state of occurring in the time of the same class in the form of the dayness. Here the day is of the form of a particular type of continuous time; and not the collection of movements of sun conducive to the production of the degits of moon disc. For, the act of worshipping does not have the state of occurring in such movements of sun.

Explanation

It can be objected now that the worshipping (*pūjā*) is performed only in the particular times such as *daṇḍas* (mornings or evenings) etc., but not the whole day; and therefore, the worshipping cannot have the state of being the pervader (*vyāpakatā*) of the sixteen days. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the group of sixteen days, that are to be pervaded by the worshipping, is intended to be qualified by the qualifier included in the limitness, namely the state of occurring in the time of same class as the tenth day (*sajātīyatva*), in the form of the delimitor of the relatedness of the related (*anvayitāvacchedakarūpeṇa*). Here since the dayness (*tithitva*) either by being supplied (*adhyāhāra*) or by being the constituent of the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the 'tenth day'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*daśamīpadārthatāvacchedaka*) is the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum of the meaning of '*yāvat*', the intermediate times such as the *daṇḍas* etc. cannot have the state of occurring in the time of the same class in the form of the dayness; and thus, there is no harm even if the worshipping does not pervade the *daṇḍas* (it pervades only the sixteen days which have the sameness of class as the dayness). Also here the day is intended to be an indivisible time as established in Jyotiśāstra and not the collection of individual actions (sun's movements); otherwise,. the worshipping, being absent in individual actions such as the sunrise etc., could not be the pervader of the days.

Analysis of *'ārabhya...'* according to the *Naiyāyikas*

II (ii). 75. Here only the prior absence is the meaning of 'till until' (*yāvat*). The counter-positiveness or the subjectness is the meaning of the accusative and the white tenth day, i.e. the sense expressed by the accusative base, is related to such a counter-positiveness. By such a relationship, the prior absence describing the counter-positiveness of the white tenth day is obtained. Such an absence is related to the action such as the worshipping mentioned together (along) through the relation of the pervaderness qualified by the non-occurrence in its own counter-positive (tenth day). Here the pervaderness is the state of possessing the particular worshippingness which is not the delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the prior absence occurring in the (ninth) day, i.e. the locus of oneself (the prior absence of the tenth day). The state of being the locus of oneself (the prior absence of the tenth day) is through the relation of temporal qualification qualified by the mutual absence (of the black eighth day etc.) delimited

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by the prior absence of the black ninth day, i.e. the locus of oneself (prior absence of the tenth day). From this the following difficulty becomes avoided : That the mutual absence describing the counter-positiveness of the black eigth day, i.e. the locus of the prior absence of the black ninth day, is not exclusive; and therefore, suppose the mutual absence in general is included, then there would occur the unestablishedness by taking into account the state of being the locus of the prior absence of the future black ninth day. For even then, the time functioning as the locus of the prior absence of the particular white tenth day (i.e. the time of sixteen days) has the state of being the locus of the prior absence of the particular tenth day through the relation of the state of possessing the mutual absence of the eighth day delimited by the prior absence of the black ninth day which is the locus of the prior absence of the white tenth day.

Explanation

Here Gadādhara analyses the statement '*ārabhya tasyām daśamīm tu yāvat prapūjayet parvatarājaputrīm*'. According to him, the indeclinable '*yāvat*' expresses only the prior absence (*prāgabhāva*). And the accusative associated with such an indeclinable expresses the counter-positiveness (*pratiyogitva*) or the relatinal subjunctness (*anuyogitva*). Now since the accusative base-meaning such as the white tenth day is related to the counter-positveness and the same is related to the prior absence, one cognizes the prior absence as describing the counter-positiveness of the white tenth day from '*daśamīm yāvat*'. It should be noted here that such a prior absence is related to the action of worshipping only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

through the pervaderness qualified by the non-occurrence in its own counterpositive such as the white tenth day (*svapatiyogyavrttitvaviśiṣṭavyāpakata*), and thus the pervaderness appears as only the relation and not as the meaning of '*yāvat.*' in the cognition.

Here the pervaderness (*vyāpakatva*) is to be understood as the non-delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the absence of the worshipping occurring in the Āśvin-black ninth day, i.e. the locus of oneself (the prior absence of the 'Āśvina white tenth day) (*svādhikaraṇatithiniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitānavacchedaka*); and therefore the state of being the locus of oneself is to be understood only through the relation of tempora-lqualification (*kālikaviśeṣanatāsambandha*) that is qualified by the mutual absence of the balck eighth day etc. such as *kṛṣṇanavamīprāgabhāvāvacchinna* qualified by the distinction of what is delimited by the prior absence of the balck ninthday, i.e. the locus of the prior absence of the white tenth day (*svādhikaraṇakṛṣṇanavamīprāgabhāvāvacchinnabheda viśiṣṭa*); and therefore, the act of worshipping can be explained to be the pervader of the sixteen days (and not the Bhādrapada days) that alone are the loci of the prior absence of the 'Āśvina tenth day but not the loci of the prior absence of the 'Āśvina black ninth day.

Explanation of vyāpakatva

II (ii). 76. It may be objected now as follws : That this way too, the 'Āśvina black first day etc., that precedes the immediately proceeding black eighth day etc., can have the prior absence of the particular Āśvina white tenth day through the temporal qualification consisting of the mutual absence of the days delimited by the prior absence of not immediately preceding

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(Bhādrapada) black ninth day; and therefore, how can the worshipping have the state of pervading these days functioning as the loci of the prior absence of such a tenth day?

However, this objection is not correct to state. Only the mutual absence of the black eighth day etc as delimited by oneself (the prior absence of the Āśvina black eigth day) through the relation of the state of not being the locus of the prior absence of the Āśvina black ninth day but delimited by the prior absence of the Āśvina white tenth day, needs to be included in the relation of the prior absence of the Āśvina-white tenth day. Here the state of not being the delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the mutual absence resident in the locus of the prior absence of the Āśvina white tenth day is tobe understood as the mutual absence (of the skyness etc.) delilmited by the prior absence of the oneself, i.e. the Āśvina white tenth day, through therelation of the state of being such a delimitor. From this the following objection gets refuted : 'That suppose the constant absence of such a delimitorshipness delimited in general is included (in the said definition of the pervaderness), then there would occur the contingency of the unestablishedness of the pervaderness by taking into consideration the state of being the delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the absence of the worshipping resident in the locus of the prior absence of some (*śrāvaṇa*) tenth day. Therefore, to avoid such an unestablishedness, the meaning of the word 'oneself', which is of the form of the prior absence of only the particular Āśvina white tenth day, needs to be included in the relation; and consequently, there arises the lack of generalization.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation :

Even the Bhādrapada black ninth day can be the locus of the prior absence of the Āśvina white tenth day, but the prior absence of the Bhādrapada black ninth day does not occur in the Āśvina black eighth day etc; and therefore, the mutual absence of the days, delimited by the prior absence of not immediately preceding Bhādrapada black ninth day, can be admitted there in the Āśvina black eight day. Thus, the Āśvina black eighth day etc., can have the prior absence of the Āśvina white tenth day through such a temporal qualification consisting of such a mutual absence; but since the same eighth day etc. are not the loci of the act of worshipping, the same worshipping cannot have the state of pervading such a black eight day etc., that are not the loci of the prior absence of the Āśvina black ninth day but are the loci of the prior absence of the Āśvina white tenth day.

However, Gadādhara overcomes the difficulty in explaining the pervaderness on the ground that the mutual absence having the days delimited by the prior absence of the particular black ninthday as its counter-positve (*kṛṣṇanaavamīprāgabhāvāvacchinna-pratiyogikabheda*), must be included (cognized) in the relation of the prior absence of the Āśvina white tenth day (*prāgabhāvasambandha*) only through the relation of not being the locus of the prior absence of the Āśvina black ninth day delimited by the prior absence of the Āśvina white tenth day (*daśamīprāgabhāvāvacchinna kṛṣṇanvamīprāgabhāv-ānadhikaraṇatva*); And since the Āśvina black eighth day etc. cannot be claimed to be the non-locus of the prior absence of the Āśvina black ninthday as delimited by the prior absence of the Āśvina white tenth day, the act of worshipping need not pervade such a black eighth day

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

etc. by occurring there. Also, the state of not being the delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the absence resident in the locus of the prior absence of the white tenth day (*svādhikaraṇaniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitā-navacchedakatva*), that constitutes the definition of the pervaderness (*vyāpakatva*), must be admitted to involve only the mutual absence (*bheda*) such as '*pūjātvam svādhikaraṇa niṣṭhābhāvāpratiyogitāvacchedakam na*' but not the constant absence such as '*pūjātve sāvadhikaraṇa niṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatvam nāsti*'. And such a mutual absence is acutally only the mutual absence of the days delimited by the prior absence of the Āśvina white tenth day (*daśamīprāgabhāvāvacchina*), through the relation of the state of being the delimitor of the counter-positiveness described by the absence resident in the locus of the prior absence of the Āśvina white tenth day; and since the worshipping is present in the sixteen days (Āśvina black ninth day to Āśvina white tenth day), the same worshipping can be the pervader.

Limit of Space (region) (*deśarūpā sīmā*)

II (ii). 77. The limit of the form of space (region) is found in usages such as 'He travels from Kaśī to Kauśīkī' (*kāśītah kauśīkīm yāvāt yati*) etc. In such cases, Kauśīkī is cognized to be the limit of travelling. And such a limitness is the state of not being the locus of going that pervades the region from the east of Kaśī to the west of Kauśīkī. The word 'till until' (*yāvat*) conveys the state of being the pervader of the region beginning from the east of Kaśī to the west of the Kauśīkī, while not being the locus of Kauśīkī, with respect to the act of going. Here the accusative-meaning, i.e., the boundaryness or the state of possessing the boundary is to be related to the east of Kaśī etc., and the conclusion

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as to what is the verbal cognition must be postulated like in the earlier case by scholars on their own.

Explanation

After explaining the usage involving '*yāvat*' expressing the limit or boundary of the form of time, Gadādhara now examines the usage involving '*yāvat*' expressing limit or boundary of the form of space (*deśarūpā*). According to him, since in '*kāśītah kauśikīm yāvat yāti*, the agent goes from the east of kāśī to the west of Kauśikī, the limitness of Kauśikī is the state of not being the locus of the going pervading the east of kaśī to the west of Kauśikī. And the word '*yāvat*' expressing the limit of space conveys the state of being the pervader of the region of east of Kaśī to the west of Kauśikī (*kāśīpūrvakauśikīpascimadeśavyāpakatva*). Also according to the Prācyas and the Navyas, the accusative in association with '*yāvat*' conveys the limitness or the boundaryness (*avadhitva*) and the state of possessing the limit or boundary (*avadhimattva*) respectively. Thus one cognizes in such usages that one is the agent of going that pervades the region from the east of kāśī to the west of Kauśikī.

Usages with '*Yāvat*' expressing abhividhi

II (ii). 78. The word '*yāvat*' expressing the complete pervasion (*abhividhi*) is found in the usages such as 'The winter lasts beginning from the month of Kārtīka to the month of Caitra' (*kārtīkam ārabhya caitram yāvat śītam bhavati*) and 'The rain god has showered from Kāśī to Pataliputra' (*kaśītaḥ pāṭalīputram yāvad vṛṣṭo devaḥ*). The complete pervasion means the pervasion stretching up to that. Thus, in the first instance, the word '*yāvat*' conveys the state of pervading the time that follows immediately

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the time preceding Kārtīka (i.e. the beginning from the kārtīka) to the time that preceds the immediately following time of Caitra (i.e. the end of the Caitra) as qualified by the non-occurrence in the time following the Catira with respect to the winter-season. Whereas in the second instance, the same word conveys the state of pervading the region (that is east of the west of Kāśī (i.e. beginning from Kāśī) to the region that is west of the east of Paṭaliputra (i.e. the end of Pāṭaliputra) as qualified by the non-occurrence in the region that is east of Pataliputra with respect to the rainy season. The remaining aspects are to be understood as explained before. Also, in the case of usages involving the word '*āṅ*' synonymous with 'till until' (*yāvat*), the same said methodology must be understood (followed). However, in association with such an '*āṅ*' word, even the ablative is grammatically correct.

Explanation

After explaining the usages involving the word '*yāvat*' expressing '*maryādā*', Gadādhara now explains the usages involving the word '*yāvat*' expressing complete pervasion (*abhividhi*). According to him, *abhividhi* is the pervasion stretching upto the end of limit (*tatparyantā-bhivyāpti*). Thus, in '*kārtīkam ārabhya caitram yāvat śītam bhavati*' and '*kaśītaḥ pāṭalīputram yāvad vṛṣṭo devaḥ*', the indeclinable word '*yāvat*' conveys the state of pervading the time beginning from the Kārtika to the end of the Caitra-time (*kārtīkapūrvakālottaracaitro-ttarakālapūrvakālavyāpakatva*) and the state of pervading the region beginning from the Kāśī to the end of the Pāṭalīputra-region (*kāśīpaścimadeśa pūrvapāṭalīputra pūrvadeśa paschimadeśavyāpakatva*) in the winter season

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*śītabhavana*) and the rainy season (*vṛṣṭi*) respectively. It should be noted here that even '*abhividhi*' is of two types as *kālarūpa* as in the first instance and '*deśarūpa*' as in the second instance; and like '*yāvat*' expressing *maryādā*, the word '*yāvat*' expressing *abhividhi* too conveys only the pervaderness (*vyāpakatva*) and hence does not differ in its sense.

Usages with karmapravacanīya *'anu'*

II (ii). 79. In the usage involving adnominals '*anu*' etc. such as 'It rained following the sacrifice' (*yajñam anu prāvarṣat*), the casualty of the form of the *kāraka*-relation is the meaning expressed by the adnominal '*anu*'. In the rule prescribing the adnominal designation for '*anu*' namely 'The adnominal '*anu*' is used in the sense of sign' (*anur lakṣaṇe* P. i.4.84), the word 'sign' (*lakṣ aṇa*) is intended to convey the *kāraka*-cause. The meaning of accusative (*yajñam*), namely the superstratumness, having relation with sacrifice, is related to such a causality. And the causality is related to the rain through the relation of describing. Or, as an alternative, the producedness is the meaning of the adnomial '*anu*'. The accusative meaning, namely the describedness; having the relation with the sacrifice, is related to such a producedness; and the producedness is related further to the train through the relation of the substratumness.

Also in the usages involving '*anu*' such as 'The wariors are inferior to Arjuna' (*anvarjunam yoddhārah*), the inferiority of the form of the lower rank is the meaning of the adnominal '*anu*'. And the state of having Arjuna as the limit is the meaning expressed by the accusative (*arjunam*) and the same is related to the lower

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

rank. Although the limitness is of the form of being the ablation (the point of receding), the contingency of the ablative case is avoided on the ground that the same is not related to the action. In the cases such as 'He is taller than this one' (*asmād ayam dīrghaḥ*)' the ablative is explained after the world expressing limit, only by supplying the verb expressing 'being' (*bhavati*). Thus the convention that *upapadavibhaktis* (cases added due to nouus) are exceptions to the genitive also gets established.

Explanation

Gadādhara now sets out to analyse the meaning of the adnominal (*karmapravacanīya*)'*anu*' and the meaning of the accusative in the usages associated with such an'*anu*'. According to him, the term '*anu*' in the rule '*anur lakṣaṇe*'(P.i.ii.84) is used in the sense of the sign (*lakṣaṇe*) or that which functions as the cause (*hetu*) and hence the same conveys the causlity (*hetutva*).And the accusative in association with such '*anu*' conveys the superstratumness. Thus one cognizes that the rain describes the causality of the rain found in the sacrifice from '*yajñam anu prāvarṣat*'. Or as an alternative '*anu* can be admitted to express the producedness (*janyatva*) and the accusative expresses the describedness (*nirūpitatva*) ; and hence one cognizes that the rain has the producednees described by the sacrifice.

However, in the examples as '*anvarjunam yoddhāraḥ*', the adnominal '*anu*' expresses the inferiority (*hinatva*) such as the lower rank (*apakarṣa*) and the accusative expresses the state of having Arjuna as the limit (*arjunāvadhikatva*); and hence one cognizes that the warriors have the lower rank which has Arjuna as its limit. A point to be noted here is that the limitness

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*avadhitva*) of Arjuna is certainly being ablation (*apādānata*); however, the *kāraka*-ablative cannot be imposed after the word '*arjuna*' as only where the meaning expressed by the ablative can be related to the action, *kārada*-ablative is used and the state of having Arjuna as its limit is not related to the action (it is related to only the lower rank).

Uasges with adnominal *'prati'* etc.

II (ii).80. In the usages such as 'The lightening illuminates over the tree' (*vṛkṣam prati vidyotate vidyut*), 'He is nice towards his mother' (*mātaram prati sādhuḥ*) 'Whatever (share) is to me' (*yo mām prati syāt*), and '*Rain sprinkles* (waters) over each and every tree' (*vṛkṣ am prati siñcati),* etc., the words such as '*prati'* etc. are prescribed the designation of adnominal (*karmapra-vacanīya)* by the rule (*lakṣaṇethambhūtākhyāna...'* P. i. 4. 90*)*. Here in the first instance, the state of being the sign of the form of being what is to be indicated is the meaning of the adnominal '*praṭi'*. Since the knowledge of the illumanation of the lightening is produced by the illumination of the tree, the same tree has the state of being the indicator; and the meaning of the accusative is either the superstratumness or the describedness. In the second instance the niceness means acting or serving favourably; and the relation of being the servant relating to the action of serving constituting the niceness is the meaning of the admoninal; whereas the adjunctness relating to the relation of being the servant or the state of describing such a relation is the meaning of the accusative. In the third instance, the share means the abode of one's ownership and the same is the meaning of the adnominal '*prati';* and the relation of ownership relating to the share is the accusative meaning. Thus,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the cognition is that the share that belongs to me should be given. In the fourth instance, the accusative is used only in the sense of the object, and the fruit of making the adnominal designation for *prati* is only the prevention of the retroflexion (*ṣatva)*; and the adnominal '*prati*' is meaningless; whereas the pervaderness is to be obtained on account of the repetition of the word (*prati)* twice like in the case of the usage 'The horses are found in each and every house' (*gṛhe gṛhe, śvāḥ*). On the other hand, suppose the adnominal word '*prati*' itself is held to be expressive of the pervaderness, then the same being already expressed, the repetition itself would become untenable like in the case of the usage such as 'The horses pervade the house' (*gṛham vyāpnuvate' śvāḥ)*.

Explanation

Gaḍādhara now sets out to ecplain the uses with '*prati*' etc. that are assigned the adnominal designation (*karmapravacanīya)* by the rule '*lakṣaṇa...*' (P.i.4.90). When the rule (P. i.4.90) assigns adnominal designation for '*prati*' etc. in the sense of sign (*lakṣaṇa)* etc., the rule *karmapravacanīyayukte* (p.1...) assigns the accusative. In '*vṛkṣam prati vidoyotate vidyut'*, the lightening is inferred by the illumination of the tree; and hence the adnominal '*prati*' expresses the state of being the sign (*lakṣaṇa)* of the form of being the indicator (*paricāyakatva)* of the tree. And thus, one cognizes in such a case that the lightening has the act of illumanating, that is the abode of the indicatedness described by the indicatorness of the tree. In '*mātaram prati sādhuḥ*', the son is nice means he acts or serves the mother favourably, and hence the adnominal '*prati*' expresses the relation of being the servant relating to the action of serving. And thus one cognizes that one is the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

abode of the relation of being the servant that has the monther as its relational adjunct. In '*yo mām prati syāt*', one is the owner of share means one has the share, i.e. is the abode of ownership; and hence the adnominal '*prati*' expresses the share, i.e. the abode of ownership, in the object of giving. In '*vṛkṣam vṛkṣam prati siñcati*', the pervaderness is obtained by the repetition of '*vṛkṣ am*' and the adnominal '*prati*', though prevents *ṣatva in 'sincati*', is meaningless (*nirarthaka)*; and hence one cognizes that one is the agent of sprinkling (watering) that describes the objecthood of all the trees.

Refutation of the objection that '*prati*' is meaningful.

II (ii). 81. It may be objected now as follows: That the adnominal '*prati*' is assumed (admitted) to be expressive of the pervaderness in 'He studies every day' (*pratidiam adhīte*); whereas the repetition is assumed (admitted) to be expressive of the pervaderness in 'He sprinkles (waters) for each and every tree' (*vṛkṣam vṛkṣ am prati siñcati);* and therefore, in the present case both '*prati*' and repetition cannot be avoided from being considered as expressive of the pervaderness due to the convention that in the assembly of two meaningful words, when both can be held to be meaningful, no one can be held to be meaningless.

However, this objection is not correct to state. In the case of the usage, 'He studies every month' (*pratimāsam adhīte),* the case ending that is other than the nominative is grammatically incorrect in the indeclinable compound; and therefore, the adnominal '*prati*' needs to convey the pervaderness as related to the month with respect to the action of studying and the nominative case is used only for the grammatical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

correctness. However, in the case of 'He sprinkles (waters) for each and every tree' (*vṛkṣam prarti siñcati)*, the adnominal *'prati'* cannot convey the pervaderness, which is related as a qualification of an item to something which is obtained as the qualifier to the tree, qualified by the objecthood, i.e. the accusative -meaning, with respect to the action of sprinkling (watering); for, there occurs contradiction to the established convention of qualification in the case of the qualifier relating with respect to something else. Also, since the relation of the objecthood itself needs to be admitted as the constituent of the qualification of the pervaderness with respect to the tree, the same, being non-occurrence exacting, cannot be the constituent delimiting relation of the absence of the pervaderness in negatives. Also it is not justified that the adnominal *'prati'* expresses the pervaderness, as consisting of the relation of the substratumness, with respect to the objecthood described by the sprinkling (watering). The item that is other than the meaning of the negative particle cannot appear between the meaning of the base (tree) and the meaning of the case (objecthood) as it is against the semantic convention. In the cases of usages such as 'Because of the non-origination of the others (desire, and enemity) for the non-stupified (*nāmūḍhasyetarotpatteḥ) (Nyāyasūtra,* iv. 1.2.) and 'Because of the non-origination of the sprout without destroying seed' (*nānupamṛdya prādurbhāvāt)*, only the meaning of the negative is cognized to be related as the qualifier with respect to the causality, i.e. the ablative case-meanings. Thus, the adnominal *'prati'* is only meaningless. Also in the cognition of the pervaderness obtained from the repetition, the pervaderness of the tree is related to the objecthood

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

described by the sprinkling (watering) only as a relation on account the speaker's intention.

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection now that the adnominal '*prati*' cannot be held to be meaningless (*nirarthaka)*. According to him, the adnominal '*prati*' and the repetition which are found to be meaningful in '*pratidinam adhīte*' and '*vṛkṣam vṛkṣam siñcati*' need to be held to be meaningful as the convention that when the two meaningful words are used together in association with each other, no one can be meaningless stipulates meaningfulness for both words.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the adnominal *prati* needs to be admitted as expressive of the pervaderness in '*pratimāsam (dinam) adhīte*' etc. due to the fact that the nominative used after the *avyayībhāva* compound *pratimāsam (dinam)* cannot express the prevaderness (it is used only for grammatical coorectness); however, the same adnominal '*prati*' need not be admitted to be expressive of the the pervaderness in '*vṛkṣam vṛkṣam prati siñcati*' as the repetition (*vīpsā)* can very well express the same. Also, even when the same '*prati*' is admitted to be expressive of the pervaderness, the same '*prati*' needs to express the pervaderness, i.e. the qualifier to the tree as the qualifier to the action of sprinkling (*seka);* and thus the rule that an item recollected as the qualifier to some thing cannot be related to some thing else as the qualifier (*ekatra viśeṣaṇatyopasthitasya nānyatra veśeṣaṇatvam)* becomes contradicted. Moreover, it should be noted that in *nāmūḍhasyetarotpattaḥ* (Nyāyasūtra, iv. 1.2.) etc., the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meaning expressed by the negative particle, which functions as the qualificand of the ablative base-meaning, i.e. the origination, is cognized to be relating to the ablative case-meeaning, i.e. the causality, as the qualifier; and therefore, nothing excepting the meaning of the negative, which is obtained as the qualificand of the base-meaning, can be cognized to be related to the case-meaning as the qualifier. Thus the pervaderness, expressed by adnominal '*prati*' as the qualificand of the tree (the base-meaning), cannot be cognized to be relating to the objecthood (the case meaning) described by the sprikling (watering) as the qualifier. Therefore, '*prati*' must be admitted to be meaningless in '*vṛkṣam vṛkṣam prati siñcati*'.

Alternative theory

II (ii). 82. However, suppose in the usages such as 'He sprinkles (waters) over the tree' (*vṛkṣam prati ciñcati)* etc., the adnominal preposition '*prati*' has distinct denoted or suggested sense (of the objecthood), then the same could be admited to be the sense expressed by the adnominal '*prati*' here as well. Therefore, the usege of the adnominal '*prati*' here, like that of the adnominal '*prati*' there, is not meaningless. As a matter of fact, it should be noted that lack any purpose can be overcome in the usages with the adnominal '*prati*' (*ṣatvabādha* can be the purpose) like in the case of the usages with the meaningless adnominals such as '*pari*' (*nighātabādha* can be the purpose).

Also, in the case where the adnominal '*prati*' expresses the pervaderness as its meaning, only the *avyayībhāva*-compound such as 'He sprinkles every tree' (*prativṛkṣam siñcati)* is ruled (established). Since the rule

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

assigning the *avyayībhāva*-compound (*avyayam vibhakati......P..)* for the indeclinables having the same sense as the repetition is not read in the section involving options, the same becomes compulasory. Thus, with the intention of repetition (i.e. with the intention of expressing the pervaderness), the usage 'He sprinkles over the tree' *vṛkṣam prati siñcati*) is not tenable unlike the usage 'He sprinkles over each and every tree' *(prativṛkṣ am or vṛkṣam vṛkṣam prati siñcati)*. Also, in all the cases where an *avyavībhāva*-compound is found with the indeclinable word expressing the sense of pervaderness, only the nominative case is used after such an *avyayībhāva*-compound. However, unlike the locative usage such as 'He goes near the pot' (*upakumbhe gacchati),* the locative usage such as 'The horses are in each and every house' (*pratigṛhe' śvāḥ*) cannot be tenable. By the said reasoning (that an item obtained as the qualifier to some-thing cannot be related to some thing else as the qualifier, c.f. II (ii) 81), the adnominal '*prati'* in such cases cannot convey the state of being the pervader of the house to the horses etc. Also supposing the meaning of the *avyayībhāva*-compound, namely the state of being the pervader of the houses, is related to the locative-meaning such as the state of being the abode of the horses through the substratumness, or supposing the meaning of the same compound, namely, the state of being the pervader of the house, i.e. the property-possessor, is related to the state of being the abode of the horses through the identity, then the convention that the base-meaning is not related to the locative case-meaning such as the state of being the abode through the substratumness or the identity, to be assumed to avoid the incorrect statements such as 'The pot occurs in the provability' (*meyatve' ghaṭaḥ)*, and 'The

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

pot occurs in the occurrence of the pot' (*ghatavṛttau ghaṭaḥ)*, would become contradicated.

In the usages such as 'Keep it near the pot' (*upakumbhe nidhehi)*, 'He has come from near the pot (*upakumbhād* āgataḥ), and 'It is done by the one near the pot' (*upakumbhena kṛtaḥ)* etc., there occurs no contradiction to convention if near the pot etc., which are intended to be the base-meanings, are cognized to be related to the case-meanings such as the substratumness (abodeness) i.e. the ablation and the agency through the relation of the superstratumness, or if the same near the pot etc. are cognized to be related to the superstratumness (occurring in the substratumness etc.) through the relation of the describedness. Thus, one may ponder over that such locative and other usages are tenable.

Explanation

Gadādhara now establishes an alternative theory that the adnominal '*prati*' can be admitted to be meaningful. According to him, if the objecthood (*karmatva)* is the meaning of '*prati*' in the case of '*vṛkṣam prati siñcati*', then in the case of '*vṛkṣam vṛkṣam prati siñcati*' too, the same can be admitted to convey the same objecthood.

However, Gadādhara's own position is as follows : That the meaningless admominals such as '*adhi*' in '*kuto' adhyāgacchati* etc., are explained to prevent *nighāta;* similarly the meaningless adnominal '*prati*' in '*vṛkṣam vṛkṣam prati siñcati*' too can be explained to prevent '*ṣatva*'. Thus the same need not be meaningful. A point to be noted here is that if the adnominal '*prati*' is held to be meaningful and expresses repetition (*vīpsā)*, i.e. the pervaderness (*vyāpakatā);* then the *avyayībhāva-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

compound '*prativṛkṣam*' becomes compulsory as the rule *avyayam vibhakti* (P...) assigns the '*avyayībhāva*-compound in the sense of the *vīpsā* or the *vyāpakatā* without option. Thus, when the *vīpsā* or the *vyāpakatva* is intended to be denoted by '*prati*', the usage '*vṛkṣam prati siñcati*' is not possible (only '*prativṛkṣam* or *vṛkṣam vṛkṣam prati siñcati*' is possible). Also, another point to be noted here is that, when an *avyayībhāva*-compound such as '*pratigṛham*' is formed with the indeclinable '*prati*' expressing the *vyāpakatā*, the compound takes only the nominative case for grammatical correctness but not the locative, as then the pervaderness expressed by the same locative as the qualifier to the house through the describing would be needed to be related to the horses as the qualifier; and thus would contradict the semantic convention that an item obtained as the qualifier to something cannot be related to some thing else as the qualifier. Also yet another point to be noted here is that since the superstratumness described by the near the pot (*kumbhasamīpādheyatā*) is present in the substratumness (*ādhāratva*), the base-meaning such as the near the pot (*kumbhasamīpa*) can be related to the case-meanings such as the substratumness (*ādhāratva*), the ablation (*apādānatva*) and the agency (*kartṛtva*) through the superstratumness; or the same near the pot can be related to the superstratumness occurrent in the substratumness, the ablation and the agency through the describing; and therefore, the locative, the ablative and the instrumental usages such as '*upakumbhe nidhehi*', '*upakumbhād āgataḥ*' and '*upakumbhena kṛtaḥ*' are tenable.

Usages with '*antarā*' etc.

II (ii) 83. In 'Hari stands in between you and me'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(tvām ca mām ca antarā hariḥ) etc., the accusative, assigned by the rule' 'Accusative is used in association with *'antrarā'* and *'antareṇa'* (P. ii. 3. 4.), expresses the describedness as its meaning. And such a meaning is related to the middleness, i.e. the delimiting property of the state of being the expressed meaning of the word *'antarā'.* Thus, this way the accusative-meaning must be distingushed in other cases by scholars on their own in the said direction.

Thus ends the second part of the analysis of the accusative-meaning.

Explanation

The rule *'antarāntareṇa yukte'* (P. ii. 3. 4) assigns the accusative after the words associated with *'antarā'* and *'antareṇa'*. And in *'tvāın ca mām ca antarā hariḥ'*, the descirbedness *(nirūpitatva)* expressed by the accusative is related to the middleness *(madhyatva)*. Thus one cognizes that Hari is qualified by the middleness described by both you and me. Also, in *'antareṇa harismaraṇam na sukham'*, the counter-positiveness *(pratiyogitva)* expressed by the accusative is related to the absence. Thus, one cognizes that the absence of the happiness (comfort) is caused by the absence of the remembering of Hari.

This concludes the second part of the analysis of the accusative-meaning in the Vyutpattivāda.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER III

THE INSTRUMENTLAL-MEANING

Meaning of the instrumental and Definition of the agency (*kartṛtva)*

III. 1. The instrumental *kāraka*-case expresses the agency and the instrumentality relating to the action as its meanings. For, the rule is that the instrumental case is used in the sense of both the agent and the instrument (P.ii. 3. 18). The primary agency, however, is only the effort conducive to the action. And in the active usage associated with the active ending such as 'Caitra cooks' *(caitraḥ pacati)* etc., such an agency is conveyed by the active ending as the qualificand of the action. However, in the passive and the impersonal usages such as 'The rice is cooked by Caitra' (*caitraṇa pacyate taṇḍulaḥ)* and 'It is slept by Caitra' *(caitreṇa śayyate)*, the same is conveyed by the instrumental as the qualifier of the action.

Explanation

After explaining the meanings of the nominative and the accusative cases which are probably the toughest of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

all the *kāraka*-cases, Gadādhara sets out to explain the meanings of the instrumental (third) case. Since Pāṇini has assigned the agency *(kartṛtva)* and the instrumentality *(karaṇatva)* (*kartṛkaraṇayoḥ tṛtiyā,* P. ii. 3. 18), to the instrumental, the same are the meanings of the instrumental. It should be noted here that the primary agency *(mukhyakartṛtva)* is the effort conducive to the action such as the cooking *(kriyānukūlakṛti)*, and therefore, the instrumental expresses the agency means it expresses the effort. However, since the cognition produced in the active statement such as '*caitraḥ pacati*' is that Caitra is the abode of the effort conducive to the action of cooking *(pākānukūlakṛtimān)*, and that produced in the passive statement such as '*caitteṇa pacyate taṇḍulaḥ*' is that the rice is the abode of the softening produced by the action of cooking in turn produced by the effort (*kṛtijanyapākajanyaviklittyāśrayaḥ*), the active conjugational ending *(ākhyāta)* and the instrumental case *(tṛtīyā)* are held to express the effort as the qualificand and as the qualifier in the active and the passive statements respectively.

Refutation of *alternative theory*

III. 2. Some hold alternatively here as follows : That in the passive and the impersonal statements too, the effort is only the meaning of the conjugational ending. And the superstratumness can be the meaning of the instrumental. And such a superstratumness is to be related to the effort expressed by the conjugational ending as the qualifier. Also the effort is to be related to the action as the qualifier. In the cognition of the effort as the qualifier to the action, the knowledge of the association of the conjugational ending such as *ātmane-pada* with the passive '*yak*' affix is the required

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cause. For, in the active usages such as 'He cooks' (*'pacati'*, *'pacate'*) etc., the effort is not cognized so as the qualifier to the action. Since in the passive usages such as 'It is known by Caitra' (*caitreṇa jñāyate)* and 'It is gone to by Caitra' (*gamyate)* etc., the instumental is assumed to be expressive of the superstratumness, such an assumption of expression is not additional.

However, the alternative theory is not correct. In the *kṛdanta*-usages without conjugational endings such as 'It is cooked by Caitra' *(caitreṇa pakvam)* etc., the instrumental needs to be admitted as expressing the sense of the effort. In such cases the conjugational ending expressing the sense of the effort is not present. Since the primary *kṛt*-affix is admitted to be expressive of the agent and the object, the same cannot be expressive of the effort.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains an alternative theory of instrumental meaning *(tṛtīyārtha)* to refute it finally. According to the alternative theory, the effort (*kṛti*) can be admitted to be the meaning of the conjugational ending everywhere; i.e. in active, passive and impersonal usages; whereas the superstratumness *(ādheyatā)* can be admitted to be the meaning of the instrumental. Since the cognition produced in the passive usage '*caitreṇa pacyate taṇḍulaḥ*' is that the rice is the abode of the softening produced by the action of cooking produced in turn by the effort, occurrent in Caitra (*caitravṛttikṛti-janyavyāpārajanya viklittyāśrayaḥ),* the superstratumness is the qualifier to the effort. A point to be noted here is that there occures no haeviness in the assuption that the instrumental expresses the superstratumness as the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

same needs to be assumed to express the same in '*caitreṇa jñāyate*' etc any why in accordance with the cognition that the knowledge is occurrent in Caitra (*caitravṛttir jñānam*).

However, Gadādhara refutes the alternative theory on the ground that in the primary *kṛdanta*-usages such as '*caitreṇa pakvam*' etc., where no conjugational endings are found used, and the primary (*kṛt*) affixes are assigned only in the sense of the agent or the object, the effort cannot be expressed except by the instrumental; and hence the same instrumental must be admitted to be expressive of the effort.

Instrumental must express the effort

III. 3. It may be stated now as follows : That the primary active affix '*kṛt*' assigned in the sense of the agent must be admited to have the expressive power only in the effort and not in the agent as qualified by the effort; and since in 'He is the knower' (*jñātā*) etc., the '*kṛt*' is assumed to be expressive of the sense of the substratumness, the sense of the agent can be obtained by merely relating the agency to the abode (substratum). However, even then the state of expressing the sense of the effort is quite uncalled for the passive '*kṛt*' (in *pakvam* etc.,). Though the said '*kṛt*' affix has the state of expressing the sense of the agent in some cases ('*paktā*' etc.), the 'kṛt'-affixes do not have the state of expressing the effort in 'The rice is to be cookied by Caitra' (*caitreṇa pācyaḥ*), 'The rice is difficult to be cooked by Caitra' (*duṣpacaḥ caitreṇaodanaḥ*) and 'The cooking of the rice is done by Caitra' (*caitreṇo danasya pākaḥ*); and therefore, in accordance with the cognition of the effort (in '*caitreṇa pācyaḥ*' etc.), the instrumental

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

must necessarily be admitted to be expressive of the effort. Thus, in 'It is cooked by Caitra' (*caitreṇa pacyate)* etc. too, the effort must be admitted to be conveyed only by the instrumental. Since the verbal cognition can be explained there even by holding that the superstratumness appears as the relation of Caitra with the effort, the admittance of the cognition of the superstratumness as the qualifier with respect to the effort is not justified. In that case, even the relation of the superstratumness would be required to be assumed as the object of cognition and the same would cause an additional burden. Also, the heaviness would occur due to the inclusion of the recollection of the additional item (superstratumness) in the totality of causes of verbal cognition consisting of the knowledge of such a sentence.

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection now that although the passive *kṛt*-affix in *caitreṇa pakvam* etc. does not express the effort *(kṛti),* the active *kṛt-* affix must express the effort for achieving economy (when the same is admitted to express the agent qualified by the effort *(viśiṣṭa).* the heaviness occurs due to the fact that the effort differs in different cases). Thus the Pūrvapakṣ in holds that the instrumental should be admitted to express only the superstratumness. Also according to him, in '*jñātā'* etc., the agent is obtained by relating the effort, i.e. one of the two meanings of *kṛt,* to the abode (of knowledge), i.e. the second of the two meanings of *kṛt* (here the cognition produced is that one is the abode of the knowledge, *jñānāśrayaḥ)* However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the *karmakṛt-* affixes in '*caitreṇa kṛtam'* etc. cannot express the effort *(kṛti)*; and hence only the instrumentals in such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cases need to be admitted as expressive of the effort. According to him, in statements such as '*caitreṇa pācyaḥ*' etc., the *kṛt* -affixes do not express the effort; however, since one cognizes the effort in such cases, the instrumentals need to be admitted as expressive of the effort due the lack of other alternatives. Thus, Gadādhara establishes that the instrumental must be admitted to be expressive of the effort even in the passives such as '*caitreṇa pacyate*' etc. A point to be noted here is that when an item can appear as the relation, the same is not justified in being considered as the referent-qualifier; and hence when the superstratumness can appear as the relation of Caitra with the effort, the same is not justified in being considered as the meaning and hence the referent -qualifier of the effort.

The Pūrvapakṣin's objection that the effort cannot be the meaning of the instrumental

III. 4. Now it is objected as follows : When the effort is admitted to be the meaning of the instrumental there (in '*caitreṇa pacyate*' etc), it would become necessary to admiṭ that the absence of the effort of Maitra expressed by the instrumental word is related to the cooking in the passive negative statementts such as 'It is cooked by Caitra but not by Maitra' *(caitreṇa pacyate na maitreṇa)* etc. However, since the absence of such an effort as delimited by the relations of the inherence is possible even with reference to the cooking having Maitra as its agent, the overextension becomes unavoidable. Also since the producedness is not an occurrence-exacting relation, the absence of the effort as delimited by the producedness cannot be established at all. Moreover, cognition of the absence of the objecthood described by the cooking that has Maitra as the agent

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

would become impossible to explain in the object such as the rice in the case of the non-association of the accusative words expressive of the objects. On the other hand, if the superstratumness is admitted to be the meaning of the instrumental, then only the cognition of the relation of the absence of the superstratumness can be admitted with respect to the effort.

Explanation

Now the Pūr̥vapakṣin raises an objection. According to him, even when the effort (*kṛti*) is admitted to be the meaning of the instrumental case, the absence of the effort of Maitra (*maitrīyakṛti*) needs to be related to the cooking in the passive negatives '*caitreṇa pacyate na maitreṇa*' etc.; however, since the effort occurs only in the self through the inherence, the absence of the same can be related to (present in) even the cooking having Maitra as its agent (*maitrakartṛkapāka*). And thus the passive negative usage '*maitreṇa na pacyate*' would become necessary even while Maitra cooks. Also, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the suggestion that in such cases, the absence of the effort of Maitra can be related to the cooking that has Caitra as its agent (*caitrakartṛka pāka*) through the producednes (*janyatā*) on the ground that the same is not an occurrence- exacting relation (*vṛtty-aniyāmaka*). Further he refutes the suggestion that only the absence of the objecthood described by the cooking having Maitra as the agent (*maitrakartṛkapākakarmatva*) is related to the object such as the rice through the substratumness there on the ground that the cognition of the same would become untenable in the cases not involving the accussative words such as '*odanam*' expressing the objects such as rice.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Siddhāntin's argument that instrumental cannot express the superstratumness

III. 5. It may be argued now as follows : That in that case where the cooking is produced by both the agents, i.e. Caitra and Maitra, the negative statement 'It is not cooked by Maitra' (*maitreṇa na pacyate)* would become contingent as the absence of the occurrence in Maitra can be present in, i.e. related to the effort producing the cooking belonging to Caitra.

However, this argument is not correct to state. In the negative statement such as 'It is not cooked by Maitra' (*maitreṇa na pacyate),* the absence of the occurrence in Maitra should be cognized to be related to the efforts in general, as delimited by the effortness, which are conducive to the cooking in the present time; however, in the said case (of cooking having both Caitra and Maitra as its agents), only the occurrence in Maitra can be present in (i.e. related to) some effort of Maitra having the community of locus with the effortness; and therefore, such a negative statement 'It will be cooked, it has been cooked, but not being cooked now by Caitra' *(caitreṇa pakṣyate apācyata, na tu pacyate)* is facilitated. Also since only a particular action (such as going) is being produced by Maitra, through his effort, the statement 'It is not cooked by Maitra' (*maitreṇa na pacyate)* is facilitated when Maitra does not cook but does (undertake) some other action.

Explanation

Now the Siddhāntin raises an argument. According to him, when the superstratumness is the meaning of the instrumental, the absence of the occurrence in Maitra (*maitravṛttitvābhāva)* needs to be related to the effort in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the negative statement '*maitreṇa na pacyate'*; However, since the absence of the occurrence in Maitra can be related to the effort of Caitra in the case of cooking by both Caitra and Maitra, the negative usage '*maitreṇa na pacyate*' could become necessary even at the time of cooking by Caitra and Maitra togther.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument on the ground that in '*maitreṇa na pacyate*', the absence of the occurrence in Maitra needs to be related to only the effort in gėneral as delimited by the effortness (*pākānukūlakṛtitvāvacchedena)* that belongs to the present time; and since when both Caitra and Maitra cook, only the occurrence in Maitra is present in the effort having the community of locus with the effortness and being conducive to the cooking (*tādṛśakṛtitvasāmānādhikaraṇyena),* the absence of the occurrence in Maitra cannot be related to such an effort in general. A point to be noted here is that the effort (*kṛti)* is qualified as belonging to the present time (tense) (*vartamānatva);* and therefore, the usage '*caitreṇa pakṣyate apācyata na tu pacyate*' becomes possible to be explained on the ground that the absence of the occurrence in Caitra can be related to only the effort conducive to the cooking at the present time (*vartamāna pākānukūlakṛti)* but not to the effort conducive to the cooking in the past or future times (*bhūtabhaviṣyatpākānukūlakṛti)* (only the occurrence in Caitra is present there at those times).

The Siddhātin's Second argument

III. 6. Now, it may again be argued as follows : That the conjugational ending (in '*maitreṇa na pacyate')* conveys only the present time as the qualifier to the effort; and since the state of being the effort, as qualified

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by the particular present time, is the delimitor of the relatedness of relation, the negative can convey the absence of the occurrence in Maitra only as relating to the effort as delimited by such a state of being the effort, and not as relating to the effort as delimited by the state of bieng the effort in general qualified by both the particular action and the time. Since in the case of the passive statement, with the passive conjugational ending, the action (of cooking etc.) does not have the state of being the qualifier to the effort, the property such as the state of being the effort qualified by such an action of cooking cannot have the state of being the delimitor of the relatedness.

However, this argument too is not correct to state. Though the property of (i.e. the state of being) the effort qualified by the particular action such as the cooking is not the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum, the relation of the qualification, qualified by the community of locus with such a state of being the effort delimited by the action, can be admitted to appear as the relation of the absence; and therefore, such a negative statement is possible to be explained.

Explanation

Now the Siddhāntin raises another argument. According to him, the negative statement '*maitreṇa na pacyate*' becomes impossible to explain when the superstratumness is held to be the instrumental meaning. The passive conjugational ending '*te*' expresses only the particular (present) time as the qualifier to the effort (*kṛtiviśeṣaṇatayā*); and therefore, when the absence of the occurrence in Maitra is related to the effort, only the state of being the effort qualified by the present time

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*kālaviśeṣitakṛtitva*), but not the same state of being the effort qualified by both the particular time and the action of cooking (*kālakriyobhaya viśeṣita*), can appear as the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum (*anvayitāvacchedaka*). Further, since the cognition produced in the passive statement *'maitreṇa pacyate taṇḍulaḥ'* is that the rice is the abode of the softening produced by the cooking in turn produced by the effort occurring in Maitra, the effort appears as only the qualifier to the cooking; and consequently, the state of being the effort qualified by the cooking (*kriyāghaṭita dharma*) cannot be the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum in the corresponding negative statement *'maitreṇa na pacyate'*.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument on the ground that the absence of the occurrence in Maitra (*maitravṛttitvābhāva*) can be said to be relating to the effort (*kṛti*) through the relation of the qualification (*viśeṣaṇatā*) of the form of the self-linking relation (*svarūpa*) which is qualified by (i.e. having the community of locus with) the state of bieng the effort delimited by the action of cooking (*pākakriyāvacchinnatva*); and hence the state of being such an effort need not appear as the delimiting property of the relatedness to explain the negative statement *'maitreṇa na pacyate'*.

Anvayitāvacchedakāvacchinnatva cannot appear in *viśeṣaṇasambandha*

III. 7. Also, the rule that only the state of being what is delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum appears in the relation of the qualifier cannot be tenable. In that case, since in the usages such as 'Alstonia Scholaris bloom in the autumn'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*śaradi puṣpyanti saptacchadāḥ*) etc., the state of blooming of the flower Alstonia Scholaris is not the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum of the occurrence in the autumn, the relation of the occurrence in the autumn would beome contratictory with the blooming, delimited by the state of being the blooming of the flower in general, i.e. with the delimiting property of the meaning expressed by the verb '*puṣpyanti*' with the ending (*ti*). And consequently, the relation of the occurrence in the autumn with what is delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum would become untenable. Also on the other hand, suppose the occurrence in the autumn is admitted to be related to the item (blooming) that has merely the community of locus with the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum, the usages such as 'The Alstonia Scholaris bloom in the autumn' (*śaradi puṣpyanti saptacchadāḥ*) and 'The Canpaka flowers bloom in the autumn' (*śaradi puṣpyanti campakāḥ*) would become necessary to be made indiscrimanately.

Explanation

In '*ghaṭavad bhūtalam*' only the state of being delimited by the groundness (*bhūṭalatvāvacchinnatva*) appears in the relation of the qualifier such as the contact of the pot with the ground; and therefore, only the state of being what is delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum (*anvayitāvaccheda-kāvacchinnatva*) is admitted to appear in the relation of the qualifier. Thus, the Siddhāntin argues that the negative statement '*maitreṇa na pacyate*' would remain untenable as the state of being what is delimited by the effortness in general, i.e. the delimiting property of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

relatedness (*anvayitāvacchedaka kṛtitvāvacchinnatva)* cannot appear in the relation of the absence of the occurrence in Maitra, i.e. the qualifier.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin explains the negative statement '*maintreṇa na pacyate*' on the ground that such a state cannot be admitted to appear in the relation of the qualifier. According to him, when wuch a state is admitted to appear in the relation, '*śaradi puṣpyanti saptacchadāḥ*' would become untenalbe as the qualifier, i.e. the occurrence in the autumn (*śaradvṛttitva),* cannot be related either to the blooming of the flowers delimited by the bloomingness in general (*puṣpotpattitvāvacchedena)* (due to the non-blooming of alll the flowers in the autumn) or to the blooming of some flowers having the community of locus with the bloomingness (*anvayitāvacchedaka puṣpotpattitva sāmānādhikaraṇyena*) (due to the accidental blooming of even the Campaka flowers in the autumn).

Argument that anvayitāvacchedakāvacchinnatva can appear in viśesaṇa sambandha

III. 8. Now it may again be argued as follows : That in such cases, the relation of (the occurrence in) the autumn is perceived as the qualifier only with the (blooming of) Alstonia Scholaris; but the same is not perceived as the qualifier with the substratumness, i.e. the meaning of the conjugational ending, nor with the the blooming of the flowers, i.e. the meaning of the verbal root (*puṣpyanti)*. Now since the locative of the form the *kāraka*-case is not tenable after the qualifying word of time such as '*śarad' (autumn),* Śarvavarman has prescirbed the locative only independently after the qualifying word such as time. Thus when the agency containing (i.e. pervaded by) the *kārakaness* of the form

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the state of being the instrument of the action is the meaning of the conjugational ending, the same (agency) of the form of the state of being the instrument of the action of blooming of flowers, expressed by the verb '*puspyanti*' ending with conjugational ending '*ti*', needs to be admitted as relating to the relation with (concurrence in) the autumn in accordance with its relation with the flowers qualified by the occurrence in the autumn. Also, even when the *kāraka*-ness (agency) is not admitted to be the meaning of the conjugational ending, the relation of the caused and the cause is possible to be cognized generally with the blooming of the flowers functioning as the predicate, and the relation with (i.e. occurrence in) the autumn functioning as the qualifier in the subject, in the form of the power of relation of the predicate and the subject through the relational seam; and this instance is like the instance of cognition of the same in the case of 'The cool lake makes disappear grief of the heat of the summer from the person plunging deep' (*śītalam sarovagāhato nidāghaduhkham vyapaiti)*. And since the state of being what is caused (produced) by the relation with (occurrence in) the autumn is absent in the blooming of the Campaka flowers, the said contingency (of making '*śaradi puṣpyanti campakāḥ)* is avoided. Thus, in the said case (of *śaradi puṣpyanti campakāḥ*), the occurrence in the autumn need not be related to the blooming of the flowers delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum.

However, this argument too is not correct. Even then such a rule cannot be admitted to have any validity at all.

Explanaton

The Siddhāntin tries to argue now that the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

occurrence in the autumn (*śaradvṛttitva*) need not be related to the blooming of the flowers (*puṣpotpatti*) in general delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum (*anvayitāvacchedakāvacchedena*), but can be related to the blooming of Alstonia Scholaris in particular in '*śaradi puṣpyanti saptacchadāḥ'*; whereas in '*maitreṇa na pacyate'* the absence of the occurrecne in Maitra needs to be related to only the effort delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum; and thus, the state of being what is delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum (*anvayitāvacchedakāvacchinnnatva)* needs to be admitted as appearing in the relation of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇasambandha*). According to the Siddhāntin, the same, of the form of the state of being the cause (instrument) of the blooming of the flowers (*puṣpotpattinimittatva),* can be related to the blooming of flower of Alstonia Scholaris (*saptacchada)* qualified by the occurrence in the autumn (*viśiṣṭa);* and therefore, alongwith the flowers, i.e. the qualificand, even the occurrence in the autumn, i.e. the qualifier, becomes the cause of blooming; also when the agency of the inanimate flowers is not admitted to be the meaing of the *ākhyāta,* the relation of the caused and the cause (*prayojyaprayojakabhāva)* can be perceived in the form of the relation of the predicate and the subject (*uddeśyavidheyabhāva-mahimnā)* with blooming of the flower, i.e. the predicate, and the occurrence in the autum, i.e. the qualifier in the subject, by predicating the blooming of the flowers on the flowers qualified by the occurrence in the autumn. Thus, there is neither the untenability of the explanation of '*śaradi puṣpyanti saptacchadāḥ*' nor the contingency of '*śaradi puṣpyanti*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

campakāḥ' when *anvayitāvacchedakāvacchinnatva* is admitted to appear in *viśeṣaṇasambandha*.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument on the ground that the rule that the state of being what is delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum appears in the relation of the qualifier has no sanction; and hence, in '*maitreṇa na pacyate*', the absence of the occurrence in Maitra can be related to the present effort.

Second argument

III. 9. It may again be argued as follows : That in admitting such a rule, in the usages such as 'In this house, the sauce is cooked only by Maitra' (*iha bhavane maitreṇaiva pakṣyate temanam),* the relation of the exclusion (absence) of the objecthood described by the future effort inherent in some one other than Maitra would become impossible to be cognized with the cooking delimited by the cookingness, as the cooking is not recollected from the words as being the cooking of the sauce having the house as the locus; and thus the Dīdhitikāra's statement that such a relation is not possible to be cognized there would become contradicted.

However, this argument too is not correct to state. The Dīdhitikāra has stated so with the intention that in the cognition of the qualified as delimited by the qualifying, i.e. delimiting property, the property appearing as the qualifier with respect to the qualificand, functions as the qualifier with respect to the qualifier through the relation of bieng delimited by the delimitor itself. And when it is admitted that the state of being what is delimited by the state of being the cooking of the sauce in the house (that is) found in the self-linking relation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the qualifier (i.e the absence of the objecthood described by the future effort inherent in some one other than Maitra) can appear in the cognition of the qualified cooking, as delimited by the state of being the cooking of the sauce in the house, the relation of such a qualifier need not be contradictory in the cooking of the sauce which is not recollected as delimited by such a state from words.

Explanation

The Siddhāntin once again raises an argument. According to him, the Dīdhitikāra's statement that "the absence of the objecthood described by the effort inherent in some one other than Maitra (*maitrānyasamaveta kṛtiviṣ ayatvābhāva)* cannot be related to the cooking (*pāka)* as delimited by the state of being the cooking of the sauce in this house (*etad bhavan-ādhikaraṇakate-manapākatvā-vacchinna)* in the statement '*iha bhavane maitreṇaiva pakṣyate temanam'*, since the cooking as delimited by such a state is not obtained from words" becomes tenable only when the rule that *anvayitāv-acchedakāvacchinnatva* appears in the *viśeṣaṇasambandha* is admitted : However, when such a rule is not admitted, the same absence can be related to any cooking which has community of locus with the cookingness in general obtained from the words; and therefore the Dīdhitikāra's statement becomes untenable. Thus, he holds that such a rule must be admitted.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument. According to him, in the cognition of the qualified entity (*viśiṣṭabuddhi)* such as '*ghaṭavad bhūtalam'*, the groundness (*bhūtalatva)*, appearing as the qualifier in the qualificand (*dharmin)* such as the ground, appears as the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

qualifier with respect to the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa)* such as the contact of the pot through the relation of being delimited by one-self (*svāvacchinnatva).* Simmilarly in the cognition of '*iha bhavane....*', the state of being the cooking of the sauce in this house (*etadbhavanādhi-karaṇakatemanapākatva*), appearing as the qualifier in the qualificand such as cooking (*pāka),* needs to function as the qualifier with respect to the qualifier, namely, the absence of the objecthood described by the effort inherent in some one other than Maitra (*maitrānyasanveta kṛtiviṣ ayatvābhāva),* through the state of being delimited by itself; however since such a *temamapākatva* is not objetained from words, the Dīdhitiakāra has stated that such an absence cannot be related to the cooking. Thus according to the Pūrvapakṣin, Dīdhitikāra did not insist upon the admission of such a rule by holding that the qualifier is related to the qualified entity as delimited by the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum.

Final establishment of the Pūrvapakṣin's objection

III. 10. It may also be argued now as follows : That the statement that in the cognition of the qualified entity as being delimited by the delimiting property, the state of being what is delimited by the delimiting property appears as the qualifier with respect to the qualifier is also of impossible justification. In the usages such as 'The pot is a substance' (*ghaṭo dravyam*) etc., the qualifier such as the substanceness appears as only unlimited in its own form in the cognition of being the possessor of the substanceness in the pot as being delimited by the potness.

However, this argument is not correct to state either. In the case of such a verbal cognition, only the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

substanceness-delimited functions as the qualifier through the relation of identity. There is no harm in not admitting the cognition of the state of being what is delimited by the delimiting property (potness) in the qualifier (substanceness) in the case of the perception of identity that has the substanceness as its qualifier with respect to the pot qualified by the potness. Thus, though in 'It is not cooked by Maitra' (*maitreṇa na pacyate)* etc., the state of being the effort conducive to the cooking is not the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relatum, the cognition of the state of being what is delimited by such a property (the state of being the effort) obtained by implication is unhindered with respect to the relation of the absence.

Explanation

Now the Siddhāntin raises last of his arguments : According to him, the alternative that in the cognition of the qualified entity as delimited by the delimiting property, the state of being what is delimited by the delimiting property appears in the qualifier (*avacchedakāvacchedena viśiṣṭabuddhau avacchedakāvacchinnatvam viśeṣaṇe bhāsate, c.f.* III. 9) too is not tenable. In the *viśiṣṭabuddhi* such as '*ghaṭo dravyam*', the substanceness, i.e. the qualifier, appears in its own form (*svarūpeṇa)* and not as delimited by the potness, i.e. the delimiting property of the relatedness (*ghaṭatvāvacchinnatvena)*, as all the substances do not have the potness; and hence such a rule cannot be admitted.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument on the ground that in '*ghaṭo dravyam*', only the verbal cognition of identity (*abhedānvayabodha)* that the pot is identical with the substanceness-delimited is produced;

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and hence unlike '*ghaṭavad bhūtalam*', the same is not an example of such a rule. Also according to the Pūrvapakṣin, in the negative passive usage such as '*caitreṇa pacyate na maitreṇa*', only the pure effortness (*kṛttitva)* is the delimiting property of the relatendness of the relatum (the cooking does not qualify the effort and hence the state of being the effort as qualified by the cooking is not the delimiting property). However, since the verb to cook (*pac*) is found used in the statement, the state of being the effort conducive to the cooking (*pākakṛtitva)* can be implied; and hence the state of being what is delimited by such a property (*pākakṛtitva)* can appear as the qualifier in the relation of the qualifier, namely, the absence of the occurrence in Maitra (*maitravṛttitvābhāva* cf. III. 7).

Thus, the Pūrvapakṣin establishes he objection that the effort need not be the meaning of the instrumental.

Refutation of the Pūrvapakṣin's objection

III. 11. No, this objection is not tenable. Since in the *kṛdanta*-usage such as 'It is not cooked by Maitra' (*maitreṇa na pakvaḥ),* the absence of the occurrence in Maitra etc. becomes impossible to be cognized with respect to the effort, the absence of the state of being produced by the effort of Maitra becomes necessary to be cognized with respect to the action of cooking by admitting that the state of being produced by the effort is the meaning of the instrumental. Consequently in the finite usage such as 'It is not cooked by Maitra' (*maitreṇa na pacyate*) too, the same absence can be justified to be cognized with respect to the cooking from the instrumental only.

It may be objected now as follows: That in such a theory, when Maitra is asleep, the usage 'It will be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cooked, but is not being cooked by Maitra' (*maitreṇa pakṣyate na tu pacyate*) would become untenable. Since the present effort occurring in Maitra is unestablished, the absence of the state of being produced by such a present effort cannot be conveyed. Also the absence of the state of being produced by the effort belonging to Maitra but not qualified by the present tense is contradictory; and hence cannot be cognized. However, this objection is not correct to state. In the case of the statements associated with negatives, the sense of the present tense expressed by the conjugational ending is justified in being related with respect to only the absence (and not with respect to the effort etc.). Otherwise, since in the usage 'He does not see the lost (destroyed) pot' (*vinaṣṭaghaṭam na paśyati*) etc., the perception that has such a destroyed pot as its object is unestablished, the verbal cognition of relation would become untenable. Also, though in the present case (*maitreṇa pakṣyate na tu pacyate*) the present effort belonging to Maitra is unestablished, only the absence of the state of being produced by the effort, as delimited by the present time, can be cognized with respect to the cooking; and therefore, the usage is possible to be explained. Also since the absence of the state of having Maitra etc. as the agents would be admitted to be cognized only with respect to the cooking etc., as delimited by the cookingness etc., the correct usages such as 'It is not cooked by Maitra' (*maitreṇa na pacyate*) cannot be imposed at the time of the cooking having Maitra etc. as its agent; and this is in spite of the fact that the absence of the state of having Maitra etc. as its agent can be present in the cooking having someone else as its agent.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Gadādhara, the Siddhāntin, now refutes the objection that the effort is only the meaning of the conjugational ending but not that of the instrumental (c.f. III.4.). According to him, when the instrumental is not admitted to express the effort, the absence of the occurrence in Maitra (*maitravṛttitvābhāva*) would become difficult to be related to the effect in *'maitreṇa na pakvaḥ'* as no conjugational ending expressing the same is found used there; and therefore, by admitting that the instrumental conveys the state of being produced by the effort, the absence of the state of being what is produced by the effort (*kṛtijanyatvābhāva*) needs to be related to the cooking carried out by Maitra in the same expression *'maitreṇa na pakvaḥ'*. Thus, in *'maitreṇa na pacyate'* too, *maitravṛttikṛtijanyatvābhāva* can be related to the cooking (*pāka*) by admitting that the instrumental conveys the effort. Here the Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that the statement *'maitreṇa pakṣyate na tu pacyate'* becomes impossible in such a theory. According to him, when Maitra is asleep, he cannot have any present effort occurring in him (*maitravṛttivartamānakṛti*); and therefore, the absence of the state of being produced by such a present effort (*tādṛśakṛtijanyatvābhāva*) cannot be cognized to be related to the action; also the absence of the state of being produced by the effort in general without being qualified by the present time is contradictory to the action, as such a state is present in the past and future actions of Maitra (*vartamānatvāviśeṣ-itatadīyakṛtijanyatvābhāva*); and thus the verbal cognition of the relations becomes untenable.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection on the ground that in the negative statements, the present time

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is related to the absence and not to the effort or to the state of being produced by the effort; and hence the absence of the state of being produced by the effort, as qualified by the present time, can be obtained from words and related to the cooking. Here the position that the present time is related to the absence is necessitated by the fact that otherwise in *'vinaṣṭaghaṭam na paśyati'* etc., the cognition of the absence of present perception of the lost pot would become untenable due to the impossibility of the perception of the lost pot (lost pot is not present). Thus according to the Siddhāntin, *'maitreṇa pakṣyate na tu pacyate'* can be explained by cognizing the absence of the state of being produced by the effect (*kṛtijanyatvābhāva*), as delimited by the present tense (*vartamānakālavācchinna*), to be relating to the cooking which is entirely tenable.

Explanation of *'maitreṇa temanam na pacyate'*

III. 12. In the case where Maitra cooks the rice but not the sauce, the statement 'The sauce is not cooked by Maitra' (*maitreṇa na pacyate temanam*) needs to be facilitated; and therefore, the cognition of the relation of the absence needs to be admitted with the cooking as delimited by only the state of being the cooking of the sauce. However, the same is not admitted with the cooking as delimited by the state of being the pure cooking, as such a relation is contradictory. Also the advocate of the theory that the superstratumness is the meaning of the instrumental has admitted so as to explain the verbal cognition of the relation of the absence with the cooking as delimited by the particular property (such as *temanapākatva*) although the cooking is not recollected from words as delimited by such a property.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The usages such as 'It is not cooked by the pot' (*ghaṭena na pacyate*) must be considered to be of the same application and competency as that of the usage such as 'He does not perceive the sky' (*ākāśam na paśyati*). However, by intending the agency for the inanimates such as the wood and the vessel etc., the passive usages such as 'It is cooked by the wood' (*kāṣṭhena pacyate*) and 'It is cooked by the vessel' (*sthālyā pacyate*) are made like the active usages such as 'The wood cooks' (*kāṣṭham pacati*) and 'The vessel cooks' (*sthālī pacati*); and therefore the instrumental in such cases has an indication in the sense of either the agency of the form of the operation (burning or holding) or in the sense of the state of having such inanimates as the agents (wood etc.) of the form of being produced by the operations of such agents.

Similarly in 'It is known, desired or gone to by Caitra' (*caitreṇa, jñāyate, iṣyate, gamyate*) etc., the instrumental must be admitted to have an indication in the sense of the agency of the form of the substratumness or in the sense of the state of having an agent of the form of the superstratumness. Also, in 'Pot is being lost' (*naśyate ghaṭena*) etc., the instrumental must be admitted to have an indication in the sense of the agency of the form of the counterpositiveness or in the sense of the state of having an agent of the form of the relational subjunctness. It must be noted that the term 'agent' too is only secondary in the sense of an inanimate having merely the operation etc., because the word 'agent' is not used in the sense of the inanimate naturally. That is why the verbal ending (*kṛñ*) has a denotation in only the effort.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Gadādhara explains now the statement *'maitreṇa temanam na pacyate'*. According to him, the absence of the state of being produced by the effort occurring in Maitra (*maitravṛttikṛtijanyatvābhāva*) can be related to the cooking as delimited by the particular property such as the state of being the cooking of the sauce (*temanapākatvāvacchedena*). And since the *temanapākatva* constitutes only the relation of the *temanapākatvasamānādhikaraṇaviśeṣaṇatā*, the same, even though not expressed by words, can be implied in the cooking; and hence can be the delimiting property of the relatedness of the relation. (cf. III.6.).

According to Gadādhara, the negative usages *'ghaṭena na pacyate'* etc. are invalid and need not be explained. However, the active usages *'kāṣṭham pacati'* etc. and the passive usages *'kāṣṭhena pacyate'* etc. are made by intending the agency (*kartṛtva*) for the inanimates such as woods etc.; and therefore need to be explained by admitting that the agency of the form of the inanimate operation (*vyāpāra*) or the state of having the inanimate as the agent (*tatkartṛkatva*) of the form of being produced by the operation of such an inanimate agent (*tajjanyatva*) are the meanings of the instrumental. Also, in *'caitreṇa jñāyate'* and *'ghaṭena naśyate'* etc., the agents are the abode of the knowledge and the counterpositive of the destruction; and hence the agency of the form of the substratumness (*āśrayatva*) or that of the form of the counter-positiveness (*pratiyogitva*) and the state of having the agency of the form of the superstratumness (*adheyatva*) or of the form of the relational subjunctness (*anuyogitva*) need to be held to be the meanings of the instrumental.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Objection that *'kāṣṭhena pacyate'* etc. cannot be tenable

III. 13. It may be argued now as follows: That when the possessor of the conscious effort is held to be the meaning of the word 'agent', the agentive suffix would become untenable after the word 'wood' (*kāṣṭha*) etc. in the usages involving the words expressing inanimates such as 'It is cooked by the wood' etc. as there is no justifiable reason in the abandonment of the primary meaning (the possessor of the effort) of the word 'agent' in the rule 'The instrumental is used in the sense of the agent and the instrument' (*kartṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā*, P. ii. 3.18).

However, this argument is not correct to state. The word 'agent' (*kartṛ*) mentioned in the rule (*kartṛkaraṇayoḥ*..P. ii. 3.18) is intended to convey the independent agent conventionally established by the composer of the rule 'The independent is the agent' (*svatantraḥ kartā*, P.i.4.54). Otherwise, the composition of such a rule would itself become useless. And the state of being independent agent or independence (*svātantrya*) is the state of being the semantic item (*kāraka*) while not being dependent on the operation of any other semantic item (*kāraka*). In the cases such as 'The wood cooks' (*kāṣṭham pacati*) etc., the wood etc. have the agency by being intended to have the independence.

Explanation

The primary agent is held by Gadādhara to be the possessor of the conscious effort (*kṛtimān* or *yatnavām* cf. III.1). However, the Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection that when the agent is defined as the possessor of the effort, the rule (P.ii.3.18) which assigns the instrumental in the sense of the agent and the instrument, needs to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

assign the instrumental only in the sense of the possessor of the conscious effort; and thus, the instrumental in *'kāṣṭhena pacyate'* would become untenable as the inanimate wood cannot have conscious effort in it.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that although the term 'agent' (*kartṛ*) in the rule (P.ii.3.18) is meant to convey only the *kāraka* who is independent in his effort or actions (*svatantra*) as established by the Sūtrakāra in the rule *'svatantraḥ kartā* (P.i.4.54), the instrumental in *'kāṣṭhena pacyate'* and active conjugational ending *'ti'* in *'kāṣṭhaḥ pacati'* can be facilitated by intending the primary agency (*mukhyakartṛtva*), of the form of being the *kāraka* who is not dependent in his individual operation on the operation of another *kāraka* (*kārakantara vyāpārānadhīnatve sati kārakatvam*) for the inanimate wood.

Objection that inanimates cannot have instrument

III.14. It may again be objected now as follows: In spite of the fact that the independence is intended for the inanimates such as the woods, the same inanimates (woods), which have the operations (burning) conducive to the actions (cooking etc.) dependent upon the operations of the human beings, cannot have the actual independence of the form of the possession of the operations conducive to the actions not dependent on the operations of the others; and therefore, the (instrumental) case affixes that denote such an independent agency of the inanimates cannot be avoided the invalidity.

However, this objection is not correct to state. Only the operation (burning) conducive to the action of cooking, that is not dependent on the operation of another *kāraka* of the action associated with it, is the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meaning of the instrumental case that is associated with the verb expressing the action of cooking. The purpose of the qualifying phrase that ends with the expression, viz. 'while not being dependent' (included in the definition of independence) is the avoidance of the contingency of the usage, namely 'Caitra, the woods and the vessel cooks' (*caitraḥ sthālī kāṣṭhāni pacati*) in the place of the usage 'Caitra cooks in the vessel by means of woods' (*caitraḥ sthālyām kāṣṭhaiḥ pacati*). However, in the cases such as 'Caitra cooks' (*caitraḥ pacati*) and 'The wood cooks' (*kāṣṭham pacati*) etc., where other semantical items (*kārakas*) associated with the action of cooking are not established (found uttered), the qualifying phrase that ends with the expression viz. 'while not being dependent' does not appear at all. And the non-appearance of such a phrase is accomplished by assuming a separate expressive power for the conjugational ending etc. in the sense of the independence of the non-qualified *kārakatva*. This is necessitated by the fact that the expressive power referring to the qualified entity cannot produce the cognition of the qualified entity without referring to the qualifying factor.

Explanation

The inanimate objects such as the wood etc. have been explained to be the agents in *'kāṣṭhena pacyate'*, *'kāṣṭhaḥ pacati'* etc. on the ground that they can be intended to have the independence (*svātantrya*) in their own operations (burning) leading to the cooking. However, now an objection is raised that the inanimates, who are dependent on the operations of the animates in their own operations (*puruṣavyāpārādhīna kriyānukūlavyāpāra*), cannot really have any independence (*svātantrya*) in their operations producing the cooking

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

etc., which (independence) is to be analysed as the state of one possessing the operation conducive to the action (of cooking etc.) without being dependent on the operation of others (*anyavyāpārānadhīnakriyānukūlavyāpāravattva*).

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection by stating that only the agency (*kartṛtva*) of the form of the operation (burning etc.) conducive to the cooking but not dependent on the operation of any other *kāraka* of the action mentioned in the sentence (*samabhivyāhṛtakriyākārakāntaravyāpārānadhīnakriyānukūlavyāpāra*) is meant to be the meaning of the instrumental etc. mentioned in association with the verb expressing the action of cooking; and since the operation of burning conducive to the cooking in *'kāṣṭhena pacyate'* is not dependent on the operation of any other *kāraka* of any action there (no other *kāraka* is mentioned there), the same can be the meaning of the instrumental in association with *'pacyate'*. However, it should be noted here that the independence (*svātantrya*), i.e. the essential characteristic of the primary agent (*kartṛ*), is defined as the state of being the *kāraka* while not being dependent on the operation of any other *kāraka* (*kārakāntaravyāpārānadhīnatve sati kārakatvam,* III.13) and the qualifying phrase viz. 'while not being dependent' (*anadhīnatve sati*) is included there to avoid the usage *caitraḥ sthaī kāṣṭhāni pacati'* instead of the usage *'caitraḥ sthālyām kāṣṭhaiḥ pacati'* by denying the agency for the vessel and the woods for lack of independence (here the operations of the vessel and the woods are only dependent on Caitra's operation).

Objection that kartṛ cannot be explained to have the instrumental in causatives

III. 15. It may again be objected now as follows:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

That in the causative usages such as 'Maitra causes Caitra to cook' (*maitraḥ caitreṇa pācayati*) wherein the word for the causative agent is uttered (mentioned), the instrumental cannot be tenable in the sense of the primitive agent. For, the operation of the primitive agent is only dependent on the operation of the causative agent mentioned.

However, this objection is not correct to state. Since the causative agent functions as the *kāraka* only with respect to the causative operation of making the primitive agent to cook, expressed by the causative form, the operation of the independent primitive agent is not dependent on the operation of any other causative *kāraka* with respect to the producing of the primitive action of cooking. Since the operation of the causative agent (person) employing the independent primitive agent is rendered redundant in producing the primitive action of cooking, like the buying of the rice, the same cannot be held to be the cause of cooking. Thus, inspite of the fact that the causative agent has a causative operation conducive to the cooking etc., he cannot be held to be the *kāraka* with respect to the producing of the primitive action of cooking. Also since Caitra does not have *kārakatva*, the usage 'Caitra cooks' *(caitraḥ pacati)* is not made in the case of the causative usage such as 'Caitra makes Maitra cóok' (*caitro maitreṇa pācayati*).

Explanation

Unlike the primitive agent such as Caitra who is independent in his operation in the primitive usages such as *'caitraḥ pacati'*, the primitive agent such as Maitra is not independent (he is only dependent on the operation of the causative agent) in the cooking in the causatives such as *'maitraḥ caitreṇa pācayati'*; and therefore the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that the primitive agent cannot have the independence and hence the instrumental is untenable.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the causative operation causing the primitive agent to cook and the primitive operation of producing the cooking must be distinguished; and while the causative agent (*hetukartṛ*) has the causative operation and thereby functions as the *kāraka* in causing the primitive agent to cook, the primitive agent (*prayojyakartṛ*) has the primitive operation and thereby functions as the *kāraka* in producing the primitive action of cooking. Thus, the primitive operation of the primitive agent is not dependent on the causative operation of the causative agent in producing the primitive action of cooking; and hence the causative operation is irrelevant like buying of the rice in producing the cooking.

Objection that *pañcabhir halaiḥ karṣati gṛhī* becomes untenable

III.16. It may again be objected now as follows: That in the usages such as 'The householder (manager) ploughs through five plough - bearing farmers' (*pañcabhir halaiḥ karṣati gṛhī*) etc., the active conjugational ending etc. cannot express the operation of the householder (manager) employing the independent primitive agents (farmers) in the action of ploughing such as scratching of the field, due to the said reasoning (cf.III.15). Consequently, the usage would be required to be of the form of 'He makes them plough' (*karṣayati*) and not of the form of 'He ploughs' (*karṣati*).

However, this objection is not correct to state. In such cases the root 'to plough' (*kṛṣ*) means to manage

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ploughing (*pratividhāna*) through the farmers. And in support of this theory it is stated as follows: That the root 'offer' (*yaj*) in 'The priests make offerings' (*yajanti yājakāḥ*) denotes the sense of making the offerings of oblation materials, and that the root 'plough' (*kṛṣ*) in 'The householder (manager) ploughs through five plough-bearing farmers (*pañcabhir halaiḥ karṣati gṛhī*) denotes the sense of managing the ploughing. Since the root 'offer' (*yaj*) is used primarily in the sense of the particular desire for the offering of the oblation materials for the gods, only the sacrificer (*yajamāna*) has the agency described by such a desire. And therefore, it has been shown that the same root 'offer' (*yaj*) is intended to have the indication in the sense of the offering of the oblation material; and in such a sense only the priests (*yājaka*) have the independence (agency). And in the expression 'He is the offerer' (*hotā*) too, only the offering of the oblation materials is the meaning of the root 'offer' (*hu*); and not the desire for making the offer delimited by such an effect of offering. Otherwise since in that case the priests do not have the independent agency with respect to such a desire, the same would become impossible to be conveyed by the word 'priest' (*hotṛ*). However, Jīmūtavāhana holds as follows: That only the agency described by the effect, i.e. the delimiting property of the expressedness of the meaning expressed by the root (making the offering of the oblation materials), is expressed by the agentive suffix; and therefore, the expression 'offerer' (*hotṛ*) is found only in the priest and not in the sacrificer. Therefore, the operation of the receiver of the gift is not conducive to the ownership; for in that case the expression (designation) 'giver' (*dātṛ*) would become contingent in the receiver (*pratigṛhītṛ*).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

In *'pañcabhir halaiḥ karṣati gṛhī'*, the operation of the householder (manager) employing the five plough-bearing farmers for ploughing the land is rendered redundant in the actual ploughing of the land (c.f.III.15); and hence, the householder (manager) can be the *kāraka* only with respect to the impelling of the farmers but not with respect to the ploughing of the land. Thus, the Pūrvapakṣin objects that only the causative usage such as *'karṣayati'* but not the primitive usage such as *'karṣati'* would be tenable in such cases as the primitive conjugational ending in *'karṣati'* cannot express the causative agency of the householder (only the causative ending can express such an agency).

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the root 'plough' (*kṛṣ*) conveys only the meaning of ploughing (*pratividhāna*); and the operation of the householder (manager) is conducive to the managing and hence the householder can be the *kāraka* with respect to the managing; and this fact is supported by the statement *'kṛṣiḥ pratividhānārthaḥ'* A point to be noted here is that in *'yajanti yājakāḥ'* and *'hotā'* etc., the roots 'offer' (*'yaj'*) and 'offer' (*hu*) must be admitted to express only the offering (throwing) of the oblation (*haviḥprakṣepa*) and not the desire for the offering of the oblation (*dravya tyāgecchā*) This is done by assuming indication and expressive power respectively for *'yaj'* and *'hu'* in the sense of *haviḥ prakṣepa,* Thus the priests (*yājaka* or *hotṛ*) can be explained to have the independence in their own action of offering and thereby the agency to be expressed by the active conjugational ending etc. However, according to Jīmūtavāhana, the root *'hu'* refers to only the desire for the offering of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

oblation for the god (*devatoddeśykatyāgecchā*) as its sense; and the offering (*tyāga*) is the effect that delimits the root-meaning (the desire); and the agentive suffix in '*hotṛ*' refers to only the agency described by such an effect. Also, since the priest has independence (agency) in such an action, he can be the agent-*kāraka*.

Position that *'caitreṇa maitreṇa pācyate'* is untenable.

III. 17. Now it may be held as follows: That in the causative usage 'Maitra is made to cook by Caitra' (*caitreṇa maitreṇa pācyate*), though the operation of Maitra, i.e. the independent agent, is dependent on the operation of Caitra, i.e. the causative agent, the independent agent can be explained to have the independent agency in the way shown above (cf.III.15). However, the instrumental case after the word expressing such an independent agent cannot be tenable as the agency is already expressed by the causative affix.

However, this position is not correct. Since the operation of the causative agent, relating to the cooking through the relation of accomplishing of the agency, is the meaning of the causative affix, the agency of the independent primitive agent cannot be expressed by the causative affix. Even in the theory that such causative operation, delimited by the effect such as the primitive agency, is the meaning of the causative affix, the agency as adventitiously qualified by the abode cannot be managed to be cognized from any other source; and therefore, the instrumental must be explained to be tenable due to the non-expression of the qualified agent. Although the conjugational ending is not expressive of the property-possessor or qualificand (i.e. the agent), the same is not harmed (i.e. is secured) of the denotation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in the sense of the agent, to be analysed as of the form of the state of expressing the entity qualified by the effort; and therefore, there is no contingency of the instrumental after *'caitraḥ'* in 'Caitra cooks' (*caitraḥ pacati*) etc.

Explanation

Gadādhara has explained (cf. II.15) that the causative agent (*hetukartṛ*) is the *kāraka* only with respect to the causative action of making one to cook; and therefore, in the causative usage *'caitreṇa maitreṇa pācyate'* Maitra, i.e. the independent primary agent (*svatantrakartṛ*), can be explained to be the agent-*kāraka* with respect to his own action of cooking despite the fact that the operation conducive to the cooking is dependent on the causative operation of Caitra. However, the Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection now that the instrumental ending after *'maitra'* expressing the primitive agent in such a causative usage becomes untenable due to the fact that the agency has already been expressed by the conjugational ending (*te*) in *'pacyate.'*

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that since the causative affix refers to the causative operation and the causative conjugational ending refers to only the causative agency of the causative agents, the instrumental can express the primitive agency of Maitra, which is not expressed by the conjugational ending; and hence the instrumental is tenable. Also Gadādhara explains the instrumental even in the theory of others that the causative affix refers to only the causative operation relating to the cooking that facilitates the primary agency but not merely to the causative operation on the ground that the agency as qualified by the agent, i.e. the abode, is not obtained from the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

causative affix; and therefore, the instrumental is needed to express the same. Also it should be noted that the active usage *'caitraḥ pacati'* is explained on the ground that the primitive agent, who is qualified by the effort (*kṛtiviśiṣṭa kartṛ*), is already expressed by the conjugational ending; and hence the instrumental need not be used to express it once again.

Denotation in the agent (*kartrabhidhāna*)

III. 18. Also it may be objected again as follows: That this way when the denomination in the agent of the form of the state of conveying the effort as being the chief qualificand is intended, the incorrect statement 'He cooks by Caitra' (*caitreṇa pacati*) would be necessary. However, this objection too is not correct. Only the denotation in the effort as not being the qualifier with resect to the items that are other than the abodes (agents) (i.e. in the operation etc.) is meant to be the denotation in the agent. And such a denotation in the agent is possible for only the conjugational ending, primary derivative affix and compound etc. That is why the Vrttikāra (cf. On P...) has explained the denotation in the agent as possible only through the conjugational ending etc.

However, the following point must be borne in mind: That though the instrumental etc. are prescribed only in the sense of the operation of the independent agent, they however, must be admitted to have expressive power in the sense of the agency of the form of the effort due to economy in assumption. The instrumental etc., therefore, have only a conventional indication in the sense of the operation of the inanimate. Since the rule (P...) is meant to produce only the grasping (cognition) of the eternal speakers intention, such a speaker's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

intention establishes the assumption of the expressive power only when assisted by the economy. Thus, though the speakers intention is present in the operation of the inanimate, the assumption of the expressive power in the same is not established due to the heaviness in assumption. Thus in the case of the cognition of the effort of the form of the agency, the state of non-dependence on the operation of any other *kāraka* is not cognized; and therefore, there is no valid means to justify the assumption of the expressive power for the instrumental in the sense of the effort as inclusive of such a state (of non-dependence).

And the earlier said contingency of overapplication (of *caitraḥ kāṣṭham sthālī pacati*) is avoided on the ground that the agentive (instrumental) affix, indicative of the inanimate operation, conveys the same operation only as inclusive of such a state of non-dependence by indication. Otherwise, such a contingency would become unavoidable even when the instrumental affix is admitted to have an expressive power in the sense of the effort as inclusive of such a state of non-dependence.

Explanation

In *'caitraḥ pacati'*, the cognition produced is that Caitra is the abode of the effort conducive to the cooking (*pākānukūlakṛtyāśryaḥ caitraḥ*); and therefore the conjugational ending *'ti'* produces the cognition of the effort as only the qualifier of Caitra, the agent. Now since the effort is not cognized as the chief-qualificand, the denotation in the agent (*kartṛabhidhāna*) of the form of the denotation in the effort as the chief-qualificand (*mukhyaviśeṣyatayā kṛtibodhakatva*) is absent. Thus it is objected now that the instrumental in the usage such as *'caitreṇa pacati'* would become necessary due to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

absence of such a denotation in the agent of the form of the denotation in the effort as the chief-qualificand.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the denotation in the agent (*kartrabhidhāna*) means the denotation in the effort as not being the qualifier with respect to the operation which is other than the abode of the operation (*āśrayātiriktāṃśe aviśeṣaṇatyā kṛtibodhana*); and since such a denotation in the agent is present, the instrumental is avoided. It should be noted that denotation in the agent is only through the conjugational ending, primary and secondary derivative affixes and *samāsa* (*lakṛttaddhitasamāsa,* P. . .).

Gadādhara's own opinion, however, is that the rule *'kartṛkaraṇayoḥ tṛtīyā,* (P. . .) assigns the instrumental only in the agent, i.e. the abode of the independent operation; however, due to economy the instrumental must be admitted to have expressive power in the agency of the form of the effort (*kṛtirūpakartṛtva*) and the indication in the agency of the form of the inanimate operation (*vyāpārarūpakartṛtva*). It should be noted that according to him, the rule merely makes one understand the eternal speakers' intention (*anāditātparyagrāhakaka*) of a word in a particular sense; and hence the speakers' intention, only when associated with the economy in assumption (*lāghava*), helps to assume the expressive power in the agency of the form of the effort and not of the form of the inanimate operation. Also the conjugational ending that expresses the agency in *'caitraḥ kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyām pacati'* expresses the same without including the non-dependence on the operation of other *kārakas* (*kārakānt-aravyāpārānadhīnatva*); and the contingency of making the incorrect statement *'caitraḥ kāṣṭham sthālī pacati'* due to the non-expression of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

non-dependence on the operation (the wood etc. can be the agents by merely possessing the inanimate operation) is avoided on the ground that the same conjugational ending can be admitted to indicate the agency of the form of the effort including non-dependence on the operation of other *kārakas* by indication.

Analysis of *mukhyakartṛtva*

III. 19. However, in the cases such as 'The pot is produced' (*ghaṭo jāyate*) and 'The rice is accomplished' (*odanaḥ siddhyati*) etc., the logicians, who oppose the theory that the effect is existent in its cause before production, cannot explain the *kāraka*-nature and the agency for the pot and the rice by following the natural interpretation of the original rule (*svatantraḥ kartā,* P. 1.4.54).

And the primary agency described by the action is, however, not merely the effort conducive to the action. For, in the case where some distinct associate action (such as *abhighāta*) is produced necessarily along with the particular main action such as going from the effort conducive to the particular main action (going), the person (agent) possessing the effort conducive to the main action (of going) cannot have the agency described by the associate action (of *abhighāta.*). That is why the expression 'This has happened on account of me but has not been done by me' is prevalent. Thus, rather the primary agency described by the action must be admitted to be only the effort which is both conducive to the action and is intended to have the action as its object. In the case where the death of the Brahmin occurs from the arrow shot with the intention of killing someone else (deer), the operation such as the shooting the arrow

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

conducive to the death of the brahmin is certainly the object of the effort. However, since the operation of shooting the arrow is not intended to be the operation conducive to the death of the Brahmin, such an operation need not be the object of the effort in such a form as being the operation conducive to the death of the Brahmin. Therefore, the agent of such an operation does not have the agency as having the operation conducive to the death of the Brahmin; and therefore, the agent of such an operation does not qualify for the full expiation.

Explanation

It should be noted that according to the logicians, who hold the theory that the effect is non-existent in its cause before production (*asatkāryavāda*), the pot does not exist before it is produced; and hence the same pot cannot be explained to be the agent *kartṛ — kāraka*, as only the existing thing that is independent in its actions is the agent-*kāraka*. (cf. P. i. 4.54).

According to Gadādhara, the primary agency described by the action (*mukhyakriyākartṛtva*) cannot be defined to be the effort conducive to the action (*kriyānukūlakṛtimattva*) in general. When the effort having the particular action of going as its object to be produced (*ekakriyāviṣayakakṛti*) produces necessarily an associate action alongwith the main action (*nāntarīyakakriyā*) such as the *abhighāta,* the possessor of the effort conducive to the main action of going *(tatkṛtimān)* is not considered to be the agent of the distinct associate action (*kriyāntarakartṛ*). Therefore, Gadādhara rules that the *mukhyakriyākartṛtva* is the effort which is conducive while being intended to have particular main action as its object (*tatkriyāviṣayakatve sati tadanukūlā kṛtiḥ*).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Gadādhara now justifies his analysis of *mukhyakriyā kartṛtva* on the ground that when a person like Daśaratha shoots an arrow with the intention of killing the deer (*anyoddeśena*), but by chance the operation of shooting (*bāṇapraksepa vyāpāra*) effects the killing of a Brahmin, (*brāhmanavadha*), the same operation is not intended to be the object of the effort as being conducive to the death of the Brahmin (*brāhmaṇamaraṇānukūlavyāpāratvena*); and therefore the agent of such an operation does not have the agency (*kartṛtva*) in the form of having the operation conducive to the death of the Brahmin (*brāhmaṇamaraṇānukūlavyāpāratvena*); and so does not qualify for the whole expiation (*sampūrṇaprāysaścitta*).

Object to be covered by *himsālakṣaṇa*

III. 20. That is why the following statement of Miśra becomes justified. 'That the author of Tattvacintāmaṇi (cf. Ch.I,IV) has included the two qualifications (adjectives), namely, 'the state of not being the cause of the unseen merit' and 'the state of being practised with the objective of causing the death' in the definition of the violence only with the intention that the operation of the agent of killing prompting (causing) the whole expiation is the item (object) to be covered by the definition of the violence. Since the operation practised with the objective of causing the death is necessarily considered to be the operation conducive to the death, the same has the state of being the object of the effort in the form of being the operation conducive to the death. Therefore, such a qualifier (the state of being practised with the objective of causing the death)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

becomes facilitating factor of the qualified agency described by the killing. Thus, the same operation qualified by such two qualifications becomes necessarily the item (object) to be covered by the definition of violence; whereas the operation devoid of such two qualifications is ruled to be the non-item (non-object) to be covered by the definition.

Explanation

When the death of a Brahmin occurs by chance through the operation of shooting with the arrow practiced with the objective of killing the deer *(anyoddeśena sampādita)*, the agent of such an operation *(tādraśavyāpārakartṛ)* does not qualify for the agency described by the killing *(vadhakartṛtva)* (only the agent of the operation practiced with the objective of killing the Brahmin qualifies for the same). Therefore, holding that only the operation of the agent of killing (*vadhakartṛvyāpāra*) that prompts (causes) the whole expiation *(sampūrṇaprāyaścittaprayojaka)* is the item (object) to be covered by the definition of violence (*himsālakṣaṇa-lakṣya*), the author of Tattvacintamani (Ch. I) has defined *himsātva* as *adṛṣṭādvārakatve sati mara-ṇoddeśena anuṣṭhīyamānatvam.* And Misra, while commenting upon the *himsālakṣaṇa,* has justified the inclusion of the two qualifications, namely, *adṛṣṭ-ādvārakatvam* and *maraṇoddeśenānuṣṭhīyamānatvam,* on the ground that the first qualification is required to exclude the operation leading to *śyenayāga* (since it is only the cause of the unseen merit, it can be excluded when the first qualification *adṛṣṭādvārakatva* is included); whereas the second qualification is required to exclude

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the operation leading to *brāhmaṇavadha* (since it is not practised with the objective of causing the death of the Brāhmin, it can be excluded when the second qualification *maraṇoddeśea* ... is included.)

Now, as regards the item (object) to be covered (*lakṣya*): The operation practised with the objective of causing the death (*maraṇoddeśenānuṣṭhīyamāna*) can be considered to be the operation conducive to the death (*maraṇānukūla vyāpāra*); and therefore the same is the object of the effort (*kṛti viṣaya*); and thus only the operation qualified (distinguished) as the one practised with the objective of causing the death can be the item (object) to be covered by the *hiṃsālakṣaṇa* by being the operation conducive to the agency described by the death (*vadhakartṛtānirvāhaka*).

Objection that *maraṇoddeśena anuṣṭhīyamānatva* cannot cause *vadhakartṛtva* and hence is non-pervasive

III. 21. It is objected now as follows: In some cases, the operation of striking the sword practised with the objective of causing the death may have the objectness, described by both the state of being what is to be accomplished through the effort and the state of being the means to the desire end, only as being the striking with the sword, but not as being the operation of striking with the sword qualified by the state of being the operation conducive to the death. In such cases, the effort cannot be considered as having the striking with the sword, qualified by the state of being the operation conducive to the death, as its object. Consequently, the agent of such an operation cannot have the agency described by the killing qualified by the killingness.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Therefore, how is it possible that the said qualification is conducive to the agency described by the killing qualified by the killingness.

Suppose it is held that the qualification, namely, the state of being what is practised with the objective of causing the death, means the state of being the object of the effort as being the operation conducive to the death, then such a qualification included in the operation of striking with the sword can indeed cause the agency described by the killing qualified by the killingness in the agent of such an operation. However, in the said (given) cases of striking with the sword (practised as being merely the striking with the sword), the non-pervasion of such a definition of the violence is unavoidable in the striking with the sword (as the state of being the object to be accomplished by the effort as being the operation conducive to the death is lacking). However, since the agent of such an operation qualifies for the whole (full) expiation without dispute, the state of being the item to be covered by the definition is absolutely necessary for the operation of striking with the sword.

Explanation

The sword may be struck only with the objective of causing the death (*maraṇoddeśena*); however, the same striking with the sword (*khadgābhighāta*) may be intended to be the means to the desired death (*iṣṭasādhana*) and the object to be achieved through the effort (*kṛtisāḍhya*) as being only the striking with the sword (*khadgābhighātatvena*) and not as being the striking with the sword conducive to the death. And under such a circumstance,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the effort cannot be termed as having the striking with the sword conducive to the death as its object (*moraṇānukūlakrtisādhyatvaviṣayiṇī*); and therefore, the agent of such an operation causing the death (*tādṛśavyāpārakartṛ*) cannot have the agency described by the killing (*vadhakartṛtva*). Thus, it is objected now that the qualification *maraṇoddeśenānuṣṭhīyamānatva* may not necessarily cause *vadhakartṛtva* in the *vadhakartṛ*. Also the suggestion that the state of being the operation practised with the objective of causing the death (*maraṇoddeśenānuṣṭhīyamānatva*) means the state of being the object of the effort as being the operation conducive to the death (*maraṇānukūlatvena kṛtiviṣayatvam*); and hence the agent of such an operation can necessarily have the agency described by the killing is also not tenable. According to the objector, in the case where the striking with the sword is the object of the knowledge of what is to be accomplished through the effort and is the means to the desired death as being the striking with the sword, the operation of striking with the sword is undertaken as being only the striking with the sword; and so lacks of the qualification of the state of being the object of the effort as being conducive to the death included in the definition of the violence; and thus cannot be covered by the definition of the violence.

Counter-objection that non-pervasion can be overcome

III. 22. Again it may be counter-objected as follows: That the effort has the state of having the operation qualified by the state of being what is conducive to the death as its object means it has the state of describing the objectness, namely, the accomplishedness resident in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the operation, while having the state of describing the objectness, namely, the objectivity resident in the effect (death), as the qualifier. Consequently, in the said case, the qualification of the effort by the death through the relation of conduciveness does not lack of the state of producing the agency described by the killing qualified by the killingness despite the fact that the same lacks of the state of being the delimitor of the objectness (of the operation) described by the effort of the form of the accomplishedness. Thus, the state of being the operation practised with the objective of causing the death is only of the form of being the object of the effort undertaken with the intention of causing the death.

However, this objection is not correct. The said agency, described by the killing qualified by the killingness, can have the state of being the object of the prohibitory rule only in the case of 'One should not kill Brahmin¿ (*brāhmaṇam na hanyāt*) etc., when the death, i.e. the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root, is possible to be related to the effort through the relation of being undertaken with the intention of (objective of) causing the death. Also, the death, recollected as the qualifier with respect to the operation, cannot be related by convention with respect to the effort as the qualifier.

Explanation

The effort (*kṛti*) describes both the objectness, namely, the accomplishedness resident in the operation (*vyāpāraniṣṭha sādhyatākhyaviṣayatānirūpaka*), and the objectness, namely, the objectivity resident in the effect such as the death functioning as the qualifier (*viśeṣ*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

anībhūtaphalaniṣṭhoddeśyatākhyaviṣayatānirūpaka). Thus, it is objected now that the state of having the operation qualified by the state of being what is conducive to the death (*viśiṣṭaviṣayakatva*) of the effort (*kṛti*) means the state of describing such two different objectnesses; and therefore, despite the fact that the qualification of the effort by the death through the conduciveness (*anukūlatayā maraṇavaiśiṣṭya*) is not the delimitor of the objectness of the form of the accomplishedness (*sādhyatākhyavi-ṣayatāvacchedaka*), the same can cause the agency described by the killing in the agent, as the effort is itself the agency and the effort has the state of being conducive to the death. Thus, the operation of striking with the sword need not be non-pervaded by the definition of the violence as the state of being the object of the effort undertaken with the intention of causing the death (*maraṇakāmanādhīnaviṣayatva*) (of the operation) can be viewed to be the state of being practised with the objective of causing the death (*maraṇoddeśena anuṣṭhīyamānatva*).

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the counter-objection on the ground that the root 'kill' (*han*) refers to the operation conducive to the death (*maraṇā-nukūlavyāpāra*); and hence only the death is the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verb (*dhātvarthatāvacchedaka*); and also that the prohibiton *'brāhmaṇam na hanyāt'* is made only with respect to the person whose effort is intended to cause the death; Thus only when the death is related to the effort through the relation of being undertaken with the intention of causing the death (*svoddeśyakatva*) but not through the relation of conduciveness (*anukūlatā*), the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

agency described by the killing (*vadhakartṛtva*) can be explained to be the object of such a prohibition.

Reply of the objector

III. 23. Now it may be held as follows: That there is no harm even if the agency described by the operation adventitiously qualified by the death is admitted to be the object of such a prohibition. The shooting with the arrow with the objective of killing someone else too is a means to the hell provided that the same brings about the death of a Brahmin. However, only the injunction assigning (prescribing) the expiation for (one) causing the death must be explained to be not referring to the agency described by such an operation as its object; and such an explanation becomes tenable only in the event of including a term conveying the agency described by the operation conducive to the death with the objective of causing the death in the injunction assigning the expiation.

However, even then the non-pervasion is unavoidable in this theory in the case where the operation conducive to the death of the Brahmin is not undertaken with the intention (objective) of causing the death of the Brahmin; but rather the same is undertaken with the intention (objective) of causing the death of the Brahmin, dependent on the objective of some other fruit, which has the state of being such an operation as its qualifier. Since even in such a case, the full (whole) expiation is practised, the operation cannot be admitted to be non-item (object) to be covered by the definition of violence.

Explanation

According to the Pūrvapakṣin, i.e. the counter-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

objector, the death although cannot qualify the effort through the relation of being undertaken with the objective of causing the death (*svoddeśyakatva*), can qualify the effort adventitiously (*upalakaṣaṇatayā*); and therefore the effort, i.e. the agency described by the operation adventitiously qualified by the death of the Brahman (*maraṇopalakṣ-itavyāpārakartṛtva*), can be admitted to be the object of the prohibitory injunction *'brāhmaṇam na hanyāt'*. Also according to the Pūrvapakṣ in, the agency described by the operation of shooting with the arrows (*nārācakṣepa*) with the objective of causing the death of a deer (*anyoddeśena*) too can be admitted to be the object of the same prohibitory injunction, as the same too is the means to the hell by causing the death of a Brahmin. However, the same agency must be explained to be non-object of the injunction of expiation for causing the death (*maraṇaprāyaścittavidhi*), and such an explanation is possible only by forming the *vidhi* as *'maraṇoddeśeṇa-maranaṇānukūlavyāpārakartā prāyaścittam ācaret'*.

However, the original objector replies to the counter objection on the ground that even then the non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) of the agency by the *prāyaścittavidhi* in the case of the operation, not undertaken with the objective of causing the death of a Brāhmin (*brāhmaṇamaraṇ-akāmanā*), but undertaken only with the objective of stealing his money but nevertheless leading to the death of the Brāhmin (*phalāntarakāmanādhīna brāhmaṇ-amaraṇānukūlavyāpāraviṣayakecchā*), cannot be overcome in such a theory of the Pūrvapakṣin; and hence *hiṃsālak-ṣaṇa* is faulty.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Refutation of the original objection

III.24. No. this objection (cf. III. 21) is not correct of state. Like in the case where the operation is cognized to be the object to be accomplished through the effort as being only the operation conducive to the death, even in the case where the operation is cognized to be accomplished through the effort as being only particular operation, the effort referring to, i.e., producing the operation of striking with the sword undertaken with the objective of causing the death, i.e. the effect, refers to the operation as being only conducive to the death. For, the effort is admitted to be referring to, i.e. producing the means (operation) only as being associated with (leading to) the effect, i.e. the object of one's desire.

On the other hand, suppose it is admitted that the effect without being associated with means (operation) appears in the sentence meaning, then the usage 'He takes a walk for ones own satisfaction'. (*tṛptaye gamanam karoti*) would become necessary even in the case where a collective effort undertaken refers to objective of satisfaction and refers to (is conducive to) the operation of walking undertaken with the objective of some other effect (health). However, it is totally a different matter altogether as to whether the means (operation) being conducive to the effect is a relation or referrent-qualifier. This way in both cases, the effort has the state of referring (conducive) to the operation delimited by the effect (death) as its object and therefore in both eases, the agency described by the killing qual lified by the killingness and of the form of the possession of the effort referring (conducive) to the operation delimited by the qualifier (death) is unimpeded. Since even the state of being what is practiced with the objective of causing the death is included in the definition of the violence only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in the form of being what is referred to (produced) by the effort in association with the state of being conducive to the death, there occurs no untenabality.

Explanation

Gadādhara now refutes the objection raised in III. 21. According to him, in the case where the operation (*vyāpāra*) is cognized to be the object to be accomplished through the effort (*kṛtisādhya)* in the form of being the operation conducive to the death (*maraṇānukūla vyāpāratvena*), the effort, which is conducive to the operation undertaken with the objective of causing the effect such as the death (*maraṇarūpaphala-kāmanādhīnav-yāpāraviṣaya)* refers to the operation as being the means conducive to the death (*maraṇānūkūlatvena)*; and therefore, the same operation becomes the item to be covered by the definition of violence and the agent of such an operation becomes the object of the injunction of expiation. Similarly in the case where the operation is cognized to be the object to be accomplished through the effort in the form the being the striking with the sword (*khadgābhighātatvena)*, such an effort can be held to refer to the operation of striking with the sword (*khadgābhighāta)* as being the means conducive to the death; and therefore the same operation becomes the item to be covered by the definition of violence and the agent of such an operation becomes the object of the injunction of expiation. It should be noted here that the effort refers (is conducive) to the means (operation) only as being asociated with the effect such as the death, i.e. the object of one's desire (*kāmanāviṣayaphaloparāgeṇa)*, and not as not being associated with the effect (*viśrunkhalatayā)*. Otherwise, in the case where the collective effort (*samūhālambana kṛtiḥ*) refers to both the eating

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

undertaken with the objective of satisfaction and to the walking undertaken with the objective of some other fruit (*tṛptaye bhojanam madiṣṭasādhanam, phalāntarāya gamanam madiṣṭasādhanam*), the statement '*tṛptaye gamanam karoti*' would become necessary as both *tṛpti* and *gamana* can be the objects of such an effort. Thus, in the said case too, the effort refers (is conducive) to the operation of striking with the sword only as associated with (conducive to) the death and so such an operation is only the object of *himsālakṣaṇa*. Thus, in both the cases (where the operation of striking with the sword is accomplished through the effort both ways as being the operation of striking with the sword and as being the operation conducive to the death), the effort refers (is conducive) to the operation only as delimited by (conductive to) the death; and therefore, the agent of such an operation necessarily has the agency described by the killing qualified by the killingness (*viśiṣṭakartṛtva)*.

The qualification of adṛṣṭādvārakatva : Misra's opinion

III. 25. As a matter of fact, the person possessing the effort conducive to the cooking thruogh the unseen merit does not have the agency described by cooking etc. Therefore the qualification of the state of not having the unseen merit as the means is expected (required) only in the case of the action-conduciveness resident in the effort constituting the agency described by the particular action. However, the same qualification is not expected (required) in the case of the effect-conduciveness resident in the action of cooking. etc. Thus the qualification; namely, the state of not having the unseen merit as the (means) which is stated (included) by the author of the Tattva cintāmaṇi (ch.1) in the case of the death-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

conduciveness resident in the operation (action), does not constitute the part of the agency. However, Misra opines that the state of not having the unseen merit as the means is expected (required) to be the qualification only (in the death-conduciveness resident) in the effort included in the state of being what is practiced with the objective of causing the death; and also that the agency descirbed by the killing qualified by the killinness, consists of the qualification of the effort, namely the death-conduciveness, qualified by the state of not having the unseen merit as the means.

Explanation

The person who accomplishes the coooking through the unseen merit (*adṛṣta dvāra*) such as *maṇi, mantra* etc., may have the effort conducive to the cooking (*pākānukūlakṛti*); however, he cannot be considered as the agent of cooking (*pākakartṛ*). Thus to avoid the agency for the person accomplishing the cooking through the *adṛṣṭa*, the state of not having the unseen merit as its means (*adṛṣṭādvārakatva*) must be admitted to be the qualification of only the action-conductiveness resident in the effort (*kṛtiniṣṭhakriyānukūlatva*) and not of the effect-conduciveness resident in the action (*kriyāniṣṭha phalānūkulatva)*. Thus, Miśra states that the state of not having the unseen merit as its means (*adṛṣtādvārakatva*), included by the Maṇikāra as the qualification of the death (effect)-conduciveness (*maraṇarūpa-phalānukūlatva)* resident in the operation, though not consitituting the effort, needs to be viewed as the qualification of the death-conduciveness (*maraṇānukūlatva)* resident in the effort included in the state of being practiced with the objective of death (*anuṣṭhīyamānatva ghaṭakakṛti);* and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

hence, the same can be considered to be a constituent part of the agency. Also according to Misra, the agency described by the killing (*vadhakartṛtva*) consists of the death-conduciveness resident in the effort (*kṛtiniṣṭhamar-ṇānukūlatva),* i.e. the qualification of the effort, and so the agent of the operation produced by the effort conducive to the death that is not accomplished through the *adṛṣṭa,* can be considered to be the killer or harmful (*hiṃsaka*).

Conclusion

III. 26 : Thus, this way, the following theory emerges as the conclusion. That only the state of being the operation delimited by the effect such as the death is the basis or cause of the use of verbal root 'kill' (*hiṃs*). In the usage 'One ought not kill' (*na hiṃsyāt)* etc., the operation of killing expresssed by the root 'kill' is cognized to have the state of being the means (operation) to the particular usdesired end through the relation of the agency described by the operation of killing qualified by the effect of death. Though the Śyena sacrifice constitutes the sense of operation of killing expressed by the root 'kill' (*hiṃs*), the same is not present any where through such a relation of the agency, i.e. the delimiter of the causality. Since the agent of the Śyena sacrifice is devoid of the agency described by the operation leading to the effect of death consitituting the effect-conduciveness qualified by the state of not having the unseen merit as its means, the same agent need not have such an agency described by the killing qualified by the state of not having the unseen merit as its means. Now, since the Śyena sacrifice does not become the means (operation) of any particular undersired end as being the violence, the meaning of the injunction

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(i.e. the state of being the means to the desired end) is not contradictory with respect to the Śyena sacrifice even in the theory that the same meaning of the injunction is related to the action of the Śyena sacrifice.

Explantion

Now Gadādhara concludes his theory. According to him, the root 'kill' (*hims*) expresses the operation of killing delimited by the effect of death (*maraṇarūpa-phalāvacchinnavyāpāra*); and therefore in '*na himsyāt'* the operation of killing expressed by the root 'kill' (*hims*), which describes the agency of the killer causing the effect of death even without having the unseen merit as its means (*adṛṣṭādvāraka maraṇānukūlatyā)*, is cognized to be the means of the undesired end (*aniṣṭaviśeṣaṇa)*, i.e. the agent of the operation of killing conducive to the death not having the unseen merit as its means (*adṛ-ṣṭādvārakamaraṇānukūlavyāpārakartā)* is cognized to be the killer (harmful) and meeting the undesired end.

It should be noted here that the Śyena sacrifice is performed with the objective of causing the death (i.e. can be the meaning of the rooot kill) but the same is conducive to the death only through the unseen merit as its means (*adrṣṭa dvārā*); and therefore the same cannot be considered as *aniṣṭasādhana* by describing the agency of the killer by causing the death of the enemy without having the unseen merit as its means. (*adṛṣṭ ādvāraka maraṇānukūlatayā)*. Since the agent of Śyena sacrifice (*śyenakartṛ)* is devoid of the agency described by the operation conducive to the effect of death without having the unseen merit as its means (*adṛṭṣādvāraka-phalānukūla vyāpārakartṛtva)* (Śyena accomplishes the death only through the unseen merit), the agent of Śyena

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cannot be considered to be the agent of killing without having the unseen meirt as its means; and therefore the Śyena sacrifice cannot be perceived as *aniṣṭasādhana*.

Final conclusion that śyenānukūla kṛti is not the cause of death.

III. 27. As a matter of fact, the effort conducive to the Śyena sacrifice has only the state of being what is conducive to the death but does not have the state of being the cause of the death; for it is rendered redument in producing death. The Śyena sacrifice has been enjoined by the Scripture to have the causality only with respect to the killing of the enemy of the form of striking with the sword by some other agent as adventitiously qualified by the death. Though the effort conducive to the particular action is established to have causality with respect to the effect produced from the action, Śyena sacrifice has the causality only in the case of the striking with the sword etc. (and not in the case of death). Thus, the state of being what is conducive to the death constituting the delimitor of the relation of the producerness of the producer of the effect of the particular undesired end must be admitted to be the state of being only the cause producing the death and not merely the state of being what is conducive to the death. Therefore, the state of not having the unseen merit as its means need not be included in the said definition of violence. Or as an alternative, it can be suggested that the qualificdation of the state of not having the unseen merit as its means is admitted in the definition only for the sake of obtaining the inclusion of the qualification ending with the phrase 'the state of being the cause'.

It may be held now that the state of being what is intended to convey the relation of the entity (operation)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with the qualified entity (death) is generally compulsory in the Vedic statements, and therefore, the Vedic statement *(śyenenābhicaran yajeta),* that produces the cognition of being the means to the killing, conveys even the state of being the means (cause) to the death functioning as the qualifier to the Śyena sacrifice. However, even then the state of being the means (cause) to the death is invalid (unjustified) for the effort that is conducive to the Śyena sacrifice; for the rule that the effort producing the action is the producer of effect produced by the action is invalid.

Explanation

Gadādhara now states the reason for not considering the effort conducive to the Śyena sacrifice (*śyenānukūlakṛti)* as the cause of the death (*maraṇkāraṇa)*. According to him, such an effort canot be held to be the cause of death, as the same effort is rendered redundat in accomplishing the death (*anyathāsiddha)*. The scripture '*śyenenābhicaran yajeta*' actually conveys only the fact that the Śyena sacrifice is the cause of the operation of killing of the enemy (*vairivaddha)* such as the striking with the sword (carried out by some one else and) leading to the death (*maraṇopalakṣita khadgābhighāta)*. He therefore holds that even by admitting the rule that the effort conducive to the particular action is the cause of the effect produced by the action (*kriyājanyakārye tatkriyānukūlakṛtir hetuḥ)*, the effort conducive to Śyena sacrifice need not be considered to be the cause of the death.

Gadādhara further holds that the state of being conducive to the death (*maraṇānukūlatva)* in the relation delimiting the producerness of the producer of the effect such as the undesired end (*aniṣṭaviśeṣaphalajanakatāv-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

achedakapratyāsatti) (cf. III. 26) is only the state of causing the death (*maraṇakāraṇatva)* and not merely the state of being indirectly conducive to the death; and hence the Śyena sacrifice which is only indirectly conducive to the death but not the direct cause of death can be exculuded from being considered to be violence (*himsā)*; and therefore the state of not having the unseen merit as its meaning (*adṣṣṭadvārakatva*) need not be included in the *himsālakṣaṇa* to avoid Śyena sacrifice being considered as voilence.

It is generally admitted that the Vedic statements convey only the relation of the item (operation) with the qualified item (death). *(viśiṣṭānvaya);* and on that ground it is objected now that the statement *'śyenenābhicaran yajeta'* that prescribes the Śyena-sacrifice as the means to the killing, can convey the Śyena sacrifice as the direct cause of the death, i.e. the qualifier, while conveying the same as the means conducive to the striking with the sword causing the death, i.e. the qualified; and thus, the Śyena sacrifice cannot be excluded from being considered as the violence unless the phrase '*adṛṣṭādvārakatva*' is included in the *himsālakṣ ana*. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the rule that the effort conducive to the action is the cause of the effect produced by the particular action is invalid and so the Śyena sacrifice conducive tot he striking with the sword need not be the cause of the death, i.e. the effect produced from the striking.

Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva is not untenable.

III. 28. It may be objected now as follows: That the agent of shooting the arrow with the intention of killing some one else (deer) may not have the agency

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

described by the qualified killing constituting the possession of the effort conducive to the qualified death of the Brahmin; however, he qualifies for the half expiation for the sin produced from the killing. Similarly the agent of Śyena sacrifice may not have the agency described by the qualified killing; however, he too qualifies for the half expiation for the sin as half sin is inevitable; and thus the absence of the state of not being connected with (i.e conducive to) the greater undesired end becomes unavoidable.

However, this objection too is not correct. Since the half expiation is prescribed for the (person committing the) sin procduced from the unintended action (operation), the same unintended action (opration) delimited by (conducive to) the death needs to be assumed to have an independent (separate) causality in the case of the lesser sin through the relation of the posession of the effort conducive to the qualified death; and this is to be achieved by not including the objectness of the intended action (operation) delimited by (conducive to) the death. And on the strength of such an assumption, the agent of the Śyena sacrifice, who is not the agent of the qualified killing (and therefore devoid of the possession of the effort conducive to the qualified death), can avoid the originatoin of sin produced from the violence of killing. It may be objected again now as follow: That the state of producing the operation of killing which is merely adventitiously qualified by the effect such as the death can be included in the relation of the operation of killing due to economy. However, this objection too is not correct to state. The economy in the assumption, if it contradicts the sense of the Vedic scripture, is useless. Although in the case of Vedic statements, the relation of the operation with the qualified

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

death is generally valid, the sense conveyed by the injunction would have the contigency of contradiction if the Śyena sacrifice is held to be the producing cause of the death. Therefore the Śyena-sacrifice must be admitted to be rendered redundant by the shooting in effecting the death; and thus the same Śyena-sacrifice could very well be explained to be devoid of the state of being the operation conducive to the death functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verb 'kill' (*hims)* qualified by the producingness.

Explanation

When shooting is carried out with the objective of killing a deer (*anyoddeśena)*, but by chance the death of a Brahmin occurs, the agent of shooting (*nārācakṣ epakartṛ)* is admitted to qualify for the half of expiation for killing despite that he does not have the agency described by the qualified killing (*viśiṣṭakartṛtva)* such as the possession of the effort conducive to the qualified death (*viśiṣṭa viṣayaka karṭrtva)*. Thus, on this ground, it is objected that the agent of the Śyena-sacrifice qualifies for the half of expiation for killing dispite the fact that he does not have the actual agency described by the qualified killing (*viśiṣṭakartṛtva);* and so that the state of not being connected with (i.e. conducive to) the greater undesired end (evil) (*balavadaniṣṭānanu-bandhitava)* of the Śyena-sacrifice to be expressed by the injunction would become contradicted.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that even the person commiting the sin resulting from the operation undertaken without any intention of causing the death (*akāmakṛta)* has been prescribed half

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the expiation; and therefore, the operation undertaken without any intention for causing the death too must be assumed separately to be the cause of the lesser sin through the relation of the possession of the effort conducive to the qualified death *(viśiṣṭajanakakṛtimattva)*. Thus, the agent of the Śyena-sacrifice does not qualify for the full expiation (*sampūrṇa prāyaścitta);* and so the state of not being connected with (i.e. conducive to) the greater undesired end (evil) of the Śyena-sacrifice need not be contradicted.

Śyena need not be balavadaniṣṭānubandhi.

III. 29. It is again objected now as follow; That if the Śyena sacrifice intervened by the unseen transcendental merit causing the striking with the sword is rendered redundant by the unseen transcendental merit in the case of producing the death, then the operation of killing of the killer too would become redundant in the case of producing the death. Consequently, only the operation which is the immediate cause in the case of producing the death would be the cause; and even the effort causing the operation would be redundant in the case of producing the death, and therefore the possession of the effort causing the operation in turn causing the death would not be the cause of any death. However, this objection is not correct to state. In accordance with the usage such as 'He cooks' (*pacati*) at the time of the winnowing of the chaff, the same winnowing of the chaff, though intervened by the effect such as the softening of the rice grains, is admitted to be not rendered redundant in producing the cooking; in the same way in accordance with the statement such as 'He kills' (*hanti)* at the time of the operation of practicing of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

striking with the sword etc., the same striking with the sword, though intervened (by the effect), must be admitted to be not rendered redundant in producing the death. This way, our theory is sound (justified).

Explanation

Now the Pūrvapaksin raises an objection that the Śyena sacrifices needs to be admitted as the cause of the death and hence it is only conducive to greater evil (*balavadaniṣṭānubhandhi).* According to him, suppose the Śyena-sacrifice, due to being intervened by the *adṛṣṭa,* is held to be rendered redundant (*anyathāsiddha),* then the operation of the actual killer (*hananakartṛvyāpāra*) too being intervened by effect, i.e. the injury etc., would become (rendered) redundant; and hence all the efforts that cause the operations functioning as the immediate causes of the death too would become redundant as they too are intervenend by some operations causig the death. Thus, the Śyena sacrifice though intervened by the operation of the actual killer must be held to be connected with (conducive to) greater undesired end (evil) (*balavadaniṣṭānubandhi).*

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection. According to him, the operation of stricking with the sword (*khadgaprakṣepādi vyāpāra),* though intervened by some other operation (effect), needs to be admitted as the cause of death in accordance with the statement '*hanti*' at the time of the striking with the sword; whereas the Śyena-sacrifice need not be admitted as the cause of the death as the usage '*hanti*' is not prevalent at the time of the Śyena sacrifice. Thus the Śyna-sacrifice, unlike the striking with the sword, being rendered redundant

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*anyathāsidha*) in causing the death, need not be connected with any greater undersired end (evil) (*balavadaniṣṭa*).

Agent of Yantrārpaṇa qualifies for expiation.

III. 30. Like the usage 'He cooks' (*pacati*) is absent at the time of the buying of the rice grains, the usage 'He kills' (*hanti*) is also absent at the time of the making of the sword etc.; and therefore the operation of making the sword cannot be held as the object of voilence as the same is rendered redundant in producing the death. Also just as the fixing (setting) up of the tiger-trap with the objective of causing the death of the tiger is not of the form of the violence (killing of the cow), though by chance the death of a holy cow occurs therein, in the same way the same fixing (setting) up of the tiger-trap is not even of the form the violence (killing) of the tiger, as the usage 'He kills' (*hanti*) is not made at the time of the fixing (setting) up of the tiger-trap. However, it should be noted that although the operation (which is practised with the objective of causing the death of the enemy but by chance does not cause the death of enemy) does not qualify for being the violence, the operation produced from the effort condusive to the death of the enemy without having the unseen merit as its means, is, like the violence, the cause of the sin (death). Thus in the said context, the operation of fixing (setting) up of the tiger-trap, when established to have the objective of causing the death of the cow, qualifies for being the violence; and hence the trap-setter needs to undergo the expiation for killing the cow.

Explanation

Gadādhara concludes now the discussion on the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Śyena-sacrifice by incidentally examining the need for practicing the expiation by the agent in setting up of the tiger-trap (*yantrārpaṇa)* for catching the tiger. According to him, the usage '*hanti'* is never made at the time of the making of the sword (*khadga nirmāṇadaśāyām*); and therefore, neither the same operation qualifies for violence nor the agent of such an operation qualifies for the expiation. Similarly, the usage '*hanti'* is never made at the time of the fixing (setting) up of the tiger-trap (*yantrārpaṇadaśāyām)* for catching the tiger; and therefore neither the same operation qualifies for the violence (it can neither be violence to the tiger nor to the cow), nor the agent of such an operation qualifies for the expiation. However, Gadādhara establishes that since the operation of fixing the tiger trap caused from the effort (undertaken with the intention of) causing the death of the cow without having the unseen transcendental merit as its means (*adṛṣṭādvāraka tanmaraṇaprayojakakṛtij-anyavyāpāra)* is conducive to the sin caused from the death of the cow, the operation qualifies for being the violence; and therefore the agent of the operation qualifies for the full expiation. Thus he establishes his theory that the operation of striking the enemy with the sword practiced with the objective of causing the death of the enemy qualifies for the violence and the agent of such an operation qualifies for the full expiation.

Cognition of agency : Conclusion

III. 31. In the cases such as 'Caitra cooks ' (*caitraḥ pacati)* etc., the action of cooking needs to be related to the effort through the relations of both the object-referringness and the producerness to explain the congnition of the agency consisting of (referring to) the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

objectness of the cooking. Here although the object-referringness naturally constitutes the relation, the producerness too needs to be included in the category of the relation; for, the producerness has the capacity for avoiding the validity of the usage such as 'He cooks and sees' (*pacati paśyati)* in the cases where the cooking etc. are not produced. Similarly, in the passive cases such as 'It is cooked by Caitra' *(caitreṇa pacyate)* etc. too, the effort, i.e. the sense expressed by the instrumental, is to be cognized as relating to the action of cooking etc. through the relations of both the objectness and the producedness. However, suppose the state of being produced by the effort is held to be the meaning of the instrumental, then the objectness (resident in the cooking) which describes oneself (the state of being the object produced by the effort) must be included in the relation of the producedness. Or as an alternative it can be held that the state of being the object of the effort is the sense expressed by the instrumental and the producedness (resident in the cooking) which describes oneself (the state of being the object of the effort) must be included in the relation of the objectness.

Explanation

Gadādhara here concludes the section on the congnition of the agency expressed by the instrumental. According to him, in the active statements such as *caitraḥ pacati* etc. the cognition that Caitra is the abode of the effort referring to (i.e. conducive to) the cooking *(pākānukūla kṛtimān caitraḥ)* is produced; and therefore to facilitate such a cognition the action of cooking is to be related to the effort through the relations of both the object-referringness (*viṣayitā)* and the producerness (*upadhāyakatva*). Similarly in the cognition that the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cooking is the abode of the producedness described by the effort resident in Caitra *(caitranişṭhakṛtijanytvā) (viṣayatvā śrayaḥ pākaḥ)* is produced and therefore, to facilitate such a congition the effort needs to be related to the cooking through the relations of both the producedness (*janyatva*) and the objectness (*viṣayatva)*. However, Gadādhara notes that suppose the state of being produced by the effort (*kṛtijanyatva*) or the state of being the object of the effort (*kṛtiviṣayatva*) is to be admitted as the meaning of the instrumental, then the same should be related to the action of cooking through the relation of the state of being the object of the effort describeing itself (the state of being produced) *(svanirūpakaviṣayatva)* or the state of being produced by the effort describing itself (the state of being the object) (*svanirūpakajanyatva)* (here since both *kṛtijanyatva* and *kṛtiviṣayatva* are occurrent in the cooking, they are mutually described by each other).

Nature of Instrumentality (karaṇatva) in 'kāṣṭhena pacati' etc.

III. 32. In the cases such as "He cooks by means of wood'' *(kāṣṭhena pacati)*, the peculiar instrumentality is the meaning of the instrumental and the same is the state of being the cause possessing an operation. Here the state of being dependent on the operation of the agent is to be included in the operation. Otherwise, due to the contingency of the instrumentality for even the agent, the statements such as 'Caitra cooks by Caitra' (*caitraḥ caitreṇa pacati),* 'The wood cooks by Caitra' (*kāṣṭhaḥ caitreṇa pacati)* etc. would become necessary, However, it should not be objected that since the operation such as the causing the movement of the agent is dependent on the operation for the agent such as his effort, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

contingency of the instrumentality of the agent is unavoidable. The agent (in the state of being dependent on the operation of the agent) must be qualified as different from oneself.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara takes up the issue of the explanation of the instrumentality expressed by the instrumental case. According to him, the instrumentality (*karaṇatva)* expressed by the instrumental (cf. *karaṇe tṛtīyā,* P.i. 4.42); and further the operation (*vyāpāra)* must be viewed as being dependent on the operation of the agent (*kartṛvyāpārādhīna)*. He holds so because only the inanimate item such as the axe (*kuṭhāra),* whose operation of going up and down (*ūrdhvādhaḥpatana*) is dependent on the animate agent of Caitra, can be the instrument (*karaṇa*) in *kuṭhāreṇa chinatti caitraḥ etc.;* whereas an animate item such as Caitra, whose operation of causing to move up and down *(udyamana nipātana)* is not dependent on nay other animate operation, cannot be the instrument; and so '*caitraḥ caitreṇa pacati*'etc., are wrong. Also according to Gādādhara, the agent (*kartṛ*) such as Caitra need not become the instrument (*karaṇa)* in '*caitraḥ kuṭhāreṇa chinatti*' just because his operation of causing to move up and down is dependent on the effort of himself *(tadīyakṛtyādirūpavyāpārādhīna)* as the agent (*kartṛ)* in the operation of the agent (*kartṛvyāpāra)* is meant to be other than himself (*svabhinna*).

Avoidance of '*caitras tuṣaiḥ' maitras* kāṣṭaiḥ pacati.

III. 33. That in the case where only one action of cooking etc. is produced (carried out) by Caitra by woods and by Maitra by winnowing the chaff etc., respectively,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the contingency of the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra cooks by winnowing the chaff and Maitra cooks by the woods' (*caitras stuṣaiḥ maitraḥ kāṣṭhaiḥ pacati)* needs to be avoided by admitting that the state of being dependent on the operation of the particular agent uttered together is cognized in the operation of the particular instrument.

However, it should not be objected now that if the instrumentality as inclusive of the particular agent uttered together is held to be the meaning of the instrumental, then the use of the instrumental case in the sense of the instrument would become untenable in the case where the word expressing the agent is not explicitly stated. Even in such cases (as '*kāṣṭhena pacati),* the instrumental is possible in the mere sense of the cause (P.ii. 3. 23), like in the case of the statements such as 'The family is on account of the wealth' (*dhanena kulam)*, 'Fame is on account of trhe education' (*vidyayā yaśaḥ*) etc. Certainly in such cases the instrumental case is not used in the sense of the instrument as there is no association with any action.

Explanation

According to Gadādhara, when Caitra and Maitra accomplish the single act of cooking by the woods and by the winnowing the chaff, the incorrect statemnet '*caitras stuṣaiḥ maitraḥ kāṣṭhaih pacati,* can be avoided by holding that the instrumentality (*karaṇatva)* is the state of being the cause possessing the operation dependent on the operation of the agent who is other than oneself but associated with oneself (*svasamabhivyāhṛta svabhinnakartṛ vyāpārādhina vyāpāravat karaṇatva).* Since the operation of winnowing the chaff is not dependent on

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the operation of Caitra associated with oneself and also since the operation of the woods is not dependent on the operation of Maitra associated with oneself, the statement is avoided.

It should be noted here that since the instrumentality of an instrument (*karaṇátva)* is to be understood in relation with the agent, the instrumental in the sense of the instrument is not possible in the cases where there is no word expressing the agent such as *'kāṣṭhena pacati'* etc.; and therefore the instrumental in such cases needs to be viewed as the case ending used in the sense of the cause (*hetu)* (P.ii. 3. 23).

P. ii. 3.18. is necessary to explain negative statement.

III. 34. Now it may be objected as follows: That this way in the said case, there cannot be any answer excepting desired contingency when the usage such as 'Caitra cooks by winnowing the chaff' (*cairtraṣ stuṣeṇa pacati)* is imposed on account of the rule 'The instrumental is used in the sense of the cause' (*hetau* P.ii. 3.23). And therefore there occurs futility in the inclusion of the qualification, i.e. the agent associated with in the definition of the instrument, or in the separate rule of instrumental in the sense of instrument. (P.ii. 3. 18).

However, this objection is not correct to state. Though in the said case, the absence of the state of having the winnowing of the chaff as its cause is contradictory with the cooking, the usage 'Caitra does not cook by the winnowing of the chaff but only by woods' (*caitras stuṣeṇa na pacati kim tu dāruṇaiva)* needs to be facilitated; and therefore, the assumption of the expressive power of the instrumental case becomes necessary in the instrument by including the aspect of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the agent associated with it. And the separate rule of instrumental in the sense of instrument (P.ii. 3.18) becomes necessary only to grasp the expressive power in such an instrument.

Moreover in the usages such as 'This is the one whose leaves are cut off by the arrows' (*śaraiḥ śātitapatro' yam)* etc., the correctness of the compounding of the word 'leaves' (*patra)* with the word 'being cut of' (*śātita*), whose meaning is related to the instrumen-tality of the instrument, expressed by the instrumental, is possible only in the case of the instrumental being held to be a *kāraka*-case. It should not be objected, however, that when the instrumental is held to be expressing the instrumentality of the instrument that includes the aspect of the agent associated with it, the state of being the non-*kāraka* case becomes unavoidable in the instrumental case there (in *śaraiḥ śātitapatro' yam)* even though the separate rule assigns the instrumental in the sense of the instrumentality, as there is no agent word uttered in association with there of. For, only in accordance with such a difficulty, the word expressing the agent needs to be implied there in such cases.

Explanation

If causal instrumental (*hetau tṛtīyā,* P.ii. 3. 23) is tenable for the wood (*kāṣṭha)* in *'kāṣṭhena pacati,* then the same could be tenable even in the case where Caitra and Maitra accomplish a single cooking; and hence the statement '*caitras stuṣeṇa pacati'* would become unavoidable. Thus, it is objected that the definition of the instrumentality (*karaṇatva)* as *kartṛvyāpārādhīna-vyāpāravat karaṇatva* and the separate rule (P.ii. 3. 18) of instrumental in such an instrumentality (*karaṇatva)* are

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

unnecessary. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that such a definition of the instrumentality and the separate rule (P. ii. 3.18) are necessary to explain the statement such as *'caitraḥ stuṣeṇa na pacati kim tu dāruṇaiva'.* Here the statement is to be explained by holding that the instrumental in the sense of instrumentality *(karaṇe tṛtīyā)* (P.ii. 3. 18) is not possible after chaff *(tuṣa)* due to the absence of the instrumentality in the chaff *(tuṣa),* i.e. due to the absence of the *samabhivyāhṛtacaitravyāpārādhīnatva* in the operation of the chaff (*tuṣa*).

Further such a definition of the instrumentality and the separate rule (P.ii. 3. 18) are necessary to explain the compounding of the word 'leaves' *(patra)* with the word being cut (*śātita*) in *'śaraiḥ śātitapatro'yam'.* Here the compounding of the word 'leaves' (*partra*) with the word 'being cut' (*śātita*) is possible only if the arrows (*śara*) are the instrumental *kārakas* (and not the non-*kārakas)* and are related to the action of cutting expressed by *śātita*. Now, the arrows (*śara*) can be explained as the instrumental *kārakas* only when the rule (P.ii. 3.18) assigns the instrumental in the instruments and not in the causes of cutting.

Further justification of the rule

III. 35 As a matter of fact, the instrumental case has two separate expressive powers: one in the agent uttered along with it and the other in the state of being the cause possessing the operation. And in the case where the word expressing agent is not uttered along with, only the state of being the cause possessing the operation is cognized. However, in the case where the word expressing the agent is uttered along with, even the state of being dependent on the operation of the agent

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is cognized wigh respect to the operation of the instrument. Thus this theory is sound.

Moreover, the instrumental ruled in the sense of the cause (P.ii. 3.23) is contradicted by the rule assigning the ablative "A word implying debt considered as a cause but not as agent takes ablative affix" *(akartaryaṇe,* P.ii. 3. 24); and therefore, when the instrumentality is intended, the separate rule (P.ii. 3.18) assigning the instrumental in the sense of the instrumentality is necessary to facilitate the instrumental in the statement 'He is bound by the rich man through his debt.' *(dhanavatā ṛṇena baddho' yam)*. And only the state of being the cause that is of the form of the producing the effect (efficaciousness) constitutes the instrumentality. Otherwise, in the case of cutting asunder by means of the axe etc. even the sickle blade (*dātṛ*) would have the contingency of having the instrumentality as the same too has the innate nature to cut asunder.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains his own opinion. According to him, when the instrumentality (*karaṇatva)* is defined as the state of being the cause possessing the operation dependent on the operation of the agent uttered along with it (*samabhivyāhṛtakartṛvyāpārādhīna vyāpāravatkaraṇatva)*, the instrumental can be admitted to have two separate expressive powers in the two aspects: namely, the state of being the cause possessing the operation (*vyāpārāvatkaraṇatva*), and the state of being dependent on the operation of the agent uttered along with (*sambhivyāhṛta kartṛvyāpārādhīnatva);* and therefore only the first aspect can be congnized in the event where the agent-word is absent and both the aspects can be congized when the agent-word is present.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Further, Gadādhara provides one more reason as to why a separate rule assigning the instrumental in the sense of the instrumentality is necessary. According to him, the rule (P.ii. 3. 18) is necessary to facilitate the instrumental after the word 'by means of debt' (*ṛṇa)* in '*dhanavatā ṛṇena baddho' yam* as the instrumental in the sense of the cause (*hetu*) is prevented by the rule '*akartaryaṇe*' (P.ii.3.24) assigning the ablative after a word implying debt considered as a cause.

Meaning of instrumetal in '*dhūmena vahnim anuminomi*'

III.36. In the theory that the knowledge of the probans is the instrument of the inference, the word 'the smoke' (*dhūma*) in 'I infer the fire throungh the smoke' (*dhūmena vahnim anuminomi*) is intended to convey the knwoledge of the smoke. The consideration referring to the qualification of the probans qualified by the invariable concomitance is the operation of the knowledge of the probans qualified by the invariable concomitance. Since such an operation is dependent on the operation of the inferring (knowing) person such as the contact between the mind and the self, the knowledge of the smoke has the said instrumentality unharmed in it.

In the case of the inference of the fire through the probans such as the smoke, where the pot etc. are cognized by chance through some other probans, the usage I infer the pot through the smoke (*dhūmena ghaṭam anuminomi)* is not made. The state of being the describer of the instrumentality, appearing as being delimited by the state of being the knowledge of the smoke etc, i.e. the delimitor of the relatendness, should be admitted only with respect to the inference delimited

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by the state of being the inference having the fire as the qualifier, i.e. the delimitor of the relatedness. However, it is a different matter that in the theory of the Prācyas, who advocate the instrumentality in general to be the meaning of the instrumental, the state of being the describer of the instrumentality appears as the relation; whereas in the theory of the Navyas, the same state of being the describer of the instrumentality is related to the absence expressed by the negative praticle as being the counterpositive; and in accordance with such a relation, such a state of being the describer needs to be admitted as the meaning of the instrumental; and thus the same appears as the qualifier.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the instrumentality in the inference. According to him, when the knowledge of the probans (*liṅgajñāna),* instead of probans (*liṅga*), is admited by the Navyas as the instrument of inference (*anumitikaraṇ*), the word '*dhūma*' in '*dhūmena vahmim anuminomi*' needs to refer to the knowledge of the somke (*dhūmajñāna)* as the instrument; and the consideration (*parāmarśa),* by referring to the qualification of teh qualified knowledge of the probans (smoke) qualified by the invariable concomitance (*vyāptivviśiṣṭa hetujñānasya viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi*) needs to function as the operation (*vyāpāra)* of the instrument; and since the same is dependent on the operation of the human agent such as the contact between the mind and the self (*ātmamanas samyoga*), the knowledge of the smoke referring to such an operation can be the instrument of inference. It should be noted here that when the fire is being inferred through the smoke but by chance a pot too is cognized,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the statement '*dhūmena ghaṭam anuminomi*' is not to be made; and the same is avoided on the ground that the state of being the describer (*nirūpakatva)* of the instrumentality cognized as delimited by the state of being the knowledge of the smoke (*dhūmajñānāvacchinnatvena bhāsamānakaraṇatva)* is found only in the inference delimited by the state of being the inference having the fire as the predicate (*vahnividheyakānumititvāvacchedena),* i.e. that only the inference having the fire as the predicate to be established (*vahnividheyakānumiti)* is the describer of the instrumentality resident in the knowledge of the smoke (*dhūmajñānaniṣṭha karaṇatyā)*; and therefore, the inference having the pot as the predicate to be established (*ghaṭavidheyakānumiti)* cannot be the describer of the instrumentality resident in the knowledge of the smoke.

Position of others.

III. 37. However, the others hold here as follows; That though the knowledge of the probans is the instrument (of inference), the word smoke (*dhūma)* in 'I infer the fire through the smoke' is intended to convey only the primary sense of the smoke; and the instrumental there can be facilitated by the rule 'Instrumental is used in the sense of the cause' (*hetau,* P.iii. 3.23.) as merely the causeness of the form of the conduciveness common to even the delimitor of the causality of the cause is intended there in the rule. Since the smoke, i.e. the object of the knowledge of the probans (*liṅga)* producing the inference, is the delimitor of the caususlity of the cause of the inference, the conduciveness is unharmed, i.e. intact, in the smoke. However, in the said case of the collective inference of the fire and the pot, the overpervasion must be avoided

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by admitting that the state of being the describer of the conduciveness (i.e. causality of the cause) is cognized only with respect to the inference delimited by the state of being the inference having the fire as the predicate to be established.

As a mater of fact, the state of being the describer of the conduciveness resident in the producer (cause) etc. is unharmed even for the delimitor of the effectness like for the effect; and it is established (evidenced) by the valid knowledge. Thus, the conducedness (producedness), i.e. the instrumental meaning, must be admitted to be related (through the describerness) to the state of having the particular item (fire) as the predicate, functioning as the qualifier to the inference, i.e. the accusative word-meaning. Since the state of having the pot etc. as the predicate, resident in the collective type of inference of both the fire and the pot, is not produced by the smoke etc., the said overpervasion is avoided.

In the negative statement 'I infer the fire through the smoke but not through the pot' (*dhūmena vahnim anuminomi na ghaṭena)* etc., the absence of the state of being produced from the pot is not related to the inference; but rather the same is related to the state of having the fire etc. as its predicate, which is the qualificand (relatum) of the counterpositive of the absence expressed by the negative. Therefore, in the case of the inference of the fire through the probans such as the smoke, where the substanceness etc. are also cognized through the probans such as the pot etc., the statement 'I infer the fire through the smoke but not through the pot' *(dhūmena vahnim anuminomi na ghaṭena)* is facilitated. Though in the case of such an inference of collective form, the absence of the state of being produced from the probans such as the pot is absent,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the same is unharmed (present) in the state of having the fire etc. as its predicate. However, it is not possible to state that in the case of the collective inference, the absence of the state of being produced from the probans such as the pot etc., which is delimited by the state of (the inference) having the substanceness etc. as its predicate, is contradictory in the state of (the inference) having the fear etc. as the predicate to be established in general. For, the state of being produced does not have a pervasive occurrence (i.e. it can be present in the state of having the fire etc. as its predicate to be established, although it is contradictroy in the state of having the substanceness as its predicate to be established).

Explanation :

Now Gadādhara reports the position of some others who insist that the word '*dhūma*' in '*dhūmena vahnim anuminomi*' conveys the primary sense of the smoke although only the knowledge of the probans (*liṅgajñāna)* is the instrument of inference (*anumitikaraṇa)*. According to them, the rule *hetau'* (P. ii. 3. 23.) can facilitate the instrumental after '*dhūma*' in the sense of the causality of the form of the conduciveness (producerness) (*prayojakatva)* common to even the delimitor of the causeness of the causes (*kāraṇatāvacchedakasādhāraṇa);* and since the smoke is the object of the knowledge of the smoke causing the inference (*janakajñānaviṣaya),* the same can be the delimitor of the causeness of the cause; and thus can be the producer of the inference of the fire.

However, Gadādhara's own opinion may be summed up here as follows : That only the effect qualified by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the delimitor of the effectness (*kāryatāvacchedakaviśiṣṭa kārya)* is the describer of the procucerness resident in the producer (*janakaniṣṭha prayojakatā);* and hence even the delimitor, of the effectness, like the effect, can be admitted to be the describer of the producerness. Thus, the producerness of the smoke (*dhūmaprayojakatva)* expressed by '*dhūmena'* can be related to the state of having the fire as the predecate, i.e. the delimiter of the effectness of the inference (*kāryatāvacchedaka vahnividheyakatva)* expressed by '*vahnim'* through the describerness in *dhūmena vahnim anuminomi*' However, in the negative statements such as *'dhūmena vahnim anuminomi na ghaṭena'*, the absence of the state of being produced by the pot (*ghaṭaprayojyatvābhāva)* expressed by '*naghaṭena*' is related to only the state of having the fire as the predicate (*vahnividheyakatva),* i.e. the qualificand of the meaning of the instrumental (*tṛtīyārthānvayi)* and not to the collective inference of both fire and substanceness (*vahnyādyanumiti).* Consequently, the usage '*dhūmena vahnim anuminomi na ghaṭena'*, where the substanceness is cognized through the pot, can be explained. Here the absence of the state of being produced by the pot (*ghaṭaprayojyatvābhāva)* can be related to the state of having the fire as the predicate. (*vahnividheyakatva*) although the same is absent in the collective inference of both the fire and the substanceness (*samūhālambanānumiti)* having the state of bieng produced by the pot (*ghaṭa prayojyatva).*

Refutation of alternative position .

III. 38. From this the following position too becomes refuted : "That the instrumental conveys the state of having the knowledge of the probans such as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the smoke as the instrument in the inference of the probandum such as the fire, as the instrumental is assigned (used) only in the sense of the instrument there." For, in the said case of collective inference, the competency of the relation of the absence of the state of being produced from the pot expressed by the instrumental would be untenable with respect to such an inference. Also, the following position too is not correct. "That in such a case, the instrumental and the associated negative particle convey separately the state of being the delimitor of being what is produced from the instrument such as the knowledge of the smoke and its absence with respect to the state of having the fire etc. as its predicate to be established". For, the meaning expressed by a *kāraka*- case- ending cannot be related to any item that is other than the action.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara refutes the alternative position proposed by some others. According to them, in '*dhūmena vahnim anuminomi*', the instrumental after '*dhūma*' can be admitted to express only the instrumentality (*karaṇatva)* and not the causality (*hetutva);* and thus, the state of having the instrument such as the knowledge of the smoke can be related to the inference and not to the state having the fire as the predicate (*vahnividheyakatva).* However, this position is untenable because in the negative usage '*dhūmena vahnim anuminomi na ghaṭena*', the absence of the state of having the instrument such as the knowledge of the pot cannot be related to the collective inference. (it has both the state of having the instrument such as the knowledge of the smoke and that of instrument such as the knowledge of the pot in it). Also the meaning expressed

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by a *kāraka-* case must be admitted to be relating to only an action such as inference (*kriyānvayi kārakam);* and therefore the position that both the state of having the instrument such as the knowledge of the smoke and the absence of the state of having the instrument such as the knowledge of the pot are related to the state of having the fire as the predicate to be established (*vahnyādi vidheyakatva)* is also untenable.

Refutation of yet another alternative

III. 39. Now it may be suggested as follows: That in the said case of negative statement '*dhūmena vahnim anuminomi na ghaṭena*', the negative conveys the fact that the absence of the state of possessing the inference having the state of being produced by the knowledge of the probans such as the pot etc. (that is) resident in the human agent is cognized to be relating to the state of (inference) having the fire etc. as the predicate; and such an inference (possessing the state of being produced by the knowledge of the probans such as the pot) is quite established in the event of the illusion that the pot etc. is the probans of the fire.

However, this position is not correct to state. They hold that in such a position, the cognition of the absence of the state of possessing the inference would become untenable in the case of the usage such as 'This is the inference of the fire through the smoke but not through the pot' (*dhūmena vahner anumānam idam na ghaṭena)*.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara concludes his theory by refuting yet another alternative position. According to the alternative position, in the case of the negative statement '*dhūmena*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

vahnim anuminomi na ghaṭena', the state of having the fire etc. as the predicate (*vahnyādividheyakatva)* refers to only the inference having the state of being produced through the knowledge of the probans such of the smoke (*dhūmādiliṅgajñānajanyatāvadanumiti);* and therefore, the absence of the state of possessing the inference having the state of being produced by the knowledge of the probans such as the pot (*ghaṭādirūpaliṅgajñanajanyatāvad anumiti mattvābhāva),* is tenable to be related to it. However, Gadādhara refutes the position as untenable. Though in the finite usage '*dhūmena vahnim anuminomi na ghaṭena'*, the absence of the state of possessing such an inference resident in the human agent expressed by the conjugational ending, is possible to be related to the state of having the fire etc. as the predicate through *sāmānādhikaraṇya,* the same cannot be related to the same in the non-finite usage '*dhūmena vahner anumanam idam na ghaṭena'* as there is no conjugational ending to express the human agent.

Tṛtīyārtha in the expressions without action-denoting verbs.

III. 40. In the cases such as 'The mountain is known to be the possessor of the fire through the smoke' (*parvato dhūmena vahnimān),* the instrument is used only in the sense of the cause, as there is no association with any action. In such cases, the causality of the cause of the form of being the object of the knowledge that produces the knowledge (of fire), or the state of possessing the cause of the form of being the object to be known through the knowledge of the probans is the meaning of the instrumental. The term 'cause' (*hetu)* is actually synonymous with the means or instrument but not synonymous with the producing knowledge. However,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the term 'cause' (*hetu)* in the rule 'The instrumental is used in the sense of the cause' (*hetau)* (P. ii. 3.23) is not inended to convey only the causality of the cause described by the effect uttered together (fire), but rather intended to convey the causality of the cause described either by the effect uttered together (fire) or by the knowledge of the same associated effect (fire). Consequently, the rule *'hetu', P.ii. 3.23.* can assign even the instrumental after the words such as 'smoke' (*dhūma),* i.e. the object of the knowledge causing the knowledge of the effect uttered together (fire). Even the other rule (namely, *vibhāṣā guṇe' striyām* P.ii. 3. 25), assigning the ablative optionally in the sense of the quality, is intended to convey only the causality of the causes described by either of the said two. Therefore, like the causality of the inactivity in the case of the expression "He is bound by inctivity or through inactivity' (*jāḍyād baddho jāḍyena vā),* the causality of the knowledge of the smoke etc. described by the knowledge of the fire etc. is conveyed by the ablative in the expression. "It is known to have fire by the fact that it has the smoke or because it has smoke" (*dhūmād vahnimān dhūmena vā)*. The causality of the causes is nothing but the earlier stated producerness (conduciveness). Also the term '*quality*' (*guṇa*) is not meant to convey the twenty four qualities, as the state of being such a quality is not tenable in the probans such as the smoke etc.

Explanation. After explaining *tṛtīyārtha* in the cases associated with the action-denoting verbs, Gadādhara now explains *tṛtīyārtha* in the cases without the action-denoting verbs. According to him, in the expression '*parvato dhūmena vahnimān'*, the instrumental conveys either the causality of the causes (*hetutva)* having the form of being

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the object of the knowledge that produces the knowledge of the effect porduced (*jñāpaka jñānaviṣayatva)* found in the *hetu* such as the smoke, or the state of possessing the cause (*hetumattva)* having the form of being the object to be known through the knowledge of the producer (*jñānajñāpyatva)* found in the *sādhya,* such as the fire. It should be noted that the term *hetu* (P.ii. 3.23.) is meant to convey both the causality of the causes described by the effect such as the pot in '*daṇḍena ghaṭ aḥ*' (*kāryanirūpitahetutā)* and the causality of the causes decribed by the knowledge of the probandum such as the fire in '*dhūmena vahnimān*' *(sādhya jñānanirūpitahetutā)*. Consequently, the instrumental becomes tenable after the word '*dhūma*' in '*dhūmena vahnimān*' (it has the causality described by the knowledge of the *sādhya* such as the fire), like it is tenable after the word '*daṇḍa*' in '*daṇḍena ghaṭaḥ*' (it has the causality described by the effect such as the pot). Also, it should be noted that the term *hetu* supplied in the rule (The ablative is employed optionally when the noun expresses an attribute being the cause of an action, *vibhāṣā guṇe,* P.ii. 3. 25) which assigns the ablative optionally in the sense of the *guṇahetu* too is intended to convey only such two teypes of causalities. Therefore the ablative becomes tenable after the word *dhūma* in '*dhūmād vahnimān dhūmena vā*' (it has the causality described by the knowledge of the fire), like it becomes tenable after the word '*jāḍya*' in '*jāḍyād baddho jāḍy- ena vā*' (it has the causality described by the effect of inactivity).

Singificance of the term '*guṇa*'

III. 41. It may be objected now as follows: That the term smoke (*dhūma*) etc. is intended to convey only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the knowledge of the smoke; and therefore, the cause of the fire etc. has only the state of being such a quality of knowledge. However, this objection is not correct to state. Though the term 'smoke' (*dhūma*) is indicative of the knowledge of the smoke, the cause of the bondage such as the absence of the knowledge cannot have such a state of being the quality of the knowledge in the cases such as 'He is bound by the ignorance' *(ajñānād baddhaḥ)* etc. Nor the quality '*guṇa'* is intended to convey merely the property. Since even the sky is a property through the temporal qualification, the same porerty would be inexclusive. Also, the state of being a property through the relation of inherence is not inclusive of the absence etc. Also the state of being the property (quality) cannot be held to be the state of being inherent in the substance. The ablative would become tenable in the view that the ablative word 'because of the state of being the quality' (*guṇatvāt)* is not indicative in the case such as 'It is the possessor of the existence or reality because of being the quality' (*sattāvān guṇatvāt)*.

Rather therefore, the state of being the property (quality) is the state of being what is inherent in the substratum of the effect or what is to be known. Since the inactivity *(jāḍya)* and the smoke (*dhūma*) etc. are inherent in the substratum of the bondage produced by the same inactivity and the substratum of the fire to be indicated by the same fire respectively, they have the qualityness. And the purpose of including the qualification of the qualityness in the cause is to avoid the ablative ofter the scholarship (*pāṇḍitya)* and the presence (*sattva)* in the cases such as 'The son is invited because of the scholarship of the father' (*pituḥ pāṇḍityena putra āhūtaḥ)* and 'The mountain is known to posssess

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the fire because of the presence of the smoke in itself' *(dhūmasya svasmin sattvena parvato vahinniān)* respectively.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the significance of the term 'quality' *(guṇa)* in the rule *(P.ii. 3.25)*. According to him, the term '*quṇa*' cannot be admitted to convey the regular quality such as form etc. enumerated as 24 *(caturvimśati guṇāḥ)* in Nyāya. Although then the ablative can be explained after '*dhūma*' in '*dhūmād vahnimān,*' by admitting an indication for the word '*dhūma*' in the sense of the knowledge of the smoke, i.e. a quality, the same after, *ajñāna*' would become untenable in '*ajñānād baddhaḥ*' as the *ajñāna* is the absence of knowledge and hence cannot be a quality. Gadādhara further refutes the alternative position that the term '*guṇa*' is meant to convey the property *(dharma mātrapara)* on the ground that the idea of property is too general and cannot exclude even the sky etc. from being considered as the property (sky too is a property through temporal qualification) and hence the ablative becomes unavoidable after the word sky *(ākāśa)* in *ākāśena śabdaḥ*' etc. Thus he establishes his theory that the term '*quality*' *(guṇa)* is meant to convey only the item that is present in the substratum of the effect or the item to be known *(kāryasya jñāpyasya vā āśraye āśrita)*. And the rule '*vibhāṣā guṇe' striyām*', (P.ii. 3.25) facilitates the ablative optionally after '*jāḍya*' and '*dhūma*' as they are present in the substratum of the effect of bondage and the substratum of the fire to be known. in '*jāḍyād baddaḥ*' and '*dhūmād vahnimān*' respectively.

Avoidance of '*vahninā vahner vā dhūmavān ayam*'

III. 42. The state of being the producer of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

knowledge is the state of being the object of the valid knowledge conducive to the knowledge of the item to be known. Also the state of being the item (object) known is the state of being the item (object) of the knowledge produced by the valid knowledge of the same. Thus, despite the fact that the fire etc. may have the state of being the producer of the knowledge of the smoke due to the illusion of the pervadedness, the ablative usages such as 'It is known to possess the smoke because of the fire or through the fire' (*vahninā vahner vā dhūmavān ayam)* etc. are not correct. Here the state of being the valid knowledge is to be intended (admitted) to be of the form of being different from the illusoryness of the illusory knowledge in all aspects. Consequently, the said overpervasion of usage (such as '*vahner dhūmavān'*) cannot be imposed by taking into account the validity of the knowledge such as 'Fire is pervaded by smoke' *(dhūmavyāpyo vahniḥ)* in the aspect of the fireness.

Though the substanceness is the producer of the knowledge of the fire as delimited by the knowabiglity or the same as being qualified by the substanceness is the producer of the knowledge of the fire as delimited by the fireness, the usage such as 'The mountain is known to possesses the fire because of the substanceness or through the substanceness (*parvato vahnimān dravyatvāt dravyatvena vā*) need not be imposed. For, the instrumental and the ablative convey the relation of being the producer of the knowledge and that of being the object to be known of the substanceness and the fire respectively which are delimited by the substanceness-hood and the fireness, i.e. the delimiters of the relatumness. However, in the said usage, the relation of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

being the producer of the knowledge and the being the object to be known are absent in the substanceness and the fire in such a form.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara avoids the incorrect usage *vahninā vahner vā dhūmavān ayam'*. According to him, the instrumental and the ablative case convey the relation of being the producer of the valid knowledge and being the object to be known (*jñāpyajñāpakabhāva)*. Here in such a relation , the state of being the object of valid knowledge of the smoke conducive to the valid knowledge of the fire (*tajñānajanaka pramāviṣayatva)* means the state of being the producer of the knowledge (*jñāpakatva),* and the state of being the object of the knowledge of the fire produced from the valid knowledge of smoke (*pramājanyajñāna viṣayatva*) means the state of being the object known (*jñāpyatva)*. And since such a state of being the producer of the valid knowledge of the smoke (*jñāpakatva*) is absent in the fire and the state of being the object known (*jñāpyatva)* is absent in the smoke, the instrumental (ablative) statement '*vahninā vahner vā...'* is avoided. Also, Gadādhara avoids the incorrect statement '*parvato vahnimān dravyatvād dravyatvena vā'*. According to him, to make the imposition of such an incorrect statement tenable, the instrumental or the ablative case needs to convey the relation of being the producer of the knowledge and being the object to be known (*jñāpyajñāpakabhāva)* between the substanceness and the fire only as being delimited by the substanceness-hood and the fireness, the delimiters of the relatedness (*anvayitāvacehedakavahnitvadravyatvatvena);* however, since the substanceness and the fire are not delimited by such delimitors (they are delimited only by the qualified substanceness-hood

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*viśiṣṭadravyatvatva)* and the knowability (*prameyatva*) respectively, the imposition of the incorrect usage is avoided.

***Jñānaprayojyatva* and *vidheyatva* are meanings of ablative case**

III. 43. Also, this way, the rule to be formulated is that the state of being the object to be known or the state of being the producer of the knowledge is cognized with respect to the mountain delimited by the mountainness, i.e. the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum of the possession of the fire to be known (and the smoke) etc. Therefore, the usage 'The mountain possesses the fire because of the kitchenness or by that' (*paravato vahnimān mahānasatvāt tena vā)* is not correct.

It should be born in mind as follows : That in the statement such as 'The mountain possesses fire because of smoke but not because of the substanceness or the kitchenness' (*paravato vahnimān dhūmānna dravyatvānnāpi mahānasatvāt*),. there occurs the contradiction in the negative particle conveying the absence of the state of being the object to be known from the knowledge of the substanceness or that of the kitchenness etc. with respect to the fire etc. Though in such cases, the fire as being a knowable object occurring in the mountain etc. has the state of being the object to be known from the knowledge of the substanceness, and the same, as being a knowable object occurring in the kitchen, has the state of being the object to be known from the knowledge of the kitchen, the same fire, as an object having the fireness, is not established to have the state of being the object to be known from the substance-ness and the same fire, as an object occurring in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mountains, is not established to have the state of being the object to be known from the kitchenness. Consequently, the cognition of the absence of such a state is not tenable in the fire. Thus, it must be admited that only the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the form of being the delimitor of the producedness of the object produced from the knowledge, and the predicateness described by the subjectness of the mountain uttered along etc. are the two separate meanings of the ablative. And the two separate meanings are obtained (cognized) as qualified by each other due to the relation between the each other. This way in the said case, the negative particle can convey the absence of the state of being what is produced from the knwoledges of the substanceness and the kitchenness with respect to the predicateness, as the state of being what is produced from such knowledges is already established with respect to the predicateness of the fire delimited by the knowabality etc.

Explanation

The fire as demilited by the fireness *(vahnitvena)* and the somke as delimited by the smokeness *(dhūmatvena)* are the objects to be known *(jñāpya)* and the producer of the knowledge *(jñāpaka)* respectively; similarly th mountain, as delimited by the mountainness, i.e. the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum of the possession of fire and the same as delimited by the mountainess, i.e. the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum of the possession of the smoke *(vahnyādim-attvānvayitāvacchedaka parvatatvena)*, too can be the object to be known and the producer of the knowledge respectively. Therefore, only the usage '*parvato vahnimān dhūmāt, dhūmaviśiṣṭaparvatatvāt vā*' etc. and not the usage '*parvato vahnimān mahānasatvāt*' etc., are allowed.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Gadādhara now explains his own opinion that the ablative conveys the state of being what is produced by the knowledge *(jñānaprayojyatva)* and the predicateness *(vidheyatva)* as the separate meetings. According to him, the fire, as delimited by the fireness *(vahnitvādinā)*, and as occuring in the mountain *(parvatavṛttitvena)*, cannot be the object to be known either from the knowledge of the substanceness. *(dravyatvajñāna jñāpya)* or from the knowledge of the kitchenness *(mahānasatva jñāna-jñāpya)*. Therefore, the usage '*parvato vahnimān dhūmāt na dravyatvāt nāpi mahānasatvāt*'becomes untenable as the absences of the *dravyatvajñāna jñāpyatva* and the *mahānasatvajñānajñāpyatva* cannot be related to the fire due to the unestablishedness of their counterpositives. However, when the state of being what is produced by the knowledge (*jñāna proyojyatva*) and the predicateness (*vidheyatva)* are admitted as the two separate meanings of the ablative, the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the kitchenness and that of the substanceness (*dravyatvamahānasatvādi jñānaprayojyatva*), which are established in the predicateness of the fire delimited by the knowabality can be cognized to be absent in the predicateness of the fire in the said case; and hence the negative usage becomes tenable.

Avoidance of *'parvato vahnimān na dhūmāt'*

III. 44. It may be objected now as follows: That this way even the incorrect usage 'The mountain possesses the fire but not because of the smoke' (*parvato vahnimān na dhūmāt)* would become necessary. For, the predicateness of the fire delimited by the particular fireness, which is not produced from the knowledge referring to the smokeness-delimited in general as its object, is certainly not contradictory in the fire. However,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

this objection is not correct to state. We admit that the negative particle produces the cognition of the absence as occurring only in the predicatedness of the fire as being delimited by the state of being the predicateness of the fireness-delimited described by the subjectness of the mountain etc.

Explanation

Now an objection is raised on the ground that the predicatness of the particular fire delimited by the particular fireness (*tattadvahnitvādyavcchinna vidheyatā)* is produced from only the knowledge of the particular smoke delimited by the particular smokeness (*tattad dhūmatvādyavacchinnaviṣayakajñānaprayojya)* and not fom the knowledge of the smoke in general delimited by the smokeness in general (*dhūmatvāvacchinnaviṣayakajñāna prayojya);* and hence the incorrect statement '*parvato vahnimān na dhūmāt'* becomes necessary due to the possibility of the cognition of the particular predicateness of the particular predicate, not produced from the knowledge of the smoke in general delimited by the smokeness in general, in the fire. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection. According to him, the negative particle must be admitted to convey the absence of the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the smoke delimited by the smokeness only in the predicateness of the fire in general described by the subjectness of the mountain; and since such an absence is not tenable there in the predicateness of the fire in general, the incorrect statement can be avoided.

Refutation of the objection that *parvato vahnimān na dhūmāt* is possible

III. 45. However, it may be doubted (objected) now as follows; That only in the case where the state of being

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the predicateness of the fire delimited by the fireness is the delimiter of the relatedness of the relatum, the relation of the other (i.e. of the absence of being what is produced) with such a predicateness is possible; and since here only the state of being the predicateness in general, not qualified by the state of being what is delimited by the fireness, is the delimitor of the relatedness, how is the relation of the absence of being what is produced is possible with respect to the predicateness of the fiere delimited by the fireness? However, such a doubt (objection) is not correct. The sense of the predicateness expressed by the ablative is admitted to be related to the fire etc. only as delimited by the fireness etc.; and therefore, in the relation of the predicatness with the fire etc., as delimited by the fireness etc., i.e. the property of the fireness etc. delimiting the fire etc. is the qualifier with respect to the qualifier of th fire, (i.e. to the predicatenes), indirectly through the property-possessor, i.e. through the fire. In the present case, only the state of being the predicateness, as associated with the state of being the fire delimited by the fireness of the form of the self-linking relation, is the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum.

In the Prācya-theory that the word 'fire' (*vahni)* alone is intended to convey the knowledge referring to the predicateness of the fire delimited by the fireness, and that the possessive suffix (*matup*) after the word 'fire' (*vahni)* is intended to convey the relation of the form of the subjectness (qualificandness), the state of being the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum is non-contradictory for the state of being the predicateness of the fire delimited by the fireness.

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection now as follows:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

: That in *'parvato vahnimān na dhūmāt'*, only the predicateness *(vidheyatā)* as being the predicateness in general *(vidheyatātvena)* and not the predicateness of the fire as being delimited by the fireness *(vahnitāvacchinna vidheyatā)* in particular, is the sense expressed by the ablative; and since the state of being such a predicateness of the fire *(tādṛśavidheyatātva)* in particular is not the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum *(anvayitāv-acchedaka)*, the absence of the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the smoke delimited by the smokeness *(dhūmatvāvacchinnajñānaprayojyatvābhāva)* cannot be related to such a predicateness of the fire. And to overcome such as difficulty, one needs to assume that the absence of the state of being what is produced is related to only some particular predicateness; and since the absence of the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the smoke *(dhūmaviṣayakajñānaprayoj-yatvābhāva)* is possible to be related to the particular predicateness of the fire, the statement *'parvato vahnimān na dhūmāt'* would become necessary. And thus the said solution (in III. 44) becomes untenable.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection. According to him, the sense of the predicateness expressed by the ablative *(pañcamyarthavidheyatā)* should be admitted to be related to the fire only as delimited by the fireness in general *(vahnitvādyavacchedena)*; and therefore, the usage *'parvato vahnimān na dhūmāt'* can be avoided from being imposed with the intention of relating the absence of the state of being what is procuded from the knowledge of the smoke to the particular predicateness of the particular fire as only the state of being the predicateness of the fire delimited by the fireness in general *(vahnittvādyavacchinnavidheyatātva)* is the delimitor of the relatedness.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Further, Gadādhara establishes the fact that in the Prācyas' theory where the word '*vahni*' itself conveys the knowledge referring to the predicateness of the fire delimited by the fireness in general (*vahitvāvacchhinna vidheyatāśālijñāna),* the cognition produced from '*parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*' is that the mountain is the substratum of the subjectness described by the knowledge of the predicateness of the fire delimited by the fireness in general (*vahnitvāvacchinnavidheyatāśāli jñāna viśeṣ yatāśrayaḥ).* And since only the state of being the predicateness of the fire delimited by the fireness in general is tthe delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum, the absence of the state of being produced from such a knowledge cannot be related; and hence the negative statement is avoieded.

'*Ayam jānāti ātmatvāt na dravyatvāt*' : Navyass' explanation.

III. 46. However, according to the Navyas, the predicateness, only as being the predicateness delimited by the particular relation, must be admitted to be the meaning of the ablative. Consequently, there occures no untenabality of semantic competency in the relation of the absence (of the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the substanceness) with the predicateness of the knowledge as delimited by the state of being the predicatness of the knowledge in general in 'This one knows because of being the animate self and not because of being the inanimate substance' *(ayam jānāti ātmatvāt na dravyatvāt).* And this is in spite of the fact that the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the probans such as the substanceness is present in the predicateness of the knowledge described

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by the contextual qualificandness (subjectness) of the qualificand (of the subject such as the pot) which is delimited by the relation of the objectness. For, there is the cognition of the relation of the absence (of such a state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the substanceness) in the predicateness of the knowledge as delimited by the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum such as the state of being the predicateness delimited by the particular relation of inherence.

Explantion

The Navyas hold that the ablative iteself expresses the predicateness (*vidheyatā)* as the predicateness delimited by the particular relation such as the inherence (*tatsambandhāvacchinnavidheyatātvena)*. This position is advantageous because the same can explain the usage '*ayan jānāti ātmatvāt na dravyatvāt'*. When the predicateness delimited by the particular relation of inherence is the meaning of the ablative, the absence of the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the substanceness (*dravyatvajñānaprayojyatvābhāva)* can be held to have the sematic competecy (*yogayatā)* in being related to such a predicateness (*jñānatvāvacchinna-vidheyatātvāvacchedena),* as such an absence is related to the pedicateness delimited by the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum (*anvayitāvacchedakāvacchedena)* such as the state of being the predicateness delimited by the particular relation of inherence (*sambandhaviśeṣ āvacchinna vidheyatātvarūpa)*.

Otherwise, when such a predicateness is not held to be the meaning of the ablative, such a usage cannot be explained as the absence does not have the competency in being related to the predicateness of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

knowledge (only the knowledge is present in the substance such as the pot through the objectness; and so the predicateness of the knowledge has only the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the substanceness). Thus, the Navyas have suggested that the predicateness of the knowledge as delimited by the inherence needs to be admitted as the meaning of the ablative.

Definition of *vidheyatāprayojakajñāna*

III. 47. This way, even the knowledge, which is included in (i.e. which constitutes) the state of being what is produced from the knowledge (of the *liṅga)*, and which is qualified by the state of having a reference to the qualifirness (of the *liṅga)* delimited by the particular relation (of inherence), is the meaning of the ablative base (*dhūma)* (in *ayaṃ vahnimān dhūmāt)*. Consequently, the usage such as 'The (part of the fire) is the possessor of the fire because it possesses the particular property (of the fireness), and not because of the smoke' (*ayaṃ vahnimān tadrūpān na tu dhūmāt),* which is inteded to have a reference to the probans through inherence, need not have incompetency. Though the state of being what is produced from the knowledge (of the *liṅga)* having a reference to the qualifirness of the smoke through the contact is present in the predicateness of the fire, the absence of what is delimited by the delimitor of trhe relatedness of the relatum such as the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the *liṅga* having a reference to the qualifireness of the smoke as qualified by the inherence is not contradictory there. Here only the speaker's intention is the regulating (governing) factor for the appearance of the particular property having (i.e. delimited by) the particular relation (of inherence), as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

being the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum. Although the predicateness of the fire etc. possess the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the absence constituting the invariable concomidtance etc, the usages such as 'The mountain is known to be the possessor of fire, because of the absence' (*parvato vahnimān abhāvāt)* etc. are not correct (cannot be imposed). For, only the chief-qualifirness (of the smoke) described by the the chief-qualificandness (of the mountain) is to be included in the ablative meaning. And this is the derection for further discussion.

Explanation

Gadādhara after defining the predicateness of the probandum (*sādhyavidheyatā*), presents now the definition of the knowledge of the probans that produces the predicateness of the probandum (*vidheyatā-prayojaka jñāna)*. Just as the predicateness of the probandum needs to the defined as delimited by the particular relation of inherence, so also the knowledge of the probans (*prayojaka liṅgajañāna),* constituting the state of being what is produced from the knowledge (*jñāna prayojyatva)* referring to the qualifirness of the probans, needs to be defined as delimited by the particular relation of inherence (*tatsambvandhāvcchinnaprakāraka)*. Now since the absence of what is delimited by the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum (*anvayitāvacchedakāvacchinna)* such as the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the probans (smoke) having a reference to the qualifirness of the smoke as delimited by the inherence (*samavāyasambandhāvacchinnatatprakāratāśāli-jñāna prayojyatātva)* is possible to be established in the predicateness of the probandum such as the fire (*sādhya*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(vahni) vidheyatā), the usage *'ayam vahnimān tadrūpān na tu dhūmāt'* becomes tenable (Though the knowledge of the smoke delimited by the contact is the cause of the fire on the mountain, the same knowledge of the smoke as delimited by the inherence is not the cause of the fire in the fire-parts).

Also it should be noted that the qualifirness of the probans (*hetu prakāratā)* referred to by the knowledge of the probans (*liṅgajñāna*) is held to be described by only the chief qualificandness of the subject (*pakṣa*) such as the mountain (*mukhyaviśeṣyatānirūpita*); and therefore, in spite of the fact that the knowledge of the predicateness of the fire can be produced from the knowledge of the absence constituting the invariable concomitance (*vyāptyādighaṭakābhāvaprayojya)*, the statement *'parvato vahnimān abhāvāt'* stands avoided (The qualifirness described by the chief qualificandness of the mountain is found only in the smoke and not in the absence).

Analysis of instruments in '*kena hetunā ghaṭaḥ 'jāyate'*

III. 48. However, it may be doubted (argued) that the instrumental and the ablative case endings in the expressions such as 'From what cause is the pot produced' (*kena hetunā*). and 'Due to what cause is the pot produced' (*kasmai hetave) etc.* (P.ii. 3.23) cannot convey the causeness (causality) in the causes qualified by the causality, i.e. the base-meanings; for, there would occure repetition then.

However, this argument is not correct. The base-word 'cause' (*hetu)* is intended to convey there only the cause that has merely the innate potentiality of causing; whereas the case ending is intended to convey the actual

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cause that has the efficasiousness. Also, there is no lack of syntactic expectancy for the cognition of the causality of the cause associated with the particular effect with respect to the cause qualified by the causality not associated with the particular effect, like there is no lack of syntactic exprectancy for the cognition of the red staff-holderness in 'The staff-holder is a red staff-holder, (*daṇḍavān raktadaṇḍavām)*. It may be agrued again as follows : That despite the possibility of semantic relation of the causality, the redundancy in employing the word 'cause' (*hetu*) cannot be avoided in such cases; when the actual efficaciousness of the cause is obtained from the case ending, the innate potentiality of the cause can be obtained by implication itself. However, this argument too is not correct to state. Since the third (instrumental) case ending is observed to be referring to even some other meaning (instrumentalality) elsewhere, the use of the word 'cause' (*hetu)* is made to determine the case ending 'in the sense of the causality of the cause only.

Explanation

In '*kena hetunā kasmai hetave vā ghaṭaḥ jāyate'*, the instrumental etc. are asigned in the sense of the causality (*heatu,* P.ii. 3. 23). However, an argument can be made now that since the case endings are used after the words '*hetu'* expressing the cause, the same need to express the causality of the causes qualified by the causality (*hetutā);* and such a reference would involve the redundanacy in the expression due to the identity of the predicate and the delimitor of the subjectness. (*uddeśyatāvacchedakavidheyayor aikyāt*). However, Gadādhara refutes the argument on the ground that the base word '*hetu'* can expresses only the cause that has merely the innate potentiality (*svarūpayogyahetu)* to cause

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

something; whereas the case endings express the causality of the efficacious cause (*phalopadhāna hetutā)*; and therefore, a cognition of additional property in the pedicate (*videyāmaśe adhikāvagāhi*), where in the causality of the efficacious cause associated with the particualr effect (*kāryaviśeṣoparakta hetutā)* is related to the mere innately potential cause qualified by the causality not associated with any effect (*kāryaviśeṣ ānuparakta hetutā)* is certainly possible. Also it should be noted that to restrict the instrumental case, which can be used in the instrumentality (P.ii. 3.18), only in the sense of the causality (*hetutā)*, the word 'cause' (*hetu)* expressing the cause that has merely innate potentiality is required to be used in the expressions '*kena hetunā... etc.;* and thus there occures no redundancy of any sort in the use of the word 'cause' (*hetu)* denoting the innately potential cause in such a case.

Analysis of Instrumental with *'saha'*

III. 49. In 'Father has come along with the son' *(putreṇa sahāgataḥ)* etc., the instrumental is used after the word expressing the relational adjunct of association in connection with the word expressing the togetherness. (P.ii. 3.19).

Now it may be held as follows. That the state of being the relatum of the action (of coming of the father) occurring at the same time as the action (of coming of the som) recollected from the word (*āgataḥ)* uttered together with it (*saha)* is the meaning of the indiclinable word along with' (*saha*). And the state of being the relatum of the action means that the same relation (of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the father) with the action. (of the son), the relation of which action (of coming), conveyed by the word (*āgataḥ)* expressive of the action associated with it, is cognized with respect to the relatum of association (subjunct) such as the father. And such a relation (of the father) with the action in the expression such as 'Father has come along with the son' (*putreṇa sahāgataḥ)* is the agency of the father described by the coming; whereas the same in the expression such as 'Rice is eaten along with the curd' (*dadhnā sahaudano bhujyate)* is the objecthood of the rice (described by eating). And the meaning of the instrumental case too is the same relation. Thus, it can be stated that in such cases, one cognises that the agency described by the coming (of the father) occurring at the same time as the action of coming having the son as the agent appears in the father; also that the objecthood described by the eating of the rice occurring at the same time as the action of eating having the curd as the object appears in the rice etc.

However, then there would occur the redundancy of the use of the verb '*āgataḥ'*, as the indeclinable word 'along with' (*saha*) itself can convey the agency described by the particular action such as coming. For, the appearance of the action twice (as the meanings of the verbal form and as the meaning of the indeclinable '*saha')* is not conducive to the verbal cognition. The cognition of the relation of the action with the relation of the action is impossible due to the lack of syntactic expectancy caused by the identity between the predicate and the delimitor of the subjectness.

Explanation

Now, Gadādhara takes up the issue of the analysis of the meaning of the indeclinable word 'along with'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*saha*) and that of the instrumental assigned in connection with '*saha*' (*sahayukte apradhāne,* P.ii. 2. 19). According to the traditional scholars, since '*saha*' is used in '*putreṇena sahāgataḥ pitā*' etc. in the sense of the association of the agent of coming (father) with another action. (coming of the son), the same '*saha*' referes to the state of being the relatum (substratum) of the action (coming) occurring of the tune of the action recollected from the word (*āgataḥ*) uttered together (*samabhivyāhṛta padopasthāpyakriyāsamāna-kālīnakriyānvayitva*). Now the father etc. are the relatums of the actions such as coming etc. means the same have the relations such as the agency etc. described by the actions such as coming etc. And therefore, the state of being the relatums of the actions (*kriyānvayitva*) is merely having the relations cognized from the words such as '*āgataḥ*' expressive of the action (of coming) uttered together with it (*svasamabhivyāhṛta kriyāvācakapada pratipādita*). And the same relations of the agency etc. are the meanings of the instrumentals as well.

However, it should be noted here that in this theory when the agency described by the action to be expressed by the word uttered together (*tattatkriyākartṛtva*) is admitted to be constituting the meaning of '*saha*', the use of the action-word such as '*āgataḥ*' expressing the action of coming would become redundant in the expression such as '*putreṇa sahāgataḥ*' ; and also when the action is admitted to be expressed by the action-word by admitting the redundacy, the relation of the same action with the agent of the action would become untenable as it would involve the identity between the predicate (action) and the delimitor of the subjectness of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the subject (action) (*uddeśyatāvacchadakavidheyayor-aikyena*).

Explanation of the meaningfulness of *kriyāpada* and *saha*

III. 50. It may be suggested now as follows: That only the state of occurring at the same time as that of the particular action is the meaning of the word 'along with' (*saha*). And such a meaning is related to only the action recollected from the action word or verb (*kriyāpada*). Consequently, the said qualified meaning (i.e. the agency described by the action...) can be obtained from the word 'along with' associated with the action word, itself. However, this suggestion is not correct to state. In that case, the meaning of the word 'along with' (*saha*) in the expression 'Father has come long with the son' (*putreṇe sahāgataḥ*) would be required to be relating to the sense of the action expressed by the action word 'has come'; and therefore, the same word (*saha*) being syntactically dependent on the other word (*āgataḥ*) would become untenable to be compounded with the word 'son' (*putra*) (in *saputraḥ*); and thus the compound expression such as 'having son along with' (*saputraḥ*) etc. would become untenable. Also, here the meaning of the word 'along with' (*saha*) does not have the prominence of sense (primary nature); and therefore, it cannot be argued that the same word, '*saha*', despite being syntactically dependent on the other word, could be compounded. Thus it must be admitted that such a compound expression (*as saputraḥ*) being a '*bahuvrīhi*' has only the prominence of the meaning of the word outside the compound (the father) (i.e. secondary nature).

No, this whole set of arguments is not correct. Only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the time of the action recollected from the word uttered together is the meaning of the word 'along with'. And such a meaning is related to only the nominal meaning such as the father relating to the action. Also, when the action is related to the nominal meaning qualified by such a time, the idea of the state of being delimited by such a time is cognised even in the action; for, the relation of the predicate (the action) can be facilitated, by convention, with the item (father) as delimited by the delimitor (time) of the subjectness of the subject. Thus, the occurrence of the action at the same time as that of the other can be obtained betweens the two actions; and therefore our theory stands justifiec.

Explanation

Gadādhara explanins here the neaningfuleness of *kriyāpada* and *saha*. However, a possible suggestion is that the agency described by the action *(kriyākartṛtva)* is not the meaning of '*saha';* but rather only the state of occurring (of the action) at the same time as that of the particular action such as coming having the son etc. as the agents *(tattatkrīyasamāna kālīnatva)* is so. And by relating such a state to the action of coming having the father etc. as the agents, expressed by the action-word, *(pitrādikartṛkakriyā),* the idea of the agency described by the action of the father etc. that occurs at the same time as that of the action of coming the son etc. *(putrādikartṛkagamanādikriyāsamānakātīnakriyākartṛtva)* can be obtained; and thuṣ the action word-need not be redundant. However, the difficulty in such a suggestion is that then. the word '*saha'* in *'putreṇa saha āgataḥ pitā'* etc. would become syntactically dependent on the other *(anyaśāpekṣa)* by having its meaning related to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

action expressed by the action-word; and thus would become untenable to be compounded with '*putra*' etc. in '*saputraḥ āgataḥ*' etc. However, Gadādhara solves the difficulty. According to him, the indeclinable word '*saha*' can be admitted to express only the time of the action such as coming etc. recollected from the word uttered together (*samabhivyāhṛtakṛiyākāla)*. And the action-word can express the action. And the meaning of the word *saha* is related to the action (*kriyānvayi nāmārtha);* and since the action of coming expressed by the action-word is related to the nominal meaning (the father etc.) qualified by such a time of the action of coming of the son etc. (*tādṛśakālaviśiṣṭa nāmārtha)*, the action of coming of father etc. too can be cognized to have the sate of being delimited by (i.e. occurring at) the time of the action of coming of the son etc. (*putrakartṛka kriyākālāvacchinnatva)*. It should be noted here that the relation of the predicate (the action) with the subject (the nominal-meaning such as the father) as delimited by the delimitor of the subjectness (such as the time), (*uddeśyatāvacchedakāvacchedena vidheyānvaya)* facilitates the cognition of the delimitor of the subjectness (i.e. the time) in the predicate (the action); and hence the idea of the action of coming of the father occurring at the time of the coming of the son is not untenable in this theory.

Alternative theory

III. 51. Or as an alternative it can be held that the action such as the coming etc. occurring at the same time as that of the action of coming etc. is the meaning of the ideclinable word 'along with'. And such a meaning is related to the person (father) etc. through the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

relation of the agency etc. And there occurs no contradiction to the convention that when the agency of the action of coming etc., recollected from the words such as 'has come', 'comes' etc., is related to the person (father) qualified by such an action, viz. the meaning of the word along with, through the relation of agency. For, there occurs no identity between the predicate and the qualifier functioning as the delimitor of the subjectness of the subject.

It may be objected now as follows: That when the agency described by the particular action is obtained (cognized) in the person (father) etc. on the strength (basis) of the relation of the meaning of the word 'along with', the reference to the same agency by the action-word, as being the (predicate) qualifier, becomes pointless; and therefore, the use of such an action-word would become useless (redundant).

However, this objection is not correct to state. When the particular action of coming etc. is not recollected from the action-word uttered together, the expressed meaning, namely the occurrence together constituting the particular action such as coming etc., too would become impossible to be cognized even from the word 'along with'; and therefore, the use of the action-word is necessary. Also, the relation of the sense of the action expressed by the indeclible word 'along with' is not conventionally contradictory with the nominal meaning (father) through the relation of the agency etc. For, the word "along with" is not a verbal root and is merely an indeclinable. (cf. I. 62).

Explanation

Now Gadādhara presents an alternative theory of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meaning of '*saha*'. In this theory, instead of the time of the action such as the coming (*āgamanakāla*), only the action such as the coming (of the father) occurring at the same time as that of the action of coming (of the son) (*āgamanasamānakālīnāgamanādika)* is the meaning of the ideclinable '*saha*'; and since the agency described by coming etc. (*āgamanakartṛtva)*, i.e. the meanings of the action-words such as '*agataḥ*' and *āgacchati'*, is related to the father etc. qualified by such an action, the meaning of '*saha', viz.* the predicate (*vidheya)* such as the agency described by the action of coming etc. and the delimitor of the subjectness of the subject (*uddeśyatāv-acchedaka)* such as the action of coming etc. differ mutually; and hence there occurs no violation of any semantic convention *(vyutpatti virodha)*.

A possible objection to such an alternative theory is that the meaning of '*saha*' is proposed to be related to the nominal meanings, i.e. the father etc., through the agency described by the praticular action (*tattatkriyākartṛtva);* and since such an agency is nothing but the agency described by the coming etc. (*āgamana kartṛtva)* etc., the use of the action-words such as *'āgataḥ'* and *'āgacchati'* etc., would become redundant in the expression such as *'purtreṇa sahāgataḥ, āgacchati'* as the same agency could be obtained by relating the meaning of '*saha'* to the father etc. by such an agency itself. However, Gadadhara replies to the objection on the linguistic principle that since the indeclinable word '*saha'* is a non-action-denoting word (verb), it lacks innate potentiality (power) to denote any action and thereby the agency, unless the action-denoting word (verb) uttered together first expresses an action and thereby facilitates the recollection of the agency described by the same from the indeclinable.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Kṣaṇakāla should be induded in *'sahārtha'*

III. 52. It may again be óbjected now as follows: That in 'One Sumitrā gave birth to Śatrughna, liberal in actions, along with Lakṣmaṇa' (*prāsoṣṭa śatrughnam udāraceṣṭam ekā sumitrā saha lakṣmaṇena)* etc., the occurrence together of the two actions at the same time cannot be admitted to be the meaning of the word along with, as the action of giving birth to Śatrughna and that of giving birth to Lakṣmaṇa do not have the state of occurring at the same time. However, this objection is not correct to state. The state of occurring at the same time consisting of a long span of time can be held to be present even there in the action such as giving birth to Śatrughna and to Lakṣmaṇa.

However, it may again be objected as follows: That when only the time as being delimited by the timeness in general is included in (i.e. constitues) the meaning of the indeclinable 'along with', the usage 'The father has not come along with the son' (*āgato' yam na putreṇa saha)* would become untenable in the case of the person who is the agent of coming a fraction of a second earlier than the coming of the son. Since the agency described by the coming occurring at a longer duration of time such as a *daṇḍa* which is the locus of the coming of the son is present, the absence of the togetherness (association) that describes the counterpositiveness of the son delimited by the delimitor (the soness) of the relatedness of the relatum would become contradictory. However, this objection too is not correct to state. In such case, the time would be included in the meaning of the indeclinable 'along with' only as being the moment (fraction of a second).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

An objection is raised here against the theory that the occurrence together of the two actions at the same time (*kriyādvayasamānakālīnatā*) is the meaning of the indeclinable '*saha*'. According to the objector, since the two actions of giving births to two children cannot occur at one and the same moment, the statement '*prāsoṣṭa śatrughnam udāraceṣṭam ekā sumitrā saha lakṣmaṇena*' would become untenable when such a *samānakālīnatva* is held to be the meaning of the indiclinable '*saha*'. However Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that only the larger duration of time (*sthūlakāla*) such as a *daṇḍa* is meant to constitute the *samānakālīnatva;* and since the *sthūlakāla* is same for the births of both Śatrughna and Lakṣmaṇa, *samānakālīnatva* is not untenable for the actions of giving births.

Also it should be noted that when only the longer duration of time (*sthūlakāla)* as delimited by the timeness in general (*kālatvena)* constitutes *samānakālīnatva,* the statement '*āgato' yam na putreṇa saha*' would become untenable in the case of the coming of father a fraction of a second earlier than coming of the son, as the father, being the agent of the coming (*āgamanakarīṛ)* at the time (hour) of the coming of the son (*putrāgamanakālavṛtti),* cannot have the absence of the togetherness that describes the counterpositiveness of the son delimited by the delimitor (sonness) of the relatedness of the relatum (*anvayitāvacchedaka rūpāvacchinna pratiyogitākasāhityābhāva)*. However, Gadādhara avoids the untenability on the ground that only the fraction of the second (*kṣaṇa)* as being the second in general (*kṣaṇatvena)* can be admitted to be constituting the meaning of '*saha';* and since the comings of the son and the father do not occur at

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the same second, the absence of the togetherness is tenable in the father in such cases.

Bhojanādhāra should be included in Sahāratha

III. 53. In the case where the usage 'He does not eat along with another' (*na saha bhuṅkte*) is made with respect to the person eating at a different place but at the same time, even the locus of the action of eating such as the same dining hall needs to be included in the meaning of the indeclinable 'along with'. That is why the statement 'Because of the conversation, contact with' the limbs, drawing in the breath, and eating along with (*ālāpād gātrasaṁsparśād niśvāsād sahabhojanāt)* does not convey the state of being what is conducive to the sin to the eating in general occurring at the same time as that of the eating of the fallen people. For, even the eating by the same line in the dining hall would be intended to be included in the meaning of 'along with'.

Thus, in the case of the statement such as 'The person who undertakes the performance of sacrifice, the blood-relation, (i.e., sex), the study of the Vedas and the eating along with the fallen person, falls immediately without any doubt', only the state of being what causes the immediate fall is congized with respect to only the eating along with the fallen in one vessel at one particular time as only such a meaning is intended by the speaker to be conveyed by the indiclinable word 'along with'.

Explanation

Gadādhara states that like the time (*kāla)* even the locus of the action of eating (*bhojanādhāra*) should be included in the meaning of the indiclinable '*saha*'. According to him, since the negative usage '*na saha bhuṅkte'* is made when a person eats at the same time

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as the other, but at a different place than the other, the locus of the eating such as the single dining hall *(ekaśālārūpabhojanādhāra)* too should be included in the meaning of '*saha*'. Also according to him, since in '*ālāpād gātrasamaparśat... sahabhojanāt*" merely the eating occurring at the same time as that of the eating by the fallen person (*samānakālīna bhojana)* is not conductive to the sin, even the eating taking place at the same line as that of the fallen in the dining hall (*samānapaṅktikabhojana)* constitutes the meaning of '*saha*'. Also it should be noted that since in '*yajanam yonisamabandham svādhyāyam sahabhojanam*', only the eating in the same vessel (*ekapātrabhojana)* must be included in the meaning of '*saha*'. And thus, only the eating at the same vessel as well as at the same time as that of the fallen person (*ekakālilkaikapātrabhojana)* is cognized to be the cause of falling in '*yājanam yonisamandham....*'

Objection that *prasajyapratiṣedha* cannot be explained

III. 54. That when the nominal meaning (father) is admitted to have relation, as the qualificand with the togetherness (of association with the son), i.e. the meaning of the indiclinable 'along with' in the positive statement, the absence of the togetherness of (association with) the son, i.e., the meaning of the indiclinable 'along with', too needs to be admitted as conveyed by the negative particle as relating to the person (father) in the corresponding negative statement such as 'This one (Father) does not come along with the son' (*putreṇa saha nāgacchaty ayam)*. However, such a position is not tenable. In that case, since the absence, i.e., the meaning of the negative particle, needs to be admitted as cognized as the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

delimitor of the subjectness of the subject (the father) of the meaning of conjugational ending (*substratumness),* the convention that the (absence) is cognized only as the prominent related to the agency, i.e. the sense expressed by the *ākhyāta* in the case of the verbally bound negative statement gets contradicted. Moreover, since such a negative usage is made even with respect to the person (father) who never comes along with the son, there would occur the contingency of the semantic incopetency of the relation of the absence with the person in such as case. From this it follows that the difficulty of the incompetency cannot be overcome even in the position that the relation of the negation (absence) with the (agency described by the) action can be abandoned like in the case of the nominally bound negative statement. wherein the relation of the negation (absence) is only with the nominal meaning (the father); and hence the expectancy of the prominence of the negation absence is not intended.

It may be proposed now as follows : That only the time of the absence of the coming (of the son) as relating to the person (father) is the meaning of the indiclinable word 'along with' in such a case. Thus, only the agency described by the coming delimited by the present time can be cognized to be related to the person (father) delimited by the time of the absence of the son's coming; and therefore there occurs no untenabality in the explanation of the verbally bound negative statement. However, this position is not correct to state. Since such a negative usage is made even in the case where the son of the person (father) comes but the (father) himself does not come, the contingency of incompetency arises as the absence of the agency described by the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

coming delimited by the present time is absent in the person (father) delimited by the time of the abasence of son's coming; and this is inspite of the fact that the absence of the agency described by the coming is present in the person (father) delimited by the time of the son's coming.

Explanation

In the positive statement '*putreṇa saha āgacchatyayam'*, the meaning of the indiclinable '*saha*' i.e. the togetherness (*sāhitya),* is held to be the qualifier; and the nominal meaning, i.e. the father, is held to be the chief qualificand. However, the objector objects that in that case even the absence of the togetherness of (i.e. association with) the son (*putrasāhityābhāva)* expressed by the negative in the corresponding negative statement *"putreṇa saha nāgacchatyayam'* needs to be related to the same nominal meaning, i.e. the father; and thus the semantic convention that the negation (absence) (*niṣedha)* appears as the primary or chief-qualification (*pradhāna)* in the verbally bound negative statement (*prasajyapratiṣedha)* would become contradicted as when the absence is related to the father it functions only as the delimitor of the subjectness or agency of the subject (father), i.e. the substratumness expressed by the *ākhyāta, (ākhyātārthoddeśyatāvacchedaka)* and not as the primary item related to the substratumness or the agency described by the action expressed by the *ākhyāta.*

Now it should be noted that since in *'putreṇa saha nāgacchaty ayam,'* the son is not coming, the person (father) can be held to be delimited by the time of the absence of son's coming (*putrāgamanābhāvakālāvacchinna)*. Therefore, it is suggested that the time of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

absence of son's coming (*putrāgamanābhāva kāla)* to be related to the person (father) (*puruṣānvayin),* is the meaning of '*saha*'; and by cognizing the absence of the agency described by the action of coming delimited by the present time (*vartamānakālāvacchinnāgamana kartṛtvābhāva),* from the negative as relating to such a person (father), the absence, i.e. the meaning of the negative, can be cognized to be related to the action of coming expressed by the *ākhyāta*, indirectly through the agency described by the action; and thus the prominent status for the negation in verbally bound negative becomes facilitated. However, the objector refutes the suggestion on the ground that the usage *'putreṇa saha nāgacchatyayam'* is made even when the son comes but the father does not come; and therefore, the absence of the agency described by the coming delimited by the present time (*vartamāna kālāvacchinnāgamanakartṛtv-ābhāva)* cannot be related to the person (father) who is delimited by the time of the absence of the son's coming (*putrāgamanābhāva kālāvacchinna)* as he is only delimited by the time of the son's coming (*putrāgamanakālāvacchina);* and so the prominent status of the negation in the verbally bound negative statement becomes untenable.

Refutation of the objection and establishment of alternative theory

III. 55. No. this objection is not correct. The time of the particular action (of son's coming) is the meaning of the indiclinable 'along with'. And such a meaning is related, in the positives, to the nominative-meaning (father) relating to the particular action (of son's coming) and in the negatives to the action (of son's comming) expressed by the word uttered together. Since the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

compound expression 'The person, coming along with the son, comes' (*saputra āgacchati)* is to be analysed as 'The one, who comes along with the son, comes' (*putreṇa saha āgacchati yaḥ sa āgacchati),* the time of the son's coming can be related to only the person (father), i.e. the sense of the word outside the compound expressed by the nominative word (*saputraḥ*) and not to the action of coming; and thus there is neither the untenabality of the compound (cf. III. 50); nor the non-recollection of the person (father), i.e. the sense of the word outside the compound.

However, it should not be objected now that the sense of the person (father), delimited by the time of the son's coming and to be obtained from the compound, can be explained (obtained) even from the analysis of the compound'; and hence the rule that the *bahuvrīhi*-compound in general is a compulsory compound would become contradicted. The *babhuvrīhi*-compounds in general cannot be admitted to have the state of being such a compulsory compound. Only the *bahuvrīhi*-compound that conveys the sense of the word outside the dompound, not to be obtained from the nominative, is admitted to have the state of being such a compulsory compound. And here the person (father), i.e. the sense to be expressed by the word outside the compound, is conveyed only by the nominative word.

Also it should not be objected that the *bahuvrīhi*-compound would it self become incorrect in denoting the sense to be expressed by the nominative word, as it is stated that the compounding is not tenable in the sense to be expressed by the nominative word as in the case of 'He left when the rain god rained' *(vṛṣṭe deve gataḥ).* For, such a rule of incorrectness of compound is appli-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cable to only the *bahuvrīhi*-compound which is prescribed by the rule 'Two or more words, ending in any case, form a *bahuvrīhi*-compound denoting another new thing' (*anekamanyapadārthe,p ii. 2. 24)*. And here the *bahuvrīhi*-compound is prescribed only by the other rule (*tena saheti tulyayoqe, p.ii.2.23);* and such a rule is composed only with the purpose of facilitating the compound '*saputraḥ*' etc. Since in 'This person (father) does not come along with the son' (*putreṇa saha nāgacchati*) etc., such a meaning of the indiclinable 'along with' (i.e the time of the son's coming) is related to only the action of coming of the father, the absence of the agency described by the coming occurring at the same tirne as that of the son's coming can be cognized from the negative with respect to the person (father) expressed by the nominative. Thus all things such as the relation of the meaning of 'along with' with the action etc. are perfectly tenable. However, in the case of compound expression such as 'The person coming along with the son does not come' (*saputro nāgacchati)*, the untenabality of compounding of '*putra*' with '*saha*' must be pondered over as suggested earlier (cf. III. 50). Thus they state that in cases such as 'The female ass carries the load (being) along with the ten calves' (*sahaiva daśabhiḥ putraiḥ bhāram vahāti gārdabhī)* where in the female ass does not carry the calves not carrying the load, the predicate adjective 'being' (*vartamāna)* is to be supplied; and therefore, the cognition of the togetherness (association) is to be effected only by taking into account (consideration) the supplied action of being present.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara refutes the objection raised in paragraph III. 54. According to him, the meaning of '*saha*'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is the time of the particular action (*tatkriyākāla);* and the same in '*putreṇa sahāgacchati'* is related to the person, i.e. the nominative meaning (*prathamāntapadārtha*); and thus one can cognize that the father is the agent of coming and is delimited by the time of son's coming (*putrāgamanakālāvacchinnaḥ āgamanakartā*); whereas the same in '*putreṇa saha nāgacchati'* is related to the action expressed by the word (verb) uttered together (*samabhivyāhṛtakriyā); and* thus one can cognize that the father is the possessor of the absence of the agency described by the coming occurring at the same time as that of son's coming. (*putrāgamanakālīkāgamanakartā*). However, it should be noted here that the expression '*saputra āgacchati;* is to be analysed as *Putreṇa sahāgacchati yaḥ sa āgacchati;* and since the time of son's coming (*putrāgamanakāla)* expressed by '*saha'* is related to the prominent person (father), the sense of the word outside the compound (expressed by the nominative '*yaḥ*'in the analysis), and not to the action of coming, the untenabality of the *bahuvrīhi compound* is avoided (cf III. 50). Now, it is objected again that when the person delimited by the time of son's coming (*putrāgamanakālāvacchinna puruṣa)*, who is to be conveyed from the compound word '*saputraḥ'* is held to be obtained from the analysis, the convension that all the *bahubvrīhi*-compounds are compulsory would become contradicted as the compound is ruled only when the sense to be conveyed from the compound is not obtained from any other source. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that only the *bahuvrihi-* compounds such as *'prāptam udakam yam sa prāptodako grāmaḥ'* etc. wherein the sense of the word outside the compound is conveyed by the accusative '*yam'* etc., (and not by the nominative '*yaḥ'* etc.) are compulsory and not all the compounds; and hence no violation of any

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

convention takes place when the analysis is admitted as conveying the sense of the word outside the compound. Also it is objected again now that since in *'vṛṣṭe deve gataḥ'* the *bahuvrīhi* is not formed, in *'putreṇa sahāgacchati yaḥ'* too the *bahuvrīhi* cannot be formed as the compounding in the sense of the nominative is not allowed. However, Gadādhara refutes even such an objection on the ground that only the *bahuvrīhi*- compound prescribed by the rule '*anekamanya-padārthe*' (P. ii. 2. 24) in the sense of the nominative is incorrect; whereas the *bahuvrīhi*-compound prescribed by the rule '*tena saha tulyayoge*', P. ii. 2. 23) in the sense of the nominative is correct.

Meaning of the instrumental in '*jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ*'

III. 56. The rule 'The sign or attribute, by which is indicated the existence of a particular state is used in the instrumental (*itthambhūtalakṣaṇe,* P. ii. 3. 21) assigns the instrumental after the words (*jaṭā* etc.) expressing the sign. Here the state of being the sign is the state of being the distinguisher. And the same must be defined as the state of not being the counter-positive of the qualificandness of the qualificand. And the property that is the abode of such a signness is of two types: i) the chief-qualifier and ii) the adventitious qualifier. The property which distinguishes while being present is the chief-qualifier. For instance the staff which distinguishes while being present at the present time in the person, is the chief qualifier. Whereas the property which distinguishes even while not being present is the adventitious qualifier: For instance, the twisted locks of hair etc. of the ascetic etc. which distinguishes while being only present at some other time, i.e. not being present at present time is the adventitious qualifier. The relation of the chief

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

qualifier is conveyed by the possessive suffix (*matup*) etc.; for, the affixes, assigned in the sense of the presence of the property (or in whom it is), denote the sense of the relation of the present qualifier (P. v. 2. 94). Therefore, only the instrumental is used in 'He is an ascetic due to having twisted locks of hair' (*jaṭābhis tāpasah*) as the possessive suffix (*matup*) etc. are occasionless when the speaker intends that the relation of the non-present locks of hair should be conveyed. However, since the instrumental can convey the relation of even the present qualifier, like that of the non-present qualifier, the same instrumental is used even after the word expressing the chief qualifier; for instance in 'The sign (cause) which is being known to be present is the instrument' (*jñāyamānatvena liṅgam karaṇam*). etc.

Explanation

Gadādhara now sets out to explain the meaning of the instrumental assigned by the rule *itthambhūta lakṣaṇe* (P ii. 3. 21). According to him, since the rule assigns the instrumental in the sense of sign (*lakṣaṇa*), the same (sign) is the meaning of the instrumental in '*jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ*' etc. Also, according to him, since the signness (*lakṣaṇatva*) is the distiguishing factor (*vyāvaratakatva*), the same must be present; and therefore, cannot be the counterpositive of the absence occurring in the same locus as that of the delimitor of the qualificandness (*viśeṣyatāvacchedaka samānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitva*). The point to be noted here is that the sign (*lakṣaṇa*) can be either a chief qualifier (*viśeṣ aṇa*) by being present like the staff in the person in '*daṇḍḥ puruṣaḥ*' or an adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*) even without being present like the twisted locks of hair (*jāṭā*) in the ascetic in '*jaṭābhistāpasaḥ*'. And the pos-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sessive affix (*mutup*) expresses only the sense of the relation of the present qualifier (*vidyamāna),* and so the same is found in '*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ'*; whereas the instrumental can express the relation of both the chief-qualifier which is present, and the adventitious qualifier which is not present (*avidyamāna);* and thus the same is found in '*jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ'*.

Agrument

III. 57 Now it may be argued that in such cases, the instrumental does not convey the qualification of the state of being what is known as relating to the sign (*liṅga);* but rather the same conveys only the state of being what is delimited by the state of being what is known as relating to only the instrumentality, i.e. the part of the meaning of the word 'sign' (*liṅga).* However, it should be noted that such an instrumental is only the instrumental referring to the chief qualifier as there is no other rule prescribing the instrumental. As a matter of fact, though the qualification of the state of being what is known is cognized in the sign (*liṅga*) etc., the state of being what is known and the instrumentality can be cognized to have the relation of being the delimitor and th limited in the form of the relation of the community of locus; and therefore the admission of the relation of the state of being what is known with the instrumentality, i.e. the part of the meaning of the word 'sign' *(liṅga)* etc., is not proper.

It may be objected now that even when the state of being what is delimited (by the state of being what is known) is cognized in the instrumentality, i.e. the part of the meaning of the word 'sign' *(liṅga),* in the form of the relation of the community of locus, the relation of the same with the part of the meaning of the word

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'sign' *(liṅga)* becomes totally unavoidable. However, this is not correct to state. 'Since we can admit that the state of being what is delimited by the state of being what is known is cognized as the delimitor in the instrumentality having the form of the identity with the instrument (*liṅga*), and appearing (functioning) as the relation of the instrument, the relation of the delimitor and the delimited can be cognized even without allowing the relation of the state of being what is delimited with the part of the meaning of the word 'sign' *(liṅga)*.

Explanation

When the smoke becomes known to be the instrument (*karaṇa*), the same smoke acquires the instrumentality; and therefore the state of being what is known (*jñāyamānatva*) is related to the instrumentality (*karaṇatva)* of the smoke and not to the smoke, i.e. the instrument (*karaṇa),* in '*jñāyamānatvena liṅgam karaṇam'*. And therefore, it is objected now that due to the relation of the *jñāyamānatva* with the *karaṇatva*, the part of the meaning of the word 'sign' (*liṅga padārthaikadeśa*), the instrument ruled in the sense of 'sign' *(lakṣaṇa),* i.e. chief qualifier *(viśeṣaṇa)* becomes teneable after the word '*jñāyamānatva'*. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that since no other rule excepting '*itthambhūtalakṣaṇe'* (P. ii. 3.21) can assign the instrumental after the word '*jñāyamānatva'*, the instrumental after the same word can only be the one that denoties chief-qualifier *(viśeṣaṇa).*

It should be noted here that, according to Gadādhara, the relation of the *jñāyamānatva* with the *karaṇatva*, i.e. the part of the meaning of the word 'sign', is unnecessary. The objective of such a relation is to cognize the relations of the delimitor and the delimited (*avacchedyāv-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

acchedaka bhāva) between the *jñāyamānatva* and the *karaṇatva;* and since such an objective can be achieved even by relating the *jñāyamānatva* to the *liṅga* (both the *karaṇatva* and the *jñāyamānatva* are the properties of only the *liṅga* and therefore they can have such a relationship by community of locus *sāmānādhikaraṇya)* the same objective need not be accomplished by such a partial relation. Also, according to him, when the *karaṇatva, i.e.* the part of the meaning of the word '*liṅga*', is cognized to have been delimited by the *jñāyamānatva* due to its relation with the *liṅga (karaṇa)*, the contingency of the relation of the *jñāyamānatva* with the *karaṇatva,* i.e. the part of the meaning of the word '*liṅga*' (*padārthaikadeśānvaya*) need not be feared as the cognition of the relation of the delimitor and the delimited (*avacchedyāvacchedakabhāva)* is possible even by admitting the relation of the same with the instrument (*karaṇa),* i.e. even without admitting the relation of the same with the instrumentality (*karaṇatva)* (the same instrumentality is present in the instrument (*karaṇa*) through self-nature (*tādātmaya*) in the theory that the instrument and the instrumentality are one and the same).

Explanation of daṇḍavān ayam asti

III. 58. It is objected here as follows: That in ''This one was a staff-holder'' and 'The staff-holder left' (*daṇḍavān ayaamāsīt, daṇḍi gatavān)* etc, the staff is a property occurring in the past time, and therefore the same cannot be a chief qualifier; and thus the posses-sive affix such as '*matup*' is not tenable. However, this objection is not correct. In the case of the utterance of the additional predicate, even the relation of the staff as delimited by the past time functioning as the locus of the other additional predicate (the presence in the past

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

time), is conveyed by the possessive affix (such as *matup')* like the relation of the staff delimited by the present time functioning as the locus of the use of the contextual word. And therefore in such cases, only the relation of the staff as delimited by the past time functioning as the locus of the additional predicate such as the presence belonging to the past time is the meaning of the possessive affix (*matup)*. Even the non-existing staff etc., as accurring in the same past time as that of the other property such as the presence in the past time, can be the chief-qualifier in the person, i.e. the relatum of the other property (the presence in the past time). The cognition of the relation of the other additional property (the presence in the past time) with the person appearing as the qualificand of the property of the staff is held to be the cognition of the qualification of the qualified entity. Thus, neither the staff is merely an adventitious qualifier in the person, i.e. the relatum, nor the cognition of the relation of the staff-qualified is held to be merely the cognition of the relation of the person adventitiously qualified by the staff.

Explanation

An objection is raised now that since *matup* can express the relation (possession) of only the property existing at present time, the same *matup* would become untenable after '*daṇḍa*' etc in '*daṇḍavān ayamāsīt*', '*daṇḍī gataḥ*' as they cannot denote the relation of the staff belonging to the present time which alone is a chief qualifier (*viśeṣeṇa*). However, Gadādhara refutes the objection by stating that *mutup* can express, like the relation of the staff delimited by the time of the use of the word '*daṇḍa*'(*prakṛtaśabdaprayogādhikaraṇa kālāvacchinna)* in '*daṇḍavān asti*', even the relation of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

staff delimited by the time functioning as the locus of the other additional predicate such as the presence in the past time in '*daṇḍī gatavān*' etc.; and therefore, *matup* is tenable in such a sense in such a case.

It should be noted that since *matup* is possible only after the chief qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa),* the staff (*daṇḍa*) needs to be explained as the chief qualifier to facilitate the *matup* after it; and therefore, Gadādhara states that the staff (*daṇḍa),* though not present at the present time (*avidyamāna)*, can be the chef qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa)* by occurring at the same time as that of the other additional property such as the presence in the past time *(dharmāntarasambandhasamānakālīna),* but not merely an adventious qualifiers (*upalakṣaṇa)* in the person, i.e. the relatum *(anvayin)*; and thus, the cognition of the qualification of the presence in the past time in the person qualified by the staff is the qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi bodha)* and not the qualification of the relation with the person adventitiously qualified by the staff (*tadupalakṣitānvayabodha*).

Convention of viśeṣaṇa and upalakṣaṇa

III. 59. However, in some cases, the chief qualifier occurring at the same time as that of the other additional predicate becomes merely the adventitious qualifier by not being related to the relatum of the other additional predicate. For instance, the form is merely the adventitious qualifier in the relatum of the taste such as the milk in 'The corporal item (milk) having the form is having the taste' *(rūpavān rasavān);* and the dewlap is the adventitius qualifier in the cow expressed by the word cow in 'The cow having the dewlap is the expressed meaning of the word {cow} (*sāsnāvān gopadavācyaḥ)*. Also in some cases, the property related

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to the other additional property related in turn to the relatum is only an adventitious qualifier in the relatum of the other additional property by not being the delimitor of the relatendness of the relatum of the other additional property. Thus, the collective cognition produced from 'The staff and the person' (*daṇḍapuruṣau*) is held to have only a reference to the person as adventitiously qualified by the staff, but not held to have a reference to the person as qualified by the staff.

Also, by reverse, the property which is not related to the property that is related to the qualificand can function as the chief qualifier in the qualificand possessing the other property, by being the delimitor of the relatedness of the other property related to the qualificand. That is why in the theories of both the Prābhākaras and the Prācya-Naiyāyikas, who do not admit that the name (designation) has the objectness with respect to the knowledge of the named qualified by the name (designation) (such as *ghaṭo ghaṭapadavācyaḥ),* the name (designation), though not a qualifier in the knowledge of the pot, is considered to be the chief-qualifier with respect to the object (pot) of the knowledge of the pot due to its being the delimitor of the objectness of the object (pot) by way of merely being the object of the knowledge (recollection) of the third person. Also that is why the Ācārya holds that there occurs no state of being the knowledge that refers to the duality (twoness), rather only the state of being the knowledge that refers to the substances qualified by the duality (twoness) in the knowledge such as 'These are the two substances' (*dve dravye)* occurring at the time of the loss (destruction) of the duality (twoness). For, such a knowledge can be produced only from the knowledge of the chief qualifier such as the duality (twoness).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Now Gadādhara states the convention (*paribhāṣā*) for distinguishing chief qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*). According to him, the form (*rūpa*), i.e. the chief qualifier, despite occurring at the same time as that of the other additional predicate such as the taste (*vidheyānatarasamānakālīna*), is considered to be merely the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*) in the relatum of the taste (*rasa*) in *'rūpavān rasavān'* due to not being related to the taste (*tadananvayin*). Also according to him, the property such as the staff, despite being related to the property (such as the presence in the present time) related to the person (*dharmisambaddhadharmāntara*), may be considered to be merely the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*) in the relatum of the other additional property, i.e. the person, in *'daṇḍapuruṣau'* due to not being the delimitor of the realtedness of the other additional property, (*dharmāntara sambandhitānavacchedaka*) such as the presence in the present time. Now since the property such as the staff is merely an adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*) and not the chief qualifier (*viśeṣeṇa*) of the person, i.e. the qualificand, the collective cognition (*samūhālambanabodha*) produced from *'daṇḍapuruṣau'* refers to the person only as adventitiously qualified by the staff (*daṇḍādyupalakṣitaviṣaya*) but does not refer to the person as qualified by the staff (*daṇḍaviśiṣṭa viṣaya*). Further Gadādhara states that the property such as the name (*samjñā*) despite not being related to the property (potness) related to the qualificand (pot) (*viśeṣyasambaddhasambandhi*), can be the qualifier in the qualificand in *'ghaṭo ghaṭapadavācyaḥ'* etc. due to being the delimitor of the relatedness of the other additional property of the qualificand (*tatsamban-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

dhitāvacchedakatayā). That is why the Prābhākaras and the Prācya-logicious, despite not admitting that the name (*samjñā)* is the object of the knowledge of the named (pot) qualified by the name (*samjñāviśiṣṭa samjñā jñānaviṣaya)* (the name 'pot' is only the object of the recollection and not that of the perception), hold that the same name is the chief qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) in the object (pot) of the knowledge of the name (pot) (*samjñāviṣ ayaviśeṣaṇa)* due to its being the delimitor of the objectness of the object (*viṣayatāvacchedaka)* by way of being the object of the knowledge of third person (*taṭ asthajñānavisaya)*(in *ghaṭo- ghaṭapadavācyaḥ),* and therefore the same appears as the delimitor of the objectness of the object (pot); and thus the same becomes the chief-qualifier in the pot, i.e. the object of the knowledge. Now since the property such as the twoness, though not related to the substanceness relating to the substance, can be the chief-qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa)* in the substance in *'dve dravye'* by being the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum (*substance)*, the collective cognition produced from '*dve dravye'* refers to only the substance as qualified by the twoness (*dvitvaviśiṣṭa viṣayaka)* and not to the twoness *(dvitva viṣayaka)*.

Conclusion

III. 60. Further, in the same way, though the state of not being the counterpositive of the absence is undistinguished for both, the potness etc. are considered to be the chief qualifiers, whereas the blue colour etc. are considered to be the adventitious qualifiers in the pot, i.e. the counter-positive of the general absence of the (blue) pot (in '*nīlaghaṭo nāsti)*. Also in some other cases, the delimiting property of the qualificandness, though present in the qualificand, is not held to be the chief-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

qualifier, but rather to be only the adventitious qualifier due to the over- and under-pervasions and also due to the non-exclusion (non-distinction) of the qualificand from what is other than the qualificand. For instance (in *jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ'*), the twisted locks of hair, though present in the ascetic, is merely the adventitious qualifier and not be qualifier, like the self-restraint, the calmness etc., which are the delimitors of the indicatedness of the indicated item (ascetic). Thus enough of too much of discussion on the convention of the qualifiers and the adventitious qualifiers that are contextually irrelevant.

Raghunātha, the author of Dīdhiti, holds that the possessive suffix such as '*ṇini'* conveys the relation of even the non-chief-qualifier (i.e. of the adventitious qualifier) as the usages such as 'This pot is to be destroyed' (*'ghaṭo yam vināśī')* are found to be made in the language. However, such a position is not correct. For, in such usages, the word to be destroyed (*vināśin)* can be explained to have been derived from the applaction of the '*ṇini'* affix used after the root '*vināś*' in the sense of necessity (c.f. *āvaśyakādharmarṇayoḥ,* P. iii. 3. 170). This concludes the analysis of the 'instrumental meaning in the Vyutpattivāda'.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara concludes the analysis of the instrumental meaning by further elaborating on the convention of the chief qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa)* and the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa)*. According to him, the mere presence or being the non-counter-positive cannot be the determining factor of the *viśeṣaṇas*. For, when the blue pot is destroyed, the inherence of the potness and that of the blue colour are present in the pot as the inherence is eternal. Thus, both the potness and the blue-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ness of the colour are mutually non-distinct (*apratiyogitvāviśeṣa)* as far as not being the counter positives of the absence of the blue pot (*ghaṭasāmānyābhāva)* is concerned. However, while the potness is the chief qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa),* the blue colour is the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa).* Also according to him, even the present property can be the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣ aṇa).* For instance, twisted locks of hair (*jāṭā*), though present in the ascetic, is merely an adventious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa)* and not the chief qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa)* due to not being the distinguishing factor of the ascetic from the non ascetic, (*atadvyāvṛtti*) i.e. not being the delimiting property of the qualificandness of the qualificand (*viśeṣyatāvacchedaka)* like the self restraint (*dama),* calmness (*śama)* etc.

However, Gadādhara does not support Raghunātha's position that the possessive suffixes (*matvarthīya)* in *'ghaṭo' yam vināśī'* convey the relation of the non-chief qualifier (*aviśeṣaṇa)* or the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa)* such as the destruction (*vināśa).* He refutes such a position on the ground that in statements such as '*ghaṭo' yam vināśī'* etc, the '*ṇini'* affix used after the base '*vināśa*'is not a possessive suffix (*matvarthīya*) that needs to convey the relation of the adventitious qualifier, but rather the same '*ṇini'* affix is only a suffix of necessity (*āvaśyakārtha*); and therefore, need not convey the relation of the destruction, i.e. the adventitious qualifier.

This concludes the analysis of the instrumental meaning in he Vyutpattivāda.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER IV

THE ANALYSIS OF DATIVE MEANING

Nature of sampradānatva

IV. I. In the case of usages such a 'He gives a cow to the Brahmin' (*brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti)* etc., the dative, used in the sense of the indirect object, conveys the describing of the indirect objecthood of the Brahmin etc. with respect to the action such as giving etc. Here the indirect objecthood is the state of being what is in view of (intended by) the agent of giving as being related to the object of the action concerned, which is a property common to both the primary and the secondary indirect objects. Here the objecthood described by the action is the state of being the abode of the effect produced from the action. And the relation with the possessor of the objecthood is only the state of being the possessor of the effect resident in the possessor of the objecthood. Thus the indirect objecthood amounts to the state of being the object of the desire of the agent (of giving) as being the abode of the effect produced from the action (of giving). Also the rule the what one has in view through the object becomes the indirect ob-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ject (when bringing about an action) (*karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam* p. 4.32) is intended to convey the same idea. For, the grammarians have explained the phrases 'what one has in view through the object as 'what one intends to be associated with the object'. Since in the said present case, the Brahmin is the object of the desire of the giver as being the possessor of the (effect of the) ownership resident in the cow, produced from the action such as giving, the same has the indirect objecthood.

Explanation

Gadādhara now begins the forth chapter with the analysis of the meaning of the dative which is in order. According to him, since the dative conveys the state of describing the indirect objecthood of the Brahminete (*brāhmanādisampradānakatva)* with respect to the action of giving in '*brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti'* etc. (cf. *catruthī sampradāne,* P. ii. 3.13), the indirect objecthood is the dative-meaning.

Gadādhara now analyses the nature of the indirect objecthood (*sampradānatva)* as the state of being what is in view of (intended by) the agent as being related to the object of the action concerned (*kriyākarmasambandhitayā kartrabhipretatvam)*. And since the Brahmin in '*brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti'* has the state of being what is in view of (intended by) the agent of giving as being related to the cow (as the owner), the same is the indirect object. Further Gadādhara analyses that since the direct objecthood described by the action (*kriyākarmatva)* is the state of being the abode of the effect produced from the action (*kriyājanyaphala śālitva)* (cf. II. 15), the indirect objecthood amounts to the state of being the object of the desire of the agent as being the abode of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the effect produced from the action (*kriyājanya phala-bhāgitayā karturicchāviṣayatvam)*. And according to him, this analysis is justified on the ground that the grammarians explain the phrase 'what one has in view through the object' (*karmaṇā yam abhipraiti)* as 'what one intends to be associated with the object' (*karmaṇā yam abhisambaddhum icchati)* in the rule P. i. 4. 32. In '*brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti,'* the Brahmin is the object of the desire of the giver, as being the abode of the object of the ownership produced from the action of giving; and therefore the same Brahmin becomes the indirect object of giving.

Objection that *sampradānatva* is non-distinct from the *kramatva*

IV. 2. It may be objected now as follows : That the said indirect objecthood is non-distinct from the direct objecthood : The rule 'That which is desired to be reached most by the agent is the object' (*karturīpsitatmam karma* p. i. 4.49) assigns the designation of object to the *kāraka* which is desired by the agent to be obtained through the action; and the state of being what is desired by the agent to be obtained through the action is only the state of being the object of the desire of the agent as being the abode of the effect produced from the action.

Now it may be argued as follows : That the rule 'Also that which is likewise connected with even if not desired is called the object' *(tathāyuktam cānīpsitam,* p. i. 4. 50) assigns the designation of object to the *kāraka* which is the abode of the effect produced from the action although not desired by the agent to be the abode of the effect produced from the action; and therefore it can be held that the objecthood is only the state

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of being the abode of the effect produced from the action, which does not include the element of desire; whereas the indirect objecthood includes the element of desire of the agent and hence is distinct from the objecthood. However, this argument is not correct. When the objecthood does not consist of the desire, the composition of two different rules (P. 1. 4. 49 and P. i. 4. 50) would have the contigency of uselessness.

Explanation

Gadādhara states now the Pūrvapakṣins's objection that in the given analysis the indirect objecthood (*sampradānatva)* cannot be distinguished from the objecthood (*karmatva)*. According to him, the rule '*kartur īpsitatam karma*' (P. 1. 4. 49) assigns the designation of object to the *kāraka* desired to be obtained by the agent through the action (*kriyayāvyāptumiṣṭa);* and therefore, the objecthood (*karmatva)* is the state of being the *kāraka* desired to be obtained by the agent through the action (*vyāptumiṣṭatva);* and since the indirect objecthood (*sampradānatva)* too is the state of being the object of desire as being the abode of the effect produced from the action (*kriyājanyaphalbhāgitayeccehāviṣayatva),* the distinction between the objecthood and the indirect objecthood becomes untenable.

However, a possible argument here is that in '*grāmam gacchan straṇam sprśati'*, the grass (*tṛṇa),* which is the abode of touching, is the object despite not being the object of the desire as being the abode of the effect (touching) produced from he action (*kriyāianya-phalabhāgitayā icchāviṣaya)*, by the rule *tathāyuktam cānipīstam* (P. i. 4.50); and consequently, the element of desire need not be included in the body of the objecthood which is the state of being the abode of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

effect produced from the action (*kriyājanyaphalaśālitvam),* whereas the element of desire needs to be included in the body of the indirect objecthood which is the state of being the object of the desire as the abode of the effect produced from the action (*kriyājanya phalabhāgitayā icchāviṣayatvam);* and thus the indirect objecthood can be ditinguished from the objecthood. However, Gadadhara refutes the argument on the ground that if the element of desire is not to be included in the body of the objecthood, then the composition of two distinct rules '*karturīpsitatmam karma*' (P. i. 4. 49) and '*tathāyuktam cānīpsitam*' (P. i. 4. 50) for assigning the designtion of object would become unjustificed.

Refutation of the arguments

IV. 3. It may again be argued now as follows; That suppose the *kāraka* (grass), which is not desired by the agent to be the abode of the effect, too is held to be the object, then the village which is commonly desired by the agent to be the abode of the effect produced from the action, like the grass, too could be explained to have the objecthood by the same rule (P. i.4. 50); and therefore, the uselessness of the composition of the other rule (P. i. 4. 49) consisting of the desire of the agent, cannot be avoided. However, this argument too is not correct to state. The two distinct rules are composed only to convey the fact that in the case of the village, where the said objecthood not consisting of the element of desire is contradictory, the object-denoting affix conveys only the objecthood consisting of desire. And that is why, in the case where the operation is performed with the intention that the rice should have the contact with the region down below the throat, but by chance even the poison would have the contact

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with the region down below the throat from the same operation, the usage 'He does not eat poison' *(viṣam anena na bhujyate)* becomes tenable; this is so because the absence of the state of being the object of the desire as being the abode of the effect is not contradictory though the state of being he abode of the effect (contact) produced from the action of eating is contradictory in the poison. Also, therefore then the usage 'He eats the poison by chance' *(daivādviṣam bhujyate)* becomes tenable when the intention is to denote the objecthood not consisting of the desire.

It may again be argued now as follows : That the distinction can be tenable by holding that the state of being what is intended to be the abode of the effect functioning as the delimiting property of the expressedness of the meaning of the verb is the objecthood, whereas the state of being what is intended to be the abode of the effect not functioning as the delimiting property of the expressedness of the meaning of the verb is the indirect objecthood. And only the giving up delimited by the loss of one's ownership (in the object given) is the meaning of the verb 'to give' (*dā*), but the same giving up delimited by the effect such as the origination of the other's ownership (in the object given) is not the meaning of the same verb. However, this argument is also not correct to state. For, then even the mere abandoning (leaving) would have the contingency of becoming the primary meaning of the verb to give (*dā*).

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣín raises an argument now that supposing the grass in '*tṛṇam spṛśati*', which is not intended to be the abode of the effect *(phalāśrayatvenānabhipreta),*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is held to be the object due to its possession of he effect, then even the village in '*grāmam gacchati*', which is intend to be the abode of the effect (contact) produced from the action of going *(kriyājanya phalaśyaryatveneṣṭa)*, too could be explained to be the object due to its possession of the effect by the rule *tathāyuktam cānīpsitam,* (P. i. 4. 50) itself; and so the other rule '*karturīpsitatamam karma*' (P. i. 4. 49) consisting of the desire in its body (*icchāghaṭita)* would become unnecessary. However, the objector refutes the argument on he ground that the other rule (P. i. 4. 49) can be explained to be necessary to facilitate the objecthood for the village etc. which is the object of the desire; and hence does not have the objecthood not consisting of the desire; (*icchāghaṭita niruktarūpa)*. According to him, the two rules (P. i. 4. 49 and P. i. 4. 50) assign the objecthood separately for the objects (which are either the objects of the desire to be the abode of the effect produced from the action or the non objects of the desire to be the abode of the effect produced from the action); and therefore the usages '*daivād viṣam bhujyate*'and '*viṣam anena na bhujyate*' become tenable in the event of the operation of eating the rice with the intention of producing the contact of the rice with the region down below the throat (*galādhassaṃyogānukūla vyāpāra.)* but by chance the poison is also eaten, as the poison *(viṣa)* can be explained to be both an object of eating due to the presence of the objecthood not consisting of the desire and non-object due to the absence of the objecthood consisting of the desire.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin tries again to explain the distinction between the direct objecthood and the indirect objecthood in a different way. According to him, the objecthood *(karmatva)* can be defined as the state

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of being what is intended to be the abode of the effect functionings as the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning of the verb (*dhātvarthatāvacchedaka phalasālitvenoddeśyatva)* (the village can be the object, because it is intended to be the abode of the effect); and the indirect objecthood (*sampradānatva)* can be defined as the state of being what is intended to be the abode of the effect not functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning expressed by the verb. (*dhātvarthatānavacchedaka phalaśālitvenoddeśyatva)* (and the Brahmin can be the indirect object (and not the object), because he is intended to be the abode of the effect of other's ownership not functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning expressed by the verb). And this explanation is rendered possible by the fact that the verb 'to give' (*dadāti)* in *brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti* etc. can be admitted to be expressing only the giving up as delimited by the loss of ones (giver's) ownership (*svasvatva dhvaṃsāvacchinna tyāga)* and not the giving up delimited by the effect such as the other's ownership (*parasvatvarūpa phalāvacchinnatyāga)*. However, the objector refutes the argument on the ground that then the verb '*dadāti'* would require to express the sense of mere abandonment (*upekṣā*).

Distinction between karmatva and sampradānatva

IV. 4. No. this original objection is not correct. The direct objecthood is the state of being what is desired as being the abode of the effect; whereas the indirect objecthood is the state of being what is desried as being the relatum of the effect. Since the Brahmān etc. are not desired by the giver as being the abodes of the effect of ownership produced from the giving, but rather

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the same are desired only as being the describers of the ownership, the same need not be the direct objects.

It may be argued now as follows: That even the state of being the abode of the effect is a particular type of relation; and therefore, even the cow etc. cannot be avoided the indirect objecthood. Also it may be stated that since the designation of indirect object is contradicted by the designation of direct object in the case of the *kārakas* intended to be the abode of the effect, only a distinct relation that is other than being the abode of the effect is necessary to be constituting the indirect objecthood; however, then the indirect objecthood would become untenable for the tree and the husband which are intended respectively to be the abodes of the effects such as the contact with the water produced from the sprinkling and the love produced from sleeping with in the usages such as 'He sprinkles water for the tree' *(vṛkṣāyodakam āsiñcati)* and 'She lies down i.e. sleeps with the husband' (*patye śete*) etc.

However, this argument is not correct to state. The indirect objecthood (for the brahmin etc.) in the dative usages can be explained by including the relation of the effect such as describing that is different from the state of being the a bode of the effect functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verb in the body of the indirect objecthood. And in the cases such as 'He sprinkles water for the tree' (*vṛkṣāyodakam āsiñcati)* etc., the operation conducive to the action of sprinkling of the liquid substance is the meaning of the verbal root. Since the contact of the water which effects the indirect objecthood for the tree does not function as the delimitor of the abode of such a verbal root-meaning, the state of being the abode of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such a contact of the water is definitely different from the said state of being the abode of the effect functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal not. Thus, the tree etc., which are the objects of the intention (desire) having the state of being the abode of the contact of the water as the qualifier, can very well be explained to be the indirect objects.

Explanation

Gadādhara now replies to the objection (reised in the para, iv. 2). According to him, since the objecthood (*karmatra)* can be defined to be the state of being what is desired as being the abode of the effect (*phalāśrayatv-eneṣṭatva)* and the indirect objecthood (*sompradānatva)* can be defined to be the state of being what is desired as being the relatum of the effect (*phala sambandhitaye-ṣṭatva)*, the distinction between the former and the latter is quite tenable. Also since the Brahmin in *'brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti'* is desired to be the relatum (describer) of the effect of ownership produced from the giving (*tyāgajanya svatvanirūpakatayeṣṭa)*, the same can be the indirect object.

However, it can be argued here that the state of being the abode of the effect (*āśrayatva)* can be considered to be a particular type of relation (*sambandhaviśeṣ a)*; and therefore when the state of being what is desired to be the relatum of the effect (*phala sambandhita-yeṣṭatva)* is held to be the indirect objecthood, the cow in '*brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti'* could be argued to be the indirect object as it is desired to be the abode of the ownership. Also since in '*vṛkṣāyodakam āsiñcati'* etc., the tree etc., that are desired to be the abode of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

contact of the water produced from sprinkling (*sekajanya jalasamyogāśrayatayeṣṭa),* need to be explained as the indirect objects, even the counter argument that the relation that is other than the being the abode (*āśrayatvāpekṣayā bhinna sambandha)* constitutes the body of the indirect objecthood (*sampradānatā ghaṭaka)* is also untenable. Thus, even the contradiction to the designation of indirect object (*sampradānasajñā)* by the designation of object. (*karmasamjñā)* does not help to establish the position that only the relation dstinct from the relation of being the abode of the effect constitutes the indirect objecthood. However, Gadādhara replies to the argument on the ground that only the relation of the effect such as describing that is different from being the abode of the effect constituting the delimitor of the expressedness of the root-meaning (*dhātvarthatā vacehedaka phalāśrayatva bhinna sambandha)* is included in the body of the indirect objecthood; and therefore, the distention between the direct objecthood and the indirect objecthood is quite easy to establish.

Meaning of the dative

IV. 5. Also it should not be argued that the indirect objeccthood would become untenable for the husband in 'She lies down for (i.e.sleeps with) her husband' (*patye śete)* etc. due to the non-establishment of any effect that functions as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root. For, the establishment of the indirect objecthood is possible due to non-inclusion of the effect-hood in the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root that is included as constituent part in the counterpositive of the mutual absence. Thus, in 'He gives a cow to the *Brahmin' (brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti)* etc.,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the verbal cognition produced is that the person is the agent of giving producing the ownership resident in the cow which (ownership) is the object of the desire as being described by the Brahmin. Here the state of being the object of the desire of the agent as being described by the Brahmin is the meaning of the dative word '*brāhmaṇāya;* and the same is related to the ownership, i.e. the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root 'to give' ('*dā*') in turn relating to the occurrence (residence) in the cow expressed by the accusative word '*gām*'. And the giving that produces the ownership is the meaning of the verb 'to give' (dā).

Explanation

Since the indirect objecthood (*sampradāntva)* is held to be the state of being what is desired to be the relatum of the effect different from the state of being the abode of the effect, i.e. the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning of the verbal root (*dhātvarthatāvacchedaka phalāśrayatva bhinnaphalasambandhitayeṣṭatva),* it is argued now that the husband in '*patye śete'* cannot be explained to be the indirect object. Also since the root *(śī)* is intransitive, no effect that is the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning of the verbal root can be established to have been produced; and thus the husband cannot be established to be the relatum of such an effect.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection by stating that the indirect objecthood *(sampradānatva)* would be admitted to be the state of being what is desired to be the abode of the effect that is different from the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the verbal root (*dhātvarthatāvacchedakabhinnaphalāśrayatayeṣṭatva);* and since the husband is the abode of the effect of love that is different from lying down (sleeping with), he can be explained to be the indirect object. Also Gadādhara explains that while the dative expresses the state of being the object of the desire of the agent as being described by the indirect object (*nirūpitatvena karturicchāviṣayatva)* relating to the ownership, the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root (*dhātvarthatāvacchedaka svatvānvavi*), the accusative expresses the occurrece (or residence) in the cow (*govṛttitva)* relating to the ownership (*svatvānvayi);* and the verbal root expresses the giving that produces the effect of ownership (*svatvajanaka)*. And thus the cognition in *'brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti'* is that one is the agent of giving producing the ownership resident in the cow, which is the object of desire, as being described by Brahmin *(brāhmaṇanirūpitatvencchāviṣaya goniṣṭhasvatvajanakatyāgakartā.)*

Alternative theory

IV. 6. Some hold here alternatively as follows: That in association with the root 'to give' *(dā)*, the indirect objecthood is the state of describing the other's ownership functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root (to give); and the same is the primary indirect objecthood. Thus (in *'brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti')*, only the state of describing is the meaning of the dative and the same is related to the other's ownership, functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root. That is why Śūlapāṇi has declared that the offering to forefathers (*śrāddha)* has only the sacrificial offeringness from the view point of the Pitṛs'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(desceased ancestores), whereas the same offerings has the giftness only from the view point of Brahmin. Since there (in the *śrāddha)* the Pitṛs' ownership is not produced with respect to the rice being offered away, the Pitṛs cannot have the indirect objecthood. However suppose the indirect objecthood is the state of being intended as being the possessor of the ownership, then even the Pitrs can have the indirect objecthood unharmed in them; and therefore, the offering to the forefathers can have the giftness even from the view point of the Pitrs. Also, it cannot be argued that the Pitṛs do not have the state of being intended as being the possessor of the ownership in the case of the offering to the forefathers. For, the dative is expressive of the state of being intended as being the possessor of the ownership for the Pitṛs in the case of abandoning (offering), i.e. the meaning of the word 'offer' (*svadhā)* which is expressive of the abondoning (offering) of the form of offerring to the forefathers in the cases such as 'O father, this is the rice, and offering to you' (*pittaretattennam svadhā)* etc. Since the Pitṛs etc., though intended as being the possessors of the ownership (of the rice), do not actually receive the rice as such , they do not have the ownership of the rice; whereas the Brāhmins, though are not intended as being the possessors of the ownership, have the ownership procuced from the knowledge (that the rice is actually offered to the Brāhmins). Also, the *kārakas,* that do not have the state of being intended as being the possessor of ownership, but have only describing in them, have already been explained to be the indirect objects. Also, even the state of being intended to be the possessor of the ownership is non-contradictory to the Brahmins like to the Pitṛs.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains an alternative theory of the indirect objecthood (*sampradānatva*). According to the alternative theory, in *'brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti'*, the indirect objecthood is the state of describing the ownership functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root 'to give' (such as the abandoning) *(dhātvarthatāvacchedakasvatvanirūpakatva);* and since the ownership has the state of being edescribed by Brahmin (*brāhmaṇanirūpitatva)*, the same is the meaning of the dative expressive of *saṃpradānatva*. And Śūlapāṇi accepts such a theory when he states that since in '*pitaretatte annam svadhā'* etc., the Pitṛs are not the indirect objects (they do not have the state of being the describer of the ownership of the rice), the *śrāddha* has only the nature of being the sacrifical offering (*yāgatva)* with respect to them, whereas since the Brāhmins are the indirect objects (they have the state of being the describer of the ownership of the rice), the *śrāddha* has the nature of being the gift (*dānatva)* with respect to them.

Also Gadādhara states the *bādhaka* in not accepting such an altenative theory. According to him, when the indirect objecthood (*sampradānatva)* is held to be the state of being what is intended as being the possessor of the ownership *(svatvabhāgitvenoddeśyatva)*, the *śrāddha* would have the nature of gift (*dānatva)* even from the view point of the Pirts, like from the view points of the Brahmin, as the Pitṛs too have such an indirect objecthood (the dative in '*pitaretat te annam svadhān'* can express the state of being what is intended as being the possessor of the ownership for the Pitrs). Thus

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the alternative theory must be admitted. Now since the Pitṛs do not receive the rice ball (*piṇḍa*), the ownership of the same is not produced in them; and therefore, they do not have the state of being the describer of the ownership (*svatvanirūpakatva*). Whereas since the Brahmins actually receive the rice ball (*piṇḍa),* the ownership of the same is produced in them; and therefore they do have the state of being the describer of the ownership (*svatvanirūpakava*). And this is in spite of the fact that they do not have the state of being what is intended to be the possessor of the ownership.

Secondary indirect objecthood

IV. 7. However, in the case such as 'He sprinkles water to the tree' (*vṛkṣāyodakam āsiñcati*), and she lies down for i.e. sleeps with her husband' (*patye śete)* where the *kārakas* have the indirect objecthood by being the possessors of the effects not functioning as the delimitors of the expressedness of the expressed meanings of the verbal roots, the inclusion of the aspect of the state of being what is intended is necessary in the body of the indirect objecthood. For, in the cases where the contact of the water with the tree occures by chance when the water is thrown over (sprinkled) with the intention of sprinkling some other object, and also where the relation of the effect (love) occurs with the husband by chance when the wife lies down (sleeps with) with the intention of pleasing some one else, such usages are not found to be made. That is why in such cases, the state of producing the effect (contact of water etc.), which is intended as resident in the dative base-meaning (tree etc), is the meaning of the dative case. And such a dative-meaning is related to the action such as sprinkling. And

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in such cases, the indirect objecthood (of the tree etc.) is only secondary. Since the expressive power of the dative is admitted in the primary indirect objecthood, not consisting of the state of being what is intended (as being the abode of the effect) due to economy, only an indicative power of the same is admitted in the other (secondary indirect objecthood). And in 'One should offer (*piṇḍas)* to the Pirtrs' (*'pitṛbhyo dadyāt)* etc., the dative is used in the sense of the indirect objecthood described by the giving of which the agent is undetermined. And such a secondary indirect objecthood in such cases is only the state of being what is intended as being the possessor of the ownership produced from the act of giving (offering).

Explanation

After analyzing the primary indirect objecthood (*mukhyasampradānatva),* Gadādhara now analyses the secondary indirect objecthood (*bhākta sampradānatva)*. According to him, in the secondary cases, the indirect objecthood must be analysed as the state of being what is intended as being the possessor of the effect not functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root (*dhātvarthatānavacchedakaphalabhāgitayoddeśyatva)* by including the aspect of the state of being what is intended (*uddeśyatvāmśa)* in the body of the indirect objecthood. This is necessary because in the cases where the effect such as the contact of the water with the tree is produced by chance by the operation conducive to the action of sprinkling liquid substance (*drava dravya kriyānukūlavyāpāra*) carried out with the intention of sprinkling of some other object, the usage such as '*vṛkṣāyodakam*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

āsiñcati' needs to be avoided (when such a qualification is included, the usage is avoided as the tree is not intended as being the possessor of the contact of the water, i.e. the effect). Also, when such a usage is made, Gadādhara states, the dative indicates the state of producing the effect intended by the agent of sprinkling as being resident in the dative base-making itself (*savaniṣṭhatayā kartrabhipretaphalajanakatva)* which can be related to the action such as sprinkling (*sekādikriyā)* (expressive power of the dative is established only in the primary indirect objecthood, whereas only an indicatory power is established in the secondary objecthood).

Further according to Gadādhara, in the cases such as *'pitṛabyo dadyāt'* where the agent of giving is not determined (*anirdhāritakartṛka)* too, the indirect objecthood is the state of being what is intended as being the possessor of the ownership produced from giving (*tyāgajanyasvatvabhāgitayoddeśyatva)* and the dative refers to such an indirect objecthood described by the giving having the undertermined as the agent (*anirdhārita kartṛkasampradāna)*.

Avoidance of '*vṛkṣāyodakam āsiñcati'*

IV. 8. Now it may be objected as follows: That even in the case where some (other) person has the contact of the water occurring in the tree as the object of his desire, but the contact of the water occurs in the tree by the throwing of yet some other person who has the intention of sprinkling some thing else with the water, the usage 'The person sprinkles the tree with water' (*vṛkṣ āyodakam āsiñcati janaḥ)* would become contingent. For, the individuality of individual persons cannot be referred to by the word *'janaḥ'*. The individual agents (persons)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such as the servants who function as the qualificand, cannot appear in the aspect of desire (intention) as delimited by the form of the individuality of the individuals. And the state of being the object of the desire of the person delimited by the personality of the person in general, which is referred to by the word '*janaḥ*'. however, need not be contradictory in the contact of the water with the tree. Thus this way the undesired contingency of overpervasion (of the usage such as *vṛkṣāyodakam āsiñcati janaḥ)* could remain unavoided by taking into account even the view of the desire (for sprinkling water) of the person at some other time.

However, this objection is not correct : Only the desire of the person as being one that refers to the tree etc. is the meaning of the word '*vṛkṣāya*' ending in the dative. And such a desire is related to the action such as the sprinkling through the relations of both the state of being produced by itself (desire) and the state of producing the effect such as the contact, i.e. the object of itself (desire). And in the said case, where the contact of the water is produced with the tree through the individual action of sprinkling, the desire belonging to some other person at some other time may have the action of sprinkling through the relation of the state of producing the effect such as contact, i.e. the object of iteself (desire); however it does not have the same through the relation of the state of being produced by itself (desire). Consequently, the action of sprinkling does not have the qualification of the desire through the two relations; and thus the scholars state that the said usage lacks of semantic competency only.

Explanation

When some person has the desire that the tree

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

should have the contact with the water, but the same contact of the water is produced with the tree from the throwing (sprinking) of the water by some other person with the intention of sprinkling some thing else, the tree can be claimed to have the state of being what is intended as being the possessor of the effect (contact), i.e. the object of the desire inherent in the person in general *(janatvāvacchinnasamavetecchāviṣayasamyogarūpa phalabhāgitayoddeśyatva);* and thus the usage *'vṛkṣ āyodakam āsiñcati janaḥ'* becomes contingent. It should be noted that the word *'janaḥ'* in the statement cannot refer to the individual person such as Devadatta; and therefore the individual agents functioning as the qualificands of desire (*viśeṣyabhūtakartṛvyakti*) delimited by the individuality of the individual person (*tena rūpeṇa),* cannot appear as having the inherenec of the desire. Wheseas the state of being the object of the desire of the person in general (*śanatvāvacchinnecchāviṣayatva*), that is possible to be referred to, cannot be contradictory to the contact of the water with the trce (*vṛkṣaniṣṭhajalasamyoga);* and thus the grounds for the usage cannot be denied.

However, the other scholars refute the objection on the ground that in the desrie *'vṛkṣāya jalasamyogo bhavatu'*, even the tree becomes the object; and therefore, the desire occures in the tree through the objectness (*viṣayatā);* thus only the desire as being occurrent in (i.e. referring to) the tree (*vṛkṣaniṣṭhatvena-icchā)* is the meaning of the word ending in the dative (*caturthyantārtha).* And such a desire is to be related to the action of sprinkling etc. (*sekādikriyā)* through the double relationship of the state of producing the contact, which is the object of itself (desire) (*svaviṣayasamyogādijanakatva),*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and the state of being produced by itself (desire) *(svajanyatva);* however, since such a state of being produced by itself (desire) is contraditory (in the action of sprinking in the case where the action of sprinkling is produced from the desire of some other person at some other time *(kālāntarīṇa puruṣāntarīnecchā),* the usage '*vṛkṣayodakam āsiñcati*' need not become necessary in such a case.

Sampradānatva devoid of uddeśyatva is untenable

IV. 9. It should be understood (noted) here as follows: That suppose the form of the indirect objecthood described by the action of giving is held to be merely of the state of being the possessor of the ownership produced from the giving which does not include the state of being what is intended, then the usage 'The money is given to Caitra's wife' (*caitrapatnyai dattam)* would become necessary even in the case where the money is given to Caitra with the intention of benefiting Caitra alone, as the wife of Caitra too can be explained to have indirect objecthood. Here the indirect objecthood is caused in the wife by the giving of the money to Caitra as confirmed by the statement 'The money given to either members belongs to both the members of the couple. It should not be objected, however, that the ownership of the money in the husband alone produces the ownership of the money in the wife, and the totality of causes producing the ownership of the money in the husband cannot be so. For, the additional ownership in the wife who already has an ownership cannot be produced from the ownership found in the husband. Thus the qualification of the state of being what is intended needs to be included in the body of the indirect objecthood every where to avoid such a contin-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

gency. And so let it be admitted that even in the case such as 'One ought to give away (*piṇḍas*) to the Pitṛs' (*pitṛbhyo dadyāt)*, the primary indirect objecthood is the meaning of the dative.

Explanation

Gadādhara finds fault with the analysis of the indirect objecthood (*sampradānatva)* as the state of possessing the ownership (*svatvabhāgitayā)* which is devoid of the qualification of the state of being what is intended (*uddeśyatva)*. According to him, when merely the state of possessing the ownership produced from the giving (*tyāgajanyasvatvabhāgitva)* is held to be the indirect objecthood, the usage '*caitrapatnyai dattam'*, like '*caitrāya dattam'*, would become necessary in the event of making a gift of money to Caitra as the ownership of the money produced from the giving occurs even in the wife of Caitra like in Caitra due to the statement '*dampatyor madhyagam dhanam'*, and thus the indirect objecthood becomes quite tenable for the wife of Caitra like for Caitra himself. Also Gadādhara refutes the argument that only the ownership in Caitra (*caitrasvatva)* and not the totality of causes of the ownership in Caitra (*tatsānagrī)* is the producer of the ownership in Caitra's wife (*caitrapatnyāḥ svatva);* and since the making of gift (*dāna)* does not produce the ownership in Caitra's wife; the usage '*caitrapatnyai dattam'* cannot be imposed. According to him, the action of making gift (*dānakriyā)* produces the ownership in both Caitra and his wife symultaneously as known through '*dampatyor madhyagam dhanam';* and thus the additional ownership in the wife who already has an ownership of the money is not pos-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sible from the ownership in Caitra *(svatvavati svatvāntarānutpatteḥ);* and therefore, to avoid the contingency of '*caitrapatnyai dattam*', the inclusion of the qualification, viz. the state of being what is intended, is necessary to be included in the body of the indirect objecthood.

Alternative analysis

IV. 10. As an alternative, let it be admitted that only the state of describing the ownership, which is dependent on one's desire for the ownership in the other, is the primary indirect objecthood of the object of action of giving; and since the ownership (of money) is not established in the wife, she (wife) cannot have the indirect objecthood in the usage '*caitrāya dattam*'. The state of being what is described, that relates to (i.e. resident in) the ownership functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root is the meaning of the dative. And both the state of being the producer of itself (ownership) and the state of being dependent on the desire for itself (ownership) are the two relations of the ownership with respect to the giving of the form of the desire for the destruction of one's (donor's) own ownership. And the obtainment of (reference to) such a relationship is from the expressive power, in the theory that the giving qualified by the ownership through the said two relations is the expressed meaning of the verbal root, as the expressive power for the root would be admitted in the giving only as inclusive of (i.e. qualified by) such two relations. However, the obtainment of (reference to) such a relationship is only due to the strength of syntactic expectancy in the theory that the effect and the producing operation (action) are the two separate meanings of the verbal root.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In 'One ought to give (offer) (*piṇḍas)* to the Prits' *(pitṛbhyo dadyāt)* etc, the dative does not convey the primary sense of the state of being what is described by the Pitṛs which is related with respect to the ownership included as a constituent part in the root-meaning, as its is contradictory. However, it conveys only the secondary sense of the form of being the object of the desire as being what is described and the verbal root to give is only primary, as even offering to the Pitṛs is only giving from the view point of Brahmins. And Śūlapāṇi, who has advocated the state of being what is intended for the Brahmin to facilitate the indirect objecthood for the Brahmin with respect to the Śrāddha, too seems have laid great emphasis in the non-abondonment of the aspect of the state of being what is intended in the body of the indirect objecthood. Also even the great sage Pāṇini, while composing the rule 'what one has in view through the *karman* is called indirect object'(P. i. 4. 32), seems to agree with this theory.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains an alternative theory of the indirect objecthood. According to him, the state of describing the ownership dependent on one's own desire for the ownership in the other (*svasvatvecchādhīnatatkatvam)* can be the primary indirect objecthood described by the action of giving (*mukhyam dānakriyāsampradānatvam)*. And *'caitrapatnyai dattam'* is avoided because the desire does not refer to the ownership of the wife but to that of only husband, i.e. Caitra. According to Gadādhara, in *'brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti'* etc., the root to give (*dā)* refers to the giving producing the ownership (*svatvajanakatyāga);* and the relations between the ownership (*svatva)* and the giving (*tyāga*) which is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

nothing but the desire for the loss of one's (donor's) ownership (*svasvatva dhvamsecchā),* are the state of being the producer of itself (ownership) (*svajanakatva)* and the state of being dependent on the desire for itself (ownership) (*svecchādhīnatva)*. And this double relationship is obtained from the expressive power *(śakti*) when the root '*dā*' refers to the giving as qualified by the ownership (*svatvaviśiṣṭatyāga)* as its becomes part of root meaning; and is obtained from syntactic expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) when the root '*dā*' refers to the giving and the ownership as two separate meanings (as it does not become part of not-meaning). And the dative expresses the state of being what is described (*nirūpitatva)* relating to the ownership (*svatva)* as the same is described by the dative base-meaning (*Brāhmaṇa)*.

However, in '*pitṛbhyo dadyāt',* where the Pitṛs are not indirect objects due to the unestablishedness of their ownership in the *piṇḍas,* the dative cannot express the primary sense of the state of being what is described (*nirūpitatva) (*the ownership in the *piṇḍas* cannot be described by the Pitṛss); rather it can indicate only the secondary sense of the state of being what is the object of desire as being described (*nirūpitatvenecchāviṣyatva)* (the ownership in the *piṇḍas* can only be intended to be described by the Pitṛs in such cases). Also it should be noted that the root '*dā*' in such cases. conveys only the primary sense of giving (offering) (*dāna)* as the offering to the Pitṛs (*śrāddha*) can be considered to be the giving (offering) from the view point of Brahmin. Finally Gadādhara holds that in the original analysis of the indirect objecthood, the state of being what is intended (*uddeśyatva)* must be included in the body of the indirect objecthood (*sampradānatva)*; and the same

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

view is supported by both Śūlapāṇi (when he states that Brahmin has the state of being what is intended to facilitate the indirect objecthood for him *sampradānatānirvāhāya asti uddeśyatāpi brāhmaṇasya)* and Pānini (when he composes the rule that *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam,* P. i. 4. 32).

Non-sampradāna usage

IV. II. In 'He gives a scare to the enemy' (*śatrave bhayam dadāti),* 'producing the scare' is the secondary sense expressed by the root to give (*dā*). Consequently, only the scare has the form of being the object with respect to the root-meaning such as the operation conducive to producing. And the enemy etc. are the indirect objects by being intended as related to such a scare.

In 'He gets ready for fighting' (*yuddhāya samnahyate)* etc., the fight etc. cannot be explained to be the indirect objects due to the lack of any relation with the effect produced from the action of preparing; and therefore the dative found in such cases is not assigned by the rule P. ii. 3. 13. in the sense of the indirect object. Rather the same dative is assigned by the rule 'The dative is used in denoting the object of the verb which is supplied and is in construction with another verb denoting the action performed for the sake of another action (*kriyārthopapadasya ca karmaṇi sthāninaḥ,* P. ii. 3. 14) by intending to express the sense of 'He gets ready for making or tolerating the fight' (*yuddham kartum soḍhum vā samnahyate*). And this instance is similar to the instance of the usage 'He leaves for the woods' (*edhebhyo vrajati*) which is intended to express the sense of 'He leaves for bringing the woods' (*eddhānāhartum vrajati*). And the rule means that when the object of the infini-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tive, i.e. the word which is to be supplied and hence is not being heard (uttered) and which is to be added for expressing the action, is intended to express the objecthood in its meaning, the object gets the dative after itself. Thus, it should be understood that the state of having the tolerance making or bringing as the objective is the meaning of the dative in such cases.

Explantion

Now Gadādhara illustrates some non *sampradāna* usages such as '*yuddhāya samnahyate*' which are to be analysed as '*yuddham kartum soḍhum vā samnayate.*' According to him, when one gets ready or prepares for the fight, the fight does not become associated with any effect produced from the action of preparation (*samnahana kriyājanya phalasambandhī);* and therefore the same fight cannot be considered as the indirect object; and consequently the dative found after the word expressing the fight cannot be the *sampradāna caturthī.* Actually in such cases the dative is found after only the direct objects of the infinitve to be supplied such as '*kartum*' or *'soḍhum';* and therefore the saṃe dative is assigned by the rule P. ii. 3. 14 in the sense of only the direct object. Thus, the dative in *'yuddhāya samnahyate'* etc. is only non-*sampradāna* case.

Avoidance of dative in *rudram paśunā yajate*

IV. 12. Now it may be objected as follows: In the cases such as 'He offers to the fire and Prajāpati in the evenings' (*yadagnaye ca prajāpataye ca sāyam juhoti)* and 'I have released or poured out this precious water to all the beings' (*sarvabhūtebhyaḥ mayaitat jalam ūrjitam*), the fire and all the beings have been established to have the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

indirect objecthood of the non-rejecter. Similarly in the case of 'He offers (serves) Rurdra with the animal' *(paśunā rudram yajate)* too, the indirect objecthood of the non-rejecter would become unavoidable for the Rudra in the case of the particular type of action of offering; and consequently, the dative becomes necessary even there.

However, this objection is not correct. The action of offering causing the affection of the honoured is the meaning of the root 'to offer' *(yaj);* and since Rudra is intended to be only the abode of the love (affection), i.e. the effect functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of such an expressed meaning of the root, the same Rudra receives only the designation of object; and therefore the word expressing Rudra has only the accusative but not the dative. Though Rudra can have the said indirect objecthood of non-rejector in the case of the action of offering of the form of giving, he is not intended to have the same. However, when the indirect objecthood of the form of the state of being what is intended as being the relatum (describer) of the love (satisfaction) is intended to be present in Rudra, even the dative usage 'He makes offerings to Rudra '*(rudrāya yajate)* is correct. However, when both the direct and the indirect objecthoods are intended to be present in Rudra, only the accusative is used after the word expressing *Rudra,* as the dative is contradicted by the designation of object. Since the roots such as 'to offer' *(hu)* and 'to release or pour out' *(utsṛj)* do not convey the sense of the giving delimited by the effect such as love (affection), the deities, despite possessing the love (affection) produced from the action such as giving, do not have the objecthoods described by such an action of giving. Therefore, the accusative usages such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as 'He offers to Prajāpati' *(prajāpatim juhoti)* and 'He releases waters to the beings' *(bhūtāny utsṛiati)* cannot be imposed.

Explanation

Indirect objecthood (*sampradānatva)* is of two types: Indirect objecthood of the receiver such as Brahmin *(svīkartṛsampradānatva)* in '*brāhmaṇāya gāṃ dadāti*' and the indirect objecthood of the non-rejector such as the sun *(anirākartṛ sampradānatva)* in '*sūryāya arghyam dadāti*'. Now an objection that Rudra too can have the indirect objecthood of the non-rejector in '*paśunā rudram yajate*' is raised on the ground that he (Rudra) does not reject the offering as '*mahyam paśur na deyaḥ*' like Agni etc. who has the indirect objecthood of the non-rejector in '*yadagnaye ca prajāpataye ca sāyam juhoti*' due to non rejection.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection. According to him, the root 'offer' (*yaj*) conveyes the action conducive to the love (affection) of the honoured (*gauravitaprītihetukriyā);* and therefore, by being intended to be the possessor of the effect (love) functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root (*dhātvarthatāvacchedakarprīty āśrayatayā vivakṣita),* Rudra is only the object. Also, since Rudra is not being intended to have the indirect objecthood of non-rejector (*anirākartṛ sampradānatva)* in this case of the action of offering conducive to the love (*prītihetubhūtakriyā),* the word '*rudra*' expressing Rudra need not have the dative case after it. However, Gadādhara makes it clear that when Rudra is being intended as being the relatum (describer) of the love (*prītibhāgitayoddeśya),* he can be the indirect object; and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

therefore the dative usage '*rudrāya yajate*' is tenable; although when Rudra is being intended as being both the abode of the love (*prītibhāgin)* and the relatum of the love (*prītibhāgitayoddeśya),* the designation of indirect objecthood gets contradited by the later designation of object; and hence only the accusative usage of '*rudram yajate*' is possible.

Rajaka (washer-man) is not *sampradāna*

IV. 13. In the case of the usage 'He gives the cloths to the washerman for washing' (*rajakasya vastram dadāti),* the root give (*dā)* is not primary in expressing the sense of giving but rather is secondery in expressing the act of giving custody of one's objects to others. In the present context, the act of giving custody of ones objects to others is the operation that refers to the desire for washing (cleansing) that has the other (washer-man) as the agent. When the relation of the washer-man is intended to be only with the agent ship, i.e. the part of such an operation, only a relational genitive is used after the word '*rajaka*' expressing the washer-man. In 'He gives his back to the striker (beater)' (*hantuḥ pṛṣtham dadāti),* only the operation refferring to the giving of consent for beating that has the striker as the agent is the meaning of the root 'give' (*dā).* When the relation of the striker (beater) is intended to be with the agentship, i.e. the part of such as operation, only a genitive is used after '*hantr*'. In the same way, the genitive must be guessed upon (understood) in the cases such as 'He gives his feet to the shampooer' *(samvāhakasya caraṇam dadāti)* etc. In the cases such as 'Nārada likes the quarrel' (*nāradāya rocate kalahaḥ)* etc., the designation of indirect object is applied for the relatum of liking (i.e. Nārada) constituting the meaning of the ver-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

bal root 'to like' (*ruc*) of the form of being conducive to liking by the rule 'In the case of the verbs having the sense of 'to like' (*ruc*), the person pleased is the indirect object' (*rucyarthānām prīyamāṇaḥ,* P. 1. 4. 33). In such cases, the state of being what is located, i.e. the relation, is the dative-meaning, and the same is related to the liking. And the quarrel, causing the liking, has the agenthood by being the abode of such an action.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains as to why the washerman (*rajaka*) in '*rajakasya vastram dadāti*' cannot be the indirect object (*sampradāna*) despite the same being the receiver of what is given. According to him, in such cases, the verb '*dadāti*' does not refer to the actual giving (*tyāga*), but rather refers to only the action of giving custody of ones objects to the other (washer man)(*parāyattīkaraṇa*) which is an operation that refers to one's desire for getting ones clothes cleansed by the washerman (*tatkartṛka nirṇejanecchā prakāśakavyāpāra*). And since the washerman is intended to have merely a non-*kāraka* relationship with the agentship included in such an operation, he cannot be held to describe the ownership produced from the giving. Thus the washerman (*rajaka*) is not an indirect object, but is merely a non-*kāraka* assigned by *śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī* (P.ii.3. 50.).

Also Gadādhara explains as to why the striker (*hantṛ*) in '*hantuḥ pṛṣṭham dadāti*' cannot be an indirect object (*sampradāna*). According to him, the verb 'to give' (*dadāti*) in such usages too refers to merely an operation (expressing) of giving ones consent for beating by the striker (beater) (*tatkartṛka tāḍanānumati*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

prakāśakavyāpāra); and since the striker (*hantṛ*) is *intended to have merely a non* kāraka-relationship with the agentship included in such an operation, he cannot be held to describe the ownership produced from the giving. Thus, he is not an indirect object, but rather merely a non-*kāraka* by *śeṣa ṣaṣṭhī* (P. ii. 3. 50).

Now Gadādhara explains the indirect objecthood for Nārada in '*nāradāya rocate kalakaḥ'.* Sanskrit has developed a peculiar usage wherein the agent of liking (i.e. the person pleased) becomes an indirect object in association with the root 'to like' (*ruc).* Thus Pāṇini, recognizing this peculiar linguistic fact, has ruled that the person pleased, i.e. the agent possessing the liking, the constituent of the root-meaning such as the state of being conducive to the liking (*prītijanakatārūpa rucyarthaghaṭ aka prītibhāgin),* is the indirect object (*rucyarthānām prīyamāṇaḥ,* P. i. 4. 33). Also Gadādhara explains that in such usages, the objects such as quarrel (*kalaha)* become the agents due to the possession of the action causing the liking (*prīti janakakriyāśraya).*

Dative usages : '*puṣpebhyaḥ spṛhayati*' '*putrāya krudhyati*'

IV. 14. In 'He desires for the flowers' (*puṣpebhyaḥ spṛhayati)* etc, the flowers, i.e. the objects of desire, have the dative ending due to the indirect objecthood assigned by the rule. 'In the case of the verb having the sense of 'to desire', the object desired is the indirect object' (*spṛher īpsitaḥ,* P. i.4. 36). In such cases, the object-referringness is the sense expressed by the dative; and the same is related to the action of the form of desiring.

In 'He is angry at his son' (*putrāya krudhyati),* the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

grammatical object receives the designation of indirect object by the rule 'In the case of the verbs having the sense of to be angry, to injure, to envey, to detract, the person against whom the feeling of anger etc is directed is indirect object' (*krudh.......yam prati kopaḥ,* P. i. 4. 37). In such cases too, the object-referringness is the meaning of the dative; and the same is related to the anger. Since the anger is of the nature of a particular type of hatred or is of the form of a particular type of knowledge of feeling like devotion and faith, the same has the state of referring to an object. Similarly in 'He seeks to harm the enemy' *(śatrave druhyati)* etc. too, the indirect objecthood is assigned by the same rule (*krudh....*P. i. 40. 37). Seeking to harm is a desire to carry-out injury to the enemy. In other words it is a desire for causing disadvantage (damage). The state of describing the objectness of the object of the desire as being the relatum (possessor) of the disadvantage (damage) is the meaning of the dative; and the same is related to the desire. Or as an alternative, it can be held that the superstratumness relating to the disadvantage (damage) is the meaning of the dative. Therefore, such indirect objects as the son and enemy are not the items to be covered by the rule '*karmaṇā yam abhipraiti* (p.i. 4. 32). And envy for another's success is lack of forebearance or non tolerance of other's prosperity. In other words it is the hatred referring to the others prosperity and the object of such an envy such as the other receives the designation of indirect object by the rule P. i. 4. 32. And the jealousy is imposing vice in the virtuous. And the object of such a jealousy too receives the designation of indirect object by the same rule (P. i. 4. 32); and the particular type of objectness is the meaning of the dative in such cases.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Now Gadādhara illustrates the dative uses such as '*puṣpebhyaḥ spṛhayati'* etc. According to him, Sanskrit has developed peculiar usages suchas *puṣpebhyaḥ spṛhayati*; wherein the object desired becomes the indirect object in connection with the root 'to desire' *(spṛh)*; and recognizing this fact, Pāṇini has ruled that the objects of desire such as flowers are indirect objects (P. i. 4. 36). And since the flowers etc. are intended to be related to the desire, i.e. the root-meaning, the dative expresses the object-referrigness *(viṣayitva)*; and thus one cognises that one is the abode of the desire possessing the object-referringness described by the flowers.

Also Gadādhara illustrates the dative usages such as '*putrāya krudhayati'* etc. Accoring to him, Sanskrit has developed also the peculiar usages such as '*putrāya krudhyati*' wherein the objects against whom the anger is directed become the indirect objects in connection with the roots such as '*krudh', 'druh' etc.;* and recognizing this linguisthic fact, Pāṇini has ruled that the objects against whom the anger is directed are indirect objects (P.i.4.37). However, Gadādhara holds that the anger *(kopa)* is a type of knowledge of feeling *(jñānaviśeṣa)* like devotion and faith; and hence has a reference to objects *(saviṣayaka)*. He holds so because otherwise the object-referringness *(viṣayitva)* and the state of describing the objectness of the objects of desire as being the possessor of disadvatage (damage) *(ahitabhāgitayā icchāviṣayatvanirūpakatva)* etc., which are the meanings of the dative cases in '*putrāya krudhyati'* and '*śatrave druhyati'*, etc,. cannot be related to the meanings of the verbal roots '*krudh'* and '*druh'* etc. facilitating '*putrāya krudhyati'* and '*śatrave druhyati*' etc.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation of *viprāya śatam dhārayati*

IV. 15. In 'He owes hundred coins to the Brahmin' (*viprāya śatam dhārayati*) etc., the wealthy and the Brahmin etc. have the indirect objecthood by the rule 'The creditor receives the designation of indirect object in connection with the root to owe. (*dhār*) (P. i. 4. 35). Now it may be objected as follwos: What is the sense conveyed by the root to owe (*dhār*). It cannot be held to be the borrowing of the loan amount (*money*) given by the other (creditor) by agreeing to pay back the greater amount later. For, in that case, the usage 'He owes' (*dhārayati*) would become untenable after the acceptance (borrowing) of the item (money) as the acceptance (borrowing) does not remain consequent upon the acceptance (borrowing). Also, it cannot be termed as the desired consequence. For, such a usage as 'He owes' (*dhārayati*) is made even after the borrowing untill the clearing of (paying back) the debt (loan). Nor could it be held that it is the destruction of the action of such an acceptance (borrowing). For, the debtor does not have the agency described by such a destruction. Now it amy be argued as follows : That accepting (borrowing) is a particular type of desire; and just like the person (debtor) having such a desire has the agency described by the desire by being the abode of such a desire, just so even the person (debtor) having the destruction of such a desire can have the agency described by the destruction unharmed by being the abode of the destruction of the desire. However, this is not correct. In such a case, since the destruction of the accepting (borrowing) (desire) continues to exist even after the clearing (paying back) of the debt, the usage 'He owes' (*dhārayati*) would become necessary even after the clearing (paying back) of the debt.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Now Gadādhara illustrates yet another dative usage namely, *'viprāya śatam dhārayati'.* According to him, Sanskrit has again developed another peculiar usage wherein the creditor becomes indirect object in connection with the root to owe (*dhār*). And recognizing this linguistic fact Pāṇini has ruled that the creditor is indirect object in connection with the verb 'to owe' (P. i. 4. 35).

However, Gadādhara refutes many objections in order to determine the meaning of the root 'to owe' (*dhṛ=dhār*). According to him, the meaning of the root 'to owe' (*dhṛ = dhar*) cannot be mere accepting (borrowing) of the loan money given by others (*paradattadravyādānam*) by agreeing to pay back later the greater amount (*dravyantaradānam aṅgīkṛtya*) as then the usage '*dhārayati*', which is usually made until the debtor clears all the debt (loan), becomes untenable due to the destruction of the act of accepting (borrowing) immediately after the acceptance. Also Gadādhara refutes the argument that the meaning of the root 'to owe' can be the destruction (loss) of accepting (*ādānadhvamsa*) on the ground that the debtor (*adhmarṇa*) cannot be explained to be the agent (*kartṛ*) of such a destruction (loss), i.e. the root-meaning. Also Gadādhara states that even the position, where the accepting of the money given by the other (*paradatta dravyādāna*)is held to be a particular desire (*icchāviśeṣa*), and the debtor is explained to be the agent due to being the abode of the destruction of such an accepting (*tādṛśādānadhavamsāśrayatayā*), is not enable as the usage '*dhārayati*' cannot be avoided even after the clearing (paying back) (*pariśodhanottra*) of the debt (loan amount) due to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

presence of the destruction of such an accepting (*ādānadhvamsa)* even after clearing.

Argument

IV. 16. Also it cannot be argued that the said destruction (loss) of the accepting (borrowing) of the money as qualified by the prior absence of the clearing (paying back) of money is so (the meaning of the root 'to owe'). For, in that case the usage 'He owes' (*dhārayati)* would become necessary with respect to the loan amount of money already cleared (paid back) in tha case of the prior absence of the clearing (paying back) of some other loan amount of money taken as debt.

Also it cannot be held that only the destruction of the accepting (borrowing) of the money as qualified by the prior absence of the accepting (borrowing) of the money which is the object of the agreement to pay back the loan facilitating the accepting (borrowing), i.e. the conterpositive of itself (i.e. the said destruction), is the meaning of the root 'to owe'. For, in that case, the usage 'He owes' (*dhārayati*) would become necessary with respect to the amount equal to the loan amount which is already cleared but is to be borrowed again and is to be cleared (paid back) (after clearing (paying back) the previous debt of the same amount of money borrowed earlier). Since the later clearing (paying back) too is to be done by the debtor himself, the prior absence of the later clearing (paying back) of the loan continues to exist even after clearing (paying back) of the amount of money borrowed earlier.

Explanation

Now it is argued as follows : That the prior absence of the clearing or paying back of the loan amount

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*pariśodhanaprāgabhāva*) cannot exist after clearing or paying back (*pariśodhana*) of the loan amount; and therefore when the destruction of the borrowing of the loan amount (*ādānadhavamsa)* as qualified by the prior absence of the clearing of the loan amount (*pariśodhana prāgabhāva)* is admitted to be the meaning of the root to owe (*dhār)*, the usage 'He owes' (*dhārayati)* can be avoided after the clearing of the loan amount as the destruction of the accepting (borrowing) qualified by the prior absence of the clearing does not exist then. However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument on the ground that such a usage as '*dhārayati*' would become necessary even with respect to the already cleared loan amount (debt) as even the destruction of the borrowing of the loan amount (*ādānadhvamsa),* as qualified by the prior absence of the clearing of second loan amount (*dravyāntara pariśodhanaprāgabhāva*), can exist when two separate loans of equal amount are made and one is yet to be paid back. Also it can be argued now that when the destruction of borrowing of the loan amount, as qualified by the prior absence of the clearing of the loan amount (*dravyādāna prāgabhāva viśiṣṭadhvamsa)* which may function as the object of agreement to pay back facilitating the borrowing, i.e. the counter positive of itself (*svapratiyogi nirvāhakāngīkāra viṣaya),* is held to be the meaning of the root 'to owe' (*dhār*), the said usage '*dhārayati*' cannot be imposed with respect to the already cleared loan amount; and hence the same could be the root-meaning. However, the Pūrvapaksin refutes even such an argument on the ground that when two different loans amounting to one hundred *mudras* each, are taken with the agreement that the second loan could be repaid only after the first loan is completely cleared off, the usage

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'*śatam dhārayati*' would become necessary with respect to the already repaid first loan as the destruction of the borrowing as qualified by the prior absence of the clearing of the second loan continues to exist even after the clearing.

Refutation of the argument

IV. 17. Now it may again be argued as follows: That the destruction of borrowing qualified by the prior absence of the first clearance of the first loan, which is other than the prior absence of the second clearance of the second loan qualified in turn by the clearing of the first loan amount, functioning as the object of agreement facilitating the borrowing, i.e. the counter positive of the destruction of the borrowing, through the relations of both the occurrence in the same locus and being delimited by the single moment, is the meaning of the verbal root 'to owe'. And in the said case, the prior absence of the second clearance of the second loan amount is qualified by the first clearance of the first loan amount which is the object of the agreement conducive to the first borrowing of the first loan amount. Here the prior absence of the first clearance of the first loan amount does not continue to exist after the first clearance of the first loan amount; and thus there occurs no contingency of the usage.

However, even this argument is not correct to state. The agreement 'I must pay back so much amount to you' made before the actual borrowing of the particular (first) loan amount, the clearing of which loan amount cannot be effected due to the sudden demise of the creditor, has only the dead creditor as the payee (receiver); but must be admitted to refer to only the paying back (clear-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ing) of the same loan amount to the successor of the original creditor by the debtor, as clearing (paying back) of the loan amount to the original creditor (Caitra) by the same debtor as the agent, is impossible to establish. Thus the usage 'He owes' (*dhārayati)* would become untenable after the payment (clearance) of an amount equal to the loan amount of one hundrud *mudras* to some third person such as Devadatta by the same debtor, as the prior absence of the first clearnce of the first loan amount, which is other than the prior absence of the second clearance of the second loan amount qualified by the payment of the loan amount, i.e. the object of agreement made by the same agent, cannot exist then.

Explanation

In the case of the clearing of the first loan amount of one hundred *mudras* after taking two loans of one hundred *mudras* each, the prior absence of the second clearing of the second loan amount of hundred *mudras (udīcyapariśodhana prāgabhāva)* becomes only qualified by the first clearing of the first loan amount of one hundred *murdas, i.e.* the object of the agreement facilitating the taking of the first loan amount *(prathamādāna prayo-jakābhyupagama viṣaya prathamapariśodhana)* (it exists at the same time). Now since the prior absence of the first clearing of the first loan amount (*prathampa-riśodhana prāgabhāva),* which is different from the prior absence of the second clearing of the second loan amount (*udīcyapariśodhanaprāgabhāvānya),* is lost after the clearing, the usage '*dhārayati*' need not be made with respect to the already cleared first loan amount dispite the presence of the destruction of the first borrowing (*prathamādāna dhvamsa)*. Thus it is argued now that the destruction of the first borrowing (*prathamādāna-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

dhvamsa) qualified by the prior absence of the first clearing of the first loan amount (*prathamapariśodhana prāgabāva)*, which is different from the prior absence of the second clearing of the second loan amount (*udīcya-pariśodhana prāgabhāva)* and in turn qualified by the first clearing (payment) of the first loan amount (*prathamadra-vyādana)*, is the meaning of the verbal root 'to owe' (*dhār)*.

However, the Pūrvapaksin refutes the argument on the ground that the usage *'dhārayati'* would become untenable after the payment of an equal amount such as one hundred *mudras* to some one else i.e. third person such as Devadatta (*anyoddeśyaka tatkartṛkatāvaddravyadāna)*. This is so because in the case where the payment of the first loan amount to the original creditor becomes impossible due to the sudden demise of the original creditor, only the payment of the loan amount to some one elese such as his son or the sucessor to the original creditor by the debtor (*svakartṛkānyoddeśyaka tāvaddra-vyadāna)* needs to be admitted as the object of the original agreement to pay back the loan amount; and once such a position is admitted, the prior absence of the payment (clearing) of the first loan amount to the creditor which is other than the prior absence of the payment (clearing) of the the second loan amount, qualified by the payment of the loan amount, i.e. the object of agreement (*tadabhyupagamaviṣaya dravyādānaviśiṣṭānya-prāgabhāva)*, cannot be held to be present when the loan amount is paid to the third person.

Reply

IV. 18. Here they (the Siddhāntins) state their reply. A particular unseen effect is produced in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

debtor from borrowing the loan money (debt) which can be destroyed only by the clearing of the loan amount. And from such an unseen effect only the residence in the hell etc. are produced in the debtor died without repaying the loan amount. Thus, only the state of possessing the particular unseen effect produced from the borrowing of the loan amount sanctioned by the creditor that precedes the agreement for repayment of the additional amount is the meaning of the root 'to owe' (*dhār*). And the agentship relating to the borrowing constituting such a root-meaning is the meaning of the dative.

It may be objected now as follows: That only the non-clearing (non-paying back) of the loan is the cause of producing the ill fate, as the same has been included among the minor offences. However, the borrowing of the loan amount (debt) is not such a cause of ill fate as there is no valid means proving such a state of being the cause of ill fate for the borrowing. However, this objection is not correct to state. The non-clearing of the loan amount (debt) can be explained to have been included among the minor offences with the intention of facilitatating the state of being what is being conducive to the obtaininment of the ill effect such as the hell in the non-clearing. Thus the fact that, though the borrowing of the loan (debt) is the cause of producing the particular type of ill fate, the same ill fate can be destroyed by clearing the loan (debt) after borrowing the loan must be admitted as conveyed. Since the person not clearing the loan after borrowing the loan is subjected to the punishment in the hell, i.e. the ill effect, only the borrowing of the loan (debt) needs to be assumed as the means leading to the ill fate; also the same is more economical compared to the non-clearing of the borrowed loan

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(debt). Also when the non-clearing is the cause, the origination (production) of the ill fate (hell) becomes necessary as the destroyer of such an ill fate in any case. And thus we need not have any heavyness in assuming such a causality separately. Moreover, since the absence of clearing can exist even at the time after the clearing (it is momentary), the ill fate needs to be avoided after the clearing on account of the absence of clearing; and therefore the heaviness occurs in your theory due to the necessity of the assumption of the destruction of the clearing as the preventive factor of such an ill fate.

Now again it may be objected that only the death not following the clearance must be held to be the cause producing the sin; and therefore, there occurs no said overpervasion of contigency of ill fate. However, even this objection is not correct to state. In the case where the debtor dies before clearing the borrowed amount of loan, the clearing of such a loan amount cannot be established in any way; and therefore the causality of the cause of death as consisting of the death not following the clearance of the loan cannot be assumed. Thus, enough of this discussion.

Explanation

Now, Gadādhara, the Siddhāntin, replies to the objection raised by the Pūrvapakṣin. According to him, only the possession of a particular type of unseen effect produced from the borrowing of the money sanctioned by the creditor (*paradattadravyadānajanyādṛṣṭaviśeṣavattva)* with the agreement for paying back (clearing) the additional amount (*dravyāntara dānābhyupagamapūrvaka)* is the meaning of the root 'to owe' (*dhār)*; for, the particular uneen effect which can be de-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

stroyed by clearing the debt (loan amount) is produced from borrowing the money sanctioned by the credition. Here the agentship *(kartṛtva)* which constitutes such a root meaning is the meaning of the dative. Thus, the cognition produced in *'viprāya śatam dhārayati'* is that Caitra is the abode of the unseen effect produced from the borrowing of the loan sanctioned by the Brahmin *(viprakartṛkaṛṇādāna janyādṛṣṭaśrayaḥ)*.

A point to be noted here is that though the non-clearance of the (loan) (debt) *(ṛṇapariśodhana)* is included in the minor offences *(upapātaka),* the same, instead of the borrowing the loan *(ṛṇādana),* need not be considered to be the cause (means) of producing the ill fate *(duradṛṣṭa)* such as the hell; for the non-clearance of the loan (debt) is included in the minor offences only to indicate the fact that the same non-clearance of the loan (debt) (*ṛṇapariśodhana*) is merely a helping factor conductive to the obtainment of the effect such as the hell *(narakarūpaphalopadhānaprayojaka)* while the borrowing of the loan (debt) actually produces the hell.

Also, when the non-clearance is considered to be the cause, the clearance of the loan (debt) needs to be assumed additionally as the destroyer of the ill fate *(duradṛṣṭa)* as the ill fate may be produced even before borrowing the loan (debt) (the non-clearance is present even before the borrowing); and thus the theory would involve heavinees. Also since the clearing can be lost even after the clearing (it is momentary), the destruction of the clearing *(pariśodhana dhvamsa)* needs to be additionally assumed as the preventive factor *(pratibandhaka)* of the origination (production) of the ill fate; and thus the additional heaviness becomes unavoidable in the theory that *ṛṇāpariśodhana* is the cause of ill fate.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Dative usage '*yūpāya dāru*

IV. 19. Now in the cases such as 'The wood is meant for the post or stake' *(yūpāya dāru),* the dative is not used in the sense of being meant for it, and is assigned by the rule. 'The dative is used in the sense of the state of being meant for it (*tādarthye caturthī*, *Vār.* on P. ii. 1. 36). And the state of being meant for it is to be analysed as the state of being intended for it, i.e., having the same as itself as its purpose, i.e. the use. Thus, the Vārtika on the rule (P. ii. 1. 36) means that the dative is to be used after the word (*yūpa)* expressing the purpose or use such as the post when the thing (wood) expressed by the word (*dāru)* associated with it is being intended for it. The state of being the purpose or use, however, is not the state of being produced by it. Otherwise, since the unhappiness (suffering) is to be produced from the sin etc., the usage 'Sin is for the suffering' (*duḥkhāya pāpam*) would become necessary. Nor, is it the state of being the object of the desire as being produced. Otherwise, since the heaven etc. is the object of desire as being produced from the merit etc, the usage 'Merit is for the heaven' (*svargāya puṇyam)* etc, would become contingent. Also the same cannot be termed to be a desired contingency. In that case, the composition of the rule 'Dative is used after the action noun ending in an affix denoting abstract notion and having the force of infinitive' *(tumarthācca bhāvavacanāt,* P. ii. 3. 15), which is meant for explaining the usage 'He goes for (accomplishing) the cooking' (*pākāya vrajati)* used in the sense of 'He goes for accomplishing the cooking' (*paktum vrajati)* would become useless (unnecesary). Since the 'cooking' etc., are the objects of the desire as being produced from the said

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

going etc., the dative can be explained after the word expressing such a going, i.e, after 'cooking' *(pāka)*.

Rather only the state of being the purpose or use of such an item, is the being the object of desire conducive to the desire for the operation (of carving) resident in the thing expressed by the word associated with it; and the state of being intended or meant for it such as the state of having such a purpose is the state of being the abode of the operation (carving), i.e. the object of the desire dependent on the desire for it (*yūpa*). Since the wood has the state of being meant for becoming the post by being the possessor of the operation such as the carving, i.e. the object of the desire dependent on the desire for the post, the dative can be used after the word '*yūpa*' expressing the post, Here the state of being the possessor of the operation, i.e. the object of the desire dependent on the desire, is the meaning of the dative. The post, the dative base-meaning, is to be related to the first desire as being the object. In the same way in. 'The vessel is for cooking' (*randhanāya sthālī)* etc., the meaning of the dative must be guessed. In such a case, the operation constituting the dative-meaning is the holding of the rice etc.

Explanation

Gadādhara now illustrates the dative usage '*yūpāya dāru'*. According to him, in such a case, the Vārtika '*tādarthye caturthī vācyā'* (on P. ii. 3. 15) assigns the dative in the sence of the state of being what is meant for it (*tādarthya*) which means the state of having the same as its purpose (*sa evārthaḥ prayojanam yasya, tattvam)*. Now Gadādhara holds that the being the purpose (*prayojanatva)* is neither the state of being what is produced (*janyatva*) nor the state of being the object of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the desire as being produced (*janyatayecchāviṣatva*). For, if the former view is resorted to, then the usage '*duḥkhāya pāpam*' would become necessary as the suffering is produced from the sin, and if the later view is resorted to, then the usage '*svargāya puṇyam*' would become necessary as the heaven is the object of desire as being produced. Thus Gadādhara analyses the state of being the purpose of it (*tatprayojanatva*) as the state being the object of the desire (for the thing produced) conducive to the operation occurring in the material cause, expressed by the word associated with it (*samabhivyāhṛtapadārthaniṣṭha vyāpārecchānukūlecchāviṣayatva*); and holds that the state of being meant for it (*tādarthya*), the meaning of the dative, is the state of being the abode of the operation, which is the object of the desire (for the operation dependent on the desire for the thing produced) (*tadicchā-dhīnecchāviṣayavyāpārāśrayatvam*). And since the post is the object of the desire conducive to the operation of carving occurring in the wood expressed by *dāru*, the same is the purpose (*prayojana*). Here the cognition produced from '*yūpāya dāru*' is that the wood is the abode of the operation of cutting, which is the object of the desrie dependent on the desire for the post (*yūpecchādhīnecchāviṣaya takṣaṇādivyāpārāśrayaḥ dāru*).

Avoidance of '*svargāya puṇyam*' etc.

IV. 20. Since the merit is not the abode of the operation, which is the object of the desire dependent on the desire for the heaven, the usage 'The merit is for the heaven' (*svargāya puṇyam*) is not made. Also since the going etc, is not the abode of the operation conducive to the cooking , the dative cannot be explained after the base-word 'cooking' (*pāka*) in 'He goes for cooking' (*pākāya vrajati*) from the Vārtika *tādarthye*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

caturthī vācyā (on P. ii. i. 36). Therefore, a separate rule, 'The dative is used after the action noun ending in an affix denoting abstract notion and having the force of infinitive' *(tumarthācca bhāvavacanāt,* P. ii. 3. 15) is composed. And the meaning of such a rule is that dative is used after the primary derivative type of action noun consisting of the particular root which is expressive of the action relating to the action expressed by the verb in construction with there of and which (the sense of action) is expressed by the infinitive form of root. In the usage such as 'He goes for cooking' (*paktum vrajati*), the infinitive form '*paktum*' conveys the state of cooking associated with the state of having the same agent as that of cooking with respect to the going. This is so because, the rule 'Affixes '*tumum*' and '*ṇvul*' are used after a root when the word in construction therewith is another verb denoting an action intended for the sake of another action' (*tuman*.....P.iii. 3. 10) assigns the 'infinitive' and '*ṇvul*' when the associated action such as going is intended as having the state of being intended for it, i.e., the state of being the object of the desrie (for going) dependent on the desire for it (cooking) associated with the state of having the same agent as that of the agent of the contextual action. (cooking). However, since the dative usage such as 'The merit is for the heaven' *(svargāya puṇyam)* cannot be the object of the rule '*tumarthācca bhāvavacanāt*' (P.ii. 3. 15), the same is grammatically incorrct.

Explanation

Since the merit *(puṇya)* is a quality by being an useen effect (*adṛṣṭa*), the same cannot be the abode of any operation; and hence cannot have the dative in '*svargāya puṇyam*' by the Vārtika '*tādarthye caturthī*' (on

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

P. ii. i. 36). Also since the going (*vrajana)* is itself an operation (*vyāpāra),* it cannot be the abode of another operation conducive to, (i.e. the object of the desire dependent on the desire for,) the cooking (*pākānukūlavyāpārānāśvaya*); and thus the cooking cannot have the dative in '*pākāya vrajati'* by the rule *'tādarthye caturthī'* (Vā. on P. ii. 1. 36); and so the same needs to be explained by the rule '*tumarthācca bhāvavacanāt* (P. ii. 3. 15). Gadādhara explains the rule as the dative is used after the primary derivative type of action noun consisting of the particular root which is expressive of the action related to the action expressed by the verb in construction with there of and which (the sense of action) is expressed by the infinitive (*tumannantayaddhātunā yādṛśorthaḥ pratyāyyate samabhivyāhṛta kriyānvitatadarthaparāt taddhatughaṭitabhāvakṛdantāt caturthī)*. A point to be noted here, however, is that the infinitive usage '*paktum vrajati'* in the sense of which the dative usage'*pākāya vrajati'* is made has the infinitive assigned by the rule *tumun ṇvulau* (P. iii. 3. 10). And the rule assigns the infinitive after the verbal root when the action expressed by the verb in construction with it (*samabhivyāhṛtakriyā)* is intended to have the state of being intended for the prupose of another action (*tadarthakatvena vivakṣā)*, i.e. the state of being the object of the desire dependent on the desire for it (*tadicchādhīnecchāviṣayatva)* and the state of having the same agent as that of the action concerned (*prakṛtakriyāsamānakartṛka)*. Thus, in '*paktum vrajati'* one cognises that the state of being the object of the desire dependent on the desire for the cooking and the state of having the same agent as that of cooking are present in the going.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Dative usage '*edhebhyo vrajati*'

IV. 21. In the usage such as 'He goes for (collecting) fuel woods' (*edhebhyo vrajati)* made in the sense of 'He goes out for gathering (collecting) fire woods' (*edhānāhartum vrajati*), the fire wood does not have the state of being the purpose (use) of the going. Since the fire wood is alaready accoplished, it cannot be the object of the desire conducive to the desire for going (collecting) and also it cannot be the abode of the operation conducive to (i.e the object of the desire dependent on the desire for) the wood; and therefore the Vārtika '*tādarthye caturthī*' (on P. ii. 1. 36) cannot have any application over it. Also since the word '*edhas*' (woods) does not denote the abstraction such as the action, the rule 'The dative is used after the action noun expressing the action and having the force of the infinitive '*tumarthācca bhāvavacanāt,* (P. ii. 3. 15) cannot have any application over it. Thus, in such a case, the word '*edhas*' (woods) has the dative by the rule 'Dative is used in denoting the object substituted and construed with the action-word (verb) denoting an action for the purpose of another action' (*kriyārthopapadasya*....., P. ii. 3. 14). And the meaning of such a rule is that the dative is used after the word expressive of the object of the unused infinitive in construction with the action denoting word (verb). And the object of unused infinitive means that which is intended to be the object of the action expressed by the infinitive that is not being used in construction. In the case such as 'He goes for gathering (collecting) fuel woods' (*edhebhyo vrajati*), the meaning of the infinitive to gether (collect) is the action of gathering (collecting) related to the objecthood resident in the woods in turn related to the action of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

going expressed by the infinitive used in construction there of ; and since the wood is intended as being the object of such a sense of gathering (collecting), the dative is used after the word *edhas*. And the state of being meant for the purpose of gathering (collecting) that has such woods as its objects is the meaning of the dative.

Also, suppose in the case such as 'He goes for (performing) cooking' (*pākāya vrajati),* the sense of performing (the cooking) (*pākam kartum*) is intended to be conveyed, then dative can be facilitated by this very rule '*kriyārthopapadasya*' (P. ii. 3. 14). However, suppose the going is not intended to have the state of being meant for the purpose of perfoming that has the cooking as its object, analysed as the state of being the object of the desire dependent on the desire for the performing of the cooking, but rather the same is intended to have only the state of having the cooking, then the dative can be facilitated by the rule 'The dative is used after the action noun expressing the action and having the force of infinitive' (*tumarthācca*......, P. ii. 3. 15).

Explanation

Gadādhara notes that only the non-accomplished (*asiddha*) and not the already accomplished (*siddha)* can be the object of desire to accomplish (*icchāviṣaya);* and since the fuel woods (*edhas*) are not the objects of desire conducive to the desire for gathering (collecting), the same cannot have the dative assigned by the *Vārtika 'tādarthye caturthī'* (on P. ii. 1.36). Also Gadādhara notes that only the action nouns and not the non-action nouns can be considered to be expressive of the abstract notion such as the action (*bhāvavacana);* and since the word '*edhas*' is not expressive of any abstract

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

notion, the same cannot have the dative by the rule '*tumarthācca.....* (P. ii. 3. 14). According to him, the rule *'kriyārthopapadasya'* (P. ii. 3. 14) assigns the dative for the word expressive of the object which is intended to be the object of the sense of the action of the unused infinitive, in construction with the action-word (verb) *(kriyarthopapadaḥ taumamannanato yo dhātuḥ tatprayogam vinā tadarthakarmatayā yadvivakṣ*itam). Now since the word *'edhas'* is expressive of the fuel wood which is intended to be the unused infinitive *'āhartum,'* the same has the dative. Also, the dative expresses there the state of being meant for the purpose of gathering (collecting) that has the fuel woods as its objects (*edhaḥ karmakāharaṇa prayojanakatva).* Thus one cognizes that the student is the abode of going that has the gathering (colleting) the fuel woods as its objects in such cases.

Also Gadādhara notes that in '*pākāya vrajati'*, the dative can be explained after the word '*pāka'* by both the rules *'kriyārthopadasya....'* (P. ii. 3. 14) and *tumarthācca....*(p.ii. 3. 15). According to him, when the infinitive '*kartum'* is to be supplied, the dative can be explained by the former rule (*kriyārthopapadasya)* as the going (*vrajana)* can be held to be intended to be the object of the infinitive, i.e. to have the state of being meant for the purpose of performing that has the cooking as its object (*pākakarmaka karaṇaprayojanakatva);* and when the going is intended to have the cooking as its purpose (*pākārthakatva),* the dative can be explained by the latter (*tumarthācca)* as the term '*pāka'* can be explained to express the abstract notion such as the cooking (*pākariyārūpa bhāvavacana).*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Dative usage '*aśvāya ghāsaḥ*'

IV. 22. Since in 'The fodder (is) for the horse feeding' (*aśvāya ghāsaḥ),* the word 'horse' *(aśvaḥ)* is intended to express the horse feeding, the dative is assigned only by the rule 'The dative is used in the sense of the state of being meant for it (*tādarthye...,* Vār on P. ii. 1. 36). And by supplying the verb 'is brought' (*āḥṛyate),* the meaning that 'The fodder is brought for feeding the horse' (*aśvam bhojayitum ghāsā āhṛyate*) can be intended to be conveyed fromt the usage '*aśvāya ghāsaḥ';* and therefore, the dative can be explained by the rule 'The dative is used in denoting an action for the purpose of another action'(*kriyārthopapadasya*...(P. ii. 3. 14). Thus the word 'horse' (*aśvaḥ)* can be explained to be expressive of the primary sense of a horse. However, in the compound expression such as 'Fodder is for the feeding of the horse' (*aśvaghāsaḥ)*, the word 'horse' (*aśvaḥ)* needs to be interpreted as intended to indicate the secondary sense of feeding of the horse and as having the dative expressive of the state of being intended for it. Otherwise, the word, '*aśvaḥ*' being syntactically expectant of the word 'brought' (*āhṛta*), the dative compound *aśvaghāsaḥ* would become untenable. However, it may be argued now as follows : That even then the dative compound (*aśvaghāsaḥ)* becomes untenable; for, to avoid the dative compounding in 'The vessel is for cooking' (*randhanāya sthālī),* the relation of being the material cause and the object to be produced needs to be admitted to be the determining factor for the dative compounding by the rule 'The dative is used in the sense of the state of being meant for it' (*caturthī tadarthārtha*...*(P.*ii. i. 36). However, this argument is not correct. The grammarians, by separating the word 'da-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tive' (*caturthī*) in the compound rule (*caturthī tadarthārtha*) have explained the dative compounds such as 'House for living' is 'living-hourse' (*āvāsāya gṛham, āvāsagṛham*) and 'Fodder for feeding the horse' is 'horse fodder' (*aśvāya ghāsaḥ, aśvaghāsaḥ*).

Explanation

Gadādhara explains now the dative usages such as 'Fodder is for the horse-feeding' '*aśvāya ghāsāḥ*' etc. According to him, since the word 'horse' (*aśvaḥ*) is meant to convey the horse-feeding (*aśvabhojana para*), the dative can be explained by the rule '*tādarthye caturthī.....*,(on P. ii. 1. 36). He holds that the dative in '*aśvāya ghāsaḥ*' cannot be explained by the rule '*kriyārthopapadasya*'..... (P. ii. 3. 14) by intending the word '*aśvaḥ*' to express the primary sense of only the horse (*mukhyārtha para*) though by supplying the verb '*āhṛyate*' the sense of *aśvam bhojayitum āhṛyate*' can be explained. For, when the dative is explained to be expressive of the primary sense, the word 'horse' (*asvaḥ*), being syntactically expectant of 'to bring' (*āhartum*), becomes untenable to be compounded with '*fodder*' (*ghāsaḥ*). Also he holds that though the rule *caturthī tadarthārtha*.... (P. ii. 1. 36) allows the dative compounding (*caturthīsamāsa*) only in the cases such as '*yūpāya dāru, yūpadāru* etc. wherein the relation of being the material cause and the object to be transformed (*prakṛtivikṛtibhāva*), is involved (it allows so to avoid the compounding in '*randhanāya sthālī*' etc. wherein no such relation is involved), the dative compound does not become untenable in *aśvāya ghāsaḥ aśvaghāsaḥ* etc. For, by separating the word '*caturthi*' in the compound rule '*caturthī tadarthārtha*... (P. ii. 1. 36) (*yoga vibhāga*),

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the rule can facilitate the dative compound *'aśvāya ghāsaḥ aśvaghāsaḥ'* wherein the dative can be compounded with a nominal word.

Dative usage *'śivāya namaḥ'*

IV. 23. In association with the indiclinable words such as '*salutaion*', (*namaḥ*) 'peace' (*svasti*) etc. too the rule 'The dative is used is conjunction with salutation, peace, offerings to Gods etc., (*namaḥ svasti svāhā'*.....P. ii. 3. 16) assigns the dative case after the words expressive of the adjectives of such salutation etc. The meaning of the word 'salutation' (*namaḥ*) is offering and paying reverence. And in 'This water is offered to Śiva' (*eṣ o' rghyaḥ śivāya namaḥ*) etc., the word 'salutation' (*namaḥ*) conveys the sense of offering. The dative there conveys the state of being one who is meant to be the beneficiary of offering with respect to Śiva, the base meaning. And suppose the offering is of the form of the desire for the loss of one's ownership dependent on the desire for the effect such as 'Let this item belong the Śiva', then the state of being one who is meant to be beneficiary of offerring is the state of being the object of the desire conducive to the offering as being the abode of the ownership.

However, suppose the desire of the form of the offering alone, and not the desire conducive to the offering (or the other's ownership), refers to the ownership resident in the object being offered as being related to the other (receiver), like it refers to the absence (loss) of one's (donour's) ownership, then the state of being one who is meant to be the beneficiary of offering is only the state of being the object of the offering (giving) as being the abode of ownership. Though Śiva etc.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

do have the body, they do not accept actually any offering; also in the theory that the formula (*mantra*), meditated upon as having the form of Śiva, is one which is meant to be the beneficiary of offering, the formula cannot accept any offering. Consequently, the ownership being absent in the services offered to Śiva, the desire referring to the ownership in such things (service) offered as belonging to Śiva, is only illusory. Such a desire refers to the contradictory state of being described by Śiva etc. in the other's ownerships resident in the things offered, or it refers to the contradictory relationships of the individual things with respect to the established ownerships (of the Triśūla etc.) described by Śiva etc.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the dative usages such as '*eṣo' rghyaḥ śivāya namaḥ'* etc. wherein the dative is assigned by the rule '*namaḥ savasti*...... (P. ii. 3. 16). According to him, since in such cases the word 'salutation' (*namaḥ*) is meant to convey the offerings to Śiva etc, the same word '*namaḥ'* expresses the sense of offering (*tyāga*); and the dative expresses the state of being one who is meant to be beneficiary of offering (*tyāgoddeśyatva*) of the base-meaning (Śiva). Thus, one cognizes that the offerings of sipping water has Śiva as the beneficiary of offering' (*śivoddeśyakaḥ arghatyāgaḥ*). However, there are two alternative views : That offering (*tyāga*) is the loss of one's (donor's) ownership 'dependent' on the desire for the effect of receiver's ownership such as '*śivasyāyam bhavatu'* and that it is the production of the effect of receiver's ownership. In the first alternative, *tyāgoddeśyatva* is the state of being the object of the desire conducive to the offering

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*tyāgajanakecchāyāḥ viṣayatvam)* as being the possessor of the ownership (*svatvabhāgitayā*) as the *tyāgccehā* does not refer to the receiver's ownership by itself; whereas in the second alternative, it is the state of being the object of the offering (i.e. desire) as being the possesor of the ownership (*svatvabhāgitayā)* as the *tyāgecchā* itself refers to the receiver's ownership. A point to be noted here is that the god Śiva or *mantra* in his form cannot receive the things offered due to the absence of a receiving body (*vigrahavattvābhāva)*; and therefore, the desire such as offering (*tyāga rūpecchā*) is only illusory (*visaṃvādi)* in the things offered as belonging to Śiva; and thus the same desire must be admitted to refer either to the contradictory state of being described by Śiva (*śiva nirūpitatva)* in the ownership of the donour resident in the things offered (*dravyaniṣṭhānyadīyasvatva)* or to the contradictory relationship of things offered (*tattad dravya-saṃbandha)* with the other things (*triśūla)* etc. having the ownership described by Śiva (*śivādinirūpitavastvantara)*.

Objection

IV. 24. It may be objected now as follows: That since without the desire for the effect such as the production of other's ownership, the desire referring to the loss of one's (donours) own ownership is untenable, the view that the ownerships of the god Śiva etc. is the object of only offering becomes impossible to justify. However this objection is not correct to state. Since the desire referring to the loss of one's (donor's) ownership is conducive to the effect such as the merit, even the object of such a desire (the loss of one's ownership) which is the delimitor of the producerness of the producer of the merit can lead to the merit as its

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

effect. Otherwise even the receiver's ownership, by not producing any other desired effect, and also by not being a cherished goal of humans in itself, cannot be conducive to the desire for the receiver's ownership at first; and thus even the first alternative would become necessary to be abandoned.

Here, in the first altenative, either the state of bieng produced from the desire having the ownership as the qualifier,. or such a desire relating to the offering through the relation of being produced is the meaning of the dative. And the dative base-meaning, Śiva, is related to the desire through the particular object-referringness. Whereas in the second alternative, however, only the particular object-referringness is the meaning of the dative. And Śiva etc. (the dative base-meaning) is related to the same through the relation of being described. And the offerring, i.e. the meaning of the indiclinable '*namaḥ*', is related to the thing offered through the relation of the particular objectness. Or as an alternative it can be held that only the thing offered is related to the offering, appearing as the qualificand, through the relation of the particular object-referringness.

Explanation

Now the Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection aganinst the second alternative position : That the desire of the form of offering (*tyāgarūpecchā)* is the producer of the receiver's (Śiva's) ownership (*śivādisvatva);* and hence the state of being one who is meant to be the beneficiary of offering *(tyāgoddeśyatva)* is the state of being the object of the desire such as the offering as being the possessor of the ownership (*svatva bhāgitayā tyāgaviṣ ayatva)*. According to him, without the desrie referring

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to the effect such as the ownership in Śiva (*śivādisvatvarūpaphalecchā)*, the desire for offering (*tyāgecchā)* referring to the loss of ones (donours) ownership (*svatvābhāvagocarecchā)* is impossible; and therefore the second alternative itself is untenable.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection. According to him, the merit (*puṇya*) is produced even by the desrie for the loss of ones (donours) ownership (*svatvābhāvaviṣayakecchā*); and since, the absence of ones (donors) loss of ownership (*svatvābhāva)* is the delimitor of the producingness of the producer of the merit (*puṇya janakatāvacehedaka)*, the same becomes, like the desire for the loss of one's (donor's) ownership (*sva svatvābhāvecchā)*, the producer of the merit; and thus, even without the desire for the production of effect such thus, even without the desrire for the production of the effect such as the other's (receiver's) wonership (*parasvatvarūpaphalecchā)*, the desire referring to the loss of ones (donours) ownership (*svatvābhāva viṣayakkecchā)* becomes tenable. Gadādhara justifies this position on the ground that otherwise even the first alternative that *tyāgoddeśyatva* is the state of being the object of he desrie conducive to the offerring as being the possessor of the ownership (*svatva bhāgitayā tyāgajanakecchā viṣ ayatvam)* becomes untenable. When the loss of ones ownership (*svasvatvābhāva)* is not the producer of the mrit, the desire for the loss of ones ownership (*svasvatvābhāvaviṣayakecchā*) becomes untenable without the desire for the production of the receiver's ownership (*parasvastvaviṣayakecchā)* and the same is impossible as the receiver's ownership (*parasvatva)* is neither *puruṣ ārtha* in itself nor the producer of any *puruṣārtha* as such. Now the verbal cognition produced from '*eṣo*'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

rghyaḥ namaḥ śivāya' is that the offering of the sipping water is produced from the desire, functioning as the abode of the object-referringness described by the objectness of the form of the beneficiaryness resident in Śiva (*śivaniṣ ṭhoddeśyatākhyaviṣayatānirūpitaviṣayitāśrayabhūtecchājany-ārghyaviṣayakatyāgaḥ*).

Restriction of semantic convention

IV. 25. Semantic convention that the meaning expressed by the nominative word is the chief qualificand does not hold good; for in the usages (involving indiclinables) such as 'There occurs no pot one the ground' (*bhūtale na ghaṭaḥ)* etc., even the meaning of the indiclinable particle appears as the chief qualificand. However, unlike in 'He releases (gives away) the offering to Śiva' (*śivāya utsṛjati*), the indirect objecthood of the non-rejector cannot be established here as the offerring (*tyāga)* expressed by the word 'salutation' (*namaḥ*) cannot have the actionness. The word 'salutation' *(namaḥ)* conveys the offering only as involving the state of having the employer of itself as the agent, as the offering belonging to someneslse (employer) is never conveyed by the word 'salutation' (*namaḥ)* uttered by someone else (other than the employer). When the cognition of offering is produced from the word 'sulutation' (*namaḥ)* uttered by a particular person (employer), the doubt regarding the state of belonging to some other peson (other than the employer) with respect to either the offering or the thing being offered, is never produced. That is why, the usage 'I salutation' (*aham namaḥ)*, unlike the usage 'I give' (*aham dade),* is never made with the intention of conveying one's belongingness with respect to the offering; also the usage 'Caitra salutation' *(caitro namaḥ)* is never made with the intention of conveying

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

someone else's belongingness with respect to the offering. In the worship, the *ṛtivik*-priest employs the word 'salutation' (*namaḥ)* only after superimposing one's own belongingness with respect to the offerings of the particular things belonging to some one else such as the patron (*yajamāna)*. And such a superimposition can be explained by admitting the adventitiousness (contradictoryness) evan at the time ρf the knowledge of distinction for the *ṛtvik-priest*. Consequently, like the statement of offering of a representative, the statement of the *ṛtvik*-priest consisting of such a word as '*namaḥ'* at the time of the worship does not become untenable in producing the unseen effect (merit) though refering to the contradictory sense.

Explantion

Now Gadādhara restricts the semantic convention that the meaning of a nominative word alone appears as the chief qualificand in verbal cognition, According to him, like the meaning of the negative in '*bhūtale na ghaṭaḥ,'* the meaning of the indeclinable '*namaḥ*'too can be admitted to be appearing as the chief qualificand in '*śivāya namaḥ*' etc. Hence offering expressed by '*namaḥ'* is the chief-qualificand in '*sivāya namaḥ*'. Also according to him, Śiva etc. cannot be considered as having the indirect objecthood of non-rejecter (*anirākartṛ samapradānatva)* as there is no verb that can facilitate the indirect objecthood for Śiva in *śivāya namaḥ;* and thus the rule *namaḥ svasti*..... (P.ii. 3. 16) is necessary to assign the dative case.

A fact to be noted here is that the word *namaḥ* conveys the offering that has the employer of the word '*namaḥ'* as its agent (*svaprayoktṛ paruṣakartṛka*); and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

also the word '*namaḥ*' uttered by the person such as Caitra conveys only the offering having Caitra, and not any other person, as its agent (*anyakatṛka*). This is held to be so because when some one like Caitra utters the word '*namaḥ*', neither the offering (*tyāga*) nor the thing offered (*tyajyamānadravya*) can ever be doubted to have some one else as the agent. Also, when the *ṛtvik*-priest utters the word '*namaḥ*', only the offering belonging to the patron (*yajamāna*) who is other than the utterer is cognized; and therefore it must be admitted that the *ṛtvik*-priest uses the word '*namaḥ*' by imposing his own belongingness to the ownership (*svīyatva*) in the offering of the things belonging to the patron (*yajamāna dravya tyāga*) even at the time of the contradictory knowledge such as '*idam dravyam madīyam na*'. Thus the use of the sentence '*śivāya namaḥ*' consisting of the word '*namaḥ*' can produce the unseen merit inherent in the patron but not in the *ṛtvik*-priest (Mīmā, Sū. iii. 7. 8).

Expressive power of '*namaḥ*'

IV. 26. Like the first personal pronoun 'I' (*asmat*), the indiclinable 'salutation' (*namaḥ*), which is expressive of the offering qualified by the person associated with the agentship of the agent of uttering itself, conveys the uttering person such as Caitra in a disticnt way (i.e. as being Caitra). However, suppose the state of being Caitra etc., as the nonexpressed meanings, are not possible to be conveyed, then the same too need to be included in the category of expressed meanings. And the generalizing factor of such a state of being Caitra is the generic property of the body of the utterer, i.e. the Caitraness, functioning as the adventitious property not occurring at two different bodies at one single time. Although the state of being the individual indiclinable words is not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

possible to be generalized, the singleness (oneness) of the epressive power(s) should be explained somehow like the singleness (oneness) of the expressive powers of pronouns.

The utterrence (of the person), included as the adventitious qualification, needs to be qualified as being of Vedic in nature. Therefore, the usage 'The rice is the salutation' *(annam namaḥ)* cannot be impossed with the intention of conveying the spontaneousness of offering of rice which is other than the non-worshipping. Dispite the presence of semantic competency, the use of the word 'salutation' (*namaḥ)* is not enjoined by the Vedas in such a case; and therefore the same cannot express the offerring due to the non-establishment of the Vedic utterance, the adventitious qualification of the person, who is the expressed meaning of the word 'salutation' consisting of, i.e. uttered along with '*annam*'. Also thus, to avoid the usage 'He worships the servant' (*pūjayati)* in the case of the action causing the love for the person of the lower rank (servent), the occurrence in the person having the higher rank compared to the person associated with (i.e. uttering) the word '*pūjayati*' needs to be admitted as the adventitious qualifier in the congnition of the expressed meaning of the word '*pūjayati*'. Since in the said case of '*pūjayati*', the love occurring in the person of lower rank is not covered by the adventitious qualification such as the occurrence in the person having the higher rank compared to onself, i.e. the agent associated with the utterance of the word '*pūjayati*', the word '*namaḥ*' does not have the state of being expressive of the action causing the love for the servant dispite having the competency for expressing the same. Thus there is no usage such as 'He worships

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the servant' *(pūjayati)* with the intention of conveying such an action. Also this way it need not be admitted that since the word 'salutation' is not used with the intention of conveying the ofering to the person of lower rank (servant), the word 'salutation' *(namaḥ)* has the expressive power in the sense of the offering having resepcted person of higher rank as the beneficiary. Though the state of having the respected person of higher rank as the beneficiary is included in the body of the meaning of the word 'salutation' *(namaḥ),* the said qualification needs to be included in the utterence to avoid the use of the word 'salutation' in the sense of the spontaneous offering of something to the person of higher rank which is other than the offering of the things to the god; and therefore such an overpervasion can be avoided by such a qualification itself.

Explanation

The first person pronoun *(asmat)* is admitted as having the expressive power *(śakti)* in the sense of person delimited by the property adventiously qualified by the agency of the agent of uttering itself *(svoccāraṇa kartṛtvopalakṣitadharmāvacchinna)* (Śaktivāda II. 108). Similarly the word '*namaḥ*' too needs to be admitted as having the expressive power in the sense of the offering qualified by the person adventitiously qualified by the agency of the agent of uttering itself *(svoccāraṇakartṛtvopalakṣita puruṣaviśiṣṭa tyāga).* And since such an adventitiously qualified person is included in the body of the expressed meaning of the word '*namaḥ*', the utterance of the word '*namaḥ*' appears distinguished as being that of individuals such as Caitra.

Further Gadādhara holds that only in the cases where the Vedic literature is found to be using or sanc-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tioning the use of the word '*namaḥ*', the cognition of the offering can be experienced; and therefore the utterance of the word '*namaḥ*' (*svoccāraṇa*) must be viewed to be Vedic (*vedīya*) or asantioned by the Vedas (*vedabodhita*). Thus the usage '*annam namaḥ*' cannot be imposed with the intention of conveying the spontaneous offering of the rice which is different from the offering to the god (*pūjābhinnayādṛcchikānnatyāga*), as the Vedic utterance, i.e. the adventitious qualification of the person to be expressed by the word '*namaḥ*' associated with such a word of *annam* (*tadghaṭita tatpada śākya puruṣopalakṣaṇa*), cannot be present.

It should be noted that unlike the usage '*caitraḥ harim pūjayati*', the usage '*bhṛtyam pūjayati*', wherein the action causing the love for the person of lower rank (*nīcaprītihetukriyā*) is intended, cannot be admitted; and hence the occurrence in the respected person (*gauravitavṛttitva*), which is the occurrence in the person having the higher rank compared to the person such as Caitra associted with the word '*pūjayati*' (*svasamabhivyāhṛtakartṛpuruṣāvadhikotkarṣavadvṛttitva*) needs to be included as an adventious qualifier in the love (Here the love occurring in the person of lower rank does not have the state of occurring in the person having the higher rank compared to Caitra associted with '*pūjayati*' and hence the usage is avoided). Aslo the qualification of being Vedic in nature (*vedīvatva*) needs to be included in the utterance of the indiclinable '*namaḥ*' to avoid the cognition of offering having the things which is other than the offerring of things to the respected person such as Śiva; and by that alone the usage '*namaḥ*' conveying the offering of things to the person of lower rank is avoided; and therefoe the word

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'*namaḥ*' need not be admitted to have expressive power (*śakti*) in the sense of the offering having the respected person as the beneficiary separately to avoid such a usage.

Meanings of *svāhā* and *svadhā*

IV. 27. In ' The offerings are to Indra' (*indrā*ya *svāhā*) and 'The offerings are to you (*pitṛs*)' (*tubhyam svadhā)* etc., the words 'offer' (*svāhā)* and 'offer' (*svadhā)* which convey the offering of the oblation to the god adventitiously qualified by the throwing into the fire and the offering of the *piṇḍas* etc. to the forefathers respectively, are like the word salutation (*namaḥ)*, expressive of the offerings by the person adventitiously qualified by the agency of the agent of the utterrence sanctioned by the Vedic injunctions. Otherwise there would occur the overpervasion of spontaneous offerings like in the previous case of the usages with '*namaḥ'* Therefore the state of having the god etc. as the beneficiary etc. too need not be included in the body of the expressed meaning. The use of the indiclinable words such as 'offering' *(svāhā)* etc. with the intention of conveying the spontaneous offering not having the god etc. as the beneficiary cannot be imposed due to the absence of the state of being sanctioned by the Vedas. Also therefore, the uses of the indiclinable words such as 'offering' (*svāhā)* and 'offering' (*svadhā)* need not become expressive of the unrelated contradictory senses, though the offerings of the water for the reception and that of the water for the sipping etc. lack the state of being what is qualified by the throwing into the fire and the state of having the forefathers as the beneficiaries in the Tāntric worships. Under such a circumstance, the contingency of the uses of the particular words of offering

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such as *'namaḥ'*, *'svāhā'* and *'svadhā'* in each others places are avoided due to the absence of the state of being assigned (sanctioned) by the Vedas only.

Explanation

Gadādhara now avoids the uses of the indiclinable words such as *'svāhā'* and *'svadhā'* in the sense of the spontaneous offerings to the ordinary persons *(yādṛcchika-tyāga)*. According to him, they need to express the offerings of the oblations to the god qualified by the throwing into the fire *(agniprakṣepopahitadevoddeśyakatyāga)* and the offerings of *piṇḍas* to the Pitrs as only adventitiously qualified by the agency of the agent of utterring sanctioned by the vedic injunction *(deśanādesitoccāraṇa-kartṛtvopalakṣita)* respectively. He holds so becasuse, once the offerings of oblations and that of *piṇḍas* as adventitiously qualified by the agency of the agent of uttering sanctioned by the Vedic injunctions are admitted as the meanings of the indiclinables such as *'svāhā'*, and *'svadhā'* they need not include the state of being offered to the gods and the state of being offerred to the Pitṛs in the categories of expressed meanings *(vācyāntarbhāva)*, as the uses of the same words without intending to express the same offerings to the god and to the Pitṛs can be avoided due to the mere absence of the state of being assigned by the Vedic injunction *(deśanādeśitatva)*.

***Nati* as the meaning of '*namaḥ*' and the objection.**

IV. 28. The second meaning of the indiclinable 'salutation' *(namaḥ)* such as the bowing down is ones own operation conducive to the cognition of the lower rank of oneself. And the dative (in association with *namaḥ)* expresses the state of being the boundary or the having the boundary relating to the lower rank. Here

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

oneself means the speaker who utters the indiclinable. Thus the cognition from the words 'Salutation to Hari' (*namo haraye*) uttered from Caitra etc. is that the operation of Caitra etc. is conducive to the knowledge of lower rank of Caitra that has Hari as its boundary. However, in the usage 'Having saluted *Nārāyaṇa*' *(nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya)*, the dative case is not used dispite its association with the word '*namaḥ*'. Since the accusative is a *kāraka*-case, the weak *upapada*-dative is contradicted (annulled) by the stronger accusative.

Now it may be objected as follows: That Nārāyaṇa etc. have only the state of being the boundary of the lower rank constituting the meaning of the word 'salutation'; and the same cannot be the objecthood. The objecthood is of the form of being the abode of the effect produced from the action (cf. II(i)....); and since such an objecthood is not possible for *Nārāyaṇa* ec., the word '*nārāyaṇa*' cannot be the subject (base) of the accusative case. Also it should not be argued that the objecthood of the form of being the abode of the effect such as the cognition of the lower rank is quite unharmed (i.e. not contradicted) in *Nārāyana;* and therefore the accusative can be tenable after the word '*nārāyaṇa*' by intending to convey only such an objecthood. For, in that case, the state of being the abode of the effect such as the cognition of the lower rank caused by the falling to the feet like a piece of long suggesting the lower rank having *Nārāyaṇa* as the boundary, becomes common to even some other human being; and therefore the usage 'He salutes to human being' *(manuṣyam namaskaroti)* would become contingent at the time of saluting *Nārāyaṇa*.

Now it may be held as follows: That the operation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

conducive to the cognition referring to the state of being the boundary of the lower rank as the qualifier is the meaning of 'salutation'; and Nārāyaṇa etc. have the objecthood by being the qualificand (abode) of the cognition constituting such a salutation; whereas only the effect, which functions as the qualifier with respect to the operation through the relation of conduciveness, should be considered as the effect constituting the objecthood such as the state of being the abode of the effect produced from the action; and therefore some other human being, i.e. the cognizer of the being the boundary of the lower rank, need not have the objedthood as only the conduciveness (and not effect through the conduciveness) is the qualifier with respect to the operation. However even such a position is not correct. Then objecthood would becomes tenable for Nārāyaṇa only in the case such as 'Having bowed down to Nārāyaṇa' (*nārāyaṇam praṇamya*) and not in the case such as "Having made the salutation to Nārāyaṇa" (*nārāyaṇam namahskṛtya);* and since the knowledge (congnition) included in the meaning of the word '*namaḥ*' , does not constitute the verbal root-meaning, the being the object of such a knowledge cannot have the nature of the objecthood; and the state of bowing down is present only in the operation constituting the meaning of the indeclinable '*namaḥ*' but not in Nārāyaṇa.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara describes the bowing down (*nati),* the meaning of 'salutation' (*namaḥ*) etc. According to him, the bowing down is the operation conducive to the cognition of the lower rank of the speaker himself (*apakarṣa bodhānukūlavyāpāra);* and the dative refers to the state of being the boundary (*avadhitva)* which is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

related to the 'lower rank' through the describing, as being the boundary of the lower rank is described by the same. However, the point to be noted here is that while in '*haraye namaḥ*' only the *upapada*-dative is assigned by the rule '*namaḥ svasti.....*' (P. ii. 3. 16), in '*nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya*', the *kāraka*- accusative is possible as Nārāyaṇa can have the objecthood described by the making of salutation, i.e. the action expressed by the verb.

However, the objection is that Nārāyaṇa etc. are only the describers of the boundary of the lower rank (*apakarṣāvadhitvanirūpaka),* and not the abode of the effects produced from the action (*kriyājanya phalaśālitva)*; and therefore cannot be the objects of saluting. A possible argument is that only the knowledge of being the boundary of the lower rank of the speaker (*apakarṣabodha)* is the effect (*phala)* and due to being the abode of such an effect, Nārāyaṇa etc. can be explained to be the objects. However, this argument is faulty because like Nārāyaṇa, others too could be the abode of the knowledge of being the boundary of the lower rank of the speaker, and hence could be insisted to be the objects. Another possible argument is that the root 'to make salutation' (*namaskṛ)* refers to the operation conducive to the knowledge that has the state of being the boundary of the lower rank as the qualifier (*apakarṣāvadhitvaprakāraka bodhānukūla vyāpāra);* and since only Nārāyaṇa can be the abode of the knowledge functioning as the effect, only he can be the object; whereas since others cannot be the abode of the knowledge functioning as the effect (they can only be the abode of the conduciveness descirbed by the operation), they cannot be the objects. However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes even such an argument

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

on the ground that only in the case of the verbal roots such as *'praṇam'*, and not in the case of the use of indeclinables such as *'namas (kṛ)'* such an effect produced from the action is tenable to be cognised; and hence Nārāyaṇa can be the object only in *'nārāyaṇan praṇamya'* and not in *'nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya'* etc.

Refutation of objection

IV. 29. No this objection is not correct: In 'He makes salutation to Nārāyaṇa'. (*nārāyaṇam namaskaroti*) etc., the operation conducive to the knowledge is conveyed only by the root 'to make' (*kr*). In such a case, merely being the object of the knowledge that has the being the boundary of one's (speaker's) own lower rank as its qualifier is the meaning of the indeclinable (*namaḥ*). Here oneself (*svam*) means the agent uttering the indeclinable. Thus, the cognition produced from the collective unit of words is that 'One is the possessor of the effort conducive to the operation producing the effect of being the object of such a knowlege'. And Nārāyaṇa etc. have the objecthood by being the abode of such an objectness. For, in the definition that the objecthood is the state of being the abode of the effect delimiting the expressedness of the meaning of the verbal root, the being the delimiting property of the expressedness of the meaning of the verbal root does not mean the being the delimiting property of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the verbal root; rather it means the being what is conveyed as the qualifier with respect to the meaning such as the operation through the relation of conduciveness. Since in the present case, the meaning of the indeclinable 'salutation' (*namaḥ*) is related to the meaning of the verbal root directly, the same meaning of the indeclinable 'saluta-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tion' (*namaḥ*), namely, the being the object of such a knowledge, has the state of being the delimitting property of the meaningness of the meaning of the verbal root unharmed.

Explanation

Gadādhara now replies to the objection raised in IV. 27. According to him, the entire concept of operation conducive to the knowledge having the being the boundary of the lower rank as the qualifier (*apakarṣāvadhitva prakāraka bodhānukūlavyāpāra)* is the meaning of the root 'to make' (*kṛ*). Also since Nārāyaṇa etc. are the abodes of such a state of being the objects of the knowledge (*tādṛśaviṣayatāśraya),* the same are the objects. However, an arguement is raised that since such a state of bieng the objects of the knowledge is not the meaning of the root '*kr*', the same cannot be the effect, i.e. the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning of the root (*dhātvarthatāvacchedakaphala);* and therefore, Nārāyaṇa etc. cannot be the objects by possessing such a state. However, Gadādhara refutes the argument on the ground that the being the delimitor of the expressedness of the meanings of the root (*dhātvarthatāvacchadakatva)* is meant to be what is being conveyed by the verbal root as being related to the operation, i.e. the other root-meaning. through the conduciveness (*vyāpārarūpārthe anukūlatāsambandhena viśeṣaṇatayā dhātupratipādyatva);* and since the being the object of such a knowledge is directly related to the operation, i.e. the root-meaning, the same can be the *dhātvarthatāvacehedaka*.

Refutation of further objection.

IV. 30. Also it should not be objected that this way the region left behind etc. cannot be avoided the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

objecthood described by going. Though the separation etc. do have the state of being what are produced from the action, they do not have the said state of being the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning of the verbal root 'to go' (*gam*). For, the separation etc. do not, in any way, appear as being the qualifier with respect to the meaning of the root 'to go' (*gam*). Also, despite Nārāyaṇa etc. being the objects of making (salutation) (*karoti*), the accusative cannot be imposed after the word '*nārāyaṇa*' etc. in association with root 'to make' (*karoti*) without the word 'salutation' (*namaḥ*) used in the sentence. Since no word referring to the effect relating to the operation, i.e. the root-meaning, is present, the meaning of the accusative cannot be related to the effect in such cases. Nor there is any contigency of the accusative usage such as 'He makes the effect to be Nārāyaṇa' (*nārāyaṇam phalam karoti*). For, in such a case, the effect is not to be related directly to the operation, i.e. the root-meaning. The relation of the meaning of nominal, that is other than an indiclinable, with the root-meaning is against the semantic convention. The meaning of the accusative, namely the superstratumness can be related to only the effect that is directly relating to the operation, i.e. the root-meaning, as the qualifier. Therefore, in the usages such as 'Having made Śikhaṇḍin as the leader, staying in front' (*puraskṛtya śikhaṇḍinam...*) etc., Śikhaṇḍin etc. have the objecthood descirbed by the action of making (the leader); for, the same is the abode of the effect such as the staying in front, i.e. the meaning expressed by the indiclinable 'leader' (*puras*), that directly qualifies the operation of making (of leader) expressed by the root 'to make' (*kṛ*).

Explanation:

Now an objection can be raised that when what is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

being conveyed by the root as being the qualifier with respect to the operation (*vyāpāre viśeṣaṇatayā dhātu-pratipādya)* is held to be the delimitor of the meaningness of the meaning of the root (*dhātvarthatāvacchedaka),* even the region left behind (*pūrvadeśa*) would become the object of going in '*grāmam gacchati',* as the separation can be conveyed by the root *gam* as a qualifier with respect to the opeation, and the region left behind is the abode of such a separation.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the separation cannot be conveyed by the root 'to go' (*gam)* as the qualifier with respect to the action of going expressed by the root.

A point to be noted here is that the accusative cannot be imposed after the word '*nārāyaṇam karoti'* where the verb '*karoti'* is not associated with the indeclinable '*namas'.* Since the effect such as the state of being the object of the knowledge (*bodhaviṣayatva)* cannot be referred to by any word, the same cannot be related to the operation expressed by '*karoti'.* Another point to be noted here is that the incorect usage such as '*nārāyaṇam karoti'* etc. cannot be imposed: Since only the accusative-meaning, i.e. the superstratumness, and not the effect, can be related to the operation, Nārāyaṇa cannot be the object of making. However, the usage '*śikhaṇḍinam puraṣkrtya'* can be explained: Since the indeclinable word '*puras'* is used in association with the verb '*karoti',* the effect, namely the staying in front (*agradeśāvasthāna)* expressed by the indeclinable '*puras'* (*nipātārtha)*, can be related to the operation, as the qualifier (*dhātvarthavyāpār-aviśeṣaṇatayā):* and thus Sikhaṇḍin can be the object of the operation expressed by the root to make (*kr)* (*kṛtikarmah*).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Passive usage *'nārāyaṇo namaskriyate'*

IV. 31. In the passive usages such as 'Nārāyaṇa is saluted (*nārāyaṇo namaskriyate)* and 'The superior (worthy) one is placed in front' (*jyāyān purskriyate)* etc., the effects expressed by the indeclinable (*namas* and *puras*) appear as related to the operations expressed by the verbal roots only as the qualificands. And the state of being the abode related to such effects is conveyed by the passive verbal endings.

It may nevertheless be argued that the rule that (the meaning of a) *kāraka*-case is directly related to the root-meaning such as the operation gets violeted in such an relationship. However, such an agrument is not correct. The idea of 'directly' in the rule is meant to convey the idea that the meaning of a *kāraka*-case is not related to the meaning of the root without allowing what is other than the meaning of the indiclinable as the intermediate qualificand. Otherwise, in the usage 'The pot is produced from the stick but not from the globularness' (*gaṭo daṇḍāj jāyate na pārimāṇḍalyāt)* etc, the *kāraka*-ablative could not convey its meaning, i.e. the state of being produced, as a counterpositive.

The state of being what is produced as described by the globularness is established to be present in the knowledge having the state of being what is produced from he globularness-hood-delimited through the object-referringness. Or as an alternative, it can be admitted that in such cases only the origination qualified by the state of being what is produced is the meaning of the verbal root 'to be produced' (*jan)*. And the negative particle conveys the absence of the state of being described by the globularness, i.e. the meaning of the ablative word, in such a root-meaning. Although in accord-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ance with the said methodology, the *svayam bhū* to be saluted has only the objecthood in 'Having made salutation to the self-born' *(svayambhuve namaskṛtya)*, the word expresseing the same has only the dative case due to the speakers intention that the same is merely the boundary of the lower rank.

Explanation :

Now Gadādhara illustrates the passive usage '*nārāyaṇo namaskriyate*' etc. Here, according to him, the indeclinables such as '*namas*' express the effects such as the state of being the object of knowledge *(bodhaviṣ yatva)* only as the qualificand of the operation expressed by the root; whereas the passive endings express the being the abode related to such an effect. Thus one congises that one has the effort conducive to the operation producing the state of being the object of such a knowledge of ones (speaker's) lower rank resident in Nārāyaṇa (*nārāyaṇavṛttir yā svāpakarṣabodhaviṣayatā tatprayojakavyāpārānukūlakṛtimān)*.

Now, an objection can be raised as follows: That when the superstratumness, i.e. the meaning of the accusative (*kāraka*-case), is related to the effect expressed by the indeclinable such as '*namas*', the convention that the meaning of a *kāraka*-case is directly related to the meaning of the root gets contradicted. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the convention is meant to rule that the meaning of the *kāraka*-case is not related to the meaning of the root-meaning without allowing what is other than the meaning of the indiclinable as the intermediate qualifiecand. According to him, otherwise the usage '*ghaṭo daṇḍāj jāyate na pārimāṇḍalyāt*' becomes untenable due to the fact that the relation of the state of being what is pro-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

duced by the globularness (*svārthaprayojyatva)* becomes untenable with the absence expressed by the negative particle (*na*). However, to avoid the contradiction to the semantic convention, Gadādhara suggests an alternative that the origination qualified by the producedness (*prayojyatvaviśiṣṭotpatti)* is the root-meaning, and the absence of the being what is described by the globularness (*pārimāṇḍalya nirūpitatvābhāva)* expressed by the ablative plus the negative can be related to the origination so that the meaning of *kāraka*-case need not relate to what is other then the meaning of the root.

Alternative theory

IV. 32. Some hold here alternatively as follows: That in 'Having made salutation to Nārāyaṇa' (*nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya)* etc, the word 'salutation' *(namas)* is intended to express the object of making salutation; and therefore, like the pot etc. which can be explained to have the objecthood described by the making in "He makes non-white pot into white pot' i.e., he whitens' *(ghaṭam śuklam karoti = śuklīkaroti)*, Nārāyaṇa etc. can be explained to have the objecthood described by the making of salutation by intending to express the idea of ''Having made Nārāyaṇa, the object of salutation''. In the case of 'Having made Śikhaṇḍin, as the leader staying in front' *(śikhaṇḍinam puraskṛtya)* etc, the indeclinable word 'in front' (*puras)* is intended to convey the person staying in front. Similary, in 'He directly perceives the pot' (*ghaṭam sākṣāt karoti)* etc, the word 'directly' (*sākṣāt)* is intended to convey only the object of one's own perception but not intended to convey the property of being the object of one's own perception. Also, this way, in 'He expresses the grief' (*duḥkham āviṣkaroti)* etc. too, the indiclinables 'before

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the eyes' (*āvis*) etc. are intended to convey the sense such as making one's feeling etc. appearent, i.e., making the objects of other's knowledge etc. Thus, they state that the accusative must be explained everywhere like in the previous case. (i.e. in '*nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya*' etc.).

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains an alternative theory which holds that a property-possessor (*dhrmin)* such as the object of making salutation (*natikarman)* and the object of one's own perception (*svīyapratyakṣaviṣaya)* instead of the property (*dharma)* such as the being the object of salutation (*natikarmatā)* and the being the object of one's own preception (*svīyapratyakṣaviṣayatā),* are the meanings of the indeclinable words. According to him, like the pot in '*ghaṭaṃ śuklīkaroti'*, Nārāyaṇa in '*nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya'* etc. too can be explained to be the object of making salutation by intending the indeclinable to express the object of making salutation (*kṛtikarman*). Thus, he suggests that the indeclinables '*puras*' and '*sākṣāt*' etc. convey the property-possessors (*dharmin*) such as the leader staying in front (*agrasthita)* and the object of one's own perception (*svīyapratyakṣaviṣaya), respectively.* It should be noted that when the indeclinables express the properties, the same properties, being non-delimitors of the meaningness of the root-meanings, cannot make Nārāyaṇa etc. the possessors of themselves, i.e., the objects; whereas when the same express the property-possessors, the same property-possessors, being the objects of making (*kṛtiviṣayatvena),* can make Nārāyaṇa etc. identical with themselves, i.e. the objects.

Refutation of the alternative theory

IV.33. However this alternative theory is not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

correct. When the indeclinable 'salutation' *(namas)* is held to be expressive of the property-possessor, the incorrect usage 'The object of making salutation is present' *(namo bhavati)* would become contingent like the correct usage 'Hari manifests' (*harir āvirbhavati*). Therefore, it must be admitted that indeclinable such as 'salutation' (*namah* in 'He makes salutation' (*namaḥ karoti),* 'He makes manifestation' *(āviṣ karoti),* 'He pays respect or honour's (*puraṣkaroti)* and 'He adorns' (*alamakaroti),* etc are only expressive of the property due to economy. The possessors of the particular properties can be explained to be the objects as explained earlier. However, in accordance with the usage 'Hari manifests' *(āvirbhavati)* etc., the indeclinable such as 'before the eyes' *(āvir)* would be admitted to have an indication in the property-possessor, the abode of the manifestation, like the words such as 'white' *(śuklaḥ)* etc. have indication in the white clothing in the case of 'The clothing is white' (*śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*).

Or as another alternative, it could be admitted that only the property such as the mainfestation is the meaning of the indeclinable 'before the eyes' *(āvis)* in such cases as well, and the same is related, through identity, to the becoming, the root-meaning. And since only the indeclinables such as 'before the eyes' etc. and not the indeclinables such as 'salutation' (*namas)* etc. would be admitted to have the expectancy for relating their own meaning to the action of becoming, the incorrect usage 'Nārāyaṇa becomes the salutation' ('*nārāyaṇo namo bhavati)* etc. cannot be imposed.

In 'He makes non white (pot) into white (pot)' *(śuklīkaroti*) etc., even the words ending in *'cvī'*-affix have been assigned in the sense of assuming the nature

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(state) by the agent which was not before (P. v. 4. 50); and assuming the nature which was not before means acquiring the property such as the whiteness by the property-possessor which was not present before, i.e. in the past as delimited by the earlier time. Or the same is the property such as the whiteness which was not present, i.e. which did not-exist in the property-possessor as delimited by the earlier time. And the metholodology of explaining the cognition in 'The non-white becomes white' (*śuklī bhavati)* is the same i.e. taking recourse to the indication as in the case of '*āvirbhavati'*.

Explanation

Gadādhara now refutes the alternative theory. According to him, when the indeclinable 'salutation' (*namaḥ)* is admitted to convey the property-possessor (*dharmin)*, the same would have agreement (*sāmānādhikaraṇya)* with the word '*hari'* etc; and consequently the usage '*harir namo bhavati'* would become necessary. Thus it must be admitted that indeclinables 'salutation' *(namaḥ)* etc. convey only the properties such as the state of being the object of the knowledge having the boundary of the lower rank as the qualifier (*apakarṣāvadhitva prakāraka bodharviṣayatā)*.

Also according to Gadādhara, '*āvirbhavati'* etc. are used in agreement with '*harir'* etc. in '*harir āvirbhavati'* etc.; and therefore need to express only the property-possessor, i.e. the agent of manifestation, along with *harir* etc. Nevertheless, to achieve the uniformity in meanings, it can be held that *āvir* etc. too express only the properties such as the manifestation (*prakaṭatā)* which can be related to the becoming expressed by the verbal

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

root *bhū* etc. through identity. Further, according to Gadādhara, roots ending in *cvī*-affixes such as '*śuklīkaroti* express the properties such as the whiteness (*śauklya)* but not the property-possessors (*dharmin)* such as the white pots (*śuklaghaṭa)*; and therefore indeclinables salutation (*namas)* etc. need not express the properties on the analogy of cvī-forms. A point to be noted here is that *cvi*-forms are ruled (P. v.4. 50) in the sense of acquiring the nature (state) which was not present earlier (*abhūtatadbhāva);* and therefore cvī- forms express only the properties and not the property-possessors.

Objection that *abhūtatadbhāva* cannot be the meaning

IV. 34. It may be objected now as follows: That there would occur the heaviness if the idea extending upto the acquiring of the nature (*state*) which is not present earlier is admitted to be the expressed meaning of the cvī-affix. Therefore let it be admitted that only the state of being what was not present earlier, relating to the whiteness etc., i.e. the delimiting property of the meaningness of the meaning referred to by the word 'white' (*śukla)*, is the meaning of *cvī*-affix. Like the excellence, i.e. the meaning expressed by the comparative suffix '*tarap'* in 'He is excelling in whiteness' (*śuklataraḥ*), even the meaning of cvī-affix can be related to the delimitor of the meaningness of the meaning by restricting the semantic convention.

However, this objection is not correct to state. Since in my theory too, only the property such as the whiteness etc. is admitted to be the meaning of the cvī-affix, no occasion for any heaviness can occur. Also since the superstratumness qualified by the state of being the counterpositive of the absence occurring in oneself (the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

pot) as delimited by the earlier time would be admitted to be the relation of the base-meaning with the meaning of the cvī-affix and the state of not being present earlier would be obtained in the whiteness, the usage 'The atom of the water becomes white' (*jalaparamāṇuḥ śuklībhavati)* will have no occasion to be imposed. Also since the whiteness etc., are the expressed meanings only as being the properties and not as being of the same forms (individualities) such as the whiteness etc., there occurs no danger of endlessness of expressive powers. Also since only the particular superstratumness resident in the particular properties functioning as the delimitors of the expressedness of the expressed meanings of the bases are admitted as appearing as the relations, the incorrect usage such as 'The atom of the water becomes white' *(jalaparamāṇuḥ śuklībhavati)* need not be imposed by taking into account the state of being what is not present earlier of some other property.

Explanation

An objection is raised now that when the acquiring of the nature (state) which is not present earlier (*abhūtatadbhāva)* is admitted as the meaning of the *cvī*-affix, both the whiteness (*śauklya)* and the state of being what is not present earlier (*abhūtatva)* would be required to be the expressed meanings of *cvī*-words; and hence the heaviness results. And therefore it is suggested that only the part of *'abhūtatvābhāva'*, namely the state of being what was not present earlier (*abhūtatva)* should be admitted as the meaning of *cvī*-affix; and by relating the same to the whiteness, i.e. the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning of the word *'white'* (*śuklādipadārthatāvacchedaka),* the idea of *'abhūtatadbhāva'* can be obtained.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that he too accepts only the whitness (*śauklya)* etc. and not both the whitness (*śauklya)* and the state being what is not present before (*abhūtatva)* as the meanings of *cvī*-affix; and therefore the heaviness does not occure in his theory. Another point to be noted here is that to obtain the idea of *abhūtatva,* the superstratumness qualified by the state of being the counter-positive of the absence of the whitness occurring in the pot as delimited by the pot (*pūrvakālāvacchinna svaniṣṭhābhāva pratiyogitva sahita)* would be admitted as the relation of the white pot, i.e. the base-meaning, with the whiteness, i.e. the *cvi*-meaning; and therefore the incorrect statement *jalaparamāṇuḥ śuklī bhavati* cannot be imposed, with the idea of relating the atom of the water with the whiteness.

Fault in admitting *abhūtatva* as the meaing of *cvī*-affix.

IV. 35. However, in the theory that the state of being what is not present before, occurring in the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the base, is the meaning of cvī-affix, the semantic competency would become untenable for the relation of the absence of the whiteness in 'Pot becomes non-white' (*aśuklībhavti);* for the absence of the whitness, i.e. the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the base, is already present somewhere (in the non-pots) before. Aslo, when the state of being not present in the particular property-possessors is held to be the meaning of *cvī*-affix, there would occur the endlesseness of expressive powers. Therefore only the absence as delimited by the earlier time must be admited to be the state of being what is not present earlier (the meaning of *cvī*-affix); and the same must be said to be related

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning of the base through the relation of the counter-positiveness as qualified by the community of locus. And the qualification of the entity, qualified by the absence (non-presence) through such a relation, must be admitted with the base- meaning (white pot). Otherwise, the incorrect statement such as 'The crow becomes non-white' (*kāko' śuklībhavati)* would become necessary as the non-whitness, having comminity of locus with its own absence in some other case (pot), can be seen to be present even in the crow which is always non-white. Here in 'The crow becomes non-white' (*kāko' śuklībhavati),* the appearance of the qualification of the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the base, which is in turn qualified by the other word-meaning, namely, the absence (non-presence), is not possible in the base-meaning (non-white crow). When the base word (*kāka)* does not convey, with the help of its own word-power, the relation of the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the base delimited by the particular qualifier (counter-positiveness), with respect to its own meaning, the same base-word cannot convey, even with the help of the syntactic expectancy such as the association with another word, which is conduceive to the cognition of relation of two-word-meanings, the relation of the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the base, as delimited by the same qualifier, with respect to its own base-meaning. Therefore, the qualification such as the counter-positiveness qualified by the absence (non-presence) of the meaning of *cvī*-affix, which is not conveyed by the base-word through it's own word-relation (power) cannot appear with respect to the relation of the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the base-word. Thus the untenablity occurs.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains the difficulty in admitting the state of being what is not present before (*abhūtatva)* (identical with *avidyamānatva)* as the meaing of *cvī*-affix. According to him, when such a state of being what is not present before is admitted as '*cvi*'-meaning. the semantic competency (*yogyatā)* would become untenable in *'ghaṭo aśuklībhavati'* as the state of being what is not present before (*abhūtatva)* of the form of the absence of the whiteness cannot be cognized in the non-white pot having absence of the whiteness. According to Nyāya, absence of some thing cannot be related to some locus, possessing the asence of the same thing (*tadviśiṣṭe tadananyāt)*. Therefore, only the state of being what is not present before having the form of the absence delimited by the earlier time (*pūrvakālāvacchinnābhāva),* needs to be admitted as the meaning of *cvī*-affix. Also when such a state of being what is not present before is admitted as *cvī-meaning,* the same can be related to the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning of the base, through the relation of the counterpositiveness delimited by the community of locus (*sāmānādhikaraṇyasahita pratiyogitva)*. Now the relation of the whiteness, i.e. the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the base qualified by such a state of being what is not present before, must be admitted in the white pot, i.e. the base-meaning (*prakṛtyartha*), through such a relation. This realtionship becomes necessary to avoid the contingency of the incorrect usage such as '*kākaḥ-aśuklībhavati';* for, otherwise such a usage cannot be avoided as the non-whitness, having community of locus with its own absence, i.e. the whiteness,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*svābhāvasamānādhikaraṇa),* is present in the items such as the white pot. Also when such a relationship of the delimitor is admitted with the base-meaning, such an incorrect usage can be avoided, as the non-whiteness, the delimitor, qualified by the absence of the non-whiteness, i.e. the whiteness, cannot be cognized in the crow, i.e. the *cvī*-base meaning, through such a relation.

Asauklya is the meaning of *cvī*-base

IV. 36. In our theory, however, the non-whiteness etc., qualified by the loci of their own absences delimited by the earlier time through the relation of the superstratumness, which are the meanings of the words ending in *cvī*-affix, need to be admitted as relating to the action of becoming, i.e. the meaning of the root 'to become' *(bhū)* through the relation of the community of locus; and therefore, only the becoming, i.e. the meaning of the verbal root 'to become' *(bhū)* as qualified by the non-whiteness in turn qualified by the locus through such a relation, can be cognized as relating to the substratumness, i.e. the meaning of the verbal ending *(ti),* through the relation of being described. And since the substratumness described by such a qualified becoming is present in only the locus of the absence of the non-whiteness (i.e. the white pot) at the earlier time, there occurs no contingency of the said over pervasion, i.e. occurrence of the incorrect usage *'kākaḥ aśuklībhavati'.* Remaining aspects of verbal cognition must be guessed by scholars on their own.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the avoidance of the incorrect usage *kākah aśuklībhavati* by proposing the theory that only the non-whiteness (*aśauklya)* and not the state

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of being what is not present before having the form of the state of being what is absent before (*avidyamānatārupābhūtatva)* is the meaning of *cvī*-affix in '*aśuklībhavati*' etc. According to him, the non-whiteness can be produced only in the item (pot) where the absence of the non-whiteness was present before (*pūrvakālāvacchedena svābhāvādhikaraṇa),* and also the non-whiteness is present only in the locus (pot) where the becoming (*bhāva)*, i.e. the meaning of the root 'to become' (*bhavatyartha)* is present; whereas the substratumness expressed by the verbal ending (*ti*) (*ākhyātārtha)* is described by the becoming, the root-meaning, (*bhavatyarthanirūpita)*. Therefore, the substratumness would be qualified by through the relation of describing only in the locus (pot), where the becoming is qualified by the non-whiteness through the community of locus, which (non-whiteness) is qualified in turn by the locus of its own absence through the superstratumness. Now since the substratumness can be qualified by such a becoming only in the pot and not in the crow, only the statement '*ghaṭaḥ aśuklībhavati'* can be made whereas '*kākaḥ aśuklībhavati*' stands avoided.

Meaning of dative in *svasti bhavate*

IV. 37. In the usage such as 'May it be well with thee' (*svasti bhavate)* etc., the blessing is the meaning of 'well being' (*svasti)* (P. ii. 3. 16). And the blessing is one's (blesser's) desire for the well being of the other (blessed). Here one means speaker of the word well being. And the relation of describing relating to the well being is the meaning of the dative. Thus, the cognition produced is that my own desire has a reference to the well being of you (the bless: d one). In the case of the usage such as 'Let there be prosperity (happiness) for

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

myself' *(svstyastu mahayam)* etc., the word *'svasti'* is expressive of the prosperity (happiness). There too, only the relation of describing that is related to the prosperity (heppiness), i.e. the meaning expressed by *'svasti'*, is the meaning of the dative. Thus enough of further elaboration.

Thus ends the analysis of the meaning of the dative.

Explanation

Gadādhara concludes the fourth chapter with the discussion on the meaning of the dative in connection with *'svasti'* in *'svasti bhavate'* etc. (P. ii. 3. 16). According to him, the indeclinable *'svasti'* in *'svasti bhavate'* expresses the blessing (*āśīr*) of the form of one's (blesser's) desire for the well being of the other (blessed) (*parahita viṣayakasvecchā),* and the dative expresses the relation of being described (*nirūpitatvasambandha)* of the well being, as the second person describes the blessing. However, the indeclinable *'svasti'* in *'svasty astu mahyam'* cannot express the same blessing as the blessing can be concerning only the others; and therefore, the indeclinable in such cases must be admitted to express only the prosperity (happiness) for oneself (*kalyāṇa*), and the dative can be admitted to express the relation of being described. Thus, one cognizes in such cases that one's own desire refers to the prosperity described by oneself' (*mannirūpita hitaviṣayiṇī madīyecchā)*.

Thus ends the analysis of the meaning of the dative in the Vyutpativāda.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF ABLATIVE MEANING

Meaning of ablative in '*vṛkṣāt parṇam patati*'

V. 1. In the ablative usages such as 'The leaf falls from the tree' (*vṛkṣāt parṇam patati)* etc., the ablative conveys the ablation described by the action of falling from the tree, i.e. the maning expressed by the ablative base (cf. *apādāne pañcamī,* P ii. 3. 28). The ablation is the state of being the abode of the separation produced from the action of falling, functioning as the delimitor of the counterpositiveness of the counterpositive of the mutual absence resident in itself (the tree) (*dhruvam apāyae*... P 4. 24). Here functioning as the delimitor of the counterpositiveness..... is included, as the qualifier of the action, to avoid the ablation, described by the act of falling of itself producing the separation of the tree resident in itself, for the leaf. The ablative case has two separate expressive powers: one in the state of being the delimitor of the counterpositiveness of the counterpositive of mutual absence, and the other in the separation. The tree, i.e. the meaning of the ablative base, is related to the mutual absence and to the separation through the relation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of superstratumness. Whereas the state of being the delimitor of the counter positiveness is related to the action of falling through the relation of the substratumness, and the separation is related to the same action through the producing.

However, it may be objected that since the relation of producing is not the delimitor of the counterpositiveness, the negative particle cannot convey the absence of the separation as delimited by such a relation of producing with respect to the action of falling in the negative statement. Then in that case, let it be admitted that the state of producing the separation itself is the meaning of the ablative, and even the same state, like the state of being the delimitor of the counterpositiveness, is related to the action of falling through the relation of substratumness. Thus the verbal cognition produced in the given case is of the form that the leaf is the abode of the action of falling producing the separation resident in the tree which is the delimitor of the counter-positiveness of the counter-positive of the mutual absence resident in the tree.

Explanation

Now, Gadādhara sets out to analyse the meaning of the ablative which is in sequential order. According to him, since the ablative case (*pañcamī)* is enjoined by the rule (P ii.3. 28) in the sense of the ablation (*apādānatva),* the same refers to the ablation in '*vṛkṣāt parṇam patati*' etc. Also according to him, since the ablation (*apādānatva),* is defined by the rule P i. 4. 24, the same is the state of being the abode of the separation produced from the action of falling, functioning as the delimitor of the counterpositiveness of the counter-positive of the mutual absence resident in the tree itself

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*svaniṣṭhabhedapratiyogitāvacchedakībhūtakriyājanyavibhāgāśrayatvam.*). He explains that the tree, i.e. the ablative, is the fixed point (*dhruva*) and so does not have the action of falling producing the separation from itself; rather it has only the mutual absence that 'it is not the possessor of the action of falling, the producer of the separation' (*vibhāgajanakībhūtakriyāvān na'*); and so is the abode of the separtion (*vibhāgāśraya*).

Also he holds that the ablative case is used in the sense of such an ablation (*apādānatva*) means the same has the two separate expressive powers (*śaktis*) : one in the mutual absence (*bheda*) and the other in the separation (*vibhāga*) found in the tree; and thus one cognizes from '*vṛkṣāt parṇam patati*' that the leaf is the possessor of the action of falling conducive to the separation resident in the tree (*vṛkṣaniṣṭhavibhā*gānukūlakṛi*yāvat parṇam*).

It should be noted here that a non-occurrence exacting relation (*vrttyaniyāmakasambandha*) such as the producing (*jankatā*) cannot be held to be the delimiting relation of the counterpositiveness described by an absence (*pratiyogitānavacchedaka*); and therefore, in the negative statement such as '*vṛkṣāt parṇam na patati,*' the absence of the separation, the counterpositiveness described by which is delimited by such a producingness, cannot be cognized from the negative particle. Thus to overcome such a difficulty, Gadādhara suggests that the ablative can be held to convey only the state of producing the separation (*vibhāga janakatva*), the absence of which can be cognized to be relating to the action of falling through the relation of substratumness, which is an occurrence exacting relation, in such negative examples.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Objection that semantic competency (yogyatā) is untenable.

V. 2. Now the two alternatives could be that the negative particle associated with the ablative conveys i) either both of the two separate absences of the said two meanings (namely, the state of producing the separation and the state of being the delimitor of the counterpositiveness of the counterpositive of the mutual absence) or ii) either one of the two absences in accordance with the contextual requirements. However, both the alternatives are untenable. The first alternative is not tenable due to the following reason:That though in the usage 'The leaf falls from the tree and not from itself' *(vṛkṣāt parṇam patati na svasmāt),* the absence of the state of being the delimitor of the counter positiveness of the counterpositive of the mutual absence resident in itself is present in the falling resident in itself, the absence of the state of producing the separation resident in itself cannot be present there; and hence semantic competency would be lacking in the relation. Also, though in the usage 'The leaf falls from the tree and not from the ground' *(vṛkṣāt patati na bhūtalāt),* the absence of the state of producing the separation resident in the ground is present in the falling, the absence of the state of being the delimitor of the counterpositivness of the counterpositive of the mutual absence resident in itself is not present there; and hence the semantic competency would be leaking. The second alternative is not tenable due to the flowing reason : In the usage 'The leaf falls form the tree but not from the leaf' *(vṛkṣāt patram patati na patrāt),* the state of not being the delimitor of the counterpositiveness of the counterpositive of the mutual absence resident in the leaf, like the state of not producing the separation resident in the leaf, is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

contradictory in the falling resident in the leaf due to the presence of the state of being the delimitor of the counterpositiveness of the counterpositive of the mutual absence resident in some other leaf; and hence the semantic competency is impossible to be facilitated.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection now that semantic competency (*yogyatā),* for relating the absence of the ablation, becomes untenable in the negative statements. According to him, in the theory that the ablative expresses the state of being the delimitor of the counterpositiveness of the counterpositive of the mutual absence (*bhedapratiyogitāvacchedakatva)* and the state of producing the separation (*vibhāgajanakatva)*, the negative particle needs to convey either both of the two absences of the two ablative meanings or either one of the two absences of the two meanings in the action of falling depending upon the context. However, both the alternatives are untenable. When the first alternative is admitted, the semantic competency for the relation of the absence of the ablation could not be tenable in *'vṛkṣāt parṇam patati na svasmāt'* as the absence of the state of producing the separation resident in the leaf (*svaniṣṭha vibhāgajanakatvābhāva)* is contradictory in the action of falling; and this in spite of the fact that the absence of the state of being the delimitor of the conter-positiveness of the counterpositive of the mutual absence resident in the leaf (*svanṣṭhabheda pratiyogitāvacched-akatvābhāva)* is tenable in the action of falling resident in the leaf. And when the second alternative is admitted, semantic competency for the relation of the absence of the ablation could not be tenable in *vṛkṣāt patram patati na svasmāt* as the state of not being the delimitor of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the counterpositiveness of the counterpositive of the mutual absence (such as *kriyāvān na)* resident in the leaf *(svaniṣṭhabhedapratiyogitānavacchedakatva)*, like the state of not producing the separation resident in the leaf *(patraniṣṭha vibhāgājanakatva),* is contradictory in the action of falling due to the possibility of the same mutual absence in some other leaf.

Reply to the objection

V. 3. Here they state their reply to the objection as follows : That the separation and the state of producing are the two separate meanings of the ablative case. The ablative base-meaning (such as the tree) is related to the separation through the relation of describing the boundary of limit. The separation, qualified by the base-meaning (tree) through such a relation, is related further to the state of producing through the particular relation of being described. Here the state of producing is of the form of being conducive to the effect. And such a state of producing described by the separation as qualified by the base-meaning is related to the action of falling in the positive usages; whereas the same is related to the absence relating to the action of falling as being the counterpositive in the case of negative usages. The action of falling of the leaf producing the separation of the leaf from the tree etc. is not conducive to the separation as qualified by the state of having the leaf as it's boundary or limit. Since the leaf etc. is not the abode of the separation, as qualified by the state of having the leaf itself as its boundary, the action of falling of the leaf cannot have the community of locus with the separtion as qualified by the such a state. Also since the state of being what is actually conducive to the effect consists of the state of having the community of locus

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with the effect to be produced, the said semantic incompátibility becomes avoided.

Explanation :

Gadādhara replies to the objection of said semantic incompatibility here. According to him, the ablative need not express the state of being the delimitor of the counterpositiveness of the counterpositive of the mutual absence *(bhedapratiyogitāvavacchedakatva)* and the state of producing the separation (*vibhāgajanakatva*); rather it can express merely the separation (*vibhāga)* and the state of producing (*janakatva*). And since the base-meaning such as the tree is related to the separation and the same separation is further related to the state of producing, the state of prȯducing described by the separation as qualified by the base-meaning (*viśiṣṭanirūpita vibhāga jananakatva)* can be explained to be related to the action of falling etc. in the positive usage such as '*vṛkṣāt parṇam patati'*; whereas the same can be explained to be related to the absence expressed by the negative particle and in turn relating to the action of falling (*kriyānvayinyabhāva)* in the negative usage.

A point to be noted here is that the state of producing the separation (*vibhāgajanakatva*) is the state of being actually conducive to the effect of separation (*phalopadhāyakatva);* and since the action of falling of the leaf (*patrādikarmaṅ)* producing the separation of the same from the tree (*vṛkṣ apatravihāga janaka)* cannot be conducive to the separation having the leaf itself as its boundary (*partrāvadhika vibhāgopadhāyaka)*, it cannot have the community of locus with the separation as having the leaf itself as its boundary (*patrāvadhika vibhāga sāmānādhikaraṇya)*, i.e. it can be found only in the locus

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the separation (such as the tree) which has only the tree as its boundary. Thus, there is no untenability of the semantic competency (*yogyatā)* in the cognition of the absence of the state of producing the separation in the negative usage '*vṛkṣāt patram patati, na patrāt.*'

Meaning of ablative in '*vṛkṣād vibhajate*'

V. 4. In the usages such as 'The bird separates from the tree' (*vṛkṣād vibhajate*) etc. too, the ablative conveys only the state of having the tree as the boundary in the separation; for the ablation in such cases is of the form of being the boundary. Also since the verbal ending '*te*' conveys the substratumness described by the separation qualified by the state of having the tree as it's boundary, the incorrect usage 'The tree separates from itself' (*vṛkṣaḥ svasmāt vibhajate)* cannot be imposed. Just as the contact qualified by the state of having oneself as it's adjunct is not found in oneself, the separation qualified by the state of having oneself as it's boundary too is not admitted in oneself. Also, even if the separation having oneself as its boundary is found to occur in oneself, it cannot be disputed that oneself cannot be admitted to be the locus of the separation qualified by the state of having oneself as its boundary. The being the boundary etc. is a particular type of self-linking relation.

Or as an alternative, it can be held that the separation, the locushood, and the state of being what is conducive to (the effect) are the three separate meanings of the ablative in 'The leaf falls from the tree' (*vṛkṣāt patati)*. The base-meaning (tree) is related to the separation through the relation of having oneself as the boundary; and the separation, qualified by such a base-meaning (tree), is further related to the locushood

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

through the particular relation of describing. Whereas such a locushood is related to the state of being conducive to (the effect) though the describing. However, the action of falling resident in the leaf does not have the state of being what is conducive to the locushood resident in other than the tree and described by the separation qualified by the state of having the tree as it's boundary. For, even the cause such as the action of falling has only the state of being what is conducive to the locushood described by the effect (separation) resident in the leaf, i.e. the abode of itself (falling). Thus everything is fine.

Explanation

Gadādhara now illustrates the usage '*vṛkṣād vibhajate*'. According to him, the ablative in such cases expresses the state of having the tree (base-meaning) as its boundary (*vṛkṣāvadhikatva)*, as the ablation (*apādānatā*) is of the form of being the boundary (*avadhitā)* and one understands the subsratumness as described by the separation qualified by the state of having the tree as the boundary (*vṛkṣāvadhikatvaviśiṣṭa vibhāganirūpitāśrayatva)* form the ending (*te*). Thus, the cognition is that the bird has the substratumness as described by the separation qualified by the state of having the tree as the boundary. The advantage of such a cognition of the state of having the tree as its boundary in the separation from the ablative is that the incorrect usage such as '*vṛkṣaḥ svasmād vibhajate*' can be avoided; Since one cannot have the separation having oneself as the boundary (*svāvadhikavibhāga*), but since one can have only the separation having something else as the boundary (*parāvadhikavibhāga),* the tree cannot have the separation having the tree itself as the boundary (*vṛkṣāvadhikavibhāga)*.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

As an alternative, Gadādhara suggests that the ablative itself can be held to express the separation (*vibhāga),* the being the locus (*adhikaraṇatā)* and the state of being what is conducive to the effect (*prayojakatva)* which can be related to each other by restricting the semantic convention. Since the action of falling resident in the leaf (*patra niṣṭhakriyā)* is conducive to the locushood in the leaf described by the separation qualified by the state of having the tree as the boundary (*vṛkṣāvadhikatvaviśiṣṭa vibhāganirūpitā-dhikaraṇatā)* only when the same locushood is found in the tree (*vṛkṣani-ṣṭḥa)* and not when it is found in the ground (*bhūtalani-ṣṭha*), the same action of falling resident in the leaf cannot produce such a locushood in the ground; and so the absence of the state of being what is conducive to such a locushood in the ground, i.e. the ablative-meaning, can be related to the action of falling resident in the leaf. Thus, semantic competency (*yogyatā)* can be explained for relating the absence of the state of being what is conducive to the locushood, i.e. the ablative-meaning, to the action of falling of the leaf in *'patram vṛkṣāt patati ṇa bhūtalāt'.*

objection that *vṛkṣāt tyajati* can be imposed.

V. 5. Now it may be objected as follows : How is it that, like the usages 'The leaf falls from the tree' (*vṛkṣāt patati*) and 'The leaf separates from the tree' (*vṛkṣāt vibhajate),* the usages such as 'The leaf leaves from the tree (*vṛkṣāt tyajati)* are not made. There cannot be any contradiction in relating the ablative-meaning such as the state of producing the separatoin with respect to the leaving of the form of the action delimited by the separation; and also in relating the ablative-meaning such as the sate of having the boundary with respect to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

effect such as the separation, i.e. the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning of the root.

Also it should not be argued that the relation of separation with the action of leaving that is delimited by the separation is semantically incompatible, as the predicate and the delimitor of the subjectness of the subject would become identical. There cannot be any contradiction to the semantical convention when the state of producing the separation as qualified by the base-meaning (tree) is related to the leaving delimited by the separation through the relation of producing. Also it should not be argued that the references to the separation and the operation dependent on (i.e. produced by) the particular roots (such as *vibhaj)* need to be admitted as the cause for the cognition of the relation of the ablative-meanings such as the state of having the boundary and the state of producing the separation; and due to the absence of such a cause, the ablative-meanings cannot be imposed to be related to the meaning referred to by the root 'leave' (*tyaj*). At the time of the illusion of the synonymity of the roots such as 'leave' (*tyaj)* and 'fall' *(pat)* and also at the time of that of 'leave' (*tyaj)* and 'separate' *(vibhaj),* the meanings of the ablative are related to the separation and the operation, i.e. the meanings of the root 'leave' (*tyaj);* and therefore, the references to such meanings produced from the root 'leave'*(tyaj)* too need necessarily to be admitted as the cause of their relation with the meanings of the ablative.

Again it should not be argued that the reference to the operation not delimited by the effect such as the separation as produced from the root is the cause of the cognition of the state of producing the separation, i.e. the ablative-meaning, and the reference to the separation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as the chief qualificand produced from the root is the cause of the cognition of the state of having the boundary respectively; and therefore the operation and the separation, which can be the objects of the reference to the operation as delimited by the separation produced from the root 'leave' *(tyaj),* cannot be related to the state of producing the separation and to the state of having the boundary, i.e. the ablative-meanings, respectively. In the theory that the effect and the operation are the two separate meanings of the root, even the separation and the movement as not delimited by the separation can be referred to by the root 'leave' *(tyaj)* independently as the chief qualificands; and therefore, such meanings (separtion and movement), which are the objects of such a reference, could very well be related to the particular ablative-meanings.

Explanation

Now the Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that since the root 'leave' (*tyaj*) too expresses the operation (movement) as delimited by the separation (*vibhāgāvacchinna kriyā*), the two meanings of the ablative, namely the state of producing the separation (*vibhāgajankatva)* and the state of having the boundary (*avadhimattva*), can be related to the two root-meanings, namely, the action of leaving and to the separation respectively. And thus the incorrect usage '*vṛkṣāt tyajati*' can be imposed with the intention of cognizing such a relationship.

However, three separate arguments against such relations of the ablative meanings with the leaving and the separation, i.e. the meanings of the root '*tyaj'*, are raised here on the following grounds: i) That such a relation of the ablative meanings, namely, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

avadhimattva and the *vibhāgajanakatva,* with *vibhāga* and *spanda*, is against the semantic convention due to the identity between the predicate and the delimitor of the subjectness of the subject (*uddeśyatāvacchedak-avidheyaikya);* ii) that such a relation of the ablative-meanings is untenable due to the absence of the required cause, namely, the reference to the separation and the operation (movement) from the particular root (*dhātuviśeṣ ādhīnavyāpāropasthiti);* and iii) that such a relation is untenable due to the absence of reference to the operation not delimited by the effect such as the separation (*vibhāgarūpa phalānavacchinnav-yāpāropasthiti),* and that of the reference to the separation as the qualificand (*vibhāgamukhyaviśeṣyakopasthiti*). However, the Pūrvapakṣ in refutes the arguments and states that the ablative-meanings such as the state of producing the separation (*vabhāgajanakatva)* and the state of having the boundary (*avadhimattva)* can be related to the meanings of the root (*tyaj*). According to him, such a state of producing the separation as additionally qualified by the ablative base-meaning (*prakṛtyarthaviśeṣita vibhāgajanakatva)* can be related to the action of falling as delimited by the separation (*vibhāgāvacchinna);* and hence the identity between the predicate and the delimitor of the subjectness (*uddeśya vidheyaikya)* is not a problem. And also he states that in the illusion that '*tyaj*' and '*pat*' are synonymous, the verbal cognition is produced from '*vṛkṣ āt tyajati';* and hence the reference to the operation and the separation from the root '*tyaj*' (*tyajdhātujany-atadarthopasthiti)* too needs to be admitted as the cause of cognition of the relation of the ablative-meaning (*pañcamyarthānvayahetu*). And also further he states that in the theory that the effect and the operation are the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

two separate root-meanings, the separation (*vibhāga)* and the movement (*spanda)* can be referred to as the chief-qualificands; and hence the ablative meanings can be related to them without causing violation of any semantic convention.

Refutation of the objection

V. 6. However, this objection is not correct to state. In the theory that the operation as delimited by the effect is the meaning of the root, the cognition can be avoided (in *vṛkṣāt tyajati)* by following the said methodology (cf. V. 5) only. However, in the theory that the operation and the effect are the two separate meanings of the root, only one expressive power in the operation and the effect of the form of the desire such as the root word should produce the cognition referring to both the operation and the effect must be admitted for the verb (for avoiding the cognition) like for the word 'sun and moon' (*puṣpavantau*) *(cf. Śaktivāda...II...).*

The expressive power, however, is not of the form of the convention (primary significantion) which has distinct objectness delimited by the state of referring to the particular (distinct) objects (such as the operation and the effect) resident in the collective congnition such as 'The root should produce the cognition of the operation and the root should produce the cognition of the effect. In that case, due to the non-distinction from the polysemous words, there would occur the contingency of the cognition of either of the two, namely the effect and the operation by leaving out either of the two in some cases. Thus, the knowledge of the expressive power of the root, referring to the non-delimitation by the state of referring to what is other than the separation with respect to the objectness

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

resident in the knowledge of signification, would be admitted as the cause of the cognition of the relation of the state of having the boundary, i.e. the ablative-meaning, with the separation; and the knowledge of the expressive power of the root referring to the non-delimitation by the state of referring to the separation with respect to the objectness resident in the knowledge of expressive power would be admitted as the cause of the cognition of the relation of the state of producing the separation, another of the ablative-meaning, with the action of falling. Therefore there is no occasion for the overpevasion (of the cognition in *vṛkṣāt patati)* as a non-confused cannot have such a knowledge of expressive power from the root 'leave' (*tyaj)*. Like the two separate expressive powers, even the said single expressive power of the root can be conducive to the verbal cognition of the effect and the operation by the reversal of the qualifier and the qualificand status for the effect and the operation in the passive statements. Only in the case of admitting the qualified expressive power for the root, the reversal of the qualifier and the qualificand status for the effect and the operation becomes untenable.

Explantion

Gadādhara now refutes the objection raised in V.5. According to him, when the operation as delimited by the separation (*vivbhāgāvacchinnavyāpāra)* is the meaning of the root *tyaj*, cognition in *vṛkṣāt tyajati*, etc. could be avoided by holding that the reference to the operation as not limited by the separation (*vibhāgānavacchinna vyāpāropasthiti)* and the reference to the separation as the chief qualificand (*vibhāga mukhyaviśeṣyakopasthiti)* are the causes for the cognition of the relation of the ablative-meanings, namely, the state of producing the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

separation (*vibhāgajanakatva)* and the state of having the boundary (*avadhimattva)*. Whereas when the operation and the effect are the two separate meanings of the root '*tyaj*'., the cognition of either of the two root-meanings could be avoided in '*vṛkṣāt tyajati*' by holding that the root has only a single expressive power such as 'the root should produce the cognition referring to both the operation and the effect' (*phalaviṣayakavyāpāraviṣ ayakabodham janayatu dhātuḥ)* in both the operation and the effect, but not an expressive power of the form of the convention (*saṅketarūpa)* found in the collective form of knowledge (*samūhālambanabodhaniṣṭha*) such as 'the root should produce the cognition of the effect and the root should produce the cognition of the operation' (*phalaviṣayakam vyāpāraviṣayakam bodham janayatu dhātuḥ)*. Here such an expressive power has a reference to the different objectnesses delimited by the state of referring to the particular (distinct) objects (such as the operation and the effect) *(tattadviṣayakatvāvacchinna vibhinna viṣayatāśāli)*. Also the state of not being delimited by the state of referring to something other than the separation (*vibhāgetaraviṣayakatvānavacchinnatva)* and the state of not being delimited by the state of referring to the separation (*vibhāgaviṣayakatvānavacchinnatva)* in the objectnesses resident in the knowledges of expressive powers are the preconditions for relating the state of having a boundary (*avadhimattva)* to the separtion and the state of producing the separation (*vibhāgajanakatva)* to the operation of falling (*kriyā);* and since such preconditions are lacking (such states are absent in the objectnesses resident in the knowledges of the expressive powers of the root *tyaj),* Gadādhara avoids the incorrect usage *vṛkṣāt tyajati* due to the untenability of the verbal congnition from the same.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Cognition of the effect and the operation

V. 7. It may be objected now as follows : That the contingency of the cognition (s) of one meaning by leaving out the other meaning is unavoidable in the theory that the root has two distinct expressive powers in the effect and the operation. Similary the contingency of the cognitions of two meanings, i.e. the effect and the operation, which are not functioning as the qualifier and the qualificand respectively and not that of the cognitions of the two meanings that are functioning as the qualifier and the qualificand respectively, would become unavoidable from even the transitive root '*tyaj*' like that from the word 'Sun and Moon' (*puṣpavantau)* even in the theory of admitting that the root *gam* has the signification of the said form (i.e. *phalaviṣayakavyāpāraviṣayaka bodham janayatu),* as the expressive powers of the transitive root '*gam*' would become similar to the expressive powers of the word 'Sun and Moon' (*puṣpavantau)*. However, such an objection is not correct. Then the state of referring to the effect and the state of referring to the operation appearing as the qualifiers with respect to the knowledge of expensive power need to be admitted as having a reference to the relationships of the delimitor and the delimited. Since only the two objectnesses of the effect and the operation, that appear as the qualifier and the qualificand, assume the relationships of the delimitor and the delimited, the effect and the operation appear only as the qualifier and the qualificand. Since in the signification (expressive power) of the word 'Sun and Moon' (*puṣpavantau*), the relationships of the delimitor and the delimited do not appear in the two objectnesses of the Sun and the Moon, the Sun and the Moon appear only as unqualifieds; and thus there is no untenability of any kind.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the cognition of the effect and the operation as having the qualifier and the qualificand-relationship (*viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvāpanna)* from the transitive roots such as '*gam*' in '*grāmam gacchati*' etc. According to him, when the expressive power of the form that 'the root should produce the cognition of the effect and the cognition of the operation' (*phalaviṣ ayakavyāpāraviṣayaka bodham janayatu dhātupadam)* is admitted for the transitive roots such as '*gam'*, the same roots would become identical in nature with the word 'Sum and Moon' (*puṣpavantau)* by having separate significations in the effect such as the contact and the operation such as the going. However, the effect and the operation need not be cognized without having the qualifier-and the qualificand-relationship (*viśeṣyaviśeṣ aṇabhāva)* in them. And he explains this fact by holding that the signification (expressive power) of the root must be admitted to refer to the state of referring to the effect (*phalaviṣayakatva)* and the state of referring to the operation (*vyāpāra viṣayakatva)* found in the cognition (*bodha*); and since the effect and the operation must appear as having the qualifier—and the qualificand-relationship for facilitating the delimitor and the delimited relationship (*avacchedyāvacchedakabhāva)* in the objectness of the effect (*phalaviṣayatā)* and the objectness of the operation (*vyāpāraviṣayatā),* the difficulty of the non-cognition of the qualifier and the qualificand relationship in the effect and the operation is avodied. A point to be noted here is that in the passive statements such as *grāmo gamyate,* the qualifier and the qualificand relationship is reversed and so the operation appears as the qualifier and the effect appears as the qualificand.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Avoidance of *vṛkṣāt spandate'*

V. 8. It may be held now that suppose the usages such as 'The bird moves from the tree' (*vṛkṣāt spandate*) are incorrect, then the following position must be admitted. That in the theory that the transitive roots are expressive of the operations as qualified by the effects, the recollection produced from the knowledge of expressive power of the root referring to the operation, as delimited by the separation, is the cause of the cognition of the state of producing the separation, i.e. the ablative-meaning. However, in the theory that both the effect and the operation, which are not associated with any mutual qualification, are the meanings of the (transitive) roots, the recollection produced from the knowledge of the expressive power referring to both the state of being what is delimited by the state of being what refers to some other effect, and the state of not being what is delimited by the state of being what refers to the separation with respect to the objectness resident in the knowledge of the signification (expressive power), is the cause of the same cognition. Thus enough of too much of elaboration.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains the avoidance of the incorrect usage '*vṛkṣāt spandate*' which ensues from the confusion of transitivity for the root '*spand*'. According to Ġadādhara, since the root '*spand*' is not expressive of the operation as qualified by the effect such as the separation (*phalāvacchina vyāpāra vācaka)*, the question of relating the state of producing the separation (*vibhāgajanakatva),* *i.e.* the ablative meaning, to the operation expressed by the root '*spand*' does not arise. Thus the usage '*vṛkṣāt spandate*'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cannot be imposed in the theory that the transitive roots express only the operations as delimited by the effects. Also, since the state of being what is delimited by the state of being what refers to some other effect (*phalāntara viṣayakatvāvacchinnatva)* is not found in the objectness resident in the knowledge of the expressive power of the root '*spand*' (*saṅketīyabodhaniṣṭha viṣayatā),* the question of relating the same oblative—meaning to the operation expressed by the root '*spand*' does not arise. Thus, the usage *vṛkṣāt spandate*' cannot be imposed in the theory that the qualified effect and the qualified operation are the two separate meanings of the root '*spand*'. Further, since the transitive root is expected to be expressive of the operation as delimited by the separation, (*vibhāgāvacchinnavyāpāravācaka)*, the objectness resident in the knowledge of the expressive power of the root '*tyaj*' (*saṅketīya bodhanisthaviṣayatā)* is only delimited by the state of being what refers to the separation (*vibhāga viṣayakatvāvacchinna);* and thus, due to the absence of the required cause itself, other incorrect usages such as '*vṛkṣāt tyajati*' cannot be imposed with the intention of relating the ablative meaning to the operation expressed by the root '*tyaj*'.

Ablative in '*vyāghrād bihheti*' etc.

V. 9. In the cases such as 'He fears from the tiger' *(vyāgharād bibheti)* and 'He protects from the thieves' (*dasyubhyo rakṣati),* the ablative has been assigned by the rule 'In the case of words implying fear and protection from danger, that from which danger or fear is produced is the ablation' (*bhītrārthānām bhayahetuḥ* P i. 4. 25). The fear is the anticipation of undesired contingency (danger) from the other, and the protection is the operation conducive to the cessation (avoidence)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the undesired contingency (danger). Thus the meaning of the rule is that the item conducive to the undesired contingency gets the designation of ablation in connection with the roots expressing the fear or the protction from the undesired contingency. Now this way, the state of being what is produced is the meaning of the ablative in such cases; and the same is related to the undesired contingency constituting the said root-meaning.

Now it may be objected as follows : How is it that the usage 'He fears from the tiger'(*vyāghrād bibheti)*, which is intended to refer to the fear of the person for whom the fear from the tiger is unestablised; nevertheless, the person anticipates his own death etc. as dependent on the tiger etc., be valid.?. For, the state of being what is dependent on, i.e. what is produced from, the gager is contradictory to the undesired contingency (of death). However, in that case, the state of having what is produced (from the tiger) as the qualifier can be admitted as the meaning of the ablative case in connection with the roots expressive of fear. And such a meaning can be related to the anticipation of undesired contingency. Although in the present case, the state of being produced from the tiger is contradictory to the undesired contingency of death belonging to the person himself, the state of having what is produced from the tiger as the qualifier is quite unharmed in the anticipation of the contingency of death; and hence there cannot be any untenability. Thus, even the sentence 'He fears form the friend' (*bibheti*) in the event of the illusion that the friend is an enemy, can be explained to be valid. Therefore, one explanation of he rule (P.i.4.25) is that in connection with the roots implying fear or danger, the item anticipated to be the cause of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

fear or danger is the ablation; whereas the other explanation of the rule is that in connection with the roots implying the protection such as the operation conducive to the cessasion (avoidance) of danger, the item causing such a danger is the ablation. And the danger is only the trouble which can be common to all the cases.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the ablative usages such as '*vyāghrād bibheti*' and '*dasyubhyo rakṣati*' etc. According to him, since the rule *bhītrārthānām bhayahetuḥ* (P i.4. 25) assigns the designaion of ablation after the words implying the cause of fear and the undesired contingency of danger (*anīṣṭaprayojaka)* in connection with the roots expressing the fear and the protection from the undesired contigency (*bhaya trāṇārthaka)*, the words 'tiger' (*vyāghra)* and 'thief' (*dasyu*) get the designation of ablation. Here since the fear (*bhaya*) is the anticipation of undesired contingency of danger (*aniṣṭasambhāvanā),* the ablative-meaning, namelythe state of being what is caused (*prayojya)*, is related to the root-meaning such as the danger; and thus one cognizes that the person is the abode of the anticipation of the danger caused by the tiger (*vyāghraprayojyāniṣṭasambhāvanāśrayaḥ)* and that the person is the abode of the operation conducive to the avoidance of the danger caused by the thief (*dasyuprayojyāniṣṭanivṛttyanukūla vyāpārāśrayaḥ)*.

An objection is raised here that when an hero does not fear the tigers, nevertheless anticipates the death from the tiger, the usage *'vyāghrād bibheti'* would become untenable as the state of being produced or caused from the tiger (*vyāghrādhīnatva)* is not tenable in the danger

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such as the death of the hero (here actually only the death of the tiger has the state of being produced from the hero). However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that only the state of having what is being caused from the tiger as the qualifier (*vyāghra prayojyatāprakārkatva)*, instead of the state of being what is dependent on the tiger (*vyāghrādhīnatva)* or the state of being what is produced from the tiger (*vyāghra prayojyatva*), is the ablative-meaning; and since such an ablative-meaning can be related to the anticipation of danger of death, the cognition that the person has the anticipation that has the state of having what is being caused from the tiger as the qualifier becomes tenable; and thus the ablative usage also becomes tenable.

Now, Gadādhara interprets the rule (P i. 4. 25) both ways as what is anticipated as being the cause of fear is the ablation (*bhayahetutvena sambhāvitam apādānam*) in connection with the roots implying fear (*bhayārthak-adhātuyoge)* and also as what is the cause of the danger (death) is the ablation (*tadaniṣṭaprayojakam apādānam)* in connection with the roots implying the protection (*trāṇārthakadhātuyoge)* to facilitate the uses '*vyāghrād bibheti*' and '*dasyubhyo rakṣati*' respectively.

Explanation of *'Kaṇṭakād aher vā rakṣati'*

V. 10. Now it may be asked as to how the ablation of the thorn and serpent etc, the pains produced from which are never established before in any one, could be explained?. However, then it must be admitted that only the operation (of removing etc.) conducive to the avoidance of the operation (of piercing etc.) resident in the thorn etc. and producing the pain in oneself is the protection of, oneself that has such a thorn etc. as the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ablation. Also, the protection of the insentient object such as the pot etc. must be stated to be the operation consisting of, i.e. conducive to the avoidance of the operation (of child etc.) producing the destruction of the pot etc.

Explanation

An objection can be raised now that in '*kaṇṭakād ahervā ātmanam rakṣati*' etc., the thorn or serpent etc. cannot be explained to have the designation of ablation when the pains are never experienced from them. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that in such cases only the operation conducive to the avoidence of the operation of piercing that produces the pain (trouble) in oneself (*svaduḥkhopadhāyakavyāpāravirahānukūla vyāpāra)* can be admitted to be the protection of oneself (*svakarmakarakṣaṇa*); and hence the same can cause the ablation in the thorn and the serpent etc. Also another point to be noted here is that in '*bālād ghaṭaṃ rakṣati'* etc., involving insetient beings such as the pot etc., as the objects, the danger such as the fear or pain is not possible; and hence the ablation needs to be explained for the boy etc. by holding that the operation conducive to the avoidance of the action producing the destruction of the pot in the boy (*vināśopadhāyaka vyāpāra nivṛttyanukūlavyāpāra)* is the protection of the pot etc; and hence the same can facilitate the ablation in the boy.

Illustration of '*yavebhyo gām vārayati*'

V. 11. In the usages 'He wards off the cow from the wheat' (*yavebhyo gāṃ vārayati),* 'He wards the blind from the well ' (*kūpād andham vārayati)* etc., 'the wheat' and 'the well' etc. have the designation of ablation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

from the rule 'In the case of desired object, from which one is prevented is ablation (*vāraṇarthānām īpsitaḥ,* P. i. 4. 27). Warding off means preventing from the action; and hence the meaning of the rule is that the desired object, i.e. the object that is intended by the particular agent of the action as being the abode of the effect produced from the particular action, is the ablation in connection with the roots implying such a warding off. Here the action is of the form of eating and falling etc. However, due to the intention of the speaker, the prevention of only one particular action such as eating etc. is conveyed from the root 'ward off' etc. in the particular cases. Here the prevention means the operation conductive to the absence of the agency. And the cow and the blind etc. receive the objecthood by being the abode of the effects, i.e. the delimitors of the expressedness of the meanings of the roots, such as the absence of the agency. The ablative occurring after the word 'wheat' (*yava*) etc. conveys the state of having the effect such as the contact, as the object of the desire as being occurrent in the wheat with respect to the eating. Further, the desire resident in the cow etc., i.e. the agents of the action of eating etc., must be included in the ablative-meaning. Thus in the said case, the cognition is of the form that the person has the effect conductive to the operation in turn conducive to the absence of the particular agency described by the particular action having the particular effects resident in the cow etc. Here by the particular effects are meant to be only the effects such as the contact with the place down below the throut and the contact with the next region etc. which are the objects of the desires of the cow and the blind etc. as occurring in the wheat and the well etc. The blind etc. do not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

have the desire for falling into the well etc; however, they do have the desire for going to the well as going to the forward region etc. The contact produced from the action of going in the form of the contact occurring in the region which is in reality the well etc., has the state of being the object of the desire of the blind etc. unharmed.

Explanation

Gadādhara now illustrates the usages '*yavebhyo gām vārayati'* and '*kūpād andham vārayati'* etc. According to him, since the designation of ablation is assigned by the rule '*vāraṇārthānām īpsitaḥ* (P i. 4. 27), the wheat etc., that are intended by the agent of the action of warding off (*tatkriyākarturabhipreta)* as being the objects or as being the abode of the effect of separation produced from the action of warding off (*tatkriyājanyaphalabhāgitayā),* become the ablation in connection with the roots implying prevention of the action (*kriyāpratiṣedhārthakadhātuyoge).* Here the prevention of the action of eating (*kriyāpratiṣ edha)* is actually the operation conducive to the absence of the agency described by the eating etc. (*kartṛtvābh-āvānukūla vyāpāra*) as the agency is avoided by the operation.

It should be noted here that the ablative conveys the state of having the effect such as the contact down below the throat, the object of the desire, as being occurrent in the wheat etc. (*yavādigatecchāviṣayībhūtagalādhasamyogaphalakatva);* and hence the desire (*icchā*) that actually occurs in the agent of eating *(bahakṣaṇa kartṛ)* is to be included as the part of the ablative-meaning only. Although the blind may not have specific desire for going (falling) into the well (*kūpagamanecehā)* as he does not intend to proceed

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to the well, he can certainly be explained to have such a desire by way of his desire for going to the region that lies forward. Thus the blind etc., who are intended by the agent of the action of warding off as being the objects of or the abode of the effects such as the separation produced from the action of warding off, can become the ablations in connection with the roots implying prevention of the action.

Yavādigatatvena icchāviṣayatva is the meaning

V. 12. It may be objected now as follows: That in the present case, let only the state of producing the particular effects resident in the wheat and the well etc., be admitted as the meaning of the ablative case; and what is the point in including the desire in the ablative meaning.? However, this objection is not correct.

In the case where Caitra etc. are found to have the occasion for partaking poison by way of eating an hidden-noninternal element, and not by way of their own desire, the usage 'He prevents Caitra from poison' (*caitram viṣ ād vārayati)* is not found to be made with respect to the agent of operation of warding off that prevents the eating of poisoned food, rather only the usage 'He wards him off from the poisoned food' (*saviṣānnād vārayati)* is found to be made. And to avoid the earlier usage, the composer of the rule has included the desire by the use of desirerative affix in the word 'desired object' (*īpsita)*. Therefore, the usage such as 'He wards of the cow from eating that wheat' (*tadyavād gām vārayati)* would become contingent due to the fact that the state of being the object of desire (for eating) as resident in the particular wheat cannot be established with respect to the particular contact, i.e. the effect of eating; and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

this is in spite of the fact that the eating of the particular wheat, which is not eaten by any one, cannot be established. Thus, in such cases, the effort of some scholars in explaining the cognition of both the state of having such a particular wheat as the object and the state of having the cow as the agent with respect to the eating, is certainly not necessary (not welcome).

Explanation

An objection is raised here that the state of having the effect such as the separation which is the object of desire as being occurrent in the wheat etc. (*yavādigatatve-necehā viṣayatva),* which includes the desire in its body, need not be admitted as the meaning of the ablative; rather only the state of producing the effect such as the separation occurrent in the wheat and the well (*yavakūpādi-gataphalaviśeṣajanakatva),* can be admitted as the meaning of the ablative, as the same can be related to the action of warding off. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that Pānini has used the term '*īpsita*' in his rule '*vāraṇārthānām īpsitaḥ*' (P i. 4. 27) to avoid the usage '*viṣād vārayati*' instead of '*saviṣānnād vārayati*' in the event of Caitra eating poison by way of non internal element (*ingradient)* of food and not by way of his own desire; and therefore the desire must be included in the ablative—meaning by holding that *yavādigatatvene-cchāviṣayatva* is the ablative-meaning. It should be noted here that when the desire is included in the meaning, the usage'*viṣād vārayati*' is avoided, as the state of having the effect of separation which is the object of desire as occurrent in the poison cannot be established in the action of eating; whereas the usage '*saviṣānnād vārayati*' is accommodated as the state of having the effect of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

separation which is the object of desire as occurrent in the poisoned food is possible to be established in the action of eating. Also, another advantage of including the desire in the meaning of the ablative is that the correct usage *'yavād gām vārayati'* can be explained as the state of being the object of the desire as occurrent in the wheat *(yavādigatatvenecchāviṣayatva)* can be established in the effect of contact.

Illustration of Paṇḍitāt Purāṇam śṛṇoti

V. 13. In the cases such as 'He listens to the Purāṇa from the Paṇḍit' *(paṇḍitāt purāṇam śṛṇoti)*, and 'He studies the Vedas from the teacher' *(upādhyāyād vedam adhīte)* and 'He is the one who has learnt the message from Rama' *(rāmād adhītasandeśaḥ)* etc., the speaker (teacher) receives the designation of ablation from the rule 'The noun denoting the speaker (teacher) is called ablation in relation to the action signifiying formal teaching' *(ākhyātopayoge,* P. i. 4. 29). In such cases, the state of being dependent on the utterance that has the ablative-base-meaning such as the speaker, Pandit etc. as the agent, is the meaning of the ablative case. And such an ablative-meaning is related to the actions such as uttering, listening and knowing particular message, etc.

In the cases such as 'The pot is produced from the lump of clay' *(mṛtpiṇḍād ghaṭo jāyate)* etc., the primary cause has the ablation from the rule 'The primary cause of the agent (of the verb) to be born *(jan)* is ablation *(janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ,* P i. 4. 30). In such cases, the state of being the 'primary cause' does not mean the state of being the material cause. In spite of the absence of the relationship of being what is produced and the material cause, the ablative is found used in the usages such as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'Bharata is born earlier than *Śatrughna* from Kaikayi', (*prāk kaikayīto bharatas tato' bhūt)* and 'He is born from the wind' (*vāyor jātaḥ*) etc. The body of the son does not have the state of being the bodies of the parents; rather it has only the state of being the transformation (modification) of the semen and blood of parents. Though the semen and the blood etc. do occur in, i.e. constitute the body of parents, they do not function as the parts of the body, like the excretion and the urine. Only the state of being what is produced from the parts of an entity has the form of being the transformation (modification) of the same material cause.

Explanation

Gadādhara now illustrates the usages '*paṇḍitāt purāṇnam śruṇoti*', '*upādhyāyād vedam adhīte* etc. According to him, since the designation of ablation is assigned for the speaker (teacher) (*ākhyātṛ)* by the rule *ākhyātopayoge* (P i. 4. 29), the ablative case conveys the state of being what is dependent on the utterance of the speaker (teacher) (*ākhyātṛkartṛkoccāraṇādhīnatva)* which can be related to the actions such as listening etc. Thus, one cognizes in such cases that one is the abode of the listening dependent on the utterance of the Pandit (*paṇḍitakartṛkoccāraṇādhīnaśravaṇāśrayaḥ)* and that one is the abode of the knowing of a message dependent on the utterance of Rāma (*rāmakartṛkoccāraṇādhīnasandeśajñānāśrayaḥ)* etc. Also Gadadhara illustrates here the usages '*mṛtpiṇḍād ghaṭo jāyate*' etc. According to him, the primary cause of the agent to be born (*janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ)* gets the designation of 'ablation' by the rule P. i. 4.30; however the term 'primary cause' (*prakṛti)* cannot be taken to denote the material cause (*vikāri or*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

upādānakāraṇa), as the relation of what is transformed and the material cause (*prakṛti vikṛti bhāva)* is not intended between the object to be produced and the primary cause in *'prāk kekayīto bhoratas tato bhūt'* etc. In such cases, the body of the son to be born is a transformation (modification) of only semen (*śukra*) and of excretion (*mala)* etc. that do not form a part of the body of the parents, i.e. the material cause.

Refutation of the objection.

V. 14. It may be objected now that only an ablative of cause (*hetupañcamī)* and not an ablative of ablation (*apādāna pañamī*) is found in such cases. However, this is not correct. There is no separate rule (excepting *akartaryaṇe,* P ii. 3. 24) assigning the ablative in the sense of the cause that is other than the debt or quality. Otherwise, since the usages such as 'The curd sets in from the milk' (*dugdhāt dadhi bhavati),* 'The pot is produced from the clay' (*mṛttikābhyo ghaṭo jāyate)* and 'The bow is produced from the horn' (*sṛṅgād dhanur jāyate)* etc. can be explained to have the ablative of cause from the rule *hetau* (P i. 4. 35), the rule 'The primary cause of the agent of the verb to be born is ablation (*janikartuḥ*. P i. 4. 30) would have the contingency of redundancy. Thus, it must be admitted that in the present case, only the state of being the cause in general is the being primary cause. Therefore even the statements such as 'The pot is produced from the stick' (*daṇḍād ghaṭo jāyate)* are desired. Also therefore, the ablative found in the statements such as 'Iśvara is one from whom the substance, the quality and the action are produced' (*yato dravyam guṇāḥ karma)* can be explained, despite the fact that Iśvara does not function as the primary cause

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(material case) of the effects such as the substance. Also it may be argued that despite intending the cause in general from the word primary cause (*prakṛti*), the ablative case of ablation cannot be explained in '*yato dravyam guṇaḥ karma*' due to the absence of the association with any action; and the ablative case of cause is not possible due to the fact that the same is tenable only in the sense of the debt or the quality. However, this is not correct. Due to the lack of any other alternative, the ablative needs to be explained by supplying the verb such as 'is born' (*jāyate*) in *yato dravyam.....*

In the cases such as 'The Ganges originates from the Himalayas' (*himavato gaṅgā pravahate*), the source of origin has the ablation by the rule 'The source of the agent of the verb 'to become' becomes the ablation (*bhuvaḥ prabhavaḥ*, P i. 4. 31). Here, the source of origin is that from the relation of which the origination, i.e. the first manifestation, takes place. And hence only the first origination is the meaning of the root 'to become' (*prabhū*). The ablative-meaning, namely the state of being dependent on the relation, is related to such an action. And the base-meaning such as the mountain Himalaya is related to the relation of the origin.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara refutes the objection that in '*mṛtpiṇḍād ghaṭo jāyate* etc., the ablative of ablation (*apādānapañcamī*) need not be explained by the rule '*janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ*' (P i. 4. 30); rather only an ablative of cause (*hetupañcamī*) could be held to be explained by the rule '*hetau*' (*P* i. 4.55). According to him, the ablative of cause is possible only in the cases of debt

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*ṛṇa*) (cf. *śatād baddhaḥ*' by *akartaryaṇe*, P ii. 3. 24) and of quality (*guṇa*) (cf. *jāḍyād baddaḥ,* by *vibhāṣā guṇe astriyām, P....),* but not anywhere else. Thus, only the rule *janikartuḥ*.....(P i. 4. 30) needs to be admitted as assigning the ablative case here. A point to the noted here is that the primary cause (*pṛkṛti)* in the rule *janikartuḥ prakṛtih* (P i. 4. 30) is meant to be only the cause in general (*kāraṇa);* and Kekayi, wind and stick etc. in '*prāk kekayīto bharatas tato' bhūt*, *vāyor jātaḥ,* and '*daṇḍād ghaṭo jāyate*' etc., could be explained to be ablations by being the cause in general.

Another point to be noted here is that in '*yato dravyam guṇāḥ karma*' etc., the verb '*bhavati*' should be supplied; and, so the pronoun '*yat*' indicating the supreme god, which gets the designation of ablation (*apādāna)* by the rule P i. 4. 30, can be explained to be a *kāraka* due to *kriyāyoga*; and thus can have the ablative case by the rule '*apādāne pañcamī*' (P ii. 3. 28).

Now as regards the ablative usages such as '*himavato gaṅgā pravahati*' etc.: According to Gadādhara, in such cases, the source of origination (*prabhava)* recives the designation of ablation (*apādānatva)* by the rule '*bhuvaḥ prabhavaḥ*' (P i. 4. 31). And since the term '*prabhava*' in the rule means that from the relation of which the first manifestation takes place is ablation (*yatsambandhāt prathamaprakāśana),* the ablative refers to the state of being dependent on the relation of the source of origination (*sambandhādhīnatva);* and the cognition produced in such cases is that the Ganges is the abode of the first manifestations dependent on the relation of the Himalaya (*himavat sambandhī prathama prakāśanavatī gaṅgā).*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Illustration of *'upādhyāyād antardhatte chātraḥ'*

V. 15. In the case such as 'The student conceals himself from the teacher' (*upādhyāyād antardhatte chātraḥ*), the cause of concealment receives the designation of ablation from the rule 'when concealment is indicated, the person whose sight one wishes to avoid is ablation' (*antarddhau yenādarśanam icchati,* P. i. 4. 28). The concealment is the operation of concealing oneself intended to have absence of the objectness described by the perception by some other agent (teacher), and resident in oneself as the objective. Thus the meaning of the rule is that the one (the teacher), the desire for the absence of the objectness described by the perception of which agent (the teacher) is found to be produced, is the ablation; and such a desire is the constituent part of the concealment by being conducive to the operation of concealing. And the state of describing the agency is the meaning of the ablative in the said case. Therefore the cognition of relations produced in such a case is that the student is the agent of the operation which is intended to produce the absence of the objectness described by the act of seeing by the teacher, i.e. the agent, and resident in oneself.

However, it should be noted here as follows: That in the cases such as 'This one is longer than that one' (*asmād ayam dīrghaḥ*) and 'This note is higher than that note' (*asmāt ayamtāraḥ*) etc., the ablative is not used in the sense of the ablation. This is so because, the limit (boundary) of the length and hight etc. are not ruled to be the ablation. The rule 'The fixed point from which something moves away is the ablation' (*dhruvam apāye apādānam,* P i. 4. 24) assigns the ablation for only the *kāraka* which functions as the boundary (limit) in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

moving away, i. e. in the case of the action such a separation, and also in the case of the separation produced from some other action (falling); however, it does not assign the same for the boundary (limit) in general. However, if the term 'moving away' (*apāya*) is said to be indicative of all things (boundaries) in general, then the inclusion of such a term in the rule itself could become purposeless.

Explanation

Gadādhara now illustrates the usage '*upādhyāyād antardhatte chātraḥ'* etc. According to him, since the rule '*antardhau yenādarśanam icchati'* (P i. 4. 28) assigns the designation of ablation for the *kāraka* whose sight one wishes to avoid, i.e. the teacher etc., the desire for the absence of the objectness described by the perception of which agent is found to be produced (*yatkartṛkadarśanaviṣayatāvirahoddeśa*), becomes apādāna. And the ablative case expresses the state of describing the agency (*kartṛtānirūpakatva*), which is related to the perception, a part of the meaning of the concealment (*antardhi*), to be analysed as the operation intended to have the absence of the objectness described by the action of seeing by the other agent (teacher) as its object (*anyakartṛkadarśana viṣayatoddeśyaka vyāpāra*).

A point to be noted here is that in '*asmād ayam dīrghaḥ'* and '*asmād ayam tāraḥ*' etc., the ablative after the pronoun '*asmāt*' cannot be held to be denoting the ablation (*apādāna*) as the person and the note are not fixed points from which some thing moves away (*apāya* or *vibhāgāvadhi*), Thus Gadādhara states that the person, who is the boundary of certain qualities such as the length *dairghyāvadhi*), cannot receive the designation of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ablation from the rule '*dhruvam apāye apādānam*' (P i. 4. 24), as the same assigns the designation for only the boundary of separation (*vibhāgāvadhi).* Now the danger in allowing the rule P i. 4. 24 to assign the ablation for the boundary of any quality would be that the term '*apāya*' would need to indicate any thing (boundary) (*vastumātra);* and thus would become purposeless by facilitating the designation of ablation for the boundary of any quality that is described by any thing (*vastumātra nirūpita).*

Sense of '*apāya*'

V. 16. Now it may be argued as follows : That only the action would be indicated (conveyed) by the word moving away (*apāya).* In the cases such as 'This one is longer than that one' *(asmād ayam dīrghaḥ)* etc., the verb 'to become' (*bhavati* is to be supplied; and since the becoming (growing) longer (*dīrghabhavana)* is nothing but the state of being the longer (*dīrghatā)*, the action of becoming longer gets the state of being what describes the boundary. And it is absolutely necessary to supply the action (verb) (*bhavati)*, as otherwise without the association with the action the syntactico-semantic relation of the *kāraka* would becomes untenable. Also, this way, since in 'The lightening flashes forth from the thunder cloud' (*balāhakād vidyotate vidyut),* the action of flashing forth does not have the state of being what describes the boundary, the additional verb 'coming off' (*nissṛtya*) needs to be supplied. That is why the grammarians hold that such an ablation is not of expressed action (verb), but rather is of implied action (verb). Here the state of being the ablation of the expressed verb means the state of being the ablation of the uttered verb, and the state of being the ablation of implied verb means the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

state of being the ablation of the supplied verb. Also the term 'object' or 'verb' means 'describer of the ablation of boundary'. And coming off is only separating; and thus in the said case, the implied action (verb) has the state of being what describes the ablation of boundary.

However. then the tree in 'It falls from the tree' *(vṛkṣāt patati),* would not get included. And suppose you state that the action of separating is to be implied their too, then the convention that the ablation in such cases has the state of being of the expressed action or the verb (describer of the boundary) would become contradicted.

Suppose in the case such as 'This one is longer than that one' *(asmād dīrghaḥ)* etc., the action (verb) is implied, then the action (verb) needs to be implied even in the cases such as 'The people of Mathura are richer than the people of Srughna' *(māthurās śraughnebhyaḥ āḍhyatarāḥ);* and thus, the ablation in such a case, which is actually of the form of to be implied (required) action (verb), would have the contingency of being included under any category of the ablation of supplied action (verb). Thus the two types of ablations would become non-distinct ablations. Therefore the division of the ablation by the grammarians as that "the ablation is of three kinds: such as those that are of implied action (verb), those that are of expressed action (verb) and those that are of required action (verb) would become contadicted.

Explanation

It has been stated earlier that the word 'moving away' *(apāya)* in the rule (P i. 4. 24) cannot indicate boundary of any thing *(vastumātra),* as then the boundary

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

described by any quality (*vastumātranirūpitāvadhi)* would become the ablation. Now the Pūrvapakṣin argues that the same word 'moving away' *(apāya)* in the rule can be admitted to indicate only the action (*kriyāmātra);* and hence only the boundary that is described by the action of separating would be the ablation; and in *'asmād ayam dīrghaḥ'*, etc., the (meaning of) pronoun can be the ablation by being described by the implied action of '*bhavati'* which (action) has the state of being what describes the boundary (*sāvadhi (ka) tva*). The Pūrvapakṣ in justifies his position by stating that the implying of the action (verb) is very much necessary to explain the *kāraka*-status for the boundary.

Also he states that in '*balāhakād vidyotate vidyut*', the thunder cloud (*balāhaka)* can be explained to be the ablation by implying the verb 'having come off' (*nissṛtya*) which has the state of being what describes the boundary (*sāvadhikatva)*. A point to be noted here is that the ablation of the clould does not have the state of being that which has an expressed action (verb) (*nirdiṣ ṭaviṣayatva),* rather the same has the state of being that which has an implied action (verb) (*upāttaviṣayatva),* as only the implied verb '*nissṛtya'* has the state of being what describes the boundary (*sāvadhikatva*).

However, Gadādhara refutes the argument on the ground that in such a position, the rule P i. 4. 24. would mean that the fixed point from which some thing moves away, i. e. which has a verb that describes the boundary, is ablation; and since the tree in '*vṛkṣāt patati'* does not have any verb that describes boundary of itself (the verb *patati* does not describe the boundary of the tree as it expresses the action of coming down to the ground), the same would become excluded from being

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the ablation. Also the verb '*nissṛtya*' cannot be implied there to explain the ablation for the tree as then it would not be of expressed action (verb) (*nirdiṣṭa viṣaya),* and would be of only implied action (verb) (*upāttaviṣaya).* Further it should be noted that when an action (verb) is implied in '*asmād ayam dīrghaḥ*' for explaining the ablation for the person, the contingency of implying the action (verb) would become unavoidable in '*māthurāḥ śraughnebhyaḥ āḍhyatarāḥ*' for explaining the same for the people of Srughna; and thus both the ablations of implied action (*upāttaviṣaya)* and of supplied action (*apekṣitaviṣaya*) would not be distinct types of ablations as held by the grammarians.

Apāya cannot be held to signify kriyāsāmānya

V. 17. Now it may be held as follows: That the action in general and the separation produced from the action are intended to be expressed from the word 'moving away' (*apāya).* This way since there is no need to imply the action such as separating in cases such as 'The leaf falls from the tree' (*vṛkṣāt patati),* the ablation of tree in such a case too can be explained to be of only expressed action (verb) such as falling. However, in the case where the action (verb) is implied in order to facilitate the ablation such as 'The lightening illuminates from the thunder cloud' (*balāhakād vidyotate vidyut),* the ablation of the could is that of implied action (verb) such as coming off (*nissṛtya).* Whereas in the case where the action (verb) is implied in order to complete the sense of the sentence, and the ablation is facilitated thereby, the ablation is of required action (verb); for instance in 'The people of Mathurā are richer compared to the people of Srughna' (*māthurāḥ sraughnebhyaḥ*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

āḍhyatarāḥ), and 'This one is longer than that one' (*asmād dīrghaḥ),* the ablation of the person and that of people are of required actions (verbs).

However, even this position is not correct. For, even then there cannot be any way out to explain the ablation in the cases such as 'This one is higher in tone than that one' *(ayam asmāttāraḥ)* etc. In such cases, the higherness of note is a generic property; and so cannot have the ablation as the generic property does not have the state of being what has the boundary. Otherwise even the ablative usages such as 'This is a cow from (because of) being that' *'ayam asmād gauḥ'* would become contingent.

Also it may be argued that the higherness, dispite being a generic property, can be admitted to have the state of being what has a boundary in accordance with the usage such as 'This one is higher in tone than that one' (*ayam asmāt tāraḥ*) etc. However, this argument is not correct. The entity which has the higherness of tone compared to one, has the lowerness of tone compared to the other. And the two properties that are concorrent cannot be admitted to be generic properties; also when the two concorrent properties are admitted to be the generic properties, the contingency of cross-connection would result. Thus, when the higherness of tone etc. are admitted to have the state of being what has boundary, the usage of higher tone like the usage of lower tone would result in the case of lower tone compared to the tone that is higher than itself; also similarly the usage of lower tone, like the usage of higher tone, would result in the case of higher tone compared to the tone that is lower than oneself.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Here an objection is raised by the Pūrvapakṣin that the word 'moving away' (*apāya*) in the rule (P i. 4. 24) is intended to convey only the action in general (*kriyāsāmānya)* or the separation produced from the action (*kriyājanyavibhāga);* and therefore in '*vṛkṣāt patati'* the tree can be explained to be the ablation described by the action of falling without implying the action of separating, and thus the ablation of the tree is of expressed action (verb) (*nirdiṣṭaviṣaya).* Also the Pūrvapakṣin holds that in cases such as '*balāhakād vidyotate vidyut'* etc., wherein the action (verb) '*nissrtya'* is to be implied to facilitate the ablation, the ablation is of implied or supplied action (verb) (*upāttaviṣaya);* whereas in '*ayam asmād dīrghaḥ'* etc. wherein the action (verb) '*asti'* is to be implied to complete the sentence, and the ablation of the person is facilitated thereby itself, the ablation of the person is of required action (verb) (*apekṣitakriya).*

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection. According to him, the difficulty in such a position is that the higherness of tone (*tāratva*) in '*ayam asmāt tāraḥ'* being the generic property (*jāti*), cannot be considered as having the state of being what has boundary (*sāvadhikatva);* and therefore the ablation of the tone cannot be explained. Moreover, according to him, when the higherness of the tone (*tāratva*) etc. are admitted to be *sāvadhika*, then the tone would become dependent on the boundary in general (*avadhimātrāpekṣin);* and thus the tone which is higher compared to the particular lower tone cannot be prevented from being viewed as lower compered to the same (lower) tone (thus it forces the usage *ayam asmāt mandaḥ);* and also the tone which is lower compared to the particular (higher) tone cannot be prevented from being viewed as higher tone compared

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to the same (higher) tone (thus it forces the usage '*ayam asmāt tāraḥ)* erroneously.

Argument that 'ayam asmāt tāraḥ' can be prevented

V. 18. Now it may be argued as follows: That the usage of the higher tone (of conch) with respect to the particular (lower) tone (of conch) is dependent on the state of possessing the generic property, delimiting the preventiveness of the tone (of conch), preventing the relisation (perception) of the tone (of conch), while being of the same class as that of the lower tone. Therefore, the usage of higher tone need not be made with respect to the particular tone of conch higher than some other tone (of conch), like the usage of higher tone made with respect to the tone that is higher than itself. Then however, in that case in 'This sound (of conch) is higher than that sound (of another couch)' (*ayam asmāt' tāraḥ*), the ablation expressed by the ablative must be said (admitted) to be related to the realisation (perception) and to the sameness of class of sound; and the same constitutes the cause of the usage of the word 'higher' such as the generic property, delimiting the preventiveness of the tone (of conch) preventing the realisation (perception) of the tone (of counch) which has community of locus with the sameness of class in the sound. And by such as process alone the said contingency of the usage of lower tone for the higher tone can be (possible to be) avoided. In the said case, the sameness of class of sound means the property of being the sound resident in the sound; and therefore, such a sameness of class of sound and the realisation (perception) of sound cannot be held to have the state of being what have the boundary or limit (*sāvadhikatva*), and thus the ablation of the form of the state of being what has the boundary or the limit cannot be the meaning of the ablative in such cases.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explantion

The Pūrvapakṣin argues that when the two distinct sounds of two conches are made, the sound of a conch which prevents the realization of sound of another conch (*sākṣātkāra pratibandhaka)* and which has the sameness of class of sound (*sājātya)* with the sound of another conch is considered to be higher in tone (*tāra*). Consequently, the usage '*ayam asmāt tāraḥ*' can be prevented with respect to the sound which is higher than some other sound in tone like the usage "*ayam asmāt tāraḥ*" made with respect to the sound which is higher compared to itself in tone. However, the Siddhāntin refutes the argument on the ground that the tone which is higher compared to the particular lower tone can be avoided from being viewed as lower compared to the lower tone by holding that in the usage '*ayam asmāt tāraḥ (mandaḥ)*', the ablation expressed by the ablative (*pañcamyartha)* is related to both the realization of sound (*sākṣātkāra)* and to the sameness of class of sound (*sājātya)*. Here the sameness of class of sound constitutes the cause of the use of the word '*tāra*' (*tārapadapravṛttinimittaghaṭaka)*, the generic property delimiting the preventiveness of the tone preventing the realization of lower tone (*sākṣātkārapartibandhakatāvacchedaka jātirūpa*); and the realization of sound (*sākṣātkāra*) shares the common locus with the sameness of class of sound through the objectness (*sājātyasamānādhikaraṇa)*. A point to be noted here is that the sameness of class of sound amounts to being the property of soundness (*śabdatvajāti);* and therefore neither the sameness nor the realization can be considered to have any boundary or limit (*sāvadhika)*.

Vṛtti can be sāvadhika

V. 19. It may be objected now as follows: That

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

though the generic property, constituting the sameness of class, cannot be held to have the state of being what has the boundary or limit, the occurrence (superstratumness) resident in the realization indeed has the state of being what has the boundary or limit. Also this way the realization or direct preception is the knowledge possessing the peculiar object-referringness and the object-referringness of such a knowledge necessarily has a boundary or a limit; and therefore, the cognition can be explained (in '*ayam asmāt tāraḥ*') properly by admitting the relation of the ablative meaning (of the form of ablation) with such as superstratumness and the object-referringness.

However, this objection is not correct to state. Both the occurrence (superstratumness) and the object-referringness have only the state of describing the adjunctness of the objects that are the substratums of themselves, but do not have the state of being what have the objects of the substratums of themselves as their boundary or limit. For, the two items namely, the state of being what has the object of the substratum of itself as the boundary or limit and the state of describing the adjunctness of the object of the substratum of itself differ in themselves. Otherwise, in the cases such as 'It exists in the pot' (*ghaṭe vartate*), and 'It referes to the pot' (*ghaṭam avagāhate),* the usages such as 'It exists from the pot (*ghaṭād vartate*) and 'It refers from the pot' (*ghaṭād avagāhate*) would become unavoidable on account of the fact that the pot can be the ablation. Now since 'the state of being what is the adjunct of' (i.e.the describer of) is not of the form of the ablation, the ablative case after the word expressing the adjunct is prescribed by a distinct rule (when a noun is joined with the words meaning 'other than', different from etc.,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ablative is used cf. *anyā-rāt*, P ii. 3. 29) in association with the use of the word 'other' etc. However, when the state of being the adjunct of is of the form of the ablation, such a prescription would become useless.

Explanation

The sameness of class of sound *(sājātya)* is held to be the generic property of being the sound *(tadvṛttiśabdatvajāti);* and therefore the occurrence or superstratumness *(vṛtti)* constituting the sameness of class of sound can be held to have the state of being what has boundary of limit (*sāvadhikatva*); also the realization of direct perception of sound (*sākṣātkāra*) is to be analysed as the knowledge posessing the peculiar object-referringness *(vilakṣaṇaviṣayitāśālijñāna)*. And thus it is objected that the cognition in '*ayam asmāt tārah*' can be explained by relating the ablation of the form of the state of being what has boundary or limit to the superstratum *(vṛtti)* and to the object-referringness *(viṣayitā)*.

However, tha Siddhāntin refutes the objection on the ground that the superstratumness *(vṛtti)* and the object-referringness *(viṣayitā)* can have only the state of describing the adjunctness of the objects of the substratum of themselves *(svādhāraviṣayapratiyogikatva)* (in '*ghaṭe rūpam'*, the superstratumness is the adjunct of the object. (i.e. the locus) such as the pot, which is the substratum of the superstratumness itself; also in *ghaṭam avagāhate,* the object-referringness of the knoweldge is the adjunct of he object such as the pot of the knowledge, which is the substratum of the object-referringness itself); and therefore, the same cannot have the state of being what has a boundary or limit *(tadavadhikatva)*. According to the Siddhāntin, the *tadavadhikatva* and the *tatpratiyogikatva* need to be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

distinguised, as otherwise the incorrect usages such as '*ghaṭād vartate*' and '*ghaṭād avagāhate*' cannot be avoided in the place of '*ghaṭe vartate*' and '*ghaṭaṃ avagāhate*' respectively. For the pot by having the state of being what has superstratumness as is adjunct (*vṛttipr-atiyogikatva)* can be the limit or boundary of the superstratumness (*vṛttyavadhi)* and also by having the state of being what has the object-referringness as its adjunct (*viṣayitāpratiyogikatva)* can be the limit or boundary of the object-referringness (*viṣayitāvaddhi);* and thus the same can very well be held to be the ablation of the occurrence and that of the knowledge.

Explanation of ablative in ayam asmāt tāraḥ

V. 20. It may be held now as follows : That since the mutual absence expressed by the word 'other' does not function as the action, the *kāraka*-ness is untenable for the pot etc. (in '*ghaṭād anyaḥ*' etc.); and therefore, the blessed sage has composed the other rule '*anyārād*.....,(P ii. 3. 29). (and not because that the *pratiyogitā* is distinct from ablation). However, this is not so. If this is so, then you need to explain the ablative (in '*ayam asmāt tāraḥ*'etc.) by admitting the actionness for the superstratumness constituting the higher tone etc. And since the actionness is not tenable for the superstratumness and consequently the ablative becomes untenable there for the word '*tāra*' (in *ayam asmāt tāraḥ*), a different rule (namely the Vārtika *lyab lope karamaṇyadhikaraṇe ca)* needs to be followed for explaining the ablative.

Also in 'The quality is different from the substance' (*guṇo dravyād bhinnaḥ*) etc., the ablative is prescribed by only the rule '*anyārād*.... (P ii. 3. 2. 9). For, the word 'other' (*anya*) in the rule is meant to be standing

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

for any word (such as *bhinna*) which expresses the different item. However, it should not be objected that when the word 'other' *(anya)* is meant to be standing for the any word that expreses the different item, the use of the word 'another' (*itara*) synonymous to the word 'other' *(anya)* would become useless in the rule. Between the words 'other' (*anya*) and 'another' (*itara*), one is meant to be standing for the word that expresses the item as qualified by the mutual absence, wehreas the other is meant to be standing for the word expressing the item as qualified by the quality such as the distinction; and therefore, the use of two different words are significant. However, the use of the word 'separate' (*pṛthak)* in the rule 'The ablative is used in association with the words '*pṛthak*,' '*vinā*' etc. optionally' (*pṛthag vinā*......, P ii. 3. 32) is to facilitate the instrumental optionally in association with such a word (as *pṛthak).* As a matter of fact, the word 'separate' *(pṛthak)* in the rule is meant to stand for only the word that expesses the sense of non-association; and therefore is not meant to stand for the word expressing the item that has the quality of separation. For, only the non-association is cognized in the examples such as 'The limbless burns (i.e. affilicted wih pain) though not associated with moon' (*dunoti candrāt pṛthagapy anaṅgaḥ)*.

Explanation

In '*ghaṭād anyaḥ'* etc. the ablative is used. And to facilitate the ablative in such cases, Pāṇini has composed the rule '*anyārād* (P. ii. 3. 29) (since adjunctness (*pratiyogitā)* is different from the ablation (*apādānatā),* ablative is not possible from the general rule *apādāne (*P.ii. 3. 18). However, it is objected here that Pāṇini has compsed the rule *anyārād*... (P ii. 3.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

29) only because the difference expressed by *anya* etc. (*anyādiśabdārthabeda*) is not a *kāraka,* and so *kāraka-* ablative is not possible from· *apādāne....* (P iii 3. 18); and not because the *pratiyogitā* is different from *apādānatā*. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that then in '*ayam asmāt tārah*' etc. too the superstratumness constituting the higher tone (*tārādighaṭaka vṛtti)* cannot be a *kāraka;* and so the *kāraka*-ablative would become untenable from the general rule '*apādāne....* P ii. 3. 18.; and thus the Vārtikakāra needs to compose the rule *lyablope karmaṇyadhikaraṇe ca'.* to facilitate the ablative in *'ayam asmāt tārah'* etc. (when *lyap* is lost in '*imam apekṣya tārah'*, the ablative becomes effective after *imam).*

In *'guṇo dravyād bhinnah'* etc. too, the ablative is found to be used; and according to many scholars, the ablative is to be facilitated there from the rule *'anyārād....* (P ii. 3. 29) by explaining the word '*anya'* as meant to stand for any word such as '*bhinna'* that expresses 'different'. It should be noted here that the separate mention of the words '*bhinna'* and '*itara*' is justified on the ground that while '*bhinna*' stands for the word expressing the item as qualified by the mutual absence (*anyonyābhāvaviśiṣṭārthaka),* the word '*itara*' stands for the word expressing the item as qualified by the quality of separation (*pṛthaktvarūpaguṇa viśitṣ ārthaka).* Also the mention of the word '*pṛthak'* in the rule *'pṛthagvinā'* (P ii. 3. 32) is justified on the gound that it facilitates the optional use of instrumental. (*vaikalpika tṛtīyā)* or that it stands for the word expressing the non association as in '*dunoti candram pṛthagapyanaṅgaḥ*'.

Anya etc. are expressive of the mutual absence

V. 21. Again it can be objected as follows : That

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the words 'other' (*anya)*, and 'different' (*bhinna)* etc. are not expressive of (the items as qualified by) the mutual absence; rather they are expressive of only the items as qualified by the qualitiy of spearation. Otherwise in that case, the negative in 'The pot is not a clothing' *(ghataḥ paṭo na)* too would become expressive of such a sense of the (item as qualified by the) mutual absence; and therefore, the ablative would become necessary even in association with such a negative. Also it cannot be argued that the same word 'other' (*anya)* is meant to stand for the word expresive of the item as qualified by the mutual absence; and since the word 'another' (*itara)* too is meant to stand for the word expressive of the item as qualified by the mutual absence, the mention of the same word (*anya*) would become useless. Therefore, the negative cannot be expressive of the item as qualified by the mutual absence. Since the mutual absence expressed by the same negative can be related to the meaning of another nominal base through a relation of non-identity, the same negative can be admitted to be expressive of merely the quality of mutulal absence due to economy. Thus, there is no contingency of the use of ablative in association with the negative (in *'ghaṭaḥ paṭo na')*.

However, this objection is not correct. In order to facilitate the ablative in 'The quality has difference from the substance' (*dravyād guṇasya bhedaḥ)* etc., only the words expressive of mutual absence need to be used in the rule. And even the words 'other' (*anya)* etc. are expessive of only mutual absence that qualifies the expressed meaning (i.e. the item qualified by the mutual absence). This is the theory of the followers of Ācārya.

Here if the word 'other' expressive of the mutual absence is not conducive to the ablative, then the ablative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

would become untenable in the cases such as 'The quality is different from the substance' (*dravyād anyo guṇah*). Since the quality such as the separation is untenable in the quality, only the mutual absence must be admitted as the meaning of the word 'other' (*anya)*. On the ogher hand in the theory that the use of the word 'other' (*anya)* expressive of the mutual absence is conducive to the use of the ablative, the ablative is possible to be avoided in association with a negative particle by including the qualificaion of 'the state of being what is other than the particle'; As a matter of fact the ablative is used only in the case when the sense such as the conterpoistiveness described by the mutual absence is intended to be expressed. And the counterpositiveness described by the mutual absence expressed by the negative particle is, however, not conveyed by the ablative case; for, the meaning of the case ending that is other than the superstratumness is conventionally established to be relating to the absence expressed by the negative only as being the counterpositive. For instance, in the case such as 'This money does not belong to Caitra' *(na caitrasya)* etc., the meaning of the genetive (ownership) is only the counterpositive of the absence expressed by the negative. Thus the ablative is not used in associaton with negative (in '*ghaṭaḥ paṭo na* etc).

Eplanation

The Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection that the words such as '*anya*', '*bhinna*' etc. in the rule '*anyarād....*' (P iii. 3. 29) are meant to stand for only the words expressive of the items as qualified by the quality such as the separation (*pṛthaktvarūpaguṇaviśiṣṭārthaka)* and not meant to stand for the words expressive of mutual absence (*anyonyābhāvārthaka*) on the gorund that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

otherwise the ablative would become necessary in '*ghataḥ paṭo na*' due to the negative conveying the mutual absence. Also, the Pūrvapaksin refutes the argument that the words such as '*anya*' etc. can be admitted to convey the item as qualified by the mutual absence (*tadviśiṣṭārthaka)* on the ground that the word '*itara*' too could be conveying the same sense; and hence the mention of '*anya*' seperately in the rule becomes untenable; whereas the negative needs to be admitted as conveying only the property of mutual absence (*dharmāntaravācaka)* due to economy; and the contingency of ablative is avoided in '*ghaṭaḥ paṭo na*' etc. due to the non-conveying of the items as qualified by the mutual absence (*viśiṣṭāvacakatva)*.

However, the followers of Ācārya refute the objection. According to them, only the words expressive of the mutual absence (*bhedārthaka)* need to be included in the rule to explain the ablative in '*dravyād guṇasya bhedaḥ*' etc.; and therefore, even the words '*anya*' etc. which are expressive of the items as qulaified by the mutual absence (*viśiṣṭārthaka)* in the rule, must convey only the mutual absence (*bheda*) which functions as the qualifier of the expressed meaning, i.e. 'different' (*vācyaviśeṣaṇa)*. Further, they hold that even the words such as '*anya*' conveying the mutual absence (*anyonyābhāvārthaka*) need to be admitted as conducive to the ablative (*pañcamīprayojaka),* as otherwise the ablative cannot be explained in '*dravyādanyo guṇaḥ*' etc; while preventing the same in '*ghaṭaḥ paṭo na*' (In such a case the negative conveys the mutual absence, by restricting the convention that only the words conveying mutual absence that are other than the negative (*nipātātirikta)* are conducive to the ablative). However, Gadādhara opines that since in '*dravyād anyo guṇaḥ*' etc., the ablative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

conveys the counterpositiveness described by the mutual absence expressed by *anya*' (*anyonyābhāvīya pratiyogitva*), the ablative is correct; whereas since in '*ghaṭaḥ paṭo na*', the ablative does not convey the same described by the absence which is expressed by the negative particla '*na*' (*nañpadopasthāpyābhāvīyapratiyogitā),* the ablative is not correct. Any meaning except the superstratumness expressed by the case ending (*ādheyatvātirikta vibhaktyartha)* is held to be related to the absence expressed by the negative particle as only the counterpositive. For instance, in the usage '*nedam caitrasya*' etc., the ownership expressed by the genitive is related to the absence expressed by the negative particle as counter-positive; and when the ablative is admitted in '*ghaṭaḥ paṭo na*' to be expressive of the counterpositiveness described by the mutual absence expresed by the negative, such a convention gets violated.

Justification of the use of words '*anya*' and '*itara*'

V. 22. It may be held now that in the theory of the ritualists, who do not admit the quality of separation, the redundancy of the mention of either of the two words, namely, 'different' (*anya)* and 'another' (*itara)* cannot be avoided in the rule. In the said methodology of admitting the same meaning for both, the usefuleness cannot be explained for the mention of both. However, this position is not correct. In their theory too, one word could be explained to be useful as inclusive of the word expressive of the mutual absence primarily, whereas the ogher word could be explained to be useful as inclusive of the word expressive of the item qualified by the mutual absence.

It may be objected now as follows; That in 'There

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is difference from the clothing' (*paṭād bhedaḥ)* etc., the case can be held to be only the ablative used in the sense of ablation due to the association with the action of differing. Supposing it is held that the counter-positiveness described by the meaning (absence) expressed by the root has the form of the ablation, then the countingency of occurence of ablative in 'It is present in the pot' (*ghaṭe vartate)* is avoided due to the contradiction by the locative of location by being later. Or as an alternative, it can be held that only the peculiar counterpositiveness described by the absence has the form of the ablation. Though the ablation is untenable, the ablative case can be explained in the usage 'There is difference from the pot' *(ghaṭād anyatvam)* due to the association with the word 'other'. In such a case, the ablative-meaning is admitted to be related to only the difference which appears as the qualifier from the word 'other' (*anya*). However, the same meaning is not admitted to be related to the same difference which appears as the qualificand from the abstract affix; for, the state of describing the counter-positiveness (the ablative-meaning) is established by the convention to be relating to the binary difference, i.e. the part of the meaning of secomdary word-relation, like it is established to be related to the part of the word-meaning. However, this objection is not correct to state. Since the usage 'There is the difference from the pot' (*ghaṭād anyatvam*) is made only with the intention of the relation of the state of describing the counterpositiveness of the pot and the clothing etc. with the differece which appears as the qualificand from the abstract affix, the words 'other' or 'different' *(anya)* and 'another' *(itara)* are included in the rule to facilitate only such relations.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Or it can be held now as follows: That in the rule 'The fixed point from which something moves away is called ablation' (*dhruvam apāye....* P ii. 3. 18), only the state of being a boundary or limit and not the counterpositivess is intended; for, there is no generalizing factor as to which of the two-meanings, namely, the being the boundary or limit and the counter-positiveness is intended to be conveyed. Thus, the use of the two separate words viz. other or different *(anya)* and another *(itara)* is meant to facilitate the ablative in 'There is the difference from the clothing' (*paṭād bhedaḥ*) etc.

Explanation

In the theory of the ritualists, separation *(pṛthaktva)* is not admitted as a quality *(guṇa)*; and hence the words '*anya*' and '*itara*' cannot be explained to be standing for the words '*bheda*' expressing the mutual absence and '*bhinna*' expressing the item qualified by the mutual absence respectively; and hence the use of the two words becomes difficult to explain in the rule. However, Gadādhara justifies the use of the two words by stating that one word can be said to express the difference primarily (*prādhānyena anyonyābhāva)* such as *bheda*, and the other can be said to express the item qualified by the difference (*anyonyābhāvaviśiṣṭa)* such as *bhinna*.

Now an objection is raised here that in '*paṭād bhedaḥ*' etc., only an ablative case expressing the ablation can be explained due to the reference to the action of difference from the root '*bhid*'; and hence the use of the separate words expressing the difference (*anya* and *itara)* in the rule '*anyārād*' (P ii. 3. 29) is unjustified. Also, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, when the countepositiveness described by the action expressed by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the root (*dhātūpasthāpyakriyā pratiyogitā)* is held to be the ablation (*apādānatā),* the ablative case in ' *ghaṭe rūpam vartate'* is avoided due to the locative expressing the location which is later. Also, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, the ablative case in '*ghaṭe vartate rūpam',* can be avoided by holding that only the peculiar countrpositiveness belonging to (desccribed by) the absence (*abhāvīyavilakṣaṇa pratiyogitā)* is the ablation (in '*ghaṭe' rūpam vertate'* no word referring to the absence is used). The Pūrvapakṣin now illustrates the usage *ghaṭād anyatvam*'. According to him, in '*ghaṭād anyatvam'* the ablative cannot be held to be used in the sense of the ablation due to the absence of any action; however, the ablative is facilitated due to the associatin with the word '*anya'.* And in such cases, the state of describing the counterpositiveness, i.e. the ablative—meaning (*pañcamyar-thapratiyogikatva),* is related to only the mutual absence expressed by the word '*anya'* as the qualifier ('*anya'* primarily expresses the item as qualified by the mutual absence) and not to the same mutual absence expressed by the abstract affix as the qualificand (*anyatva* expresses the absence primarily); further such a relation is not contradictory as the covnention establishes that the ablative-meaning can be related to even the part of the meaning of the secondary word-relation (*vṛttyaikadeśa).*

However, Gadādhara refutes the Pūrvapakṣin's objection on the ground that the usage '*ghaṭād anyatvam'* is made even when the state of describing the conterpositiveness of the pot (*ghaṭa pratiyogikatva)* is intended to be related to the difference expressed by the abstract affix (*anyatva)* as the qualified; and therefore the use of two separate words '*anya'* and '*itara'* in the rule '*anyā rād....* (P

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ii. 3. 29) can be justified in facilitating the two usages '*ghaṭād anyatvam*' and '*ghaṭād bhinnaḥ*' respectively wherein the *ghaṭapratiyogikatva* is related to the mutual absence apearing as the qualified and to the same appearing as the qualifier respectively.

Anya and *itara* are *svarūpamātrapara*

V. 23. As a matter of fact, the words other or different '*anya*' and another *itara* are meant to stand merely for the word-forms viz, other (*anya*) and another *itara* as such. Supposing they are meant to stand for any words expressing the senses of 'other or different and another, then the usages such as 'It is one from the pot' *(ghaṭād ekaḥ)* would become necessary like 'It is different from the pot' (*ghaṭād anyaḥ*).

It may be held now that the word 'one' (*eka*), has expressive power in the sense of the other advetitiously qualified by the otherness expressed by the associated word only as delimited by the potness etc. functioning as the delimiting property of the objectness of the object of speaker's knowledge (intention), and not in the same sense as delimied by the otherness. In the statement such as 'Caitra brings one (pot) and Maitra brings another (pot)' (*caitra ekamānayati maitraś cāparam*), the objecthood described by the bringing is cognized to be occurring in the items (pots), as adventitiously qualified by the otherness recollected from the word (*eka*) uttered together; and in such a cognition the objecthood appears as only delimited by the potness and the clothingness etc; and not as delimited by the state of being what is other than the word pot and the clothing etc. (*ghaṭapaṭa* etc) expressive of the counterpositive relating to the otherness. Otherwise (when the words '*anya*' and '*itara*',

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

are not held to be standing for the words such as *'eka'* by being *svarūpa-mātrapara),* the contingency of the genitive case after the word *'ghaṭa'* expressing the counterpositive (pot) in 'This is one of the pot'*(ghaṭ asyaikaḥ)* would become difficult to be avoided, though the ablative usage *(ghaṭād ekaḥ)* becomes incorrect, i.e. is avoided in association with the word *'ekaḥ'.*

However, even then the words 'other' *(anya)* and 'another' *(itara)* cannot be held to be standing for the words conveying the sense of 'other', and 'another' respectively due to the undesired contingency of the ablative (in *sa ghaṭāt)* in association with the correlative pronoun 'that' (*tad*) expressing 'other'. Thus, to facilitate the ablative in 'It is different from the clothing' (*paṭād bhinnam*), 'It differs from the pot' *(ghaṭād bhidyate)* etc., only the ablation must be explained somehow in such cases.

Explantion

Gadādhara now explains the reason as to why he words *'anya'* and *'itara'* in the rule *ayārād....* (P ii. 3. 29) are meant to stand for the mere word-forms viz; '*anya*' and *'itara' (svarūpa mātra para)*. According to him, when the words *'anya'* and *'itara'* are meant to stand for any words that express the sense of different (other) or another, then the ablative usage *'ghaṭād ekaḥ'* would become necessary as the word *'ekaḥ'* can express the sense of different (other) there. Thus, he maintains that in cases such as *'paṭād bhedaḥ', 'ghaṭād bhidyate'* etc, the ablative needs to be explained by admitting the ablation for the clothing *(paṭa)* and the pot (*ghaṭa*) etc.

At this stage, an objection is raised here that the word *'eka'* etc. can be admitted to be expressive of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sense of different (other) only as dilimited by the potness, i.e. the delimiting property of the objectness of the object of the speaker's intention (knowldge) (*vaktṛbuddhiviṣayatāvacchedakaghaṭatva)* and not as delimited by the otherness (*anytva)* etc; and hence the word '*eka*' etc. can be expresive of the sense of different (other). According to the objector, in '*caitra ekamānayati' maitraś cāparam*', the objecthood, described by the bringing (*ānayanakarmatā),* appears in the item (pot) adventitiously qualified by the otherness recollected from the word '*anya*' (*samabhivyāhṛtānyapadopasthāpite)* only as qualified by the potness; and since there the word '*ghaṭa*', expressing the counterpositive (pot) relating to the otherness, is absent, the incorrect usage '*ghaṭād ekaḥ*', cannot be imposed on account of the contingency of the ablative after the word '*ghaṭa*' in association with '*eka*'. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that dispite the absence of the ablative usage '*ghaṭād ekaḥ*', the ablative usage '*sa ghaṭād*' cannot be avoided due to the contingency of the ablative in association with the correlative '*tat*' when the words '*anya*' and '*itara*' are held to stand for any words expressing the 'other' and 'another' (*anyārthapara*); and hence should be held to be standing merely for the word-forms viz; '*anya*' and '*itara*' as such (*svarūpamātra para*). And thus to explain ablative usages '*paṭād bhinnam*' and '*ghaṭād bhidyate*' the ablation must be explained for the words' *paṭa* etc., in association with the action of differring.

Explanation of ablation

V. 24. This fact can be explained as follows : That the root 'differ' *(bhid)* does not express the mutual absence as its sense. For, the incorrect usage 'The clothing differs from the pot' *(ghaṭād bhinatti paṭaḥ)*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

would become necessary; and also the correct usage. 'The clothing is known to be different' *(bhidyate paṭāḥ)* would become untenable, as he passive affix and the passive *ātmanepada*-ending *(yagātamane pada)* are impossible in the sense of the agent. Also since the root 'differ' (*bhid*) does not belong to *divādi gaṇa* and is a *parasmaipadi,* the active *śyan* affix and the active *ātmanepada* endings are occasionless. Also since the agent is associated with an intransitive root, the verb cannot be held to have been intended to be object-agentive'. Though some intransitive verbs (such as *bhū* in *bhūyate odanaḥ*) can be explained to be the object-agentive (quasipassive) by including the causative sense in it, the verb '*bhid'* cannot be object-agentive, as the inclusion of the causative sense in the senses of the root '*bhid'* expressing the mutual absence is impossible due to the mutual absence being non-produced.

In 'The grainary, breaks asunder *(bhidyate kusūlaḥ)* etc. the root to 'break as under' (*bhid*) is transitive by having the sense of breaking; and therefore, the grainary can be the object-agent. Thus, the root to 'differ' *(bhid)* must be admitted to express the sense of the causing the knowledge of distinction (difference). Here the causing the knowledge of distinction means the invariable concomitance and the being the attribute of the subject that cause the objectness described by the knowledge of the distinctin. And the unique item that is the abode (substratum) of such a causing of the knowledge is stated to be the distinguisher by being the agent of distinction (difference). And the abode of the effect such as the being the object of the inference having the otherness (distinction) as the qualifier, that (effect) functions as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the root, is the object to be distinguished due to being the object of the knowledge of distinction. Thus, in 'The earth differs from the other substance' (*pṛthivī itarebhyo bhidyate)* etc., the earth etc. are also the objects and not merely the agents. However, when merely the mutual absence (difference) is to the established, the statement of such a proposition (*pṛthivī itarebhyo bhidyate)* by all the scholars is due to the lack of attentiveness of some of the earliar scholars in the matter. And the words such as fire (*vahni)* in the proposition (*parvato vahnimān),* is intended to convey the being the object of the knowledge of he fire. And the ablative found after the part of the *hetu (dhūmat*) does not convey the state of being what is caused to be known (inferred); rather it covneys only the state of being what is produced. Here the scholars skilled in the analysis of the subtle hold that the word 'some' (*keṣām cit*) is to be explained by following the theory of Maṇikāra etc.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains the ablation of the clothing etc. in *'paṭād bhinnam', 'ghaṭād bhidyate'* by admitting the causing of the knowledge of distinction (*anyatvena jñāpana*) as the meaning of '*bhid'.* According to him, when the root to differ (*bhid)* is admitted to express the mutual absence (*anyonyābhāvārthaka),* the incorrect ablative usage '*ghaṭād bhinatti paṭaḥ'* would become necessary as the pot can be intended to be the counterpositive of the mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva pratiyogi*) expressed by '*bhid*'; whereas the correct ablative usage '*bhidyate paṭaḥ'* would become untenable, as the *yak* affix and the *ātmanpada-endings* cannot be explained in the active (*kartari*) form of verb '*bhidyate*'. Also, the '*yak*'- affix and the *ātmanepada* endings cannot

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be explained in the verb '*bhidyate*' by intending that the clothing (*paṭa)* is the object-agent (*karmakartṛ),* as the root '*bhid*' is intransitive. Although the rice etc. in '*bhūyate odanaḥ* etc. can be explained to be the object-agent by including the causative sense (*ṇyarthāntrabhāva*) in the sense of the intransitive root 'differ' '*bhid*', the clothing (*paṭa)* in '*bhidyate paṭaḥ*' cannot be explained to be object-agent (*karmakartṛ*) by including the causative sense in the sense of the root '*bhid*' as the mutual absence is never produced. Thus, Gadādhara holds that the root 'differ' (*bhid)* must be admitted to be referring to the action of causing the knowledge of distinction (difference) (*anyatvena jñāpana*) which is nothing but the invariable concomitance and the being the attribute of the subject conducive to the objectness of the knowledge of what is to be established *(jñānaviṣayatā prayojakavyāptip-akṣadharmatā)*. And in '*pṛthivī itarebhyo bhidyate*'(which is to be anaalysed as '*pṛthivī itarebhyo anyatvena jñāpyate),* the earth is both the agent causing distinction (*bhedaka)* by being the unique item which causes the knowledge of distinction (*bhidādikartṛ)* and the object to be distinguished (*bhedya)* by being the abode of the effect such as the qualifier (*anyatva prakārakānumiti viṣayatā)* functioning as the dilimitor of ehe expressedness of the meaning expressed by the root (*dhātvarthatāvacchedaka)* and so is *karmakartṛ*.

Also, Gadādhara states that in the proposition *'parvato vahnimān dhūmāt'*, the word '*vahni*' is meant to convey the being the object of the knowledge of fire (*vahnyādijñānaviṣayatā)* and the ablative of *dhūmāt* is meant to convey only 'what is being caused by the knowledge of smoke and thus one cognises that the mountain is the substratum of the fire being the object

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the knowledge of fire which is being caused by the knowledge of the smoke (*dhūmajñānaprayojyā yā vahniviṣayakajñānaviṣayatā tadāśrayaḥ*).

Illustrations of *arjunaḥ crośāl lakṣyan vidhyati*

V. 25 In the usages such as 'Arjuna hits the target from a krosa' (*arjunaḥ krośāl lakṣyam viddhyati*), 'This man having eaten today, shall eat after two days' (*adya bhuktvā dvyahād bhoktā*), etc. the ablative assigned by the rule. 'a noun denoting the time or space gets the locative or ablative case affix when the sense implied is the interval between the two *kārakas*' (*saptamī pañcamyau kārakamadhye,* P ii. 3. 7) expresses the state of being what interveness of the two *kārakas,* i.e. the distance to be traversed (space) and the time, the two meanings exprressed by the ablative bases. Thus, in the first instance, the form of the cognition is that Arjuna hits the target which is situated in the region next to the part of the region to be traversed such as the *krośa* occuring next to the region occupied by oneself. Here the ablative refers to both the state of being the region occurring next to the region occupied by the agent Arjuna, i.e. the associated word-meaning, which (the region) is related to the *krośa* as the qualifier, and to the state of being what is situated in the region next to the region which is related to the *krośa* as the qualificand. Here we admit that the ablative case produces, due to the restriction of convention, the cognition of the part of its own meaning as related to some other word meaning (*krośa*) in turn related to another part of its own meaning.

In the second instance, the form of the cognition is that the one is the abode of the effort conducive to the eating occurring in the day coming next to the two

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

days that come in turn next to the first day which is the substratum of the effort conducive to the eating. Here only the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the word *kāraka* such as the operation conducive to the action of eating is intended by the word *kāraka* in the rule. Therefore, here the ablative can be tenable even when it produces the cognition of the state of belonging to the third day coming next to the two days i.e. the ablative base-meaning in the act of eating, which is related to the effort conduccive to the first act of eating, and the cognition of the state of cccurring next to the time, i.e. the substratum of the effort conducive to the another action of eating, functioning as the qaulifier to the base-meaning (two days). Here (when the *kāraka* means agent of action) the time of the two days would become untenable to have occurrence (i.e. intervention) in between the two different *kārakas,* as the agent of the two eatings is one and the same. (Thus, the word '*kāraka*' is taken to mean the operations leading to the eatings which are two). That is why it is stated that 'There occurs only one intervening time between the two different agencies of one agent'.

Thus ends the analysis of the meaning of the ablatives.

Explanation

Gadādhara concludes his analysis of ablative meaning with the illustration of the meanings of the ablatives in '*arjunaḥ krośāl lakṣyam vidhyati*' and '*adya bhuktvā ayam dvyahād bhoktā*'. According to him, in such cases the ablatives by the rule. *saptamī pañcamyau kārakamadhye*' (P ii. 3. 7) expresse the state of being what intervenes (*vyavadhāyakatva)* of the space (*krośa)* between the two *kārakas,* namely the agent and the object; and that of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the time (*dvyaha*) between the two *kārakas,* namely the tow operations of one agent respectively.

Since the earlier meaning is the qualifier and the later meaning is the qualificand in the cognition such as the target which is situated in the region next to the part of the region to be traversed such as the *krośa* occurring next to the region occupied by oneself (*svādhiṣṭhita deśānantara krośātmakādhva bhāgā nantaradeśastha),* the state of being the region next to the region occupied by the agent (*kartradhiṣṭhita deśānantarya)* appears as relating to the *krośa* as the qualifier, and the state of being what is stituated in the region next to the region (*anantaradeśasthatva)* appears as relating to the *krośa* as the qualificand. Also since the word *kāraka* in the rule is not intended to express the agent qualified by the action of eating (*kriyāviśiṣṭa)* but is intended to express the operation conducive to the action of eating (*kriyānukūla vyāpāra),* functioning as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the word *kāraka,* the ablative case in *adya bhuktvā dvyahād bhoktā* becomes tenable in expressing both the state of belonging to the third day coming next to the two days, i.e. the ablative base meaning (*prakṛtyarthakālānantara kālīnatva),* and the state of occurring next to the time, i.e. the substratum of the effort conducive to the another action of eating (*aparakriyānukūlakṛtyadhikaraṇakālānantarya*) relating to the effort expressed by the base of *bhoktā*.

Thus ends the analysis of the meaning of the ablative.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CATPER VI

ANALYSIS OF GENITIVE MEANING

Illustration of śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī

VI. 1. Since no *kāraka*-case can be used while intending the relation of ownership etc. of the agent, the genitive case is assigned by the rule "Genitive is used in the sense of remaining relations" (*śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī*, P. ii. 3.50) in the cases such as 'This money belongs to the Caitra' (*caitrasyedam*) etc. Also, in the cases such as 'This is the cause of the pot' (*ghaṭasya kāraṇam*), and "This is the hand of Caitra' (*caitrasya hastaḥ*) etc., the ownership, the state of being described and the being the parts (limbs) etc. have the state of being the meanings of the genitive only as being the relations in general, and not as being the ownership etc. in particular. For, otherwise, the contingency of endlessness of expressive powers of the genitive cannot be avoided. Though the particular relation such as the contact with the body etc are present in the cases such as 'This clothing does not belong to Caitra' etc. (*caitrasya nedam vāsaḥ*), where the negative particle is used with the intention of producing

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the cognition of the absence of the particular relations such as the ownership, the genetive has only a secondary indication in the sense of the particular relation such as the ownership. Thus the convention, namely, 'There is no indication for the declensional endings' is meant to convey only the idea that when there is no special rule, one case ending does not have indication in the sense of the other case-meaning. That is why Misra has stated that the genitive in association with *'kṛt'* derivative (such as 'a' in *kṛṣṇasyākṛtiḥ*) expresses the agency etc. only as relation.

This way, Vārtikakāra's justification of the rule assigning the genitive that 'Of the verbs having the sense of 'to remember'; 'to give', etc., the objectis take the genitive case' (*adhīgartha...* P. ii: 3.52) becomes proper when he states that the rule is meant to be assigning the genitive in the case such as 'The recollection is of the mother' (*mātus smṛtam*) only when the objecthood is intended to be a relation. If the rule 'Genitive is used in the sense of remaining relations' (P. ii. 3.50) is not intended to assign the genitive in the event of intending the relations such as the agency etc. as a relation in general, then such a rule (as *adhīgartha...* P.... ii. 3.52) would become only prescriptive of the genitive. Since the genitive is expressive of the agency etc. only as a relation in general, the genitive associated with the word 'cooked' (*pakvam*) in 'The raw uncooked food is the cooked or dressed food of the Śūdra, while the food cooked by Śūdra is stated to be the remainder of food' (*āmam śūdrasya pakvānnam, pakvam ucchiṣṭam ucyate*), expresses only the agency and not the ownership as its sense. Also, in this explanation, even the theory of the New-Smārtas (Raghunātha etc.) that "The sacrifice of rice-oblation boiled with milk would become untenable when

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the release of the male calf has the Śūdra as its agent" would become tenable.

Explanation

Gadādhara now takes up the analysis of genetive-meaning. According to him, since no *kāraka*-case can express the relation of ownership belonging to Caitra (*caitrapratiyogika svatva*) in *'caitrasyedam dhanam'* etc., Pāṇini assigns non-*kāraka*-relational genitive (*sambandha-ṣaṣṭhī*) by the rule *'śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī'* (P. ii. 3.50). Also according to him, in *'caitrasya dravyam'* etc., the relations such as the ownership (*svatva*) are the genitive meanings only as the relations (*sambandhatvena*), and not particularly as the ownership (*svatvena*) etc., as otherwise the genitive would need to have many expressive powers in many particular relations. Although the relations are genitive-meanings only as relations, the non-*kāraka*-negative particle (*nañ*) in *'caitrasya nedam vāsaḥ'*, wherein Caitra has the relation of contact with the clothing (*saṃyogasaṃbandha*), can express the absence of the particular relation of the ownership (*svatvādisam-bandhaviśeṣa*) due to the assumption of an indication for the genetive in the sense of the special relation of ownership (*viśeṣasaṃbandha*). It should be noted here that this position conforms to the view that the genitive refers to the relation in general (*sambandha sāmānye ṣaṣṭhī*); and therefore, even Misra states that the genitive used in association with *kṛt* derivations (*kṛdyoge ṣaṣṭhī*) such as the one in *"kṛṣṇasya kṛtiḥ'* expreses the relation of agency only as a relation in general.

It should be noted here that the rule *'adhīgartha ...'* (P. ii. 3.52). has been composed by Pāṇini to facilitate the genitive in the sense of the relation of the objecthood in *'mātus smṛtam'* etc. However, such a rule

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is not prescriptive (*vidheyaka*) of the genitive that the genitive is used in *'mātus smṛtam'* etc., only when the relation of objecthood is meant to be conveyed particularly as the relation of objecthood (*karmatvena rūpeṇa*). And this fact can be explained only in the theory that the rule *'śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī'* (P. ii. 3.50) assigns the genitive in the relations such as the agency and the objecthood etc. only as the relations in general and not as the particular relations such as the agency and the objecthood etc. However, if the rule (P. ii. 3.50) is not held to be prescriptive of the genetive in *'mātus smṛtam'* when the relations such as the objecthood etc., are intended as being the relations in general (*sambandhatvena sambandha*), then only the rule *'adhīgartha...,* (P. ii. 3.52) needs to be admitted as prescriptive of the genitive in *'mātus smṛtam'* etc. Thus, Gadādhara maintains that to facilitate the restrictive status (*niyamaparatva*) for the rule *'adhīgartha...'* (P. ii. 3.52), the rule *'śeṣe* ṣaṣṭhī' (P. ii. 3.50) needs to be admitted as prescriptive of the genitive in the sense of the relations only as relations in general. Now since the genetive can express the relations such as the ownership etc. only as the relations in general, the genitive supplied in *'āmam śūdrasya pakvānnam pakvam ucchiṣṭam ucyate'* has to express only the relation of the agency (*kartṛtva*), and not the relation of ownership (*svatva*), as a relation in general; and thus the theory of Raghunātha that otherwise when the genetive expresses the ownership, the sacrifice of rice oblation prepared with milk by the Brahmin becomes untenable provided the releasing of the calf is done by a Śūdra (*śūdrakartṛkavṛṣotsarga*) (the ownership of the Śūdra is very much present in such an oblation) is also facilitated.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Genitive cannot express Svatva

VI. 2. Also, it cannot be objected that in such cases the genitive associated with the *kṛt* - derivatives produces the cognition of the relations such as the agency only as the agency etc.. The genetive producing the cognition of such an agency is prohibited in association with the past participial *kṛt* affix '*ka*' (in *pakvam*) etc. And since the genitive expresses the relations in general, the genitive can be explained in 'The fire is never satisfied with the woods and the woman is never satisfied with the man' (*nāgnis stṛpyati kāṣṭhānām na pumsām vāmalocanā*), by intending that the instrumentality is only a relation. For, otherwise, the genitive would become untenable in the cases where the relation of instrumentality etc. is intended particularly as the instrumentality etc. as the same would be only the object of the instrumental-prescription.

Explanation

An objection can be raised here now that the genitive in '*āmam śūdrasya pakavānnam pakvam ucchiṣṭam ucyate*' can be admitted to express the agency (*kartṛtva*) as a particular relation of agency (*kartṛtvena*) and not as a relation in general (*sambandhatvena*); and hence when *vṛṣotsrga* is done by a Śūdra, the cooked rice oblation need not become the abode of the ownership described by the Śūdra (*śūdranirūpitasvatvāśraya*). However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the rule '*na lokāvyayaniṣṭhā*' (P.ii.3.69) has prohibited the genitive in the sense of the agency as the agency. Also according to him, such a prohibition is necessary because otherwise the genitive in '*nāgnis stṛpyati kāsthānām...*' cannot be explained in the sense of the instrumentality as a relation in general.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Refutation of objection

VI. 3. Now it may be objected again as follows: That when the genitive expresses the relations only as relations in general, the usage 'The person of the staff' (*daṇḍasya puruṣaḥ*) in the place of 'The staff of the person' (*puruṣasya daṇḍaḥ*) too would become necessary. Also similarly, though the staff and the form etc., are not the substratums of the person and the pot etc. respectively, the usage such as 'The staff is a person-holder' (*puraṣī daṇḍaḥ*) and 'The form is the possessor of the pot' (*ghaṭavadrūpam*) would become unavoidable like the usages such as 'The person is a staff-holder' (*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*) and 'The pot is the possessor of form' (*rūpavān ghaṭaḥ*). The possessive affix is enjoined in the sense 'this one belongs to it' like in the sense 'this one is the possessor of it.' Since the genitives occurring after the word 'staff' (*daṇḍa*) and 'form' (*rūpa*) can express the relations of their respective base-meanings with Caitra and the pot respectively, the possessive suffixes would become contingent even after the words *'puruṣa'* and *'ghaṭa'* expressing the person (Caitra) and the pot.

However then we shall counterobject as follows: That even when some particular relations are held to be the meanings of the genitive, the sate of being what is inherent (inherence) etc. need to be admitted as the meanings of the genitive in accordance with the usages 'This is the form of the pot' (*ghaṭasya rūpam*) etc. And consequently, how can the usages such as 'Caitra belongs to the hand' and 'The hand has Caitra' (*hastasya caitrah, caitravān hastaḥ*) and also the usages 'The tree belongs to the branch' and 'The branch has the tree' (*śākhāyāḥ vṛkṣaḥ vṛkṣavatī śākhā*) be not imposed? And the answer that since there are no such prior usages, such usages

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

are not made is equal to our answer that the usages such as 'The hand has the person' (*puruṣī daṇḍḥ*) etc. are not made due to the absence of such prior usages.

Explanation

Now an objection is raised on the following grounds: That since the genitive is held to be expressing the relations such as the ownership as relations in general (*sambandhatvena*), the usage *'daṇḍasya puruṣaḥ'*, instead of the usage *'puruṣasya daṇḍaḥ'*, would become necessary due to the relation of belongingness being equal to both the staff and the person. Also since the possessive suffix (*matup*) is assigned even in the sense of belongingness (*tadasya*) like in the sense of possession (*tadatrāsti*), the usage *'puruṣī daṇḍaḥ'* like the usage *'daṇḍī puruṣaḥ'* would become necessary due to the possibility of the analysis of such usages as *'puruṣo' syāsti'* like *'daṇḍo' syāsti'*. Further since the genitive occurring after the words *'daṇḍa'* etc. can be held to express the relations of their meanings such as the staff with Caitra (person) (*caitradiniṣṭha tadarthasambandha*) in general, the possessive suffix could become unavoidable after *'daṇḍa'* etc.; whereas whẹn the genitive is held to express the relations such as the *svatva* as specific relations, only the statements such as *'puruṣasya daṇḍaḥ'* or *'daṇḍī puruṣaḥ'* would become tenable as only the contact of the staff with the person (*daṇḍapratiyogika puruṣānuyogikasamyoga*) is to be expressed by the genetive etc.

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that when the genitive is held to be expressive of some relations particularly as the contact etc., the inherence etc. would become necessary to be admitted as the meanings of the genitive in accordance with the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

usages such as *ghaṭasya rūpam;* and therefore even the usage '*hastasya caitraḥ*' would become contingent with the intention of conveying the inherence in the hand and Caitra.

Illustration of *'narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ nareṣu vā'*

VI. 4. In the cases such as 'The Kṣatriya is the bravest of men or among men' (*narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ nareṣu vā'* 'The chariot riders are the quickest of travellers or among travellers' (*adhvagānām rathagāminaḥ, śīghratarāḥ adhvageṣu vā*) and 'The blacks are richly endowed with milk of cows or among cows' (*gavām kṛṣṇāḥ sampannakṣīraḥ gaṣu vā*) etc, the genitive or the locative is assigned optionally for the word which stands for the whole from which a part is signled out by the rule '*yataśca nirdharṇam*' (P. ii. 3.41.). And the meaning of such a rule is that 'The genitive and the locative are prescribed after the words expressive of such items (men) delimited by those properties (humanity), which property-delimiteds (men) as qualified by which generic properties, (humanity), are explained to be the possessors of the predicate (such as the bravity) qualified by the exclusion from the items (men) delimited by the properties (humanity) which are devoid of such a qualifier (the Kṣ atriyaness). In the present context, the genitive is used after the word 'men' (*nara*), as the relation of the predicate such as the particular type of bravity, which is being excluded from the men devoid of such a qualifier (Kṣatriyaness), is intended to be occurrent in the men qualified by the qualifier such as the Kṣatriyaness. In the cases such as 'The demons are the bravest compared to the men' (*narebhyo rākṣasāś śūratamāḥ*), the said singling out or distinguishing property does not occur in the demons though the state

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of being the bravest, which is excluded from the men devoid of the demonness is intended to be occurring in the demons qualified by the qualifier of the demonness; for, the demons qualified by the demonness are not delimited by the common property such as the humanity.

Explanation

Gadādhara now illustrates the genitive/locative usages *'narāṇām kṣatriyas śūrāḥ nareṣu vā'* etc. which have genitive or locative optionally. According to him, in such instances, the rule *'yataśca nirdhārṇam'* (P. ii. 3.41.) assigns the genitive or the locative optionally after the words *'nara'* etc. which are expressive of the whole such as the men as delimited by the generic property such as the humanity (*taddharmāvacchinnavācakapada*) when the same wholes such as the men delimited by the property of humanity (*yaddharmāvacchinna*) and qualified by the qualifier such as the Kṣatriyaness (*jātyādiviśeṣaṇa visiṣṭa*) are intended to be the possessors of the predicates such as the bravity qualified by the exclusion from the occurrence in the men, delimited by the property of the humanity, and devoid of the humanity of such a qualifier of the Kṣatriyaness (*tādṛaśaviśeṣanaśūnya taddharmāvacchinna vyāvṛttatvaviśiṣṭa vidheyavattayā*). A point to be noted here is that the usage *'narāṇām nareṣu vā rākṣasāś śūratamāḥ'* is never made but only *'narebhyo rākṣasāś śūratamāḥ'* is made, although the state of being the bravest of all excluded from the men devoid of the demonness (*tacchūnya narādivyāvṛttaśūratamatva*) is possible in the demons who are qualified by the qualifier of the demonness (*rākṣasatvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭe*); this is so because the said singling out or distinction (*nirdhāraṇa*) is not tenable as the sate of being delimited by the common property such as the humanity (*naratvarū-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

pasāmānyadharmāvacchinnatva) is lacking in the demons qualified by the demonness who are to be singled out or distinguished from the men.

Justification of the term *'taddharmāvacchinna vyāvṛttatva'* etc.

VI. 5. Since in 'The Kṣatriya is the bravest of all the men' (*narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūratamāḥ*) etc. the exclusion (lit. state of being excluded) from the men in general is contradictory to the state of being the bravest resident in the Kṣatriya etc., 'the state of being devoid of such a qualifier' is a qualification with respect to the men, i.e. the limit or boundary of exclusion. If the exclusion from any particular substance (whole), which can be the substratum of such a generic property, is intended to be the qualifier in the predicate, then the incorrect statement such as 'The pot is the possessor of odor among the substances' (*dravyeṣu ghaṭo gandhavān*) would become necessary. For, the odour (the predicate) etc. are excluded from some particular substance such as the sky. On the other hand, if the exclusion from all the wholes (delimited by the property) devoid of such a qualifier is intended, then the application of the rule (P. ii. 3.41). would become untenable even in the cases such as. 'The Kṣatriya is the bravest of all the men' (*narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūratamaḥ*) itself; for, 'the being the bravest' etc. are not excluded from the demons etc. who are devoid of the qualifier of the Kṣatriyaness etc. Therefore, the exclusion from the whole is qualified as 'delimited by the property (of the humanity etc.)'

Explanation

In this passage Gadādhara justifies the inclusion of various qualifying terms in the explanation of the rule

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

P. ii. 3.41. The qualifying term 'The state of being devoid of such a qualifier' (*tādṛśa viśeṣaṇaśūnyatva*) needs to be included in the whole such as the humanity delimited (*naratvāvacchninna*), i.e. the limit or boundary- of the exclusion (*vyāvṛttyavaddhi*), as otherwise the exclusion from the men in general (*narādisāmānya vyāvṛttatva*) would become untenable in the predicate such as the state of being the bravest (*śūratamatva*) in '*ṇarāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūratamaḥ*' etc. When such a qualifier is included, *kṣatriyatvaśūnyanarādivyāvṛttatva* can be easily explained in the predicate. Also the term 'Delimited by the generic property of the whole' (*taddharmāvacchinna*) needs to be included in the exclusion (*vyāvṛttatva*) as otherwise the exclusion from some particular individual (*yatkiñcitvyaktimātra vyāvṛ-attatva*) would become possible in the predicate such as the odour (*gandha*) necessitating the usage '*dravyeṣu ghaṭo gandhavān*'. When such a qualifier is included, *taddharmā (dravyatvā) vacchinna vyāvṛttātva* is not tenable in the odour and so the usage is avoided.

Also, 'The exclusion from all those who are devoid of such a qualifier' (*tādṛśaviśeṣaṇaśūnya sāmāny-avyāvṛttatva*) cannot be included as the qualifier in the predicate, as then the usage '*narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūratamaḥ*' itself would become utenable due to the impossibility of the exclusion from the demons devoid of the qualifier such as the Kṣatriyaness (*kṣatriya tvaśūnya rākṣasavyāvṛttatva*) such as the bravity. :When the *sāmānyavyāvṛtta tva* is not insisted upon, the exclusion from the men devoid of the Kṣatriyaness becomes tenable in the predicate.

Sādhāranadharmāvacchinnavyāvṛttatva or bheda are not genitive meanings.

VI. 6. It may be objected now as follows: That the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

exclusion associated with the common - property (humanity)-delimiteds (such as Vaiśya etc.) who are devoid of the qualifiers such as the generic property of the Kṣatriyaness, may be stated to be the meaning of only the genitive etc. occurring after the words (*nara*) etc. expressive of the whole as delimited by the common property (humanity etc.). However, by such a process, only the exclusion from the whole delimited by the common property such as the humanity etc. can be obtained in the predicate, but the exclusion from the men qualified by the state of being devoid of the particular property of the Kṣatriyaness cannot be obtained in the predicate. For, there occurs no word that produces the cognition of the state of being devoid of such a qualification, i.e. the Kṣatriyaness, in the men, i.e. the meaning of the genitive (locative) base. Also such a state cannot be held to be the meaning of the genitive (locative) cases; for, then there would occur the contingency of assuming many expressive powers for such cases.

Also it may be argued that only the difference is the meaning of the genitive; and by relating the Kṣatriya etc., i.e. the nominative-meanings, as counterpositive to such a difference, the exclusion from the men who are different from the Kṣatriya etc. can be obtained without assuming different expressive powers. However, even such an argument is not correct. Even then, the contradiction to the convention that the meaning of a case ending, that is other than the number, appears only as the qualificand of the base-meaning cannot be avoided. Also in accepting the view that in the usage ''Among the men, only the Kṣatriyas have the bravity' (*nareṣu kṣatriyānām eva śauryam*), the Kṣatriya etc, who are recollected as the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

qualifiers to the difference expressed by the genitive, are related to the difference expressed by the locative as the qualifiers, another convention gets contradicted. Thus as an alternative, it can be admitted that the recollection of the men, in the particular form of being the people who are other than the Kṣatriyas, is obtained from the words such as 'man' (*nara*) etc. due to the indication.

Explanation

Now the objector states that the exclusion associated with the Vaiśya etc. who are delimited by the common property such as the humanity, but are devoid of the qualifier such as the Kṣatriyaness (*jātyādi viśeṣaṇaśūnya sādhāraṇadharmāvacchinnānvitavyāvṛttatva*), cannot be the meaning of the genitive case. According to him, when such an exclusion (*vyāvṛttatva*) is admitted to be the meaning of the genitive etc. occurring after the words such as *'nara'* etc. that express the wholes as the common property (humanity)-delimiteds (*sādhāraṇa dharmāvacchinna vācaka*) in *'narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ'* etc, the exclusion from only the men, who are delimited by the common property of humanity, and not from those who are qualified by the state of being devoid of the Kṣatriyaness (*kṣatriyatvādi śūnyatvaviśiṣṭa narādivyāvṛttatva*) can be obtained in the predicate such as the bravity, as there is no word that expresses the state of being what is devoid of the Kṣatriyaness in the men. Also, the objector states that due to the endlessness of expressive powers (*śaktyānantya*), the state of being devoid of the Kṣatriyaness (*kṣatriyatvādiśūnyatva*) cannot be admitted as the meaning of genitive itself.

A possible suggestion is that the mutual absence or difference (*bheda*) is the genitive meaning; and by relating

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the Kṣatriya to such an absence as a counterpositive (*pratiyogitayā*), the idea of the exclusion from the man different from the Kṣatriya (*kṣatriyānya narādivyāvṛttatva*) can be obtained in the predicate such as the bravity. However, the difficulty in such a suggestion is that the convention that case-meaning that the is other than a number (*saṃkhyātiriktavibhaktyartha*) appears only as the qualificand of the base-meaning (*prakṛtyarthaviśeṣya*) gets violated, as the mutual absence or difference needs to be related to the men, i.e. the base-meaning, as a qualifier. Thus, the objector suggests that the genitive bases such as '*nara*' etc themselves can be admitted to be expressive of the men etc. as having the particular form of being the men different from the Kṣatriya (*kṣatriyānya naratvādiviśeṣarūpeṇa*); and thus, the exclusion from the men devoid of the Kṣatriyaness (*kṣatriyatvādiśūnya narādivyāvṛttatva*) can be cognized in the predicate such as the bravity.

Refutation of the objection

VI. 7. Let it be so. However, you need to explain as to what is the nature of exclusion, and where is it being related to? If you hold the that exclusion is of the form of non-occurrence in the men etc., and the same is related to the property of bravity recollected from the word such as 'bravest'; then, such a position would be wrong. Meaning of a word is not related to the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning of another word. Also in the expression such as 'Of the categories, the existence occurs in the possessor of the generic property' (*padārthānām jātimatī sattā*), the absence of the occurrence in the category that is other than the one possessing the generic property, in general, is refuted, i.e. is not allowed. Also since the absence of the state

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of being what is inherent in such a category as generic property is unestablihsed, the exclusion cannot be cognized even by violating the convention. Moreover, in the statement such as 'The pot among the substances is the possessor of shell-neck etc.' (*dravyeṣu kambugrīvādimān ghaṭaḥ*) etc., the property such as the potness is not recollected as being the deilmitor of the reletedness of the relatum; and therefore, the exclusion cannot be tenable to be related to such a potness.

Explanation

Gadādhara now refutes the objection by questioning the nature of exclusion (*vyāvṛttatva*) and that of its relatum (*āśraya)*. According to him, exclusion (*vyāvṛttatva)* cannot be defined as the non occurrence in the men etc., (*tadavṛttitva*) and also as the one relating to the bravity expressed by the word *'śūratamāḥ'* etc. For, then the convention that 'The meaning of a word is related to the meaning of another word and not to its parts' (*padārthaḥ padārthena anveti*) gets violated as the bravity being the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning (*padārthatāvacchedka*), is only a part of another word-meaning.

Also Gadādhara states that the convention '*padārthaḥ padārthena anveti*' is not to be violated, because otherwise the non-allowance of the relation of the exclusion (*vyāvṛttatva*) or the absence in general of the occurrence in the category of things that is other than the possessor of the generic property (*jātimadanya padārthavṛttitva sāmānyābhāva*) (expressed by the genitive '*padārthānām* in '*padārthānām jātimatī sattā*) with the existence, i.e. the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the locative base (*padārthatāvachedaka*), becomes pointless. Also, Gadādhara sates that in '*dravyeṣu*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

kambugrīvādimān ghaṭaḥ', the potness (*ghaṭatva*) is predicated upon the state of being the posessor of the shell neck etc. (*kambugrīvādimattva*); and therefore, the exclusion expressed by the locative needs to be related to the potness, i.e. the predicate; but since the potness is recollected only as the potness (*svarūpataḥ*) and not as delimited by the potness-ness, i.e. the delimitor of the relatedness of the relations (*anvayitāvacchedkarūpeṇa*), the exclusion cannot be related to the same potness.

Position of some scholars

VI. 8. Some hold here as follows; That in 'Kṣatriya is the bravest of men' (*narāṇām Kṣatriyaḥ sūraḥ*) etc., even the one who is other than the kṣatriya, like the Kṣatriya, is the meaning of the world *'kṣatriyaḥ'* by indication; also similarly even the one who is other than the bravest, like the bravest, is the meaning of the word '*śūraḥ*'. The non-difference, i.e. the meaning of the genitive, is related to the Kṣatriya and to the one who is other than the Kṣatriya. Thus, the cognition of the meaning is that the Kṣatriya who is identical with the man, is the bravest, whereas the one who is other than the Kṣatriya, identical with the man, is not the bravest. Also just as in the case 'The bravity is found among the Kṣatriyas of men' (*narāṇām kṣatriyeṣu śauryam*) etc., the word *'kṣatriya'* denotes both the positive and the negative senses like in the earlier case; similarly the word *'śauryam'* denotes both the senses of the bravity and its absence. Thus the cognitions produced in such cases are that 'The bravity occurs in the Kṣatriya who is identical with the man, and the absence of bravity occurs in the one other than the Kṣatriya who is not identical with the man. In the case of the usages where the words expressing the subject and the predicate have

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

grammatical disagreement, (i.e. *narāṇām kṣatriyeṣu śauryam*), the absence of the predicate delimited by the same relation, which appears as the relation between the subject and the predicate in the positive cognition, is the indicated meaning of the predicate word (*śauryam*). And in the cases of the usages where the same (subject and predicate) words have grammatical agreement (i.e. in *narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ*), what is different from the subject and what is different from the predicate appear as the meanings of subject and predicate words. This is the general convention.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara illustrates the position of some other scholars. According to them, in the cases where subject and predicate words agree (*samānādhikaraṇa*) such as *'narāṇām kṣatriyaś śūraḥ'* etc., both subject and predicate words (*kṣatriyaḥ* and *śūraḥ*) refer to one who is other than Kṣatriya (*kṣatriyānya*) and the one who is other than brave (*śūrānya*) by indication like Kṣatriya and brave. Also, according to them, the genitive after the word *'nara'* expresses the non-distinction or the non-difference (*abheda*) which is related to both the Kṣatriya and the one who is other than Kṣatriya; and thus the cognition is that the Kṣatriya who is identical with the man is brave, and the one other than the the Kṣatriya who is identical with the man is not brave (*narābhinnaḥ kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ* and *narābhinnakaṣtriyānyaḥ na śūraḥ*). Whereas in the cases where the subject and the predicate words do not agree (*asamānādhikaraṇa*) such as *'narāṇām* kṣatriyeṣu *śauryam'* etc., both the subject and the predicate words (*kṣatriyeṣu* and *śauryam*) refer to the one who is other than the Kṣatriya and the absence of bravity by indication like the Kṣatriya and the brevity.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

And thus the cognition is that the bravity occurs in the Kṣatriya identical with the man (*narābhinnakṣatriye śauryam*) and the absence of bravity occurs in the one other than the Kṣatriya identical with man (*Kṣatriyānyasmin śaury ābhāvah*).

Now these scholars explain the convention (*vyutpatti*) facilitating such cognitions. According to them, since in the positive cognition (*bhāvānvayabodha*) produced from '*narāṇām kṣatriyeṣu śauryam*', the substratumness (*āśrayatā*) appears as the relation between the Kṣatriya, i.e. the subject, and the bravity, i.e. the predicate, the predicate word in the usages without agreement can indicate the absence of the predicate, i.e. the bravity, the counter positiveness of which is delimited by the substratumness (*āśrayatāv-acchinna pratiyogitākavidey-ābhāvaḥ*); and thus the cognition that the absence of bravity occurs in one who is other than the Kṣatriya (*kṣ atriyānyasmin śauryābhāvaḥ*) can be had. Also since the subject and the predicate words, in the case of usages with syntactic agreement between subject and predicate, can indicate what are other than the Kṣatriya and what is other than the bravity, (*vidyeyadharmi bhinna*), the cognition that the one who is other than the Kṣatriya who is identical with the man is not brave (*narābhinnakṣ atriyānyo na śuraḥ*) can be had.

Refutation of some scholars' position.

VI. 9. No, this position is not correct. In that case, in the usage 'Salutation to the one who is the best of men' (*tasmai puruṣottamāya namaḥ*), the non-difference from the meanings of *'puruṣa'* (i.e. man and other than man) would be required to be related to the meanings of *'tat'* (i.e. to the one and other than the one); and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

therefore the compounding of the word *'puruṣa'* with *'uttamaḥ'* becomes untenable due to the incompetence of words. Consequently, the *Prakāśa* kāra's refutation of the genitive *tatpursuṣa* compounding of the word *'puruṣottamāya'* in the sense of singling out by resorting to the prohibition such as not in the sense of singling out or distinguishing (*na nirdhāraṇe*) would become unjustified. Also, in that case, the position that in 'The kingdom belongs to the Kṣatriya who is the bravest among the men' (*nareṣu kṣatriyasya śūrasyedam rājyam*), the other than the Kṣatriya, i.e. the meaning of *'kṣatriya'*, relating to the one other than the brave, i.e. the meaning of *'śūra'*, is not further related to the relation of ownership expressed by the genitive; rather only the *Kṣatriya,* who is related to the brave, is related to the same relation, becomes untenable. Also in accordance with the fact that in 'He eats white Saindhava' (*śuklam saindhavam bhuṅkte*), the horse does not appear as the chief-qualificand in the cognition of the salt which appears as the qualifier with respect to the objecthood, the cognition of one meaning as the qualifier and the cognition of another meaning as the non-qualifier would become unjustified with the meaning of the genitive, provided that the recollection of the two meanings are from one single base word *'kṣatriya'* ending in genitive.

Explanation

Gadādhara now refutes the position of Some scholars. According to him, when in *'narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ'* etc., the identity of the man and the identity of the one who is other than the man expressed by the genitive *narāṇām*' (*ṣaṣṭhyarthabheda*) are held to be related to the Kṣatriya and the one who iṣ other than the Kṣatriya, then in *'tasmai puruṣottamāya namaḥ'* too

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the identity of the man and the identity of the one who is other than the man expressed by the genitive (*ṣaṣṭ hyarthabheda*) can be held to be related to the one and the other than the one expressed by 'one' (*tatpadārtha*) by explaining the compound as *'tasmai puruṣāṇām uttamāya'*; and thus the compound expression *'puruṣ-ottamāya'* would become untenable due to the lack of competency of the word *'puruṣa'* for being related to the word *'uttamāya*. It should be noted, however, that the expression *'puruṣottamāya'* is not *nirdhāraṇe ṣaṣṭhī'* by *'yataśca nirdhārane* (P. ii. 3. 41), rather it is only a *karmadhāraya*.

Another fault in the theory of Some scholars is that in *'nareṣu Kṣatriyasya rājyam'* etc., the position that "the Kṣatriya, identical with the brave, (*śūrābhinnakṣatriya*), i.e. one of the two meanings of the genitive base 'Kṣatriya,' but not the one who is other than the Kṣatriya, related to the one who is other than the brave (*aśūrānvita kṣatriyānya*), i.e. another of the two meanings of the genitive base *'Kṣatriya*, is related to the relation of ownership (*svatva sambandha*) expressed by the genitive case," becomes untenable due to the contradiction to the convention that of the two base-meanings, one cannot be related to the case-meaning as the qualifier if the other is not related to the case-meaning as the qualifier (*ekasya viśeṣaṇatayā aparasyāviśeṣaṇatayā bhānasya vyutpattivirdhāt*). And this convention is necessary to avoid the relation of the horse (one of the two meanings of *saindhava*) to the objecthood as the qualificand while the salt (another of the two meanings) is relating to the same objecthood as a qualifier in *'śvetam saindhavan bhuṅkte'* etc. Thus Gadadhara refutes the position as untenable.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Difficulties in the Position of Some Scholars.

VI. 10. This way, in 'Among the substances the earth and the water are possessors of taste' (*dravyeṣu kṣitipāthasī rasavatī*), the state of being what is other than the possessor of taste is not possible to be cognized in what are other than those that are delimited by both the earthness and the waterness; for, the mutual absence (difference) of the two as delimited by the earthiness and the waterness, is present separately even in the earth etc. that possess the taste. Also such a state cannot be cognized in the entity delimited by the mutual absence (difference) of the earth and the water separately; for, the state of being what is other than the possessor of the taste is contradictory there in the same way. Also such a state cannot be related to the entity, i.e. the fire (*tejas*) delimited by the mutual absence of the one (the water) which is qualified by the mutual absence of another (the earth); for, then the predicate such as the state of being what is other than the possessor of the taste cannot be related to the other than the water, i.e. the meaning of another word *'jala,'* as one word *'kṣiti'* itself can have an indication in the entity delimited by the mutual absence of one (the water) which is qualified by the mutual absence of another (the earth). Also, the relation of the predicate with the meaning of only one word constituting the *dvandva* - compound is contradictory to the semantic convention. Also, such a state, i.e. the predicate, cannot be related to the fire which is other than the water related in turn to the entity other than the earth through identity, when the two items, i.e. what is other than the earth and what is other than the water can be recollected from the two words through indication; for, even then the relation of the predicate cannot be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

explained with the meanings of the two words. Also, it should be noted that the meanings of the two words, which constitute the *dvanda* compound, cannot be interrelated with each other.

Explanation

Gadādhara now points out other difficulties in the position of 'Some scholars'. According to him, when the subject and the predicate words are admitted to express the respective subject and predicate and also what are other than the subject and the predicate, the subject and the predicate words, i.e. '*kṣitipāthasī*' and '*rasavatī,*' need to express in '*dravyeṣu kṣitipāthasī rasavatī*' the earth and the water, and what are other than the earth and the water, and also the state of being what is other then the possessor of the taste *(rasavadanyatva)*. However, than the same predicate *(rasavadanyatva)* cannot be related to what are other than those that are delimited by both the earthness and the waterness *(kṣitijalobhayatvādyava cchinnabhinna)*, as even the possessor of the taste (*rasādimat*), i.e. earth or water, can be claimed to have the difference from both the earth and the water that are delimited by the earthness and the waterness (*ubhayatvāvacchinnabheba*) separately. Also Gadādhara points out that the *rasavadanyatva* cannot be related to the entity (fire) delimited by the mutual absence of the water which is in turn qualified by the mutual absence of the earth (*ekabhedaviśiṣṭāparabhedāvacchinna*) by admitting an indication for either of the two subject words (*kṣiti* or *jala*) in *ekabhedaviśiṣṭāparabhedāvacchinna*, as then the relation of predicate (*vidheyānvaya*) with the same entity (*ekabhedaviśiṣṭa...*) expressed by other subject words (*jala* or *kṣiti*) would become untenable. Further

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such a position is untenable as the relation of the predicate with the meaning of only one of the two subject-words constituting a *dvandva*-compound is contradictory. Also, on the same ground that the predicate must be related to the meanings of both the subject words constituting the *dvandva*, Gadādhara refutes the suggestion that the predicate *rasavadanyatva* can be related to the fire which is other than the water related in turn to the other than the earth through identity (*abhedenekabhinnānvite aparabhinne*) by accepting that both the subject-words indicate other than themselves, i.e. the earth and the water (*tattadbhina*). Thus, Gadādhara refutes 'Some scholars' position that subject and predicate-words express both subject and predicate and other than what are subject and predicate.

Refutation of yet other's position

VI. 11. Yet others hold that in 'Kṣatriya is the bravest among the men' (*narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ*) etc., the identity (non-difference) relating to the bravest is the meaning of the genitive. And the identity of the Kṣatriya is related to the bravity - delimited who is identical with the man. Consequently, the exclusion of the bravity from the man who is other than the Kṣatriya is obtained by implication. However, this position is totally wrong. In such a theory, there would not be any way to explain the identity in 'The bravity occurs in the Kṣatriya of the men' (*narāṇām kṣatriye śauryam'*) and 'Of Kṣatriyas Karṇa donates abundantly' (*kṣatriyāṇām karṇaḥ pracuram dadāti*) etc.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the position of yet other scholars for final refutation. According to these scholars,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in *'narāṇām kṣatriyaś śūraḥ'* the genitive after *'nara'* etc. can be admitted to express the sense of identity (non-difference) (*abheda*); and by relating such a sense to the brave, delimited by bravity, and in turn related to the Kṣatriya through identity, the cognition that 'The Kṣatriya is identical with the brave who is identical with the man' (*narābhinnaśūrābhinnaḥ kṣatriyaḥ*) can be obtained; and hence by implication the exclusion from the man different from the Kṣatriya can be obtained. However, Gadādhara refutes the position on the ground that in *'narāṇām kṣatriyeṣu śauryam'* etc, where the words *'kṣatriyeṣu* and *śauryam'* do not have grammatical agreement, such a cognition of identity between the Kṣatriya and the brave one becomes untenable, and so the desired exclusion also becomes untenable.

Siddhānta of Gadādhara

VI 12. This, however, is the essence of the theory: Only the exclusion (state of being excluded) is the meaning of the genitive and the locative ruled in the singling out or determination. And the exclusion is the being the counterpositive of the mutual absence in the case of the utterance having the predicate relating through identity (non-distination). Whereas the same is the being the counterpositive of the constant absence in the case of the utterance having the predicate relating through non-identity. And such a counterpositiveness described by absence (i.e. exclusion) is related to the predicate as delimited by the delimitor of the predicateness of the predicate. Thus, consequently, there cannot be any overpervasion (i.e. the exclusion from the Kṣatriya) by taking into account the absence of the predicate, i.e. the brave, and some one else, delimited by the twoness. And the man etc., i.e. the base-meanings, are related to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

absence through the relation of superstratumness described by the substratumness pervading the manness etc., i.e. the delimitors of the expressednesses of the expressed meanings of the bases. Here such delimitors are qualified by (i.e. having community of locus with) the difference of the Kṣatriya delimited by the delimitor of the subjectness of the subject such as the Kṣatriyaness. By this process (of including the difference of the Kṣatriya in the superstratumness), the exclusion (the state of being excluded) from the men in general, i.e. the meanings of the base, who are devoid of the qualifier such as the generic property of the Kṣatriyaness, can be obtained in the property of the predicate.

Explanation

After explaining and refuting various theories of the meaning of *nirdhāraṇa*-genitive, Gadādhara now establishes his final conclusive theory of the meaning of *nirdhāraṇa*-genitive. According to him, the genitive and the locative prescribed by *'yataśca nirdhāraṇam'* (P. ii. 3.14) refer to the exclusion (the state of being excluded) (*vyāvṛttatva*). And in *'narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ'*, where the predicate such as the brave (*śūra*) is related to the Kṣatriya through identity (*abhedānvayividheya sthala*), the exclusion is the state of being the counterpositive of mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva pratiyogitva*) (here the man different from the Kṣatriya (*Kṣatriya bhinna nara*) is different from the brave, and hence the same brave is the counterpositive of such an absence); and in *'narāṇām kṣatriyeṣu śauryam'*, where the predicate such as the bravity (*śaurya*) is related to the Kṣatriya through non-identity (*bhedānvayividheyasthala*), the exclusion is the state of being the counterpositive of the constant absence (*atyantābhāvapratiyogitva*) (here the man different from

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the Kṣatriya has the constant absence of the bravity, and hence the same bravity is the counterpositive of such an absence.) Also Gadādhara states that the genitive base-meanings such as the man etc., are to be related to the genitive case-meaning such as the mutual or constant absence, i.e. the part of the exclusion, through the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*) as the same absence is present there. And since the superstratumness described by the substratumness pervading the manness (*naratvādivyāpakādhikaraṇatānirūpitādheyatā*), which is the delimiting property of the expressedness of the meaning of the base (*prakṛtyarthatāvacchedaka*) is qualified by the difference of the Kṣatriya delimited by the delimitor of the subjectness of the subject such as the Kṣatriyaness (*kṣatriyatvādirūpoddeśyatāvacchedakāvacchinna bheda-viśiṣṭa*), the very nature of the superstratumness would include the difference from the Kṣatriya; and consequently, the exclusion from the men in general, who are devoid of the qualifier of the Kṣatriyaness, becomes automatically understood in the predicate such as the brave or bravity. Thus, according Gadādhara, various other theories propounded by the Pūrvapakṣins are unwarranted.

Illustration of 'dravyāṇām kṣitipāthasī rasavatī'

VI. 13. In 'The earth and the water of the substances are possessors of the taste' (*dravyāṇām kṣitipāthasī rasavatī*) etc., only the state of being the pervader of the substanceness, qualified by the two mutual absences (differences) of both the earth and the water, is the relation (of the base-meaning such as the substance with the absence). However, only the self-nature (or identity) qualified by the manness, i.e. the delimitor of the exprssedness of the meaning of the base of the genitive case applied in the sense of singling out

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

or distinction, appears as the relation of the predicate such as the bravest with the subject such as the Kṣatriya. Consequently, the usage 'The demon is the bravest of the men' (*narāṇām rākṣasḥ śūraḥ*) etc. need not become contingent (imposed). Other matters related to genitive should be pondered over by scholars on their own.

Explanation

Gadādhara now illustrates the cognition of semantic relation in *'dravyāṇām kṣitipāthasī rasavatī'* etc. According to him, only the state of being what is excluded or exclusion (*vyāvṛttatva*) is the genitive meaning; however, the substance, i.e. the genitive base-meaning, is related to the mutual absence of the possessor of taste through the relation of the state of pervading the substanceness, qualified by the difference of both the earth and the water (*bhedadvayaviśiṣṭa dravyatvavyāpakatā*); and therefore, the exclusion from the substance different from both the earth and the water can be obtained in the possessor of the taste, i.e. the predicate.

Also, in *'narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ śūratamāḥ'* etc, the predicate such as the bravest (*śūratamāḥ*) is related to the subject such as the Kṣatriya through the relation of self nature (identity) qualified by the manness, i.e. the delimitor of the expressedness of the meaning of the base of the genitive of singling out or distinction (Kṣatriya and identity of the man); and therefore the same statement becomes tenable. However, in *'narāṇām rākṣasaḥ* śūraḥ', the predicate such as the brave cannot be related to the subject such as the demon through such a relation (demon does not have the identity with the man); and therefore the same statement can be avoided.

Thus ends the analysis of the genitive-meaning.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS OF LOCATIVE MEANING

Illustration of ādhārasaptayartha

VII.1. The locative of location (or substratum) expresses the sense of superstratumness; and the same is related to the action. And the relation of being the substratum and the superstratum is not of the nature of being the relation of contact etc.; for, then even the jujube fruit which has mere contact with the basin would require to be the substratum of the basin. However, the same is only a distinct category. And such a relation of being the substratum and the superstratum is to be admitted as delimited by a particular relation such as contact, as there are usages such as 'This is the substratum by contact', and 'This is the substratum by inherence' etc.

Now it can be admitted, on account of the fear of the said over pervasion (i.e. the jujube friut becoming the substratum of basin), that the relation of being the substratum through the contact is quite a distinct category. Whereas the relation of being the substratum through the inherence is only of the form of inherence. Also it cannot be objected that since the inherence is a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

binary relation and hence occurs in two items, the superstratums such as the form etc. too would have the contingency of becoming the substratums of the clothing etc. Since in that case, the substratumness too can occur in two separate items by the same logic of being a binary relation, such an overpervasion would become unavoidable. Also, now it may be held as follows: That the substratumness occurs in the substratum (locus) through the subjunctness; whereas it occurs in the super stratum through the adjuctness; and thus the overpervasion can be overcome due to the distinction between the delimiting relations. For, only the subjunctness of the substratumness is the conducive factor for the usage of substratum. However, this is not correct. For, then there would be no valid reason to admit the relation of substratumness as a distinct category, as the overpervasion can be avoided due to the distinction between the delimiting relations of the inherence itself.

Explanation

Gadādhara now sets out to illustrate the meaning of the locative of location (*ādhārasaptamyartha*). Since Pāṇini prescribes the location in the sense of the locus (*saptamyadhikaraṇe ca*, P. ii. 3. 36) and also since the locus is the substratum (*ādharo' dhikāraṇam* P. i.4.45), the locative in *sthālyām pacati* etc. expresses the supersubstratumness (*ādheyatva*). Now while the same expressed by the locative is related to the action of cooking etc., i.e. the meaning of the verb *'pac'* in *sthālyām pacati'* etc., the same expressed by the accusatve is related to the effect, i.e. the delimitor of the root-meaning (*dhātvarthatāvacchedakaphala*, c.f. II.).

According to Gadādhara, the relation of being the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

substratum and the superstratum (*adhārādheyabhāva*) expressed by the locative is a distinct category (*padārthānthara*), and not merely the relation such as the contact (*saṃyoga sambandha*). For, otherwise even the jujube fruit found in the basin would become the substratum of the basin (*kuṇḍādhāra*) by having the contact with the basin (*kuṇḍasaṃyoga*). Now the same relation between the two substances such as the jujube fruit and the basin is delimited by the contact; whereas the same between a quality and the substance such as the form and the clothing is delimitted by the inherrence. Further, to avoid the contingency of the Jujube fruit becoming the substratum of the basin, Gadādhara modifies his view that such a substratumness delimited by the contact (*saṃyogenādhāratva*) is a distinct category found only in the basin, whereas the substratumness delimited by the inherence (*samavāyenādhāratā*) is only the inherence (it is not a distinct category). Now the form of the pot need not become the substratum of the pot dispite the inherence (of the form with the pot) being binary and occurring in both the pot and the form (*dviṣṭha*) (Otherwise, the contingency cannot be avoided even when the *saṃvāyenādhāratā* is held to be a distinct category as the same too is binary). Also the contingency need not be avoided by holding that the usage of substratum (*ādhāravyavahāra*) is dependent on the subjunctness of the substratumness (*ādhāratānuyogitā*), and the form is only the adjunct of the substratumness, whereas the pot is the subjunct of the substratumness (The substratumness occurs in the substratum through the subjunctness, whereas it occurs in the superstratum through the adjunctness). For, the contingency can be avoided even by holding that the usage of substratum is dependent on the subjunctness of the inherence

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*samavāyānuyogitā*) and the form is only the adjunct of the interence, whereas the pot is the subjunct of the inherence (The inherence too occurs in the substratum through the subjunctness and in the superstratum through the adjunctness). Thus, Gadādhara establishes that the separate substratumness (*atiriktādhāratā*) need not be admitted.

Samyogāvacchinnādhikaraṇatva is not a distinct category

VII. 2 Also it is not correct to hold that the substratumness should differ due to the difference between the superstratums to avoid the substratumness described by the form, for the wind, i.e. the substratum of the touch. For, the assumption that the inherence differs due to the difference between the superstratums would be more justified compared to the assumption that the inherence is a distinct category and the substratumness is distinguished by the difference between the superstratums.

Now it may be objected as follows: Let the substratumness as delimited by the contact be admitted to have the form of contact only. Since only the basin and not the jujube fruit is the subjunct of the contact of the jujube fruit and the basin etc., the overpervasion is avoided. Also it cannot be held that since the jujube fruit is the subjunct of the contact occurring in the basin, the same would have the contingency of being the substratum. Although such a contact of jujube fruit is occurrent in the basin etc., the same would not be admitted to be describing the adjunctness of the basin etc. Only the being the subjunct of the contact having the same (fruit?) as its adjunct is the factor conducive to the usage of the substratumness of the same (basin).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Also it cannot be held that since the contact is conducive to the cognition of the qualification of the basin etc. in the jujube fruit, it has both (basin and the fruit) as its adjuncts and (it has both) as its subjuncts. The qualificative cognition of the substratum is invalid in the superstratum through contact. Only the adjunctness of the contact is the relation in the qualificative cognition such as 'The jujube fruit is present in the basin' (*kuṇḍe badaram*); and this is like the adjunctness of the inherence in the qualificative cognition such 'The form exists in the clothing' (*paṭe rūpam*). Otherwise, the subjunctness of the inherence of the clothing would need to occur even in the form due to such a qualificative cognition as 'The form is present in clothing through inherence.'

However, if you object so, then we shall reply that the substratumness delimited by the relation of contact too need not become a distinct category from the contact.

Explanation

Since the inherence (*samavāya*) is one, the wind which is the substratum of the touch (*sparśādhāra*) through the inherence would be required to be the substratum of even the form (*rūpādhāra*) through the inherence; and therefore to avoid such a contingency. some admit that the substratumness (*ādhāratā*) is different due to the deference between the superstratums. However, Gadādhara refutes such a position on the ground that the inherence itself can be held to be different due to the difference between the superstratums, and the undesired contingency can be avoided thereby.

Now some scholars object here as follows: That since only the subjunct of the contact (*saṃyogānuyogi*) is the substratum, the jujube fruit (*badara*), which is only the adjunct of contact, need not become the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

substratum. Also they avoid the overpervasion (i.e. the contingency of the substratumness (*ādhāratā*) for the jujube) by holding that only the being the subjunct of the contact having the same entity (jujube) as the adjunct (*tatpratiyogika sambadhānuyogitā*) is the factor conductive to the usage of substratum of the same (*tadādhāra-tāprayojaka*); and (though the jujube can be the subjunct of the contact occurrent in the basin (*kuṇḍaniṣṭha saṁyogānuyogi*), the same fruit does not have the state of being the subjunct of the contact that has the basin as its adjunct (*tatpratiyogika saṁyogānuyogitā*). Further, they avoid the overpervasion by holding that the cognition of the qualification of the substratum in the superstratum (*ādheye adhikaraṇaviśistabuddhi*) through the contact is invalid (dispite the contact being found between the jujube fruit and the basin, the same contact cannot have both the basin and the fruit as its subjuncts (*ubhayānuyogika*) and also cannot have both of them as the adjuncts (*ubhaya pratiyogika*); and thus cannot cause the qualificative cognition of the basin in the fruit). Here in '*kuṇḍe badaraṁ*' etc., the jujube being nominative meaning and hence being the qualificand of the cognition such as the fruit has the contact with the basin (*kuṇḍasaṁyogavad badaraṁ*), only the state of being the adjunct of relation of contact found in the basin (*saṁyoga pratiyogītā*) becomes the determining relation (*niyāmaka-sambandha*) of the substratumness of the basin (*ādhāratā niyāmakasambaṇdha*). And this instance is similar to the instance of the state of being the adjunct of the relation of inherence (*samavāyapratiyogītā*) bieng so in '*paṭe rūpam*. Now suppose the state of being the adjunct of the relation of inherence is not admitted to be so, and only the cognition of the qualification of the substratum (clothing) in the superstratum (form) is admitted to be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

so, then the form too would have the contingency of having the state of being the subjunct of the inherence of the clothing (*paṭa samavāyānuyogitā*).

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the substratumness delimited by the contact (*saṃyogāvacchinnādhikaraṇatva*) is of the form of only the contact (*saṃyogarūpa*) and not a distinct category. Hence the heaviness resulting from the admittance of a separate substratumness is avoided.

Definition of tadādhāratva

VII. 3. Some hold that the state of being the substratum of an entity is to be defined as the state of having the contact of an entity which is preventive of the falling of the entity. And the jujube fruit does not have the state of having the contact of the basin which is preventive of the falling of the basin; for, though the fruit has the contact with the basin, the basin can fall.

However, this view is not correct. The substratumness of the entity, falling down of which is unestablished, cannot be covered in such a position. Also, since the contact, which can prevent one's own falling, is found to occur in oneself, the same oneself too would have the contingency of being one's own substratum. Also, it cannot be held that the state of being the substratum of an entity can be defined to be the state of possessing the contact conducive to the non-production of the falling occurrent in oneself, while being other than oneself. For, the usage of substratum is found to be made even at the time of the non-recollection of such a state. Thus, enough of such a discussion on the definition of the substratumness.

Explanation

Gadādhara now presents the Pūrvapakṣin's definition

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the state of being the substratum of an entity (*tadādhāratva*). According to the Pūrvapakṣin, *tadādhāratva* can be defined as the state of possessing the contact of an entity that prevents the falling of the entity (*tatpatana pratibandhakasamyogavattva*); and since the fruit does not fall when the basin possesses the contact with the fruit, the basin can be the substratum of the fruit in *'kuṇḍe badaram';* whereas since the basin falls dispite the fruit possessing the contact with the basin, the fruit need not be the substratum of the basin. However, Gadādhara refutes the definition on the twin grounds that such a definition falls short of covering the sky as the substratum of the sound which never falls; and also such a definition applies to even the superstratum such as the fruit which too possesses the contact with the substratum such as the basin. Also, according to Gadādhara, the defect cannot be rectified by modifying the definition as the state of possessing the contact conducive to the non-production of the falling occurring in oneself while being other than oneself (*svānyatve sati svaniṣṭhapatanānutpādaprayojaka samyogavattvam*). For, one uses the expression *'kuṇḍe badaram'* and cognizes the substratumness even while not understanding such a state of being what is other than oneself (*svānyatva*) etc.

Illustration of locative—meaning in 'bhūtale vartate ghaṭaḥ'

VII.4. Now it may be objected that when the locative of location is held to be expressive of the superstratumness, the contingency of the absence of the semantic competency would arise in the statement such as 'The pot is present (occurents) on the ground' (*bhūtale vartate ghaṭaḥ*); for, the occurrence, i.e. the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

. Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

root-meaning, being of the form of superstratumness, the superstratumness described by the ground cannot be present there (in such an occurrence).

However, this objection is not correct. Since in such cases (*bhūtale vartate ghaṭaḥ*), the state of describing is of the form of substratumness, only the state of being described can be the meaning of the locative. And such a state of being described by the ground etc. is not untenable in the occurrence resident in the pot etc.

Therefore, though the occurrence in the origination, i.e. the meaning of the locative word 'in the origination' (*udbhave),* is absent in both the cause and the causality in the case such as 'Ability etc. is the cause of the origination of poetry' (*iti hetus tadudbhave*), the locative case becomes tenable due to the presence of the state of being described by the origination in the causality. Or as an alternative, it can be admitted that even the root 'to be' (*vṛt*) expreses the sense of substratumness, and only the state of describing such a substratumness is the agency of the pot etc. described by the meaning of the root 'to be'. Thus in *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ vartate*, the locative expresses only the state of having the ground as the location in such a root-meaning (the substratumness), and such a state is not untenable in such a substratumness.

Explanation

Gadādhara now explains the semantic competency (*yogyatā*) in relating the superstratumness described by the ground (*bhūtalādyādheyatā*), i.e. the locative-meaning, to the occurrence, the root-meaning, which too is the superstratumness, i.e. in *'bhūtale ghaṭaḥ vartate'* in the theory that the locative expresses the superstratumness.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

According to him, the lack of competency (*ayogyatā*) can be avoided by holding that the state of being what is described (*nirūpyatā*) is the locative-meaning. Here only the state of describing *(nirūpakatva)* is the substratumness (*ādhāratā*) and the state of being described by the ground (*bhūtalanirūpyatva*) can be related to the root-meaning, i.e. the occurrence in the pot (*ghaṭaniṣṭha vṛttitva*),

However, Gadādhara suggests as an alternative that by admitting the substratumness (*ādhāratva*) as the meaning of the root *'vṛt'* and also by admitting the state of describing the substratumness (*ādhāratānirūpakatva*) as the agency of the pot (*ghaṭakartṛtva*), the locative word *'bhūtale'* can be held to be expressive of the state of having the ground as the locus (*bhūtalādhikaraṇakatva*) which is tenable to occur in the substratumness. Thus, one can cognize in *'bhūtale vartate ghasṭaḥ'* that the pot is the describer of the substratumness which has the ground as the locus, i.e. which is resident in the ground. (*bhūtalādhikaraṇaka ādhāratānirūpako ghaṭaḥ*).

Avoidnce of 'caitre caitro gacchati'

VII. 5. Suppose now the locative of location denotes the state of having the base-meaning as its locus as relating to the action, then the usage 'Caitra goes into Caitra' (*'caitre caitro gacchati*) would become necessary. For, in such cases, the root-meaning such as going is occurrent in the agent such as Caitra. Also, the usage 'Caitra goes into the ground' (*bhuvi gacchati*) would become untenable. For, the action of going occurrent in Caitra is contradictory (not occurrent) in the ground. However, this objection is not correct. Since only the substratumness delimited by the indirect relation consisting of the agent (i.e. the being the abode of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

action) is the meaning of the locative, all the usages (*'bhuvi caitraḥ gacchati'* etc.) can be explained correctly. Even an indirect relation can be admitted to be the determining factor of the substratumness on account of the conventional usages.

Also even the particular state of being delimited by a certain space is the meaning of the locative of location: For instance, the same is found in the usages "The sound occurs in the Indian lute' (*vīṇāyām śabdaḥ*), 'The sound occurs in the ear' (*karṇe śabdaḥ*) and 'The monkey-contact occurs on the top of the tree' (*vṛkṣāgre kapisaṃyogaḥ*). Also to facilitate the *kāraka*-hood for the location in such cases, the verb 'occurs' (*bhāvati*) is to be supplied. Or as an alternative, it could be admitted that the word 'also' in 'The locative is used in the sense of the locative also' (*saptamyadhikaraṇe ca* P. ii. 3. 36) assigns the locative even after the words expressive of non-*kāraka*-locations (spaces). That is why the explanation by using the locative *tatpuruṣa* such as "The absence of the probandum which occurs in what is other than the possessor of the probandum" *(sādhyavadbhinne yas sādhyābhāvaḥ*) becomes tenable in the case of the expression "The non-occurrence in the locus of the absence of the probandum which is other than the possessor of the probandum is the concomitance" (*sādhyavadbhinne sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam*). When the verb *'vartate'* is to be supplied, the compound *'sādhyavad bhinna'* would become untenable there due to the absence of competency by way of having syntactic expectancy.

Explanation:

It has been held that the locative expresses the state of having the base-meaning (ground etc.) as the locus

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*prakṛtyarthādhikaraṇakatva*) as relating to the action expressed by the root. However, in such a position, the usage *'caitre caitro gacchati'* would become necessary, as the state of having Caitra, i.e. the base-meaning, as the locus, can be related to the action of going there (it is occurrent even in the agent 'Caitra'); whereas the usage *'bhuvi gacchati'* would become untenable, as the state of having the ground, i.e. the base-meaning, as the locus, cannot be related to the action of going there (it is not occurrent in the ground). However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the substratumness delimited by the indirect relation (*paramparāsambandhāvachhinnāśrayatā*) of being the abode of its own abode consisting of the agent (*kartṛghaṭita svāśrayāśrayatvarūpa*) can be held to be the meaning of the locative in such cases; and therefore *'caitre caitro gacchati'* can be avoided, whereas *'bhuvi vartate'* can be explained. Here while in the first case Caitra does not have the substratumness (Caitra is not the abode of Caitra who is the abode of going); in the second case the ground has the substratumness (ground is the abode of Caitra who is the abode of going).

Also Gadādhara illustrates that the particular state of being delimited by space (*avachhedyatāviśeṣa*). can be the meaning of the locative of location. According to him, since in *'vīṇāyām śabdaḥ'* etc. the state of being delimited by the spaces such as the *vīṇā* etc. is present in the sound etc., the *vīṇā* etc can be explained as the location. However, the point to be noted here is that the *kārakaness* of the *vīṇā* etc. can be explained only by supplying the verb *'vartate'* etc. and thereby relating the *vīṇā* etc. to the actions. Also, the same process would make the locative compound *'sādhyavadbhinnasādhyā-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

bhāvavad (avṛttitvam vyāptiḥ)' which is to be explained as *'sādhyavad bhinne yaḥ sādhyabhāvaḥ*, untenable. This is so because, when the verb *'vartate;'* is supplied, the word *'sādhyavadbhinne'* becomes syntactically expectant of the verb *'vartate'* and thus, being incompetent (*sāpeks am asamarthavad*), cannot be compounded with the word *'sādhyābhāvaḥ'*. Thus, Gadādhara proposes yet another alternative that the word *'ca'* in the rule *'saptamyadhikaraṇe ca'* (P. ii. 3. 36) can be held to assign the locative after non-*kāraka* - locations such as *'vīṇā'*, and *'sādhyavadbhinna'* etc., in such cases.

Locative in 'carmaṇi dvīpanam hanti

VII. 6 In the cases such as 'He kills the tiger for the leather' (*carmaṇi dvīpanam hanti*) etc. the locative, which is assigned by the rule 'locative is used after the word expressing the motif in association with an object' (*'nimittāt karmayoge'*, P. ....), makes one understand the state of being the motif of killing for the leather etc., i.e. the base-meaning. However, the being the motif is not merely the being the cause in general. For, the leather etc. cannot be proved to be the cause of the act of killing. Although the leather etc. do exist prior to the killing, they are rendered redundant by the desire and the effort. Rather, therefore, such a state of being the motif is the state of being the oject of the desire for being used that is conducive to the action of killing. And only the state of being dependent on the desire regarding oneself (i.e. the leather), relating to the action of killing, is the locative-meaning. And the locative base-meaning such as the leather is related to the object-referringness of such a desire, which is a part of the locative-meaning, through the relation of describing. However, the relation of inherence between the leather and the tiger to be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

killed cannot be the meaning of the locative; rather the same is required to be the non-expressed natural relation for the correctness of the use of locative after the word 'leather' (*carman*).

Explanation:

Gadādhara now illustrates yet another usage such as '*carmaṇi dvīpanam hanti*'. According to him, in such a usage, the locative is assigned by the rule '*nimittāt karmayoge*' (P....); and the same locative expresses the state of being the motif of killing (*hanananimittātva*) of the base-meaning such as the leather. And since the lether, i.e. the motif, cannot be the cause of killing (it is rendered redundant by the desire and the effort), the state of being the motif (*nimittātva*) is not the state of being the cause (*karaṇtva*); rather it is only the state of being the object of the desire for being used that is conducive to the action of killing (*kriyajanikā yā viniyojyatvenecchā-tadviṣayatvam*). And the locative in such cases expresses the sense of the state of being what is dependent on the desire regarding oneself for being utilised (*svaviṣayaka tādṛśecehadhīnatva*). Here while such a state is related to the action of killing, the locative base-meaning such as the leather is related to the object-referringness of the desire (*icchāviṣayitā*) through the describing. And thus one cognizes that he is the abode of the operation of killing caused by the desire, i.e. the abode of the object-referringness, described by the leather in such cases.

Illustration of 'goṣu duhyamānāsu gataḥ' etc.

VII. 7. In the usages such a 'He left while the cows were being milked' (*goṣu duhyamānāsu gataḥ*), the locative is assigned after the words 'cow' (*go*) etc. by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the rule 'By the action of what so ever, the time of another action is indicated, that takes locative case' (*yasya ca bhāvena* ..., P. ii: 3. 37). And the locative after the word 'being milked' (*duhyamāna'*), which is in grammatical agreement with the word cow (*'go'*), is used on account of the converition that the qualifier word must have the same case as that of the qualificand word; and this instance is similar to the instance of accusative after the word 'blue' (*nīla'*) in 'Bring the blue pot' (*'nīlam ghaṭam ānaya'*). The word 'root meaning' (*'bhāva*) in the prescriptive rule is intended to express the action; and thus the rule (P. ii 3.37) means that the locative is used after the word expressing the object of the action, which (action) while functioning as the qualifier of the meaning of the primary derivative, functioning in turn as the qualifier of 'cow', indicates, i.e. distinguishes another action. In the given case, the action of going is intended to be cognized as having the qualification such as the occurrence at the same time as that of the milking as the primary.

Now it may be held as follows: That since the action of milking, included in the distinguishing adjective, too is the distinguisher, the locative becomes facilitated after the word 'cow' (*go*) relating to the object of milking through identity. Also therefore, such a locative expresses merely the state of occurring at the same time as that of the action etc., and the milking expressed by the root 'to milk' (*duh,*) is related to such a locative-meaning through describing. Thus, the state of occurring at the same time as that of milking is obtained in the action of going. However, this position is not correct. For, the action of milking recollected from the root 'to milk' (*duh*), being recollected as the qualifier of the cow,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

i.e. the meaning of the primary derivative, cannot be the qualifier of the state of occurring at the same time.; also the locative cannot express the sense which is not related to the base-meaning such as the cow. Thus, only the action of milking, which is to be recollected from the word uttered together, is the meaning of the locative and the state of occurring at the same time is the relation of such a locative-meaning with the other action (going). Here in the case of the utterence of the primary derivatives, that express the present tense, the state of occurring at the same (present) time appears as the relation. Whereas in the case of the primary derivativeness that express the future tense such as 'He left when the cows were going to be yet milked' (*dogdhavyāsu gataḥ*) etc., the state of belonging to or occurring at the earlier time appears as the relation; also in the case of the primary derivatives that express the past tense such as 'He left while the cows were already milked' (*dughāsu gataḥ*), the state of belonging to or occurring at the next future tense appears as the relation. Also, since in the usage 'The thirst is quenched when the water is drunk' (*pāthasi pīte tṛṣā śāmyati*) etc., the primary derivative, expressing the sense of the past tense, is uttered, the point that even the relation of being the cause and the effect appears as the relation etc. is to be pondered over by the scholars on their own.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara illustrates the usage such as *'goṣu duhyamānāsu gataḥ'* etc. According to him, the locative is prescribed after the words 'cow' (*'go*) etc. in such cases by the rule *'yasya ca bhāvena bhāvalakṣaṇam'* (P. ii. 3.37); and the primary derivatives such as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'duhyamāna' etc., which are in agreement with such words as 'go' etc (*tatsamānādhikaraṇa*), get the locative by the convention that qualifier and the qualificand must have the same case endings. Also according to him, the rule means that the locative is used after the word expressing the object of the action, which (action), while functioning as the qualifier of the meaning of the primary derivative, functioning in turn as the qualifier of the cow etc., indicates or distinguishes another action (*yadviśeṣaṇakṛdantārthaviśeṣaṇatāpanna kriyāyā kriyāntarasya vyvārtanam tadvācakapadāt saptamī*). In *'goṣu duhyamānāsu gataḥ'*, the locative is used after the word *'go'*, because it expresses the oject of the action of milking, which (milking), while functioning as the qualifier of the meaning of the primary derivative (*duhyamāna*), is intended to distinguish the action of going (*gamanakriyā*) through the qualification of occurrence at the same time as that of the action of milking' (*dohanādisamāna kālīnatva*).

Now an alternative theory is proposed that since the action of milking, included in the distinguishing adjective (*vyāvartakaviśeṣaṇapraviṣṭa*) such as *'duhyamāna',* too is a distinguisher of the action of going, the locative can be used after the word '*go*' expressing the cow which is related to the object of milking through identity (*tatkarmādyabhedānvayi gavādipada*). Also, since the locative can be held to be expressing the state of occurring at the same time (*samānakālīnatva*); and the action of milking recollected from the root *'duh'* (*dūhyādyupasthāpita*) can be related to such a state through describing, the going occurring at the same time as that of the milking can be cognized. However, Gadādhara refutes such a theory on the ground that the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

action of milking, which is recollected as the qualifier of the cow (here the primary derivative *'duhyamāna'* expresses the action of milking as the qualifier of the cow being milked), cannot be related to something else such as the state of occurring at the same time as the qualifier; and also on the ground that the locative after the word *'go'* cannot express such a state which is not related to its base-meaning, i.e. the cow, but is related to the action of milking. Thus, Gadādhara suggests that the locative must be admitted to express only the action such as milking to be expressed by the word uttered together (*samabhivyāhṛtakriyā*). Here such an action can be related to the other action through the state of occurring at the same time (*samānakālinatva*) in present participial usage *'goṣu duhyamānāsu gataḥ*; and the same can be related to the other action through the state of occurring at the earlier time (*prākkālinatva*) in future participial usage *'goṣu dogdhavyāsu gataḥ'* etc.; whereas the same can be related to the other action through the state of occurring at the next (future) time (*uttara kālīnatva*) in the past participial usage *'goṣu dugdhāsu gataḥ'* etc.

Illustration of the usage 'guṇānyatve *sati* sattvāt'

VII. 8. In the cases such as 'It is a substance because of the existence (of the existing thing) while being other than what is a quality' (*guṇānyatve sati (sataḥ) sattvāt*), the genitive term 'of the existing thing' (*sataḥ*) needs to be supplied after the locative term 'while being' (*sati*). Otherwise the locative itself would become untenable due to the fact that the same would not be the object of the said rule (P. ii. 30 37), and hence 'the action to be distinguished would be absent. In such cases,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the root 'to be' (*as*) expresses the state of being the substratum as its meaning. The occurrence of one in the locus (substratum) of another appears as the relation of the state of being the substratum of the being what is other than the quality, with respect to the state of being the substance of the existence. Consequently, the state of occurring in the same locus (substratum) belonging to the two actions, stated by the author of Cintāmaṇi as the relation, can be justified to be obtained. Also, it should be noted that despite the cognition of the state of occurring at the same time belonging to the two actions such as sleeping and eating in 'It is eaten by Caitra who is sleeping' (*śayānena caitreṇa bhuktam*), only the *'laṭ'*-affix, due to its utterence together, expresses the state of occurring at the same locus (substratum) as that of eating in the action of sleeping. Therefore, the locative is not possible. This is so because, the locative is prescribed by the rule (P. ii. 3. 37) only in the case where the state of occurring at the same time is expressed by some other grammatical element. Thus ends the analysis of locative-meaning.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara concludes the seventh chapter by illustrating the locative usage *'guṇānyatve sati (sataḥ) sattvāt'*. According to him, in such cases the genitive term 'of the existing things' (*sataḥ*) needs to be supplied so that the locative term *'sati'* can be facilitated by way of referring to the second action of being (existing) which is to be distinguished from the first action of being (existing) to be expressed by *'sati.'* When the genitive term *'sataḥ'* is not supplied, the locative case cannot be assigned by the rule (P. ii. 3. 37), as the action to be distinguished would not be obtained from any word.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Also, according to him, the relation of the two actions is the occurrence of one in the locus (substratum) of another (*tadvanniṣṭhatva*); and therefore, even Cintāmaṇi Kāra's contention that community of locus (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) is the relation becomes facilitated.

Also another point to be noted here is that in '*śayānena caitreṇa bhuktam*' etc., the relation of the state of occurring at the same time (*samānakālīnatva*) is expressed by the '*laṭ*' affix itself found in *śayānena*; and therefore, the locative can be avoided there (locative is used in '*goṣu duhyamānāsu gataḥ*' etc. since the '*laṭ*' - affix does not express such a relation of *samānakālīnatva* there).

Thus ends the analysis of the locative-meaning.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER VIII

ANALYSIS OF THE VOCATIVE MEANING

Meaning of sambodhana prathamā

VIII. 1. In the cases such as 'O Caitra, you please eat' (*caitra tvayā bhujyatām*) etc., the first (vocative) case, used in the sense of addressing (*sambodhane ca,* P. ii. 3. 47), expresses only the addressing. And such an addressing is only the desire of the speaker that the addressee should be the abode of the knowledge produced from the word uttered immediately before. And such a desire, i.e. the sense expressed by the first (vocative) case, is cognized as the qualifier of the vocative base-meaning through the relation of objectness.

It may be objected now as follows: Since the cognition of the sentence-meaning and the inclination towards eating, that are dependent on the sentence such as 'You please eat' (*tvayā bhujyatām*), are possible for Caitra etc. even without the knowledge of the state of being addressed or the addresseness, the use of the first (vocative) word 'O Caitra' (*caitra*) in such a sentence is useless. However, this objection is not correct. The use of such a first (vocative) word '*caitra*' is meant to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

have, as its purpose, only the facilitating of the knowledge of the expressive power of the second person pronoun particularly in the Caitraness-delimited in the event of the absence of direct facing, i.e. the cause of the inference of the state of being addressed or the addresseeness. Also the expressive power of the second person pronoun, expressive of the second person, as delimited by the property adventitiously qualified by the state of being the delimitor of the addresseeness, cannot particularly be ascertained in the Caitraness-delimited etc. without the knowledge of the addresseeness in the Caitraness-delimited etc.

Explanation

Gadādhara now begins the analysis of the meaning of the first vocative case (*sambodhana prathamā*). According to him, the vocative 'case' in '*caitra tvayā bhyjyatam*' etc, which is assigned by the rule '*sambodhane ca* (P. ii. 3. 47) expresses only the addressing (*sambodhana*) which is nothing but the speakers desire that the addressee must be the abode of the knowledge produced from the word uttered immediately before (*avyavahitaśabdajanyabodhāśrayatvenecchā*). And since the vocative base-meaning such as Caitra is the object of such a desire, the same is related to the desire through the objectness (*viṣayatā*).

A fact to be noted here is that even without the knowledge of the addresseeness (*sambodhyatvajñāna*), Caitra etc. could have the knowledge of the sentence-meaning (*vākyārthajñāna*) and the inclination towards eating (*bhojana pravṛtti*) produced from the sentence such as '*tvayā bhujyatām*'; and therefore, it is objected that the use of the vocative such as '*caitra*' in the sentence is pointless. However, Gadādhara refutes such an

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

objection on the ground that the use of the vocative such as, '*caitra*' is necessary to cause the knowledge of the expressive power of the second person pronoun (*yuṣmat pada śaktigraha*) in the addressee such as Caitra-ness-delimited when the direct facing such as seeing (*asādhāraṇābhimukhya*) that can cause the inference of the addresseeness in Caitra (*sambodhyatānumāpaka*) is absent. Also he refutes the objection on the ground that the expressive power (*śakti*) of the second person pronoun '*tvayā*', which is expressive of the person delimited by the property adventitiously qualified by the being the delimitor of the addresseeness (*sambodhyatāv-acchedakatvopalakṣita dharmāvacchinna vācaka*) cannot be ascertained in Caitra without the knowledge of the addresseeness (*sambodhyatvagraha*) in the Caitraness-delimited.

Illustration of 'caitrātra ghaṭo'sti'

VII.2. It may again be objected that even then in the case of the sentence such as 'O Caitra, pot is here' (*caitratra ghaṭo'sti*), where the subsequent sentence does not consist of the second person pronoun, the usefulness of the vocative word becomes untenable to be explained. However, this is not correct to state. Even in such cases, the vocative is used with the purpose that the addressee should ascertain the speaker's intention, namely (the ascertainment of) the state of being uttered for the cognition of the sentence-meaning (for the addressee) as meant by the speaker himself, in the case of each sentence. Without the ascertainment of such a speaker's intention, Caitra etc. cannot have the verbal cognition from any sentence (such as *caitrātra ghaṭo' sti'*) though heard. Now the cognition of the particular sentence-meaning in the opposite or reverse ways needs to be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

avoided for Caitra and Maitra from the sentence 'Bring Saindhava' (*saindhavam ānaya*) which is uttered to cause the cognition of bringing of horse for Caitra and the cognition of bringing of salt for Maitra; and therefore, the knolwedge of the speaker's intention, namely, (the knolwedge of) the state of being uttered with the intention of producing the particular cognition of sentence-meaning for the particular listener needs to be assumed to have the causality with respect to the cognition of sentence-meaning in general.

Explanation

The utterance of vocative is held to be useful in grasping the expressive power of the second person pronoun. However, it can be objected now that the same would become impossible in the case of sentences such a '*caitrātra ghaṭo'sti, tam ānaya*' etc. which do not precede any sentence consisting of second person pronoun. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that even in such cases, the use of the vocative is necessary to facilitate the ascertainment of the speaker's intention (*tātparyaniścaya*) such as the state of being uttered for the cognition of the sentence meaning as intended by the speaker himself (*svīyavākyārthabodhārthoccaritatva*) without which the cognition of the bringing of the pot would be impossible from the sentence for Caitra. Also a point to be noted is that the knolwedge of the speaker's intention (*tātparyaniścaya*) of the form of the state of being uttered with the intention of producing the particular cognition for the particular listener (*tadīyatadbodhārthoccaritatva*) is absolutely necessary to be considered as the cause (*hetu*) of particular cognitions for particular listeners, as otherwise even the cognition of bringing of salt (*lavaṇānayana*) for Caitra and the cognition of bringing of horse (*aśvānayana*)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

for Maitra cannot be avoided from '*saindhavam ānaya*' which is intended to produce the cognition of bringing of horse for Caitra and that of bringing of salt for Maitra. Thus, Gadādhara justifies the use of vocative in '*caitrātra ghaṭo'sti*' etc. for facilitating the grasping of speaker's intention.

Sambodhana is prakṛtyartha viśeṣaṇa

VIII. 3. In the semantic convention that 'the meaning of the case, that is other than the numeber, appears as only the qualificand of the base-meaning,' even the distinction from the addressing, like the distinction from the number, must be included. Therefore, there is no loss (harm) even if the addressing appears as the qualifier of the base-meaning. However, as an alternative, it can be admitted that the addressing appears only as the qualificand of the base-meaning. As a matter of fact, only in accordance with the convention that 'The nominal base-meaning is to be related to the action only through the case-meaning', the case-meanings such as the objecthood etc are admitted to be appearing as the qualificand of the base-meanings; and therefore, the appearance of the case-meanings such as the objecthood etc. as the qualificands is not in accordance with the said semantic covnention (that the meaning of the case that is other than the number etc. appears only as the qualificand of the base-meaning). For, there is no valid reason to admit such a convention. Since Caitra etc., i.e. the meanings of the bases, ending in the vocative cases, are related to the other word-meanings (actions) as the qualifiers, the appearance of the base-meanings is baseless, i.e. unjustified. Therefore, enough of elaboration. Thus ends the analysis of the vocative-meaning.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara explains the fact that the adressing

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

expressed by the vocative is cognized as the qualifier of the base-meaning. (*prathamārthatādṛśecchāyāḥ prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇatayā bhānam*, Cf. VIII. 1) by holding that the rule that the nominal case meaning that is other than the number appears as the qualificand of the base-meaning (*saṃkhyātiriktasubarthaḥ prakṛtyarthaviśeṣyatayaiva bhāsate*) is inclusive of even the distinction from the addressing (*sambodhanabheda*). According to him, only the case-meanings that are other than the number and the addressing appear as the qualificands of the base-meanings. Thus, the addressing can appear as the qualifier of the base-meaning such a Caitra in '*caitra tvayā bhujyatām*' etc. Now it should be noted that some scholars hold that the addressing, i.e. the vocative case-meaning, can be admitted to be appearing as the qualificand of the base-meaning. However, this view is not correct. According to Gadādhara, the vocative base-meaning such as Caitra (*sambodhanavibhaktyantaprakṛtyartha*) is related to the action such as bringing (*ānayana kriyā*) as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇataya*); and therefore, the addressing, i.e. the vocative case-meaning, cannot appear as the qualificand of the case-meaning. Also, according to him, the cognition of the other meanings of the cases such as the objecthood (*subartha karmatva*) is to be admitted as the qualificand of the base-meanings (*prakṛtyarthaviśeṣyatayā*) due to only the convention that 'The base-meanings are related to the other meanings such as the action indirectly through the case-meanings (*nāmārthasya pratyayārtham antarā kṛtvā krīyānvayaḥ*) and not due to the said rule that 'the nominal case-meaning that is other than the number appears as the qualificand ....' (*saṃkhyātirikta subarthaḥ...*) as such a rule is invalid.

Thus ends the analysis of the vocative-meaning.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER IX

ANALYSIS OF THE MEANING OF *STRĪPRATYAYAS*

Meanings of Feminine affixes

IX.1. The feminine affixes such as '*ṭāp*' etc., that have nominals as their bases and have been assigned by the rule 'when the sense of femininity is to be denoted the feminine affixes are to be employed' (P. 4. 1.3), denote sometimes femininity as the qualifier of the base meanings. For instance, 'she goat' (*ajā*), 'she horse' (*aśvā*), 'Śūdra woman' (*śūdrā)*, 'dark woman' (*śyāmā*), 'fickle woman' (*capalā*), 'Brahmin woman' (*brāhmaṇī*) 'white (fair) woman' (*gaurī*), 'woman having beautiful hair', (*sukeśī*) and 'pregnant woman' (*garbhiṇī*), etc. Here in such cases femininity means the state of possessing the uterus. Also, it may be objected that the feminine affixes '*ṭāp*' etc. are assigned after words expressing females for the sake of grammatical correctness; and therefore, femininity is not the meaning of such an affix, and the cognition of the femininity in such cases is produced from the inferential reason such as the state of being the object of the knowledge of peaker's intention as being conveyed by the base of feminine affixes. However, this objection is not correct. Due to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

deviation of the same reason in the feminine words such as 'cot' (*khaṭvā*) etc., such a reason cannot be established to prove the femininity. Even when the same reason is qualified as 'while being an animate,' the same would have deviation in the case of the words such as '*devatā*' etc. As a matter of fact, the femininity must be admitted to have been cognized as the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum of the negative-meaning (negation) in accordance with the negative usages such as 'The she-goat is absent in the place full of he-goats' (*ajavatyapy ajā nāsti*). Otherwise the validity of such usages would become untenable due to the contradiction to, i.e. impossibility of the absence of the goat delimited by the particular generic properly of goatness common to the he-goat.

Explanation

Gadādhara now takes up the analysis of the meanings of feminine affixes (*strīpratyayas*). According to him, the feminine affixes such as '*ṭāp*' etc., which have nominals as their bases (*prātipadikāprakṛtika*), have been assigned by the rule *striyām* (P. 4.11.3); and therefore refer to the femininity (*strītva*), namely possession of uterus (*yonimattva*) in 'she-goad' (*ajā*) etc. However, he refutes the position that the '*tāp*' etc. are used only for the grammatical correctness (*sādhutva*) of the words, and the femininity (*strītva*) is cognized in such cases on account of the inferential reason, namely the state of being the object of the knowledge of speaker's intention as being conveyed by the nominal bases of feminine affixes (*strīpratyayaprakṛtitātparya viṣayī bhūtatva*) on the ground that such a state cannot act as an inferential reason (*liṅga*) due to the deviation of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

same in the feminine words such as '*khaṭvā*' (while such a state is present in '*khaṭvā*, the femininity is absent there). Also Gadādhara establishes his own theory that the feminine affixes '*ṭāp*' etc. express the femininity on the ground that in usages such as '*ajavatyapy ajā nāsti*' etc., the femininity appears only as the delimitor of the relatedness of the relatum (she-goat) of the negation (*nañarthānvayitāvacchedaka*) as the absence of the goatness-delimited common to even the he-goat (*pumsādhāraṇa jātiviśeṣāvacchinnābhāva*) cannot be cognized there.; and therefore the femininity needs to be cognized.

Vaiyākaraṇas' theory

IX. 2. It may be held now as follows: That the femininity is only the meaning of the bases; and such a femininity is related to the other-base meaning such as the property-possessor as the qualifier. Whereas the feminine suffixes '*ṭāp*' etc. are merely suggestive. Therefore, we can explain the verse of the grammarians that "the five, namely, the base-meanings, the substance, (individual), the gender, the number and the object (hood) etc. constitute the base-meanings; whereas only the first three are held to be the base-meanings by some." In the verse, 'base-meaning' (*svārthaḥ*) means generic properties such as the cowness, which are the primary senses of the words 'cow' etc.' whereas 'substance' (*dravyam*) means the property-possessors such as the cow, which are secondary meanings of the word 'cow' in their theory. Also. the gender is necessary to be admitted as the base-meaning. For, otherwise, since there is no separate word expressing the masculinity in the expression such as 'There is no Brahmin, but only a Brahmin woman' (*nātra brāhmaṇo api tu brāhmaṇī*),

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the cognition of the masculine gender would become utenable. The cognition of the generic property and the substance is quite regular from the word 'Brahmin' etc. whereas the cognition of the gender is occasional as it is dependent on the speaker's intention and the competency of words. In the expression such as she is a 'Brahmin woman' (*brāhmaṇī*) etc. the masculine gender is not cognized.

However, this position is not correct. Though the masculinity can be established to be the meaning of the nominal bases by the said reasoning, there would occur the heaviness in assuming the endless nominal bases as denoting the sense of the femininity. Therefore, it is justified to assume that only a few feminine affixes denote the femininity due to economy. That is why, to include the femininity in the meanings of the feminine affixes,' the term 'gender' is mentioned in the rule 'Base-meanings, gender etc. are the nominative case-meanings' (P... ii. 3.46). Otherwise since the femininity gets included under the base-meanings alone, the mention of the term 'gender' separately in the rule would become untenable.

Explanation

Gadādhara now states grammarian's (such as Bhartṛhari's) theory of the meanings of the feminine affixes. According to Bhartṛhari, the gender such as the masculinity (*puṁstva)* and the femininity (*strītva)* are also the meanings of the nominal base (*prātipadikārtha*), whereas the affixes are merely suggestive (*dyotaka*) of the femininity. (cf. '*sāvartho dravyaṁ ca liṅgaṁ ca saṅkhyā karmādireva ca amī pañcaiva nāmārthāḥ Vākyapadīya. ...*). He supports his theory on the ground

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that in '*nātra brāhmaṇo apitu brāhmaṇī* vartate' no separate word excepting the base denoting the masculinity (*puṃstva*) is present; and hence the same becomes untenable to be cognized when the gender is not the base-meaning. A point to be noted in this grammarian's theory is that the bases necessarily denote the base meanings such as the Brahminness (*jāti*) and the individuals such as the Brahmin as they are necessarily cognized; whereas the same bases denote the gender such as the masculinity only occasionally as they are cognized only upon the speakers' intention to cognize them in '*brāhmaṇāḥ*' etc.

However, Gadādhara refutes the grammarian's theory on the ground that the assumption that fewer feminine affixes (*strī pratyayas*) denote the base-meanings etc. is much more economical compared to the assumption that endless numebr of nominal bases denote them. Also, he supports his refutation on the ground that the separate mention of the word '*liṅga*' denoting the gender in the rule '*prātipadikārtha...*' (P. ii.3. 46) would be untenable if the base itself expresses the gender etc.

Strītva is denoted as a sumbandhaviśeṣa

IX. 3. In some cases, the feminine affix denotes the femininity such as the wifeness functioning as the qualificand of the base-meaning. For instance, it denotes the same in cases such as 'Wife of an Ācārya' (*ācāryāṇī*), 'Wife of Manu' (*mānavī*), 'Śūdra woman' (*śūdrī*) etc. Here the wifeness is a type of relation and the base-meaning such as the Ācārya is related to the the same through the describing. In the case of the words such as 'A cot' (*khaṭvā*), 'A forest' (*aṭavī*) and 'A deity' (*devatā*) etc., the feminine affixes are not expressive of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the femininity. Since the possession of the femininity of the form of the uterus is incompetent (untenable) in the base-meanings in such cases, the same (base-meanings) cannot be related to the meaning of the feminine affix. Also, the statement of Śrīpatidatta that only the distinct property such as the feminine gender, which is found to occur in the words, is cognized as occurrent in the meanings of bases through indirect relations in such cases is unjustified. There is no valid means (reason) to admit that the feminine gender etc. are cognized there in the meanings.

In the rule "The feminine stems in *'Ū'* and *'Ī' are'* called *'nadī'* (P. i. 4.3), the phrase feminine stems in *'U'* and *'I'*, are intended to denote the words of feminine gender, and not intended to denote the words expressing the sense of items qualified by the femininity. Also, therefore the designation of *'nadī'* does not become untenable for the words 'forest' (*aṭavī*) etc, though not denoting the items qualified by the feminity. Also therefore, the words 'wealth' *(śrī')* and 'earth' (*bhū*) etc., though are not denotative of the items qualified by the feminity due to the absence of the state of ending in a feminine affix, can be the objects of the prohibition by the rule 'Feminine words ending in *'Ī'* and *'Ū'*, admitting *'iyan'* and *'uvaṅ'* as substitutes, are optionally termed *'nadī' (neyaṅuvaṅ sthānau*, P. i. 4.4) on account having the occasion for the designation of *nadī*'. Also it may be objected that then in the cases such as 'For the woman who is the leader' (*senānye striyai*), the designation of *nadī* would become contingent for the words *'senānī'* etc. as the words *'senānī'* etc., being dependent on the qualificands, have only the feminine genders. However, this is not correct. In accordance with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the usages, only the state of being the words of feminine genders, which is not dependent on the utterance of the feminine qualificands, must be intended to be the determining factor for obtaining the designation of '*nadī*' for the words. This in brief concludes the analysis.

Thus ends the analysis of the meanings of feminine affixes.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara illustrates the peculiarity of the feminine affixes (*strīpratyayas*) that they denote the femininity (*strītva*) only as the peculiar relations such as the wifeness (*bhāryātva*) to which the base-meanings such as Ācārya are related through describing (*nirūpakatā*) in *ācāryāṇī* etc. Also, he states that the same feminine affixes do not denote the feminity (*strītva*) in the cases such as 'A cot' (*khaṭvā*) etc., as the base meanings cannot be related to them due to the absence of the femininity of the form of possessing the uterus (*yonimattvarūpastrītva*) in the base-meanings such as the cot etc.

A point to be noted here is that though the femininity (*strītva*) is absent in the base-meanings such as the cot etc, the feminine gender which is present in the words such as '*khaṭvā*' etc. can be held not to be present in the base-meanings such as the cot etc. through the indirect relation of being cognized by the word, i.e. the abode of the gender (*svāśrayapadabodhyatā*); and hence Śrīpatidatta etc. have admitted that there is no untenability of relations (*anvayānupapatti*) if the feminine affixes are admitted to denote the gender in '*khaṭvā*' etc. However, Gadādhara refutes such a position on the ground that there is no reason to admit such an indirect

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

relation. Also, the term '*stryākhya*' in '*yūstryakhyāu nadī*' (P. i.4.3) is intended to refer to the mere words of feminine gender (*strīliṅga śabdapara*); and hence the words '*aṭavī*' etc. can be explained to have the designation of *nadī*; and also therefore, the position that the words such as '*śrī*', '*bhū*' etc. are to be prohibited from having the designation of '*nadī*' by the rule '*neyaṅuvaṅsthānau*' (P. i. 4.4) becomes tenable (otherwise, by being the words of feminine gender, *nadī*-designation becomes applicable to even them, though they do not refer to the items having femininity). However, in the usage such as '*senānye striyai,*' the word '*senānī*' cannot be imposed of the designation of '*nadī*', as the same designation would be held to be applicable to only with respect to the original feminine stems in '*Ī*', and '*Ū*' etc. that are not dependent on some other feminine stems for their gender.

Thus ends the analysis of the meanings of feminine of the meanings of feminine affixes.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHAPTER X

ANALYSIS OF MEANINGS OF SECONDARY AFFIXES

Illustration of taddhitapratyayārtha

X.I. The secondary derivative affixes, that have nominals as their bases, too produce sometimes the cognitions of relations of their meanings with the base meanings, and at other times produce the cognitions of relations of the parts of their meanings with the base-meanings. In the usages such as 'The female child of Garga' (*gārgiḥ*) (P. iv. 1. 16; vi. 4, 150), the base-meaning such as Garga is related to the producedness constituting the part of the child, i.e. the meaning of the secondary derivative affix assigned in the sense of the child. Whereas, in the usage such as 'The grand (*gotra*) child of Garga' (*gārgyaḥ*) (P. iv. 1.195) etc., the base-meaning such as 'Garga is related to the producedness, constituting the childness, i.e. the part of the grand (*gotra*) child, the meaning of the secondary derivative affix. And in the usage such as 'The great grand (young) child of Garga' (*gārgyāyaṇaḥ*) (P. iv. 1.101, i. 2. 66) etc, the base-meaning such as the grand child of Garga is related to the producedness constituting

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the part of the great grand (young) child, i.e. the meaning of the derivative affix; whereas Garga is related to the surviving, i.e. the part of the meaning of the great grand (young) child who is established by convention to be a great grand child with the great grand father surviving. Thus the cognition is that 'This great grand child is the child of the grand child of Garga who is surviving at the survival time of Garga himself'.

Explanation

Gadādhara now takes up the analysis of the meanings of the secondary derivative affixes (*taddhiṭ apratyayārtha*). According to him, the secondary affixes (*taddhita pratyaya*), like the feminiinine affixes, (*strīpratyaya*), produce the cognition of their meanings (*svārtha*) or the parts of their meanings (*svārthiaka deśa*) as having the relations with their base meanings. For instance in *'gārgiḥ'* etc. (cf. P. iv. 1. 16; vi. 4. 150), the base-meaning such as Garga is related (through describing) to the state of being produced (*janyatva*) which constitutes the part of the meaning of the derivative affix; and hence one cognizs that "The female child of Garga has the producedness described by Garga" (*garganirūpitajanyatvāśryayaḥ*). Whereas in *'gārgyaḥ'* (P. iv. 1. 105), the base-meaning such as Garga is related (through describing) to the producedness (*janyatva*) which constitutes the childness (*putratva*), i.e. the part of the meaning of the secondary affix or grand child (*gotrāprtya*); and hence one cognizes that 'The grand child of Garga is the child of the son having the producedness described by Garga' (*garganirūpita janyatāśrayaḥ putrāpatyam*). Also, in *'gārgyāyaṇaḥ'* (P. iv. 1. 101, i. 2. 66), the immediate base meaning such as the grand child of Garga is related to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

producedness which constitutes the part of the great grand child, i.e. the meaning of the affix; whereas the derivative base-meaning such as Garga is related to the surviving (*jīvana*), i.e. the part of the meaning of the great grand child (*yuvāpatya*). These relationships are facilitated by the facts that the great grand child of Garga has the producedness described by the grand child of Garga; and the survival of the great grand father is related to Garga as his survival is necessary.

Illustration of 'māñjiṣṭham vāsaḥ'

X. 2. In the usages such as 'The clothing is red like Rubia Munjista' (*māñjiṣṭham vāsaḥ*) etc, the secondary derivatie affix *'āṅ'* is assigned in the sense of coloured there by or being associated with that (*tena raktam,* P. iv. 2. 1). Here the state of being coloured thereby or associated with that means the being the object of the superimposition of the form (redness) belonging to Rubia Munjiṣṭa which is dependent on it's association with the same Rubia Munjiṣṭa. And 'the state of being dependent on it's association with that' is included as a qualification to the superimposition to avoid the state of being coloured by or associated with the yellow pigeon, i.e. the (real) abode of the yellowness to be imposed, for the conch in the superimposition such as 'The conch is yellow' (*pītaḥ śaṅkhaḥ*). Also, here 'the state of belonging to' (*tadīyatva*) is included as the qualification to the form to avoid the state of being coloured by or associated with visual perception for the clothing. Here the base-meaning such as the Rubia Munjista, which is the cause of the red form, is related to the state of being coloued by, i.e. the part of the meaning of derivative affix, through the relational adjunctness, and to the form, through the abodness. In

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the usage such as 'Roasted on a spit' (*śūlyam*) and 'Cooked in a pot' (*ukhyam*) etc, the base-meanings such as the spit and the pot are related to the refinement of the form of cooking, the part of the meaning of the secondary suffix, i.e. 'being refined', through the substratumness.

Also, in the usages such as 'The night is the time associated with the Puṣya-constellations' (*pauṣī rāthriḥ*) etc., the affix *'āṅ'* comes after the instrumental word, i.e. the name of lunar mansion, to signify the time associated with asterism or constellation (P. iv. 2.3). And the time is being associated with the constellation means it has the state of being the abode of the passing of the moon through the particular constellation. And the constellation is related to the passing of the moon, i.e. the part of the meaning of the derivative, as the object.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara illustrates the usage *'māñjiṣṭham vāsaḥ'* where the affix *'āṅ'* comes after the word of colour *'māñjiṣṭha'* in the sense of 'being coloured thereby or associated with that' (*tena yuktam.* P. iv. 2.1.). According to him, being coloured thereby or associated with that (*tena raktatvam*) means the state of being the object of the superimposition of the form of something which is dependent on the association with that (*tadīyasambandhādhīna tadīya rūpāropaviṣayatvam*). Here since the superimposition of the form (*āropa*) is qualified as being dependent on the association with that (*tatsambandhādhīna*), the usage such as *'hāritālaḥ śaṅkhaḥ'* can be avoided with the intention of the superimposition of the yellowness found in the yellow pigeon, as the same superimposition is not dependent on the association with the yellow pegeon. Also since the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

form (*rūpa*) is qualified as 'belonging to that' (*tadīyatva*), the usage *'cākṣuṣam vāsaḥ'* can be avoided with the intention of the superimposition of red form on the clothing (due to the defect in the eye) as the form perceived in the clothing does not belong to the eye (it belongs to the Rubia Munjiṣṭa). Also, Gadādhara illustrates the usages *'śūlyam'*, *'ukhyam'*, etc. wherein the base-meanings such as 'spit' (*śūla*), and 'pot' (*ukhā*) are related to the refinement of the form of cooking as the abode; and so one cognizes that 'The cooking of the form of refinment has the spit (or the pot) as the abode (*śūla ukhādyadhikaraṇakasamskāravat*). Also, he illustrates the usages *'pauṣī rātriḥ'* where *'āṅ'* is used after the word of lunar mansion to signify the time associated with constellation *nakṣatreṇa yuktaḥ kālaḥ* (P. iv. 2.3). In such cases, the base-meanings such as the Puṣya-constellation etc. are related to the passing of the moon (*śaśibhoga*) which is a part of the meaning of the derivative affix, namely the being the abode of the passing of the moon through the constellation (*tannakṣatra śaśibhogāśrayatva*), as the object. And so one cognizes that the night is the abode of the passing of the moon through the Puṣya-constellation (*puṣyanakṣatraśaśibhogāśrryā rātriḥ*).

Illustration of the usage 'pauṣo māsaḥ'

X. 3. In the usages such as 'The month is Pauṣa' (i.e. time having *paurṇamāsī* associated with the *puṣya-constellation*)' (*pauṣo māsaḥ*), 'The year is Pauṣa' (i.e. time having Paurṇamāsī associated with the *Puṣya-*constelation)' (*pauṣo varṣaḥ*), the affix *'āṅ'*, assigned by the rule that *'āṅ'* comes after the name of a full moon night to denote the devision of time in which the night falls' (*sāsmin paurṇamāsī*, P. iv. 2.21), expresses the divi-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sion of time delimited by the state of consisting of the Paurṇamāsī as its sense. And the base-meaning such as the time associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation (*pauṣī*) is related to the Paurṇamāsī through identity. The words such as *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. do not denote merely etymological sense (i.e. time having *Paurṇamāsī* associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation) as there are no usages such as 'The fortnight is Pauṣa' (*pauṣaḥ pakṣaḥ*) etc. Therefore, the same words such as *'pauṣaḥ'* are also conventional. Since the word *'pauṣaḥ'* is conventional, besides being etymological, the term 'designation' is supplied in the rule *'sāsmin...'* (P. iv. 2.21). And the delimitor of the describerness of the describer of the convention is only the state of being the collection of the (thirty) days in a month etc. that begins from the first day of the white Full moon half and ends with the New moonday; and not merely the monthness consisting of any thirty days etc. Although the term of 'month' is found to occur even in the collection of any thirty days that has any particular day as its boundary (limit), the usages 'Time having Paurṇamāsī associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation' (*pauṣaḥ*) etc. are not found to occur in the collection of days included in the thirty days consisting of the Paurṇamāsī associated with *Puṣya*-constellation, but that falls outside the lunar or solar Pauṣa-months having the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation.

Explanation

Gadādhara now illustrates yet other usages such as *'pauṣo māsaḥ'* and *'pauṣo varṣaḥ'* etc. According to him, since the rule *'sā' smin paurṇamāsī'* (P. iv. 2.21) assigns the secondary derivative affix *'aṅ'* in the sense of the division of time consisting of *Paurṇamāsī* (*paurṇamāsī ghaṭita*), the base-meaning such as the 'time associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation' (*pauṣī*) is related to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Paurṇamāsī through identity. Thus one cognizes that the month is the time associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation which is identical with the Paurṇamāsī etc. in such cases. It should be noted here that the secondary derivative *'pauṣaḥ'* (time having Paurṇamāsī associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation) is not merely etymological (*yaugika*)' but rather is conventional besides being etymological (*yogarūḍha*), as the usages such as *'pauṣaḥ pakṣaḥ'* (where a fortnight can be identical with the time having the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation) are never made. Another point to be noted here is that the word *'pauṣaḥ'* is meant to convey only a month which is conventionally established to have the collection of thirty days beginning from the first day of white (Full moon) half to New moon day (*śauklapratipadādi darśānta tithisamudāya*); and therefore, the state of being such a collection of thirty days (*samudāyatva*) found in the month is the delimitor of the describerness of the describer of the convention (*rūḍhinirūpakatāv-acchedaka*) of the word *'pauṣaḥ'*. Whereas the monthness of the month which is found in any collection of thirty days (*trimśattithirūpamāsatva*) cannot be admitted to be the delimitor, as the usage '*pauṣaḥ*' is never made with respect to the collection of any days included in the thirty days consisting of the Paurṇamāsī associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation (*pauṣyādi ghaṭita trimśat tithyantargata tithi*) which falls outside the lunar or solar Pauṣa-months (*cāndrasaura pauṣādi bahirbhūta*).

Dhanustharavi viśiṣṭatva is not the delimitor

X. 4. Now it may be held as follows: That how is it that the state of being qualified by the passage of the sun occurring through the Sagittarius is not to be considered as the delimitor of the expressedness of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

expressed meaning of the word *'pauṣaḥ'* (the time having the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation) as the usage *'pauṣaḥ'* is beyond dispute in the case of the solar month as well. However, this position is not correct. In the event when the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation is not found to occur in the solar month of the Paurṇamāsī associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation, the meaning of the word *'pauṣaḥ'* as admitted to have been obtained through the etymological convention would become lost (destroyed). Also it should not be objected that in the case of the solar month where the Paurṇamāsī associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation does not occur, the usage *'pauṣaḥ'* (time having *Paurṇamāsī* associated with *Puṣya*-constellation) is to be considered as primary with respect to the solar *Pauṣa*-month only on the basis of the conventional power of the a word *'pauṣaḥ,'* For, in that case, the analysis of the etymological sense based on the etymology of the word *'pausaḥ'* would become useless (unjustified).

It may be argued now that let the primary meaning (i.e. primary usage) of the word *'pauṣaḥ'* be lost (destroyed) in some particular (solar) year and month; but what is the harm (loss)? And in such cases, the usage of the word *'pauṣaḥ'* can be admitted to be in the sense of solar month through indication. And this instance is similar to the instance of the usage of the word *'paṅkajam'* (mud-born lotus) in the sense of the ground - lotus. However, this argument is not correct. Then the annual offerings for the deceased forefathers caused by the solar Pauṣa-month, i.e. the primary sense of the word *'pauṣaḥ'* would become lost (untenable) in the solar month wherein the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation does not occur.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Now it is proposed that the state of being qualified by the passage of the sun occurring through Sagittarius (*dhanustharaviviśiṣṭatva*) should be admitted as the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning of the word *'pauṣaḥ'* (*pauṣapadaśakyatāvacchedaka*), as such a state of being present in the solar month through temporal qualification can facilitate the usage *'pauṣaḥ'* in solar months. However, Gadādhara refutes the position. According to him, when such a position is admitted, the usage *'pauṣaḥ'* would become possible only in the solar months where the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation (*puṣyapūrnimā*) actually occurs; and hence the same usage would become untenable in the solar months where the *puṣya-paurṇamāsī* does not occur. Also, it can be held that the usage *'pauṣaḥ'* is facilitated in the solar months devoid of *puṣya-paurṇamāsī* through mere convention (*rūdhim avalambya*). However, Gadādhara refutes again such a position on the ground that then the etymological analysis of the term *'pauṣaḥ'* as the time having the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with *Puṣya*-constellation would become pointless.

Also, another position that can be held is that the primary sense (*mukhyārtha*) or usage (*vyavahāra*) of the word *'pauṣaḥ'* need not be admitted in the case of solar months devoid of the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation; and the usage of the word *pauṣaḥ'* in such cases, can be facilitated merely through the indication (*lakṣaṇā*); and therefore there is no harm in admitting such a state as the delimitor. However, Gadhādhara refutes even such a position. According to him, then the annual offerings for the forefathers (*ābdika śrāddha*), which can be caused only by the primary

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sense of the word *'pauṣaḥ'* (i.e. the time having the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation) would become untenable in such solar months.

Śūlapāṇi's theory

X.5. The followers of the naturally reported text of Śūlapāṇi hold here as follows: That the word *'pauṣaḥ'* (the time having *Paurṇamāsī* associated with *Puṣya*-constellation) has only conventional power but not etymological power in the sense of the months denoting the collection of days that begin with the first day of the white Fullmoon half and end with the New moon day and are caused from the sun passing through the Sagitttarius; and also it has the same power in the sense of the months denoting the collections of days that begin with the first day of the white Full moon half and end with the New moon day, i.e. the abode of the sun passing through the Sagittarius, but are different from the months of Māgha etc having the passage of the sun to the Capricornus to be completed by the sun passing through the Sagittarius. This position is supported by the statement that the last (Āśvina) and the penultimate (Bhādrapada) are to be known as associated with three constellations. The association with the *Puṣya*-constellation is not regular (certain) in the Paurṇamāsī of the Pauṣa month.

Now it may be argued that when the etymologicality is not resorted to, only an expressive power for the word *'pauṣaḥ'* is justified to be assumed in the sense of the solar months of the forms of the collections of days qualified by the sun passing though the particular astrological house. However, this argument is also not correct. On account of the statements such as "That is the New moonday of the Vaiśākha month which is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

associated with the Rohiṇi" etc., the words such as *'vaiśākhaḥ'* and *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. become established to have the expressive powers only in the sense of the lunar months and not in the solar months.

Explanation

Now Gadādhara analyses the theory of the followers of Śūlpāṇī. According to them, the words *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. have only a conventional power (*rūḍhatva*), and not etymological power (*yaugikatva*), in the months denoting the collections of days which begin from the first day of white Full moon half and end with the New moon day (*śuklapratipadamārabhya darśānta*), caused from the sun passing through the Sagittarius (*dhanurādistha ravyārabdha*) or in the months denoting the collections of days (which begin with the first day of the white Full moon half and end with the New moon day) that are the abode of the sun passing through the Sagittarius (*dhanurādistha ravydhikaraṇa*), but are different from the months of Māgha etc. having the passage of the sun to the Capricornus to be completed by the sun passing through the Sagittarius (*dhanurādistharavisamāpya-makarādistha ravi saṁkrāntimat*). Here the qualification 'which are different from the month of Māgha...' is included in the second alternative to avoid the use of the word *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. in the collections of days beginning with the first day of white half caused from the sum passing through the Sagittarius and ending with the New moon day of Māgha etc.

They, however, refute the argument that when the etymological sense is not admitted, the words *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. could be admitted to have the expressive power merely in the sense of the solar months (*sauramāsa*)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which can be held to be the collections of days qualified by the sun passing through the particular astrological houses (*tattad rāśistha raviviśiṣṭha kāla*). According to them, then the convention "That is the New moon day of the Vaiśākha-month which is associated with the Rohini" (*sā vaiśākhasyāmāvāsyā yā rohiṇyā sambandhyate*) which establishes the usage of *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. in the lunar months, becomes contradicted.

Gadādhara's own view

X.6. As a matter of fact, in the rule "The *'āṅ'* comes after the instrumental word, i.e. name of lunar mansion, to signify the time associated with asterism or constellation" (*nakṣatreṇa yuktaḥ kālaḥ,* P. iv. 2.3), the word 'associated with constellation' is intended to express only the state of being competent to be associated with a constellation. For, the term '*pauṣī*' is used even with respect to the *Paurṇamāsī* of *Pauṣa*-month which is not actually associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation. Otherwise, if this position were not accepted, then the usage "When Venus, the constellation of Māgha, is absent in the Paurṇamāsī of Māgha' etc. would become untenable. And here "the state of being competent to be associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation" of the *Paurṇamāsī* is of the form of the state of belonging to the fortnight begun or caused by the sun passing through the Sagittarius. And since the *Puṣya*-month (*pauṣaḥ*) regularly possesses the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning obtained through etymology of *'pauṣaḥ'* in the form of the state of consisting of the *Paurṇamāsī* included in such a form of fortnight, such words as *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. cannot be refuted to have the etymological power in such lunar months due to the said untenability of etymological power. Now it may be objected as follows:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Since the said form of the state of belonging to such a fortnight does not necessarily consist of the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with *Puṣya*-constellation, the words such as *'pauṣī'*, which produce the cognitions of the *Paurṇamāsī* as belonging to such a form of fortnight, cannot have any occasion for etymological power at all. Also, in the usage such as 'The night is the time associated with the Puṣya-constellation' (*pauṣī rātriḥ*), only the association with the *Puṣya*-constellation is cognized; and not merely the said state of being competent to be associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation. For, such a usage (as *pauṣī rātriḥ*) is made even with respect to the night of the black fortnight begun by, i.e. caused from the sum passing through the Capricornus. Thus, in the rule 'The '*āṅ*' signifies the time associated with the constellation' (P. iv. 2.3) what is intended to be expressed is only the actual association with the particular (*puṣya*)-constellation, and not merely the state of being competent to be associated with the constellation. Consequently, the words such as *'pauṣī'* etc. cannot be explained to have the etymological power in the sense of *Paurṇamāsī*. However, this is not correct. If you argue so, then let it be admitted that the words such as *'pauṣī'* etc. are conventional in the sense of the *Paurṇamāsī* as delimited by the state of belonging to the said form of black fortnight. However, since the words such a *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. have no hindrance in expressing the lunar months of *Puṣya* etc. as associated with such a Paurṇamāsī, how can the etymological power in the same be refuted for the same words?.

Explanation

Gadādhara now expresses his own view. According to him, only 'the state of being competent to be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

associated with the constellation' (*nakṣatrayogayogyatva*), and not 'actual association of the constellation' must be admitted to be intended in the rule *'nakṣatreṇa yuktaḥ kālaḥ'* (P. iv. 2.3), as the words such as *'pauṣī'* etc. in *'pauṣī paurṇamāsī rātriḥ'* etc. are used even in the sense of the *Paurṇamāsī* of *Pauṣa* - months not associated with *Puṣya*-constellation.

Also according to him, *nakṣatrayogayogyatva* of the *Paurṇamāsī* is to be analysed as the state of belonging to the fortnight of the month begun by, i.e. caused by the sun passing through the Sagittarius (*dhanurādistha ravyārabdhapakṣīyatva*); and since the time having the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with the *Puṣya*-constellation (*pauṣaḥ*) can possess regularly the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed sense obtained through etymology (*yoga labhyatāvacchedaka*) such as the state of consisting of the *Paurṇamāsī* included in such a fortnight (*paurṇamāsīghaṭitatva rūpa*), the etymological power (*yaugikatva*) cannot be refuted for the words *'pauṣaḥ'* etc.

An objection that can be raised here is that since the state of belonging to the fortnight begun by, i.e. caused by the sun passing through the Sagittarius (*dhanurāḍistharavyārabdhapakṣīyatva*) does not necessarily consist of the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with *Puṣya* - constellation, the words *pauṣī* etc. in *'pauṣī rātriḥ'* etc. cannot be insisted to have the etymologycal power in the *Paurṇamāsī* as belonging to such as fortnight (*tena rūpeṇa*). Also, according to the objector, only the actual association with the *Puṣya*-constellation (*puṣyayoga*), and not the state of being competent to be associated with the *Puṣya* - constellation (*puṣyādiyogayogyatva*) is cognized in *'pauṣī rātriḥ'* etc;

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and therefore, in *'nakṣatreṇa yuktaḥ kālaḥ'* (P. iv. 2.3), only the actual association with the constellation and not the state of being competent to be associated with the *Puṣya* - constellation needs to be admitted as intended, and thus the words *'pauṣī'* etc. cannot have the etymological power in the *Paurṇamāsī* etc. as belonging to such a fortnight. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that though the word *'pauṣī'* etc. cannot have etymological power in such a sense (it has only conventional power), the word *'pauṣaḥ'* can have etymological power in the sense of the 'time having *Paurṇamāsī* associated with the *Puṣya* - constellation.

Objection

X.7. Now it may again be objected as follows: By holding that the rule *'Āṅ* comes after the name of a 'Full moon night to denote the division of time in which the night falls' (*sāsmin paurṇamāsī,* P. iv. ii. 21) is meant to convey the sense that the *'āṅ'* comes after the time which has the state of being competent to have the *Paurṇamāsī* associated with *Puṣya* - constellation, the same rule can be facilitated to produce the knowledge that the collective secondary derivative such as *'pauṣaḥ'* has the conventional power in the sense of the month beginning with the first day of the white half and ending with the New moon day, begun by, i.e. caused by the sun passing through the Sagittarius; and therefore the acceptance of the etymological convention for the word *'pauṣaḥ'* is not justified. However, this objection is not correct. There would arise the heaviness in the theory, which involves the assumption of mere conventional power for *'pauṣaḥ'* on account of the inclusion of the qualifier, namely 'begun by (caused by) the sun passing through Sagittarius" in the body of the delimitor of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

expressedness of the expressed meaning of the secondary derivative *'pauṣaḥ'*. Compared to the heaviness in the assumption of the expressive powers for the various words such as *'pauṣaḥ'*, *'taiṣaḥ'* and *'māghaḥ'* etc. in the times (months) delimited by such heavy properties (as beginning with ...) etc., the heaviness in the assumption of a single expressive power for the affix *'aṅ'* in the sense of 'the division of time in which night falls' is much more justified. (Thus the derivatives *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. have etymological convention).

However, it may again be objected now as follows: That in the theory that the words *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. have etymological convention, the same need to be assumed as producing the cognition of identity between the conventional and the etymological senses and hence the heaviness occurs. However, this is also not correct. In your theory too, at the time of the illusion that the words such as *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. have the etymological and the conventional powers in such cases, such a cognition of identity between the etymological and the conventional meanings becomes unavoidable provided that the knowledge of speaker's intention to cognize the relation of identity between such meanings from such words is present. Therefore, the assumption of the causality of such a cognition of identity becomes necessary in the case of the words such as *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. And this is the direction for further discussions.

Explanation

Gadādhara illustrates another objection here. According to the objector, the rule *'sāsmin paurṇamāsī'* (P. iv. 2.21) is intended to convey that the time has the state of being competent to denote *Paurṇamāsī* associated

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with the *Puṣya*-constellation; and therefore, can be admitted to establish the mere convention (*rūḍhi*) for the collective derivative words (*taddhitānta samudāya*) such as *'pauṣaḥ'* in the sense of the months which begin with the first day of the white half and end with the New moon day begun by (caused by) the sun passing through the Sagittarius (*dhanurādhistharavyārabdha śuklapratipadādi darśānta*); and thus the admittance of etymological convention (*yoga rūḍhi*) for the same word is unjustified. However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that when merely a convention is admitted for the words such as *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. in the sense of such months (times), the qualification, namely, begun by i.e. caused from the sun passing through the Sagittarius (*dhanurādistharavyārabdha*) needs to be included in the body of the delimitor of the expressedness of the expressed meaning (*śakyatāvacchedakaśarīra*); and compared to such an eventuality, the admission of expressive power for the affix *'āṅ'* in the sense of the division of time, in which night falls (*sā' asmin*) (P.iv. 2.21), is much more economical.

Also Gadādhara refutes the objection that when the etymological convention is admitted for the words, such as *'pauṣaḥ'* etc., the same words need to be assumed additionally as producing the cognition of identity between the etymological and the conventional meanings (*yogarūḍhyarthābhedānvaya bodha*); and hence the heaviness occurs. According to him, such a cognition is produced even in the objector's theory that the words *'pauṣaḥ'* etc. have only etymological power provided that the speaker's intention to cognise such an identity is known to exist. Thus the admittance of etymological convention is necessary for the words such as *'pauṣaḥ'* etc.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Illustration of 'Vaiṣṇavī ṛk'

X. 8. In the cases such as 'The formula has Viṣṇu as it's deity' (*vaiṣṇavī ṛk*), and 'The oblation material has Indra as it's deity' (*aindram haviḥ*) etc., the secondary derivative affix *'āṅ,'* added to the name of the deity when something is to be spoken of as 'that has it as it's deity' (*sāsya devatā* P. iv. 2.. 24), denotes the sense of the state of having a particular deity as it's deity. And the state of having a particular deity as it's deity of the formula is the state of being taught by the Vedic formula as being the means or instrument of offering of ablations to the deity.

Now it may be argued that the state of being the instrument of offering is contradictory for the Vedic formula. For, there occurs deviation due to the origination of the offering of the form of peculiar desire to abandon even without any formula. Also there occurs redundancy of the Vedic formula on account of the totality of fixed causes consisting of the knowledge of the state of being what is a means to the desired end. Thus, how can the Vedas teach the instrumentality for the formula? Also, even if they do teach the instrumentality, how can the same Vedas remain as the means of valid knowledge?

If you argue like this, then we shall reply as follows: Yes, it is true. However, the state of being the instrument of offering of the formula is the state of having the recitation of itself as the subsidiary to the offering; but not the state of being the cause of offering.

Thus there occurs no fault. On the other hand, the state of having the particular deity as it's deity of the oblation material is the state of being the object of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

offerring directed to the deity. For, the state of being the deity of offering of the material alone is the meaning of the state of having the particular deity as its deity. Also, it should not be objected that in this theory, the Brahmin, who is the recipient of clarified butter, would need to become the deity with respect to the offering of the clarified butter. For, the being 'the goal or deity' is meant to convey the being the object of desire for offering wherein the ownership of the oblation material taught by the Veda is intended to be the qualifier. On the other hand, the ownership of the material is not cognised in the case of the recipient, i.e. the Brāhmin.

Explanation

Gadādhara now illustrates the usage *'vaiṣṇavī ṛk'* and *'aindram haviḥ'* etc. According to him, the secondary suffix *'āṅ'* assigned by the rule *'sāsya devatā'* (P. iv. 2. 24) denotes the state of having the particular deity (Viṣṇu etc.) as its deity (*taddevatākatva*). Now, *taddevatākatva* is the state of being taught by the Vedas as being the means or instrument of the offering to the deity (*taduddeśyaka tyāgakaraṇatvena vedabodhitatvam*); and the formula is the instrument of offering to Viṣṇu. An objection raised here is that the formula cannot have the state of being the means or instrument of offering to the deity (*tyāga karaṇatva*), as the offering of the form of desire to abandon cannot be produced with the help of the formula (it is produced from the totality of fixed causes consisting of the knowledge of the state of being the means of the desired end *iṣṭasādhanatāghaṭita kṛtisāmagrī*). However, Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the *tyāgakaraṇatva* is the state of having the recitation of itself as the subsidiary to the offering (*tyāgāṅgoccāraṇakatva*) which is possible in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

formula. Also according to him, the oblation material in *'aindram haviḥ'* has the state of having Indra as its deity (*taddevatākatva*) means it has the state of being the object of the offering to Indra (*taduddeśyaka tyāgakarmatva*). Now Gadādhara refutes the objection that the recipient of the clarified butter (*ghṛtādisampradāna*) such as the Brahmin would need to become the deity of the clarified butter (*taddevatā*) (it is also offered to him) on the ground that the word *'uddeśya'* in *'tyāgoddeśyatā'* is meant to convey the object of the desire for offering such as *'indraḥ havis svāmībhāvatu'* wherein the ownership of the oblation material taught by the Veda is the qualifier (*vedabodhitasvāmitva prakāreṇa icchāviṣayatā*); whereas the Brahmin in *'brāhmaṇāya ghṛtam dadāti'* is not cognized to be the object of the desire wherein the ownership is the qualifier.

Dative is weaker than tadhita

X. 9. It may again be ojected now as follows: That since the state of being the recipient of offering is expressed even by the dative case, the secondary affix *'āṅ'* and the dative case would become indistinct as far as expressing the state of being the goal (deity) of offering is concerned. Consequently, there would occur contradiction to the statement that 'The reference to the deity is obtained by the secondary affix, the dative, or the capacity (power) of formula; and in the reference, the latter ones are weaker than the still later ones'.

However, this objection is not correct. The state of being inferred (taught) by the Vedas is to be included in the state of being the goal (deity) of the offering, and the dative cannot express such an aspect. And since such an additional aspect is to be expressed through some other means, such as the secondary affix, the cognition

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the state of having the particular deity as it's deity from the dative becomes delayed by the assumption of a Śruti; and therefore it would be possible to state that the dative would have a lower (weaker) status (in its reference to the deity) compared to the secondary affix. Also, the aspect of the state of being taught by the Vedas, included in the state of having the particular deity as it's deity, can be expressed by the secondary affix, that is assigned in the sense of the state of having the peculiar deity as it's deity.

Explanation

In *'indrāya svāhā'* etc, the dative too expresses the state of being the deity i.e. goal of the offering (*tyāgo ddeśyatva*) like the secondary affix in *'aindram haviḥ'*; and on this ground now it is objected that the position of the Mīmāmsakās that among the secondary derivatives, dative and power of Vedic formula, the later ones are weaker in their reference to the state of being the deity, i.e. the goal of offering (*tyāgoddesyaka devatātva*) becomes contradicted.

However Gadādhara refutes the objection on the ground that the dative cannot express the state of being inferred or taught by the Veda (*vedameyatva*) which is to be included in the state of being the deity, i.e. the goal of offering (*tyāgoddeśyaka devatātva*); and since the dative needs to express the same with the help of some other means such as the fruit, the same can be explained to be weaker than the secondary affix which is competent to express the same aspect on its own on account of being assigned in the sense of such a *devatātva*.

Refutation of untenabality in Śūlapāṇi's theory

X. 10. It may again be objected now as follows: That although the dative does not directly express the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

aspect of the state of being taught by the Vedas, the same expreses directly the state of being the goal (deity) of the offering. Therefore, the cognition of the state of being the goal (deity) of offering to the forefathers delimited by the collective presence, dependent on (produced by) the dative case in 'One should offer rice balls to the forefathers' (*pitṛbhyo dadyāt*) is not any more delayed, i.e. indirect, compared to the cognition of the state of being the goal (deity) of offering that is obtained without the requirement of additional assumption of '*Śruti*' but is dependent on (produced by) the word '*devatā,*' a synonym of the secondary affix '*āṅ*' in 'The Pitrs are the deities to whom rice balls are offered' (*pitaro devatāḥ*). Thus, the determining factor such as the possession of the stronger signification for the word '*devatā*' compared to the dative discussed (ascertained) by Śūlapāṇi in the section "The Pitrs, who are dilimited by the collective presence and not requiring any assumption of additional Śruti, have the state of being the goal (deity) of *śrāddha*-offerings" (Yājñavalkyasmrti..3) would become untenable.

However, this objection is not correct. In the case of the cognition of the state of being the goal (deity) of offering to the forefathers delimited by the collective presence, produced from the dative case in 'One should make offerings to the forefathers' (*pitṛbhyo dadyāt*), the doubt regarding the invalidity can be overcome only in the presence of the knowledge of the state of being produced from the sentence of Smṛti (Śruti) that has the same sense as that of the Vedas. And such a cognition is always delayed. Whereas the cognition of the state of being the goal (deity) of the offering from the word 'deity,' which refers to the state of being taught by the Veda with respect to the state of being the goal (deity)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of offering, does not require any other (additional) knowledge of the sentence of Smṛti to avoid the doubt of invalidity in itself. For, the cognition by itself refers to the state of being produced from the Veda, which avoids the invalidity in the cognition of the state of being the goal (deity) of offering of the nature of itself. Also, the cognition, which is defiled by the doubt of invalidity, is useless (ineffective) though being produced. Thus, the determining state (of possessing stronger signification) is quite tenable for the word 'deity' (*devatā*), by possessing the stronger signification due to producing the knowledge of validity to be ascertained quite quickly

Explanation

It is objected now as follows : Though the dative case cannot express the state of being inferred (taught) by the Veda (*veda meyatvam*) directly, the same can express the state of being the goal (deity) of offering to the forefathers (*tyāgoddeśyatva*) directly in *'pitṛbhyo dadyāt'* etc. Thus, the cognition of such a state of being the goal (deity) of offering produced from the dative *caturthījanyatyāgoddeśyatva bodha*) in *'pitṛbhyo dadyāt'* cannot be considered to be delayed compared to the cognition of the same state, produced from the word *'devatā'* synonymous with the secondary affix (*taddhitasamānārthakadevaṭāpada janyabodha*) in *'pitaro devatā'*; and since the dative compared to the word *'devatā'* is stronger (*balavat*) in producing the cognition of such a state, the statement of Śūlapāṇi (*sāhityāvacchinnānām nirapekṣāṇām śrāddhoddeśyatvam,* Yājñalkyasmṛti ... 3) ascertaining the determining state of the possessing of stronger signification for the word *'devatā'* would become contradictory.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, Gadādhara refutes the objection. According to him, though the dative produces the cognition of *tyāgoddeśyatva,* the same cognition is delayed due to the fact that the knowledge of the state of being produced from the Smṛti synonymous with the Veda (*vedasamānārthaka smṛtijanyatvagraha*) is required to grasp the validity in such a cognitions; whereas the cognition of the *tyāgoddeśyatva* from the word *'devatā'* does not require the knowledge of the state of being produced from the Smrti (*jñānāntara*) to grasp the validity in the *tyāgoddeśyatāṁśa* (it refers to the state of being inferred to (taught) by the Veda *veda bodhitātvāvagāhi* by itself); and therefore such a cognition from the word *'devatā'* is not delayed. Thus, the word *'devatā'* in *'pitaro devatāḥ'* can be stronger in expressing *tyāgoddeśyatva.*

Mantraliṅga is weaker than 'devatā'

X. 11. This way, the cognition of the calling of the forefathers delimited by the collective presence, as recollected from the plural ending in *'pitaraḥ'*, can be effected from the formula *'āyāntu naḥ pitaraḥ'* that expresses the establishment of the forefathers for the sake of the annual offerings; and consequently, the forefathers, dilimited by the collective presence, can be obtained to have the status of deity for offerings. However, the power of capacity of the Vedic formula, being dependent on the ascertainment of the invariable concomitance requiring the help of the assumption negating the contradictory view, is certainly weaker compared to the word *'devatā'* synonymous with the secondary affix in 'The forefathers are the deities to whom offerings are made' (*pitaro devatāḥ*).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Explanation

Gadādhara now illustrates the fact that capacity or power of Vedic formula (*mantraliṅga*) is weaker than the word *'devatā'*. According to him, the plural formula *'āyāntu naḥ pitaraḥ'* produces the cognition of the calling of the forefathers delimited by collective presence (*sāhityāvacchinnāvāhana*); and therefore the state of being the deity of annual *śrāddha*-offerings can be obtained for such forefathers. However, since the capacity of Vedic formula (*mantraliṅga*) is dependent on the ascertainment of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti-niścayādhīna*), which in turn is dependent on the assumption negating the opposite view (*vipakṣabādhaka tarkasāpekṣa*), the same is weaker compared to the independent *'devatā'*-word. It should be noted that according to Gadādhara, *mantra liṅga* is weaker because it requires the *vyāpti niścaya* which in turn requires the *tarka samskāra* for understanding *(sāmarthyam sarvaśabdānām liṅgam)*.

Illustration of 'kāpotam' etc.

X. 12. In the usages such as 'It is the group of pigeons' (*kāpotam*), 'It is the group of silvery pots' (*rājatam*), and 'It is the group of people', (*janatā*) etc, the secondary affixes assigned in the sense of collection, express the sense of group or collection of entities delimited by pervading collectionness. And the pigeionness-delimited etc., i.e. the base-meanings, are related to the pervassion. And the pervasion of the state of being the collection pervassively occurring in the pigeons, the parrots and the Turdus Salica etc. is not delimited by the individuals properties such as the pigeonness etc. that occur in a lesser area. Therefore the usage 'It is the group of pigeons' (*kāpotam*) etc. is not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

made in such a collection of birds. And only the non-occurrence in a lesser area, and not the non-occurrence in the more (larger) area, is the characteristic feature of the delimitor of the pervassion. Otherwise, even the potness etc., like the skyness etc., wold not have the state of being the delimitor of the pervasion of the twoness of pots. Thus, like the usage 'There are two skies' (*ākāśau*), even the usage 'There are two pots' (*ghaṭau*) would become untenable. Now since the state of being delimited by the pigeonness etc. that is overextending in its occurrence can be established even in the pervasion of the hundredness occurring in only the hundred pigeons, the usage such as 'It is the group of pigeons' (*kāpotaṃ*) can be tenable even in the hundred pigeons. However, suppose the property overextending the pervasion is not admissible to be the delimitor of the pervasion, then some other way must be thought of to explain the usage.

Thus ends the analysis of the meaning of the secondary affix.

Explanation

Gadādhara now illustrates the usages *'kāpotam'* etc. where the secondary affix expresses the pervading collectionness-delimited (*paryāpta samudāyatvāvacchinna*). According to him, the base-meanings such as the pigeonness-delimited etc. are related to the pervasion; and thus, the group or collection of pigeons having the pervasion of the pigeonness-delimited (*kāpotatvā-vacchinnaparyāptikaḥ*) is cognized.

A point to be noted here is that the state of being the pigeons that occurs in lesser are (only in the pigeons) than the pigeons and parrots etc. (*nyūnavṛtti kāpotatva*)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cannot be the delimiting property of the pervasion of the collectionness pervading the pigeons and the parrots etc. (*kāpotaśukādiparyāptasamudāyatvasya paryāpti*); and therefore, the secondary affix need not be used after the word *'kāpota'* intending to express the collection of the pigeons and the parrots delimited by such a property of being the pigeons. Another point to be noted here is that the non-occurrence in lesser area (*anyūnavṛttitva*) and not the non-occurrence in larger area or over pervasion (*atiriktāvṛttitva*) is the essential characteristics of being the delimitor of the pervasion (*paryāptyavacchedakatva tantrá*); and therefore, the usage *'ghaṭau'*, unlike *'ākāśau'*, can be explained dispite the potness occurring in larger area than the duality (twoness). Thus, the secondary usage such as *'kāpotam'* can be made to express the collection of a hundred of pigeons, as the overpervassive property of being the pigeons (*atiriktavṛttikāpotatva*) can be the delimiting property of the pervasion of the hundredness (*śatatvaparyāpti*). However, if the overpervassive property cannot be the delimiting property, then the individuality of such hundred pots (*tādṛśasamkhyākavyaktītva*) which is not overpervassive, can be considered as the delimiting property of perverssion.

Thus ends the analysis of the meaning of asecondary affix.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

GLOSSARIAL INDEX

A

akathita (not covered object), 30

akhaṇḍapadārtha (continuous period of time), 391

akhaṇḍopādhi (imposed property) 51

agniprakṣepopahita (adventitously qualified by throwing into fire) 94; 657

atadāveśa (unreal nature) 109

atadvyāvṛtti (non distinguishing factor) 590

atiprasaktadharma (over pervassive property) 410

atiprasaṅga (over extension) 267

atiriktādhāratā (separate substratumness) 773

atiriktāvṛttitva (non-occurrence in larger area) 830

ativyāpaka (over pervading) 81

atyauntāsamyoga (intense contact) 390; 423

atyantābhāva pratiyogitva (being the conterpositive of the constant absence) 139, 395, 767

adṛṣṭa (dvāra, viśeṣa) (unseen merit) 514, 634.

adhikaraṇa (tā, tva, viśiṣṭabuddhi) (substratum) 143, 408, 768, 775

adhikāriviśeṣakṛta (performed by the particular qualified agent) 422

adhyayana (adhikaraṇatā, ādhāratā (study) 414, 424.

anatiriktavṛttitva (non-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

pervassive occurrence) 411.

anadhīnatva (not being dependent) 490

anāditātparya (iternal speaker's intention) 499

anirākatṛsampradāna (indirect object of non-rejection) 85, 619, 651

anirdhāritakartṛ ka (where the agent is not determined(608

aniṣṭa (nivṛtti, prayojaka, viśeṣaphala, viśaya sambandha, sambhāvanā hetu,) (undesired end or danger) 115, 116, 518, 700.

anīpsita (not positively desired) 28

anugata (vailakṣaṅya vyavahāra) (common) 107, 406

anumantṛtva (consentientship) 85

anumitikaraṇa (instrument of inference) 538

anuyogitāvacchedaka (delimitor of the subjunctness) 427, 443, 772

anya (kartṛka, pūrvakatva, vṛttitva, vyāpārānadhīna, sāpekṣa) (someone or something else) 31, 431, 490, 566, 652, 713

anyathāsiddha (rendered redundant) 364, 518

anyayoga vyavaccheda (exclusion from the association with others) 431

anyūnavṛttitva (non-occurrence in lesser area) 830.

anyoddeśyakatatkartṛka (paying by the same person to someone else) 630

anyonyābhāvapratiyogitva) (being the counter positive of mutual absence) 139, 738, 767

anyonyābhāvaviśiṣṭa (qualified by mutual absence) 726, 732.

anvyānupapatti (untenability of relations) 802

anvayitāvacchedaka (delimitor of the qualifiedness) 396, 400, 472, 473, 476, 570, 758

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

apakarṣāvadhitva (being the boundary or limit of lower rank) 650, 655, 660, 670

apadārtha (non-word-meaning, i.e. relation) 431

aparakriyānukūlakriyā (effort conducive to the aother action) 742

aparokṣajñānacikīr ākṛtimattva (possession of the effort, will, and knowledge) 52

apādāna (tva) (ablation) 102, 460

apekṣābuddhiviśeṣaviṣayatva (the state of being the object of the particular mental faculty of counting) 405

apekṣitakriya (of the required action) 104, 719

apratiyogitvāviśeṣa (mutually non-distinct) 590.

apradhāna (non-prominent) 68

abhāvapratiyogi (tā) (counter positive of an absence) 122, 148, 395, 414, 444, 447

abhāvānukūlavyāpāra (operation conducive to an absence) 121

abhāvīyavilakṣaṇapratiyogitā (peculior counter-positiveness described by absence) 733

abhividhi (pervasion) 439, 449

abhivyāpti (intense pervading) 388, 394

abhūtatadbhāva (acquiring the nature which was not present before) 671

abheda (anvayabodha, avagāhitva) (identity) 16, 274, 277, 480, 767

amukhya (guṇa) karman (secondary object) 28

avacchedakatva (delimitorship) 411

avacchedyāvacchedakabhāva (relation of delimited and delimitor) 262, 582, 696

avacchedyatā (tva) (being delimited) 408, 781

avadhi (tva, mattva) (the state of being the limit) 97, 102, 448, 452

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

avinābhāva (invariable concomitance) 429

avyāpti (non-pervassion) 510

asatvarūpavikāra (transformation of the form of destruction) 363

asādhāraṇa (tva) (the state of being extraordinary or peculiar) 61, 291, 792

asāhitya (non-association) 437

asiddha (non-accomplished) 641

ākhyātārtha (meaning of the conjugational ending) 373, 374

ākhyātṛkartṛka (having speaker as the agent) 708

āgamana (act of coming) 74, 575, 570

ācāra (arthaka, karman, tulyācāra, niṣṭha, sadṛśācāra) (behaving or treatment) 15, 18, 346, 347, 349, 350, 352

ātmapradhāna (onself as the chief) 47.

ādānadhvamsa (destruction of accepting) 626, 628

ādhārasaptamyartha (meaning of locative of locative) 771

ādhāratā (tva) (substratumness) 385, 760, 772, 774

ādhārādheyabhāva (relation of being substratum and superstratum) 152, 771

ādheyatā(tva) (superstratumness) 143, 411, 443

ādheyatvarūpakartṛtva (agenthood of the form of superstratumness) 382

ādheyatvasambandhāvacchinna (delimited by the relation of superstratumness) 433.

āmareḍita (repeated *avyaya*) 36

āropaviṣaya (substratum of superimposition) 287

āśrayatā (relation of substratumness) 367

āśrayātirikta (other than abode) 499

āhlāda tulyatā (equality in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

delighting) 349

B

balavadaniṣṭa (greater evil) 521, 523.

bodhārtha (intended to produce cognition) 793.

brāhmaṇa (maraṇa) (killing of Brahmin) 502, 510, 605.

bhaya (abhāva, hetu) (fear) 113, 116, 117.

bhasma (ash) 375.

bhākta (secondary) 607.

bhāvanā (productive activity) 54, 760.

bhāvavacana (expressive of abstract action) 642.

bhūtala (adhikaraṇa, niṣṭha) (gound) 145, 148, 149, 173, 778.

bheda (mutual absence of non-identity) 683, 65, 729, 767, 769.

bhojana (eating) 302, 325, 328, 571.

C

caruhoma (sacrifice of pudding) 423

caitra (kartṛka, pratiyogika, vṛtti, sattva) 147, 396, 468, 612, 745

D

daṇḍādi (period of time) 392, 587.

darśananirūpita (described by seeing) 454.

daśami (tenth day) 442, 447

dānakriyā (action of giving) 614

dinaparyāpta (pervading the thirtyness) 395

deyadravya (object given) 82.

devatoddeśyaka (offering for the god) 495.

deśarūpā (of the form of space) 448.

dohanakriyā (action of milking) 786.

dravya (tva) (sabstance, i.e. material cause etc.) 494, 551, 647.

dviṣṭha (binary) 772.

dveṣy a (disliked object) 28, 29.

dhanuṣṭharavi (sun's passage occurring through the Sagittarious) 812, 814.

dharmāntara (anotherproperty) 585, 729.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

dharmi (property-possessor) 408, 587.

dhātvartha (tā, tva) (being the expressed meaning of the root) 8, 49, 50, 84, 119, 302, 312, 326, 508, 601, 664, 733.

dhūma (jñāna) (knowledge of smoke) 536, 539, 540, 547.

dhruva (fixed point) 103.

E

eka (kālika, kriyā, padārtha, bheda, māsa) (one or same) 69, 71, 76, 403, 417, 501, 572, 764, 775

ekavākyatā (syntactic unity) 375

edhaḥkaraṇaka (having fuel as the object) 642

G

gamyādipratipādya (expressed meaning of the root *gam*) 352

gamanakartṛ (kriyā) (agent (action) of going) 48, 786

galādhassamyoga (contact with the throat) 314, 537, 704

gauṇakartṛ (secondary agent) 48

ghaṭa (tva, vidheyaka, vṛtti) 148, 264, 427, 536

H

hanana (kartṛ, nimitta) (killing) 523, 783.

haviḥprakṣepa (offering of oblation) 494.

himsālakṣaṇa (definition of violance) 503.

hetu (adhikaraṇatva, antarā, kartṛ, tva, prakāra, mat) (cause) 47, 59, 60, 270, 411, 451, 453, 492, 544, 599.

homādhikaraṇatā (substratumness described by sacrifice) 423.

I

icchā (antara, kartṛ, karmatva, ghaṭita, prakāratā viśeṣaṇa, viṣayatva) (desire) 5, 303 320, 342, 326, 329, 331, 340, 341, 343, 344, 597, 610, 643

iṣṭasādhanatājñāna (knowledge of being what is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the means of desired end) 303, 354.

īpsita tamatva (being what is desired most) 27, 122 .

J

janaka(tā) (being the cause) 538, 637

janyatā(tva) (producedness) 93, 451

jalasamyoga (contact with water) 601

jāti (generic property) 97, 135, 137, 751, 757

jatasambandha (particular relation) 556, 558, 807.

jñāna (knowledge) 284, 288, 460, 548

jñāna prayojya (tva) (being produced from knowledge) 551, 558

jñāpaka (knowledge that produces) 544, 548

jñāpyajñāpakabhāva (relation of being the knowledge that produces and what is known through the knowledge) 548

jñāyamānatva (the state of being what is known) 582

K

kaṭasandarbhādi (weaving of the mat) 363, 364

kapāladravyasamyoga (contact of pot—halves with pot) 60

karaṇa (tva) (the being the instruemnt) 31, 56, 463, 528, 582

kartur (abhipreta, icchā,) (agent) 84, 120, 592

kartṛ (abhidhāna, abhipreta, kāraka, tva, vyāpāra) (agent) 45, 61, 119, 346, 381, 462, 498, 499, 528, 608, 704, 713

karma (antara, ākāṅkṣā, tva) (object) 4, 125, 306, 333, 363, 380, 459

karmakartṛ (quasipassive agent) 47, 739

karmapravacanīya (adnominal) 33, 451

kāraka (adhiṣṭhita, antara) semantical item) 42, 49, 54, 58, 59, 337, 488, 499

kāraṇatāvacchedaka (deli-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mitor of the causeness) 538

kāryatāvacchedaka (dilimitor of the effectness) 539

kāryanirūpita (described by the effect) 544

kāla (time) 440, 472

kālikaviśeṣaṇatā (relation of temporal qualification) 444

kālikasambandha (temporal relation) 390, 392

kāṣṭhoccheda (destruction of wood) 375

kṛti (anukūla, āśraya, karma, janya, tva, niṣṭ ha, viśiṣṭa, viśeṣita, viṣ ayatā sādhya) (effort) 8, 34, 46, 50, 51, 320, 322, 463, 464, 471, 474, 478, 483, 484, 487, 491, 497, 506, 514, 515, 527

kṛtikarmatva (objecthood of the action) 8

kṛdantārtha (meaning of the primary derivative) 336

kṛṣṅanavamī (black ninthday) 444.

kyackāmyajanta (denominative) 11

kriyā (anadhikaraṇa, anukūla, anvayi) (action) 46, 107, 109, 440, 438, 463, 501, 541, 566

kriyā (kartṛ, karma, kārakabhāva) (action) 126, 501, 565, 592, 704

kriyā (ghaṭita, janya, dharmika, niṣṭhatva) (action) 83, 104, 120, 121, 358, 472, 514 538, 570, 592, 593, 595, 597, 660, 681, 719

kriyā `(niṣpādya, prakārībhūta, pracaya) 126, 358, 391, 398

kriyā (vat, viṣaya, samāna kālīna, sāmānya, hetu) (action) 23, 58, 67, 109, 110, 563, 565, 719

L

lakṣaṇa (sing or cause) 451.

lakṣaṇā (lakṣya) (indication) 437, 504.

liṅgajñāna (knowledge of probans) 535, 538, 582.

lohita (abheda, prakāraka) (red colour) 279, 282,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

284, 287, 288.

M

mantra (karaṇa, liṅga) (humn) 91, 92, 827.

maraṇa (anukūla, uddeśa, upalakṣaṇa) (death) 503, 505, 506, 509, 521, 516, 518.

maryādā (limit or boundary) 439, 449.

mahānasa (kitchen) 551.

māsa (tva, vyāpaka) (month) 395, 400, 408, 415, 416, 418, 422.

mukhya (kartṛ, karman, kriyā, viśeṣyatā) 32, 51, 155, 294, 463, 498, 501, 559, 607.

maitra (kartṛka, kṛti, vṛttitva) (Maitra) 468, 472, 483.

N

nakṣatrayoga (associated with the constellation) 817.

nañartha (meaning of negative) 427.

natikarma (object of salutation) 668.

namana (bowing) 99.

nāntarīyaka (action along with main action) 501.

nāmadhātu (denominative) 13.

nāśakatva (the state of being the destroyer) 364, 367, 382.

nipātārtha (meaning of indeclinable) 664.

niyamaparatva (rẹstrictive status) 746.

niyāmaka (determining relation) 775.

nirarthaka (meaningless) 151,153, 777.

nirūḍhalakśaṇā (conventional indication) 386.

nirūpitatva (describedness) 145, 367, 461, 603, 615.

nirūpya (tva) being described) 145, 284.

nirḍiṣṭaviṣaya (of the expressed action) 103, 716.

nirdhāraṇa (specification or distinction) 133, 137, 140, 751.

nirvartya (karman) (mainfested obeject) 22. 24. 358, 377.

nīcaprīti (love for lower

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

person) 655.

nṛtyādhikaraṇa (tā) (substratumnsess described by dancing) 414.

nyūnavṛtti (occuring in lesser area) 829.

O

odanakarmaka(tva) (having rice as the object) 9, 325

P

pakṣa (subject) 257.

pañcamyartha (meaning exrpessed by ablative) 554.

patana pratibandhaka (which prevents falling) 327.

patrāvadhika (having leaf as the boundary) 685.

padapravṛttinimitta (cause of the use of word) 721.

padārtha (tā) (being the word- meaning) 367, 431, 757.

para (kartṛ datta, svatva, hita) (other) 115, 328, 342, 598, 626, 678.

paramparāsambandha (indirect relation) 535, 781.

parasamaveta (inherant in another) 106.

parāmarśa (consideration) 81.

paricāyaka (indicator) 453.

parāyattīkaraṇa (giving caustody to others) 621, 627.

pariṇāmin (evolutory) 357, 957.

pariśodhana (clearing of debt) 627, 628, 630.

paryāpti (pervasion) 829, 830.

paryudāsa (connecting negative with noun) 37.

parvatoddeśyaka (describing the subjectness of mountain) 266.

pāka (karma, kṛti, kriyā) (cooking) 9, 472, 481, 642.

pākasiddhi (accomplishment of cooking) 290.

pākānukūla (coducive to cooking) 50, 463, 470, 519, 518, 526, 639.

pāribhāṣika (conventional) 359.

pārimāṇḍalya (globular-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ness) 667.

pitrāśrayakatva (the state of having the father as the substratum) 69.

putrasāhitya (togetherness of son) 574.

putrādikartṛka (having son as the agent) 565.

putrāgamana (coming of son) 436, 574, 575, 578.

puruṣa (animate, or speaker) 93, 489.

puṣpotpatti (bloomingness) 474.

pūrva (*kāla, bhāva*) (earlier time of state) 636, 673, 675.

pṛthaktva (quality of separation) 726, 728.

prakāra *(itā)* (referent-qualifier, relation of qualifier- reference) 291, 415.

prakṛti (modification) 291, 292, 644.

prakṛti *(karman)* (material object) 358, 363, 370, 375.

prakṛtyartha (base-meaning) 380, 742, 756, 781, 795.

prakṛṣṭopakāraka (the most effective) 56.

pratipālana (pālyatva) (protection, the state of being protected) 17, 349.

pratiyogi *(tāvacchedaka)* (being counterpositive) 35, 262, 337, 397, 425, 443, 733.

pratīti (cognition) 24, 403.

pratyakṣa (perception) 668.

pradhāna (prominent) 4. 68.

prabhava (souce of origination) 711.

prayojaka *(jya)* (cause or caused) 47, 116, 429, 476, 492, 539, 558.

pravṛtti (inclination or basis) 122, 385, 395, 405.

prasajya pratiṣedha (connecting negative with activity) 37, 73, 574.

prāgabhāva (prior absence) 443, 446, 628.

prātipadika (*artha*) (nominal base) 797, 799.

prāpya (reached object) 22, 23, 48, 57, 85, 358, 619.

phala (effect) 59, 62, 81, 519, 512, 561, 596, 600,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

691, 697, 706.

R

rajata (tva) (siiverness) 262, 269, 270, 279.

rasavad (possessor of tast) 766.

rucyartha (meaning of the root 'ruc') 622.

rūḍhatva (conventional power) 814.

S

śakti (ānantya, graha) (expressive power) 405, 654, 792.

śabda (janya, jñāna, prayoga) (word) 353, 584, 701.

śaśibhoga (passing of the moon) 808.

śūdrakartṛka (having śūdra as the agent) 746.

śeṣa (remaining *kāraka* and non-*kāraka* relations) 124.

samyoga (anadhikaraṇa, anukūla, anuyogi, ādhāra, tva, dvāra, nāśa, vyakti sambandha) (relation of contact) 122, 152, 366, 385, 392, 745, 772, 774.

samsarga (koṭi, tā, tātparya, maryādā) (relation) 380, 400, 402, 424.

sakhaṇḍapadārtha (devisible property) 154.

sakarmaka (transitive) 333.

saṅkara (cross-connection) 406.

saṅkhyātirikta (other than the number) 756, 830.

samjñā (name) 588.

sannanta (desiderative) 1.

samaniyata (co-extensive) 263.

samabhivyāhṛta kriyā (action mentioned) 72, 490, 566, 787.

samavāya (adhikaraṇatva, anuyogitā, ādhāratva, sambandha) (relation of inherence) 152, 558, 772.

samāna (ahikaraṇa, arthaka, kartṛkatva, kālīnatva, prakāraka, pratiyogikatva, vacana) (the same) 2, 71, 74, 276, 328, 330, 33, 414, 436, 570, 572, 786.

sampūhālambana (anumiti, bodha) (collective cognition) 262, 539.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

samūrṇaprāyaścitta (whole expiation) 502, 503.

sampradāna (katva, tā, tva) (indirect object) 31, 78, 592, 598, 601.

sambandha (tva, viśeṣa, ṣaṣṭhī, sāmānya) 125, 152, 588, 745, 747.

sambandhin (related) 588.

sambodhana (vibhakti) (vocative) (addressing) 791, 795.

sambodhyatā (addresseness) 791, 792.

saha (vidyamānatva) (with) 66. 69, 76.

sākṣātkāra (realization) 721.

sājātya (sameness of class) 721.

sādhutva (grammatical correctness) 797.

sādṛśyapratiyogin (adjunct of comparison) 18, 347.

sādhakatama (most efficient) 56.

sādhāraṇadharma (common property) 755.

sādhya (adhikaraṇa, abhāva, jñāna, tā, vat, vidheyakatva, vidheyatā) (probandum or major term) 7, 257, 259, 354, 367, 411, 429, 430, 507, 554, 558, 782.

sāmānādhikaraṇya (community of locus) 4, 75, 276, 279, 574, 583, 675.

sāmānya (abhāva, dharma) (general) 393, 752, 757.

sāhitya (abhāva, avacchinna) (association) 66, 570, 828.

siddha (accomplished) 641.

subartha (case-meaning) 795.

sūryodaya (sunrise) 406.

sthūlakāla (longer duration of time) 570.

strītva (femininity) 797. 802.

sva (adhikaraṇa, anvita, apakarsa, abhāva, abheda, artha, avacchinna, avadhika, ādhāra, ādheya, āśraya, itara, uccāraṇa) (oneself or itself) 70, 96, 136, 146, 150, 346, 414, 479, 654, 677, 687, 716, 723, 781, 802.

sva (kartṛka, kṛti, jāti, nirūpaka, nirūpaka, nirūpita, niṣṭha, prayoktṛ,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

pratiyogin, prāgabhāva, bhinna, viṣaya (oneself or itself) 59, 105, 115, 147, 273, 296, 400, 438, 440, 44, 490, 527, 529, 610, 628, 651, 673, 681, 777.

ṣvatantra (independent) 490.

svattva (*abhāva, āśraya, icchā, janaka, dhvamsa, nirūpaka, bhāgitā, nivṛtti, pratiyogin, viśiṣṭa*) (ownership) 78, 91, 93, 125, 598, 600, 605, 614, 615, 647, 649, 747.

svarūpa (mātra, yogya, sambandha) (one's own nature) 154, 408, 556, 737.

svasādhya (accomplishedness of oneself) 7.

svātantrya (independence) 487.

svąmitva (master-servant relation) 125.

svīkāra (svīkartṛ) (accepting) 82, 619.

T

tat (*kartṛ karma, kriyā)* (particular) 486, 501, 568, 577, 786

tat (janya, jñāna) (particular item) 486, 548

tat padārtha (particular word-meaning) 326

tattat (samasarga) relations of individual items) 403.

tattan māsatva (being the individual month) 4101, 403.

tatpratiyogika (hiving the same as the adjunct) 723, 775.

tatsāmagrī (totality of causes of ownership) 612.

tad (artha, avadkatva, avṛtti, ādhāratā, devatākatva, dhiarma vanniṣtha, vācaka, vṛtti) (particular itemı) 222, 273, 402, 723, 749, 751, 757, 775, 77, 789.

taddhita (secondary affix) 804, 826.

taṇḍulādirūpadharmi (property-possessor such as rice) 363.

tādātmya (identity) 274, 275, 637.

tādṛśa (icchā, kṛti, viśeṣ aṇa, viṣayatā) 137,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

438, 470, 483, 662, 753, 783.

tārādighaṭaka (consisting of higher tone) 17, 347.

tṛtīyārtha (meaning of instrumental) 543.

temana pākatva (the state of being the cooking of the sause) 478, 479, 486.

tyāga (offering) 91, 608, 612, 647, 648, 822, 824.

tṛṃśaddina (thirty day constituting a month) 395, 397, 408.

U

ubhaya (both items) 76, 775

uccāraṇakartṛtva (agency of the speaker) 95

udāsīna (indifferent object) 28, 103

uddeśya (avadhitva, tā, tva, vyavahāra) (subject or beneficiary) 90, 259, 297, 306, 364, 507, 560, 566, 574, 607, 612, 615, 691

uddeśyavidheyabhāva (relation of subject and predicate) 476

ukhādyadhikaraṇaka (having spit as the abode) 808

upādāna (tā, nīya) (material cause) 355, 357, 367.

upāttaviṣaya (tva) (of the understood action) 104, 716

upapada (beneficiary of certain nouns) 33, 83

upamāna (standard of comparison) 11, 17, 18, 346

upameya (bhāva) (object of comparison) 17, 346, 349

upalakṣaṇa (ṇībhūta) (advantitious qualifier) 427, 509, 580

utpatti (pratiyogika, prayojaka) (origination) 364, 382

utpādakatā (tva) (the state of being the producer) 364, 367.

V

vaktṛbuddhi (speaker's intention) 736.

vadhakartṛ (tva) (being the agent of killing) 503, 504, 506.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

vartamāna (icchā, kāla, kṛti) (present) 149, 322, 483, 484.

vastumātra (anything) 716.

vahni (tva, nirūpita, viṣaya, samānādhīkaraṇa) (fire) 264, 266, 411, 536, 539, 541, 555, 740.

vākya (artha, bheda) (sentence) 374, 402, 418.

vācya (expressed meaning) 729.

vāta (abhāva, janyatva) (wind) 435, 436.

vāraṇa (prevention) 199.

vikāra (vikārya, vikṛti) (produced object) 22, 25, 358, 360, 375.

vidheya (antara, anvaya, tā, tva) (predicate) 139, 257, 261, 297, 440, 558, 561, 566, 587.

vidheyitva (being what is to be predicated) 257.

vipakṣabādhaka (negating opposite view) 828.

viprakartṛka (having the Brahmin as the agent) 634.

vibhāga (avacchinna, avadhi, itara, janaka, janya), (separation) 681, 685, 687, 690, 694, 714.

vilakṣaṇaviṣayitā (peculiar object-referringness) 723.

viśiṣṭa (anvaya, ucchedaka, kartṛ, janaka, buddhi, vidhāna, viṣ ayaka, vaiśiṣṭya, sattva) (qualified) 27, 261, 368, 369, 420, 478, 507, 519, 521, 522, 535, 548.

viśeṣaṇa (ṇībhūta, utpādaka, tā, tva, vidhāna, sambandha,) (qualifier) 4, 303, 318, 368, 420, 456, 476, 507.

viśeṣadharma (particular property) 393, 4000.

viśeṣya (amvayi, tā, tva, bhūta, viśeṣaṇa) (qualificand) 6, 297, 313, 317, 318, 555, 580, 610, 696.

viṣaya (tā, tva, rūpa) 4, 93, 154, 270, 285, 314, 317, 318, 326, 353, 527.

vīpsā (repetition) 456.

vṛkṣa (avadhi, kartṛka, niṣ ṭha, patra) (tree) 435, 610, 685, 687.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

vṛtti (aniyāmaka) (non-occurrence-exacting) 434, 468, 681, 723.

vṛttyekadeśa (part of word-meaning) 336.

veda (Veda) 826. 827.

vaiśiṣṭya (qualification) 261.

vyadhikaraṇa (contradictory property) 148, 264.

vyavadhāyaka (what intervens) 741.

vyavahāra (tulya, mūla) (treating) 17, 346, 349.

vyāghra prayojya (caused by tiger) 700, 701.

vyāpaka (tā, tva) (pervader) 397, 398, 399, 423.

vyāpāra (āśraya, upasthiti, kartṛ, dvāra, vat, viraha) (operation) 48, 57, 60, 61, 122, 486, 499, 533, 637, 691, 702.

vyāpti (viśiṣṭa) (pervasion) 429, 535, 559.

vyāpya (kāla, vṛtti) (prevaded) 390, 414.

vyāvartaka (distinguishing sector) 580, 786.

vyāvṛtta (tva, dharma) (excluded) 135, 139. 751, 757.

vyāsajyavṛtti (adhering to each other) 413.

vyutpatti (convention) 568.

Y

yatkiñcit (individual) 400.

yatpadārtha (meaning of one word) 277.

yantrārpaṇa (setting up of tiger trap) 525.

yādṛcchika (spontaneous) 655, 657.

yogarūḍha (conventional-etymological) 810, 817.

yogyatā (semantic competency) 556, 675.

yonimattva (possessing uterus) 802.

yaugika (etymological) 360, 810.

120162

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

GURUKUL KANGRI LIBRARY

	Signature	Date
Acc.		18-2-2001
		28-3-2001
	R E	5.4.2001
Tag etc		
Filing		
E A R		20-4-2001
Any other	R E	5.4.2001
Checked		9-4-2001

Recommended By

Compiled 2002-2003

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

STOCK VERIFY
2020
G.K.V. Library

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The author of this work, Dr. V.P. Bhatta, had both traditional education (Vidhyāvāridhi, Sampurṇānanda, Sanskrit University, Banaras, India) and formal exucation (Ph.D. SSEAS, U.C. Berkeley, ca, U.S.A) and is presently working as an Editor, Sanskrit Dictionary, Deccan College, Pune. He has published a number of books such as : (i) Epistemology, Logic and Grammar, (ii) Maṇḍana's Distinction of Activity, Bhāvanāviveka and (iii) Theory of expressive Power of words, (iv) Śaktivāda; and is presently working on Śabdakhaṇḍa of Gangeśa's Tattavacintāmaṇi.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

EASTERN BOOK LINKERS
(Indological Publishers & Book Sellers)
5825, New Chandrawal,Jawahar Nagar,
Delhi-110007. Phone: [redacted]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar